07-4825-cv (L); 07-4826-cv (Con)
Cooper v. U.S. Postal Service
1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2
3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
4
5
6 August Term, 2008
7
8
9 (Argued: March 20, 2009 Decided: August 20, 2009)
10
11 Docket No. 07-4825-cv (L); 07-4826-cv (Con)
12
13
14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
15
16
17 BERTRAM COOPER,
18 Plaintiff-Appellee,
19
20 -v.- 07-4825-cv
21 07-4826-cv
22 U.S. POSTAL SERVICE, JOHN E. POTTER,
23 as Postmaster General, RONALD G.
24 BOYNE, as Postmaster, Manchester,
25 Connecticut Post Office,
26 Defendants-Appellants,
27
28 FULL GOSPEL INTERDENOMINATIONAL
29 CHURCH INC., DR. PHILIP SAUNDERS
30 HERITAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., SINCERELY
31 YOURS INC.,
32 Intervenors-Defendants-
33 Appellants,
34
35 GARY CHIPMAN, KIMON KARATH, LESLIE
36 STRONG,
37 Intervenors.
38
39 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
40
41
42 Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, WESLEY, Circuit Judge,
1 and CROTTY, District Judge. *
2
3
4 This case raises an Establishment Clause challenge to
5 religious displays in a contract postal unit operated by a
6 church in Manchester, Connecticut. Contract postal units,
7 or “CPUs,” are postal facilities operated by private
8 entities on private property (such as general stores or
9 private homes) pursuant to contracts with the United States
10 Postal Service. Plaintiff Bertram Cooper, a Manchester
11 resident, sued the United States Postal Service, the
12 Postmaster General, and the Postmaster of Manchester, for
13 declaratory and injunctive relief alleging discomfort with
14 encountering religious materials displayed at the Manchester
15 CPU. The Full Gospel Interdenominational Church, which
16 operates the CPU pursuant to a revenue-sharing contract with
17 the government, intervened as a Defendant. On cross-motions
18 for summary judgment, the district judge concluded that (i)
19 the CPU is a state actor, (ii) the contractual relationship
20 between the government and the Church is permissible under
21 the Establishment Clause, and (iii) the religious displays
22 at the CPU violated the Establishment Clause. Accordingly,
*
The Honorable Paul A. Crotty of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
sitting by designation.
2
1 the district court ordered removal of the religious
2 displays. Relief was stayed pending this appeal.
3 We conclude that Cooper had standing to raise the
4 Establishment Clause challenge and that an Establishment
5 Clause violation occurred, but as to relief, we require no
6 more than that the postal counter be free of religious
7 material, and that visual cues distinguish the space
8 operating as a postal facility from the space functioning as
9 purely private property. We vacate the judgment of the
10 district court and remand for further proceedings consistent
11 with this opinion.
12 JEFFREY A. SHAFER, Benjamin W.
13 Bull, Jordan W. Lorence, Matthew
14 S. Bowman, Alliance Defense
15 Fund, Washington, D.C., Joseph
16 P. Secola, Secola Law Offices,
17 Brookfield, Connecticut, for
18 Appellant.
19
20
21 AARON S. BAYER, Kevin M. Smith,
22 Alex J. Glage, Wiggin and Dana
23 LLP, New Haven, Connecticut,
24 Daniel Mach, American Civil
25 Liberties Union Foundation,
26 Washington, D.C., David McGuire,
27 Connecticut Civil Liberties
28 Union Foundation, Hartford,
29 Connecticut, for Appellees.
30
31 Murad Hussain, Ronald L.
32 Johnston, Arnold & Porter LLP,
33 Los Angeles, California, Ayesha
34 N. Khan, Alex J. Luchenitser,
3
1 Americans United for Separation
2 of Church and State, for Amicus
3 Curiae Americans United for
4 Separation of Church and State.
5
6 Jeffrey I. Pasek, Cozen
7 O’Connor, New York, New York,
8 Theodore R. Mann, Jewish Social
9 Policy Action Network,
10 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for
11 Amicus Curiae Jewish Social
12 Policy Action Network.
13
14 Steven M. Freeman, Steven C.
15 Sheinberg, Anti-Defamation
16 League, New York, New York, for
17 Amicus Curiae Anti-Defamation
18 League.
19
20 DENNIS JACOBS, Chief Judge:
21 This case raises an Establishment Clause challenge to
22 religious displays at a contract postal unit operated by a
23 church in Manchester, Connecticut. Contract postal units,
24 or “CPUs,” are postal facilities operated by private
25 entities on private property (such as general stores or
26 private homes) pursuant to contracts with the United States
27 Postal Service. Plaintiff Bertram Cooper (“Cooper”), a
28 Manchester resident, alleged discomfort with encountering
29 religious materials displayed at the Manchester CPU and sued
30 the United States Postal Service (“USPS”), the Postmaster
31 General of the United States (John E. Potter (“Potter”)),
4
1 and the Postmaster of Manchester, Connecticut (Ronald G.
2 Boyne (“Boyne”)) for declaratory and injunctive relief. The
3 Full Gospel Interdenominational Church (the “Church”), which
4 operates the CPU pursuant to a revenue-sharing contract with
5 the United States government, intervened as a Defendant. 1
6 The Manchester CPU is a purpose-built storefront with postal
7 facilities on one side and the Church’s outreach and
8 ministry efforts on the other, with some spillover.
9 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
10 judge initially decided that the religious displays at the
11 CPU violated the Establishment Clause, ordered removal of
12 the religious displays from the premises, and issued a
13 permanent injunction preventing the Church--and proprietors
14 of other CPUs--from displaying religious materials in
15 contract postal units. On a motion to amend the judgment,
16 the district court concluded that Cooper lacked standing to
17 challenge Postal Service policies as to other CPUs and the
18 decision was amended to apply only to the Manchester CPU.
1
The term “Church” refers collectively to the intervenor-
defendants who consist of: (1) the Full Gospel
Interdenominational Church; (2) the “Dr. Phillip Saunders
Heritage Association” (a Connecticut not-for-profit created
by the Church to hold and manage its real estate); and (3)
Sincerely Yours, Inc. (the not-for-profit entity
incorporated to operate the CPU).
5
1 The injunction is stayed pending this appeal.
2 On appeal, the Church argues that the grant of partial
3 summary judgment to Cooper was error because the displays:
4 (i) were erected without involvement or encouragement by the
5 USPS, (ii) do not violate regulations governing the
6 appearance of CPUs, and (iii) constitute private speech.
7 Cooper, in turn, contends that the CPU is a state actor
8 because (i) the USPS delegated to it an exclusively public
9 function and (ii) the extensive and detailed contracts which
10 accompany participation in the CPU program sufficiently
11 involve the state in the CPU’s activities. Cooper argues
12 that as state action, the religious displays violate the
13 Establishment Clause. Cooper stopped using the CPU when he
14 entered a nursing home, but the suit has continued on behalf
15 of three intervenors who are similarly aggrieved.
16 We now affirm in part and reverse in part. We conclude
17 that Cooper had standing to raise an Establishment Clause
18 challenge and that an Establishment Clause violation
19 occurred at the Manchester CPU, but that any such violation
20 is limited to the area of the CPU performing the public
21 function; all other areas of the CPU remain the province of
22 the private entity. Accordingly, by way of remedy, we
6
1 require that the postal counter be free of religious
2 material, and that visual cues distinguish the space
3 operating as a postal facility from the space functioning as
4 the private property of the Church.
5
6 I
7 (A) The Post Office
8 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution provides that
9 “Congress shall have power . . . [t]o establish Post Offices
10 and post Roads.” Congress has delegated the power to create
11 Post Offices to the USPS, 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(3), awarded the
12 USPS a monopoly over the carriage of letter mail, see
13 Private Express Statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1699; Air
14 Courier Conf. of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union AFL-CIO,
15 498 U.S. 517, 519 (1991), and forbidden the establishment of
16 post offices without authority from the Postal Service, 18
17 U.S.C. § 1729. 2 Congress has also directed the Postal
18 Service to “serve as nearly as practicable the entire
19 population of the United States.” 39 U.S.C. § 403(a). That
2
Services like UPS and Federal Express operate pursuant to
an exception to the monopoly which allows private carriers
to provide services for “extremely urgent letters.” See 39
C.F.R. § 320.6.
7
1 directive includes “establish[ing] and maintain[ing] postal
2 facilities of such character and in such locations, that
3 postal patrons throughout the Nation will, consistent with
4 reasonable economies of postal operations, have ready access
5 to essential postal services.” 39 U.S.C. § 403(b)(3). This
6 entails “a maximum degree of effective and regular postal
7 services to rural areas, communities, and small towns [even]
8 where post offices are not self-sustaining.” 39 U.S.C.
9 § 101(b).
10
11 (B) CPUs
12 In order to comply with the Congressional mandate, the
13 USPS uses both traditional post offices (or “classified”
14 post offices) as well as CPUs, postal facilities operated by
15 private parties on private property pursuant to revenue-
16 sharing contracts with the government. The CPUs furnish
17 postal services to places where it is not otherwise
18 geographically or economically feasible to build and operate
19 official “classified” post offices. Originally called
20 “contract stations,” CPUs have been used by the Postal
8
1 Service since the 1880s. 3
2 The “Glossary of Postal Terms” defines a CPU as:
3 A postal unit that is a subordinate unit
4 within the service area of a main post
5 office. It is usually located in a store
6 or place of business and is operated by a
7 contractor who accepts mail from the
8 public, sells postage and supplies, and
9 provides selected special services (for
10 example, postal money order or registered
11 mail). . . .
12
13 United States Postal Service Glossary of Postal Terms,
14 Publication 32, May 1997 (Updated With Revisions Through
15 July 5, 2007) at 27. 4 Five thousand CPUs across the country
16 are in locations as diverse as private homes, gas stations,
17 seminaries, groceries, gift shops, and hardware stores. See
18 Defendants’ Statement Pursuant to Local Rule 56 of the
19 Southern District of New York (“Local Rule 56(a)1
20 Statement”), ¶ 6, December 27, 2004; Postal Accountability
21 and Enhancement Act § 302 Network Plan, June 2008, at 42-
22 43. 5 Several are operated by faith-based entities. See
3
See USPS Postal History, Post Offices and Facilities,
Stations and Branches, available at:
http://www.usps.com/postalhistory/_rtf/StationsBranches.rtf.
4
The Glossary is available at:
http://www.usps.com/cpim/ftp/pubs/pub32.pdf
5
The Network Plan is available at:
http://www.usps.com/postallaw/_pdf/PostalServiceNetworkPlan.
pdf#search='post offices cpu’.
9
1 Defendants’ Local Rule 56(a)1 Statement, ¶ 16.
2
3 (C) Postal Regulations
4 According to postal regulations, a CPU “must not be
5 located in, or directly connected to, a room where
6 intoxicating beverages are sold for consumption on the
7 premises.” Standard Operating Procedures for Contract
8 Postal Units. Beyond that, instruction is provided by the
9 Contract Postal Unit Operations Guide, a training and
10 operations manual for proprietors of CPUs:
11 The appearance of your [CPU] reflects not
12 only on you as a businessperson, but also
13 on the Postal Service. Your unit should
14 be organized and clean, conveying a
15 professional image to your customers. It
16 is very important to the success of your
17 unit that our customers can recognize you
18 as an official United States Post Office
19 contract unit. The Postal Service has
20 dedicated exterior and interior signage
21 that will help you establish this
22 identity.
23
24 CPUs are regulated by these few guidelines, which are
25 mainly words of encouragement. Classified post offices, on
26 the other hand, are governed by exacting regulations. Among
27 them are limitations on the presence of religious displays,
28 messages and symbols. For example, the Postal Operations
10
1 Manual (“POM”) provides that “[e]xcept for official postal
2 and other governmental notices and announcements, no
3 handbills, flyers, pamphlets, signs, posters, placards, or
4 other literature may be deposited on the grounds, walks,
5 driveways, parking and maneuvering areas; exteriors of
6 buildings and other structures; or on the floors, walks,
7 stairs, racks, counters, desks, writing tables, window
8 ledges, or furnishings in interior public areas on postal
9 premises [of classified post offices].” POM § 124.55. 6
10 “Bulletin boards and other posting space in Post Office
11 lobbies and other public access areas may not be used for
12 posting or display of . . . [r]eligious symbols . . . .”
13 Id. Seasonal holiday displays are tightly regulated (as set
14 out in the margin 7 ). No such regulations govern CPUs.
6
This section of the POM is available at:
http://www.nalc.org/depart/cau/pdf/manuals/POM/pomc1.pdf.
7
a. [Seasonal] Displays should relate to the
business of the Postal Service, such as
promoting the use of postal products and
services and encouraging customers to send
greetings and gifts.
b. The Postal Service must avoid the
appearance of favoring any particular religion
or religion itself.
c. Symbols identified with a particular
religion, including but not limited to
nativity scenes, crosses, or the Star of
11
1 (D) The Manchester CPU
2 For more than 15 years, the Postal Service has relied
3 on CPUs to supplement postal service in Manchester,
4 Connecticut. Prior to 2001, the CPU was located in the
5 “Community Place,” an outreach organization. When Community
6 Place suspended operation in 2001, the USPS solicited bids.
7 There were two bidders: Manchester Hardware, Inc., and the
8 Full Gospel Interdenominational Church. The Postal Service
9 assigned scores to each based on location, premises, and
10 ability to provide services. The Church earned a
11 suitability score of “97" to Manchester Hardware’s “91,” and
12 the CPU contract was awarded to the Church on November 21,
13 2001. The Church then incorporated a not-for-profit
14 business, Sincerely Yours, Inc. (“SYI”), for the purpose of
15 operating the CPU. The sole business of SYI is the
16 operation of the CPU; other than offering USPS products and
17 services, it serves no commercial function.
David, shall not be displayed on postal
property. . . .
d. Printed expressions “Season’s Greetings”
and “Happy Holidays” should be used in lieu of
“Merry Christmas” or “Happy Hannukkah.”
POM § 124.57 (emphasis added); see also POM § 124.56.
12
1 The standard CPU contract requires that “all Contract
2 Postal Units . . . reflect a uniform image.” For example,
3 the contract specifies that “[a]mbient lighting shall be at
4 least 80 footcandles anywhere at the service and/or work
5 counter areas,” and individual CPU owners/entities must
6 “[c]learly indicate any [and] all deviations from [the]
7 noted . . . requirements on submitted drawings/documents so
8 they may be evaluated along with the balance of the
9 proposal.” In order to achieve the desired “uniform image,”
10 the USPS--per the CPU contract--agrees to pay for (among
11 other things) the construction of postal service counters
12 and other build-out requirements, all according to detailed
13 specifications. The USPS paid for the construction of such
14 items at SYI.
15 All money collected at the CPU is the property of the
16 Postal Service, and SYI is paid for its share of contractual
17 earnings at the end of the relevant accounting period: 18%
18 of sales of USPS products and services, and 33% of post
19 office box rental fees. Employees of SYI are trained by the
20 USPS, and “must be professionally attired, wear name tags,
21 and project a favorable image of the supplier as the
22 operator of the Contract Postal Unit,” but SYI retains the
13
1 authority to hire and fire all SYI employees.
2 The USPS “reserves the right, without prior notice, to
3 conduct audits and customer surveys and to review and
4 inspect the supplier’s performance and the quality of
5 service at any time during the operating hours of the
6 [CPU].” The USPS also appoints a “Contracting Officer’s
7 Representative” (or “COR”) as a liaison between the USPS and
8 the CPU, to ensure compliance with the CPU contract and
9 governing regulations, and to provide general oversight.
10 Defendant Ronald Boyne--the Manchester Postmaster (and a
11 Church member)--was appointed to this position at SYI. At
12 his deposition, he testified that one of his
13 responsibilities was to ensure that SYI projected a
14 “positive image” of the USPS and complied with all postal
15 regulations. When asked to name items which would not
16 present a “positive image” or were not permitted to be
17 displayed or sold in a CPU, Boyne replied that through his
18 COR training he learned that only two items were prohibited
19 by regulation: alcohol and pornography.
20 As for the displays at the CPU, the contract states
21 that SYI “will be posting advertisements for local non-
22 profit community outreach agencies such as MARC, Inc., Heart
14
1 Association, Flu Clinics, Cancer Agencies, etc.” Religious
2 displays are not mentioned.
3 SYI opened in June 2002. It is located on Main Street
4 in Manchester and is marked with various signs identifying
5 it as the “Sincerely Yours, Inc. Contract Postal Unit.” The
6 exterior of the building (which faces the street) has one
7 such sign along with the familiar eagle logo of the Postal
8 Service.
9 The interior of the CPU contains (among other things) a
10 postal counter manned by SYI employees, a waiting area for
11 customers, post office boxes, and a shelving unit containing
12 official USPS postal supplies, paperwork, and mailing boxes.
13 SYI offers a variety of postal services including Express,
14 Priority, and First Class domestic mail; international mail;
15 insurance, certification, and delivery confirmation
16 services; Post Office Box rentals; and sales of stamps,
17 stationery, and other packaging products. The prices for
18 these products and services are set by the USPS.
19
20 (E) The Religious Displays
21 Also located in the CPU are religious materials:
22 displays informing customers about prayer requests; prayer
15
1 cards; a box--located on the postal counter--into which
2 postal service customers can deposit prayer requests; a
3 framed advertisement for “World-Wide Lighthouse Missions”
4 (the missionary organization to which the SYI CPU’s profits
5 are donated); a donation box for the World-Wide
6 organization; pamphlets and flyers advertising the mission,
7 which include biblical passages and religious messages; a
8 World-Wide Lighthouse Missions donation jar on the postal
9 counter; a television monitor displaying Church-related
10 videos on one side of the postal counter; various 8 1/2" x
11 14" photographs of Church events; and pictures of “Wally”--a
12 cartoon character who conveys religious messages.
13 A sign in the middle of the postal counter bears the
14 official USPS logo and a disclaimer:
15 The United States Postal Service does not
16 endorse the religious viewpoint expressed
17 in the materials posted at this Contract
18 Postal Unit.
19
20 (F) Cooper’s Objections to the CPU
21 Plaintiff Bertram Cooper is a 77-year-old (former)
22 resident of Manchester, Connecticut. 8 Cooper used the SYI
8
While this appeal was pending, Mr. Cooper moved out of
Manchester and into a nursing home in West Hartford,
Connecticut. Because the move created potential
16
1 CPU because it was closer to his home than the next
2 available post office. As Cooper’s affidavit recounts, the
3 religious displays at SYI made him “very uncomfortable,” and
4 when he registered a complaint, he “was told that [he] could
5 go somewhere else if [he didn’t] like it.” The complaint
6 alleges that he “reasonably perceive[d] SYI’s religious
7 expression to be governmentally-sponsored and supported
8 religious activity.”
9
10 (G) The Lawsuit
11 Cooper filed his complaint on October 3, 2003, seeking
12 declaratory and injunctive relief against the USPS, the
13 Postmaster General, and the Postmaster of Manchester,
14 Connecticut. The Church intervened as a defendant. The
15 district court’s Memorandum and Order deciding the parties’
16 cross-motions for summary judgment (issued April 18, 2007),
17 concluded that:
18 (1) for the purposes of First Amendment and
19 Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the SYI CPU is
20 a state actor;
21
jurisdictional problems, this Court’s June 18, 2008 order
allowed other Manchester residents to intervene as
appellees. They are Gary Chipman, Kimon Karath, and Leslie
Strong.
17
1 (2) the contractual relationship between the USPS
2 and the Church does not violate the Establishment
3 Clause; and
4
5 (3) the religious displays at the SYI CPU violate
6 the Establishment Clause.
7
8 Initially, the District Court granted Cooper’s request for a
9 declaratory judgment covering all CPUs nationwide:
10 To the extent that [SYI], and all other
11 individuals or entities, in the course of
12 operating [CPUs] . . . act in a manner
13 that proselytizes or advances religion,
14 including, but not limited to, the
15 posting of religious displays that
16 proselytize or advance religion, such
17 conduct violates the First Amendment to
18 the United States Constitution.
19
20 On Cooper’s request for an injunction, the district court
21 directed that: (i) SYI remove all religious displays and
22 “cease from acting in a manner that proselytizes or advances
23 religion;” (ii) the USPS provide notice to all CPUs that
24 “they shall not act in a manner that proselytizes or
25 advances religion”; and (iii) the USPS institute adequate
26 monitoring procedures to ensure compliance with the order.
27 Both the Postal Service and the Church moved to alter
28 or amend the judgment. By order dated August 28, 2007, the
29 district court rejected the Church’s offer to cure the
30 Establishment Clause violation by removing the two large
31 signs and one small sign containing the words “United States
18
1 Post Office,” and by adding a sign indicating that SYI was a
2 “private entity.”
3 The Postal Service argued that the findings were
4 insufficient to support relief against the USPS generally
5 and to any CPU other than SYI. The district court amended
6 its decision, commenting that it could “find[] nothing in
7 the record indicating the Plaintiff has suffered a concrete
8 and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent
9 at any CPU other than the SYI CPU.” The relief was narrowed
10 accordingly.
11 All Defendants appealed, but the USPS dropped out,
12 leaving the Church alone as Appellant.
13
14 II
15 Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial
16 power of the United States to the resolution of cases and
17 controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. This limitation
18 is effectuated through the requirement of standing. Valley
19 Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
20 Church and State, Inc. (“Valley Forge”), 454 U.S. 464, 471-
21 72 (1982). “The question of standing is not subject to
22 waiver . . . : ‘We are required to address the issue even if
19
1 the courts below have not passed on it, and even if the
2 parties fail to raise the issue before us.’” United States
3 v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995) (quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v.
4 Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230-31 (1990)). It is axiomatic that
5 “[t]here are three Article III standing requirements: (1)
6 the plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact; (2)
7 there must be a causal connection between the injury and the
8 conduct at issue; and (3) the injury must be likely to be
9 redressed by a favorable decision.” Kendall v. Employees
10 Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2009).
11 The injury requirement is the linchpin in Establishment
12 Clause cases: “[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III
13 requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to
14 ‘show that he personally has suffered some actual or
15 threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal
16 conduct of the defendant.’” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472
17 (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S.
18 91, 99 (1979)). A demonstration of a “generalized
19 grievance” is insufficient; the plaintiff must demonstrate a
20 “‘distinct and palpable injury’ . . . that is likely to be
21 redressed if the requested relief is granted.” Id. at 475
22 (quoting Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 100).
20
1 Standing is often a tough question in the Establishment
2 Clause context, where the injuries alleged are to the
3 feelings alone. 9 This is often the case in religious
4 display cases where the fact of exposure becomes the basis
5 for injury and jurisdiction. As the Eighth Circuit has
6 observed, “[n]o governing precedent describes the injury in
7 fact required to establish standing in a religious display
8 case . . . .” ACLU Nebraska Found. v. City of Plattsmouth,
9 358 F.3d 1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2004).
10 Several times, the Supreme Court has considered the
11 problem of standing in the Establishment Clause context, but
12 so far the Court has announced no reliable and handy
13 principles of analysis. For example, in Valley Forge, the
14 Supreme Court concluded that plaintiffs lacked standing to
15 bring their Establishment Clause claim challenging the
16 conveyance, at no cost, of 77 acres of federal property to a
17 Christian college. The Third Circuit had earlier concluded
18 that the challengers “had standing merely as ‘citizens,’
9
A broad swath of litigants can demonstrate standing under
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), which permits litigants
to raise claims on the ground that their “tax money is being
extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional
protections.” Id. at 106. The issue is far more difficult
where, as here, the alleged injuries are non-economic and
taxpayer status is not the basis for jurisdiction.
21
1 claiming ‘injury in fact’ to their shared individuated right
2 to a government that ‘shall make no law respecting the
3 establishment of religion.’” 454 U.S. at 470 (quoting 619
4 F.2d 252, 261 (3d Cir. 1980)). But the Supreme Court
5 reversed because:
6 They fail[ed] to identify any personal
7 injury suffered by them as a consequence
8 of the alleged constitutional error,
9 other than the psychological consequence
10 presumably produced by observation of
11 conduct with which one disagrees. That
12 is not an injury sufficient to confer
13 standing under Art. III, even though the
14 disagreement is phrased in constitutional
15 terms. It is evident that respondents
16 are firmly committed to the
17 constitutional principle of separation of
18 church and State, but standing is not
19 measured by the intensity of the
20 litigant’s interest or the fervor of his
21 advocacy. That concrete adverseness
22 which sharpens the presentation of
23 issues, is the anticipated consequence of
24 proceedings commenced by one who has been
25 injured in fact; it is not a permissible
26 substitute for the showing of injury
27 itself.
28
29 Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 485-86 (quotations, citation, and
30 emphasis omitted). This passage explains what standing is
31 not, without saying what standing is in these kinds of
32 cases. Lower courts are left to find a threshold for injury
33 and determine somewhat arbitrarily whether that threshold
34 has been reached. Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that
22
1 the question of standing in the Establishment Clause context
2 is vexed: “[T]here are serious arguments on both sides of
3 this question, the Courts of Appeals have divided on the
4 issue, and the issue determines the reach of federal courts’
5 power of judicial review of state actions.” City of Edmond
6 v. Robinson, 517 U.S. 1201, 1203 (1996) (dissenting in the
7 denial of certiorari; joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas).
8 In short, there is uncertainty concerning how to apply the
9 injury in fact requirement in the Establishment Clause
10 context.
11 Cooper alleged that the discomfort he suffered when he
12 viewed the religious displays at SYI was so great that he
13 was inclined to drive to another postal unit. The initial
14 question is whether that amounts to a sufficiently “distinct
15 and palpable” injury for standing purposes. Our leading
16 case on Establishment Clause standing is Sullivan v.
17 Syracuse Housing Authority, 962 F.2d 1101 (2d Cir. 1992), in
18 which the Syracuse Housing Authority (the “Authority”)
19 contracted for a faith-based entity to operate a religious
20 after-school program in the community center of the public
21 housing development where the plaintiff lived. The district
22 court dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the
23
1 Second Circuit found a cognizable “spiritual First Amendment
2 injury” and reversed. Id. at 1108. The touchstone of the
3 analysis was whether Sullivan had a “direct and personal
4 stake” in the controversy. Id. Relying on Sierra Club v.
5 Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), and Valley Forge, we concluded
6 that the Authority’s conduct deprived Sullivan of his right
7 to use and enjoy the community center, that Sullivan
8 “[found] the alleged establishment of religion offensive,”
9 and that the Authority’s actions essentially established
10 religion “in a place functionally analogous to Sullivan’s
11 own home.” Sullivan, 962 F.2d at 1108. 10 Under those
12 circumstances, Sullivan’s allegations amounted to a
13 sufficiently “direct and personal stake” in the dispute to
14 confer standing, and the case was reinstated and remanded to
15 the district court.
16 Applying Sullivan, we must conclude that Cooper has
17 alleged a sufficiently “direct and personal stake” in the
18 controversy to confer standing. Cooper claims that he was
19 made uncomfortable by direct contact with religious displays
10
Separately, the Circuit also concluded that Sullivan’s
status as a parent whose child had been taught religious
songs in the after-school program gave him an additional,
independent ground sufficient to support standing.
Sullivan, 962 F.2d at 1109.
24
1 that were made a part of his experience using the postal
2 facility nearest his home, and that upon complaint, he was
3 advised to alter his behavior. Under Sullivan, these
4 allegations state an injury in fact sufficient to support
5 standing.
6
7 III
8 (A) State Action
9 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
10 provides: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
11 liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
12 Const. amend. XIV, § 1. By its terms, “private action is
13 immune from the restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
14 and the Amendment “offers no shield” against private
15 conduct, “‘however discriminatory or wrongful.’” Jackson v.
16 Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) (quoting Shelley
17 v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)). The Amendment applies
18 only to state action. Id.; see also Civil Rights Cases, 109
19 U.S. 3 (1883). The Fourteenth Amendment, in turn,
20 incorporates the First Amendment, so “[t]he Fourteenth
21 Amendment, and, through it, the First . . . Amendment[], do
22 not apply to private parties unless those parties are
25
1 engaged in activity deemed to be ‘state action.’” Nat’l
2 Broad. Co., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 860
3 F.2d 1022, 1024 (11th Cir. 1988).
4 “Actions of a private entity are attributable to the
5 State if ‘there is a sufficiently close nexus between the
6 State and the challenged action of the . . . entity so that
7 the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of
8 the State itself.’” United States v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130,
9 146 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351). The
10 “close nexus” test “‘assure[s] that constitutional standards
11 are invoked only when it can be said that the State is
12 responsible for the specific conduct of which the plaintiff
13 complains.’” Id. at 146-47 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
14 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). However, “Supreme Court cases on
15 this issue ‘have not been a model of consistency.’” Id. at
16 147 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
17 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)). “Not
18 surprisingly, therefore, there is no single test to identify
19 state actions and state actors. Rather, there are a host of
20 facts that can bear on the fairness of an attribution of a
21 challenged action to the State.” Horvath v. Westport
22 Library Ass’n, 362 F.3d 147, 151 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotations
26
1 and citations omitted).
2 “A nexus of state action exists . . . when the state
3 exercises coercive power, is entwined in the management or
4 control of the private actor, . . . or when the private
5 actor operates as a willful participant in joint activity
6 with the State or its agents, is controlled by an agency of
7 the State, has been delegated a public function by the
8 state, or is entwined with governmental policies.” Stein,
9 541 F.3d at 147 (quotations, citations, and emphases
10 omitted). However, “conduct by a private entity is not
11 fairly attributable to the state merely because the private
12 entity is a business subject to extensive state regulation
13 or ‘affected with the public interest.’” Cranley v. Nat’l
14 Life Ins. Co. of Vermont, 318 F.3d 105, 112 (2d Cir. 2003)
15 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 350). “A finding of state
16 action may not be premised solely on the private entity’s
17 creation, funding, licensing, or regulation by the
18 government.” Id.
19
20 1. Government Contracts
21 SYI’s contract with the government does not
22 convert its conduct into state action. The government
27
1 enters into contracts for all kinds of goods and services
2 without converting its contractors into state actors;
3 architects designing federal buildings or engineers building
4 bridges do not thereby become government actors. See
5 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (the “[a]cts
6 of . . . private contractors do not become acts of the
7 government by reason of their significant or even total
8 engagement in performing public contracts”). The fact that
9 “a private entity performs a function which serves the
10 public does not make its acts state action.” Id. at 842.
11 The contract itself is insufficient to render all of the
12 contractor’s conduct state action, and the CPU contract here
13 is not enough by itself to make SYI a state actor. See id.
14
15 2. The “Public Function” Test
16 Since the contract alone does not convert the CPU
17 into a state actor, we must explore whether and to what
18 extent the CPU is a “state actor” while performing its
19 contractual tasks. One way that a private entity may be
20 considered a state actor for constitutional purposes is by
21 “exercis[ing] powers that are ‘traditionally the exclusive
22 prerogative of the State.’” Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
28
1 1005 (1982) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353). “State
2 action may be found in situations where an activity that
3 traditionally has been the exclusive, or near exclusive,
4 function of the State has been contracted out to a private
5 entity. For example, only the State may legitimately
6 imprison individuals as punishment for the commission of
7 crimes.” Horvath, 362 F.3d at 151.
8 In West v. Atkins, the Supreme Court concluded that the
9 conduct of a private medical doctor attending to prison
10 inmates pursuant to a government contract was “fairly
11 attributable to the State” for the purposes of 42 U.S.C.
12 § 1983. 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988). 11 The approach is
13 functional:
14 The fact that the State employed [the
15 doctor] pursuant to a contractual
16 arrangement that did not generate the
17 same benefits or obligations applicable
18 to other ‘state employees’ does not alter
19 the [state action] analysis. It is the
20 physician’s function within the state
21 system, not the precise terms of his
22 employment, that determines whether his
23 actions can fairly be attributed to the
24 State.
25
26 Id. at 55-56 (emphasis added). State action analysis is
11
The inmate brought a § 1983 action against the doctor
alleging an Eighth Amendment violation on the ground that
the doctor failed to provide adequate treatment for an ankle
injury.
29
1 thus guided by the nature of the services supplied.
2 SYI is a state actor under this public function test.
3 Congress granted to the USPS the exclusive duty to create
4 and operate Post Offices with responsibility to accept and
5 process mail, sell postal products, and, of course,
6 participate in the safe carriage of mail. See 39 U.S.C.
7 § 404(a)(3). As to safe carriage, Congress has conferred to
8 the Postal Service a complete monopoly. See, e.g., 18
9 U.S.C. § 1693. That monopoly entails the sale of postage
10 for letters, acceptance of mail for transmission, and the
11 marking and processing of mail for delivery: all functions
12 performed by SYI and other CPUs. Accordingly, we conclude
13 that SYI is a state actor under the public function test
14 because it performs--at least in some parts of the facility-
15 -“activit[ies] that traditionally ha[ve] been the exclusive,
16 or near exclusive, function of the State.” Horvath, 362
17 F.3d at 151.
18 That is not to say, however, that all of SYI serves a
19 public function, any more than selling shovels becomes a
20 public function when a CPU is located in a hardware store.
21 SYI is an independent, separate and distinct not-for-profit
22 entity incorporated for the Church’s private use and
30
1 purposes. The extent of state action correlates directly
2 with the performance of the public function, which here is
3 limited to those areas where the business of the CPU is
4 conducted. This is so notwithstanding that signage at the
5 portal identifies the shop (or home or seminary) as a place
6 where federal postal services are rendered. In sum, SYI is
7 a state actor pursuant to the public function test, but only
8 as to those areas of its facility where the public function
9 takes place, namely the postal counter, the postal boxes,
10 and the shelving unit that stores and displays postal
11 materials.
12 Having determined that at least part of SYI is
13 operating as a state actor under the public function test,
14 we consider whether that state action violated the
15 Establishment Clause. We conclude that it does.
16
17 IV
18 The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
19 provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
20 establishment of religion.” U.S. Const. amend. I. But the
21 “Amendment contains no textual definition of ‘establishment’
22 and the term is certainly not self-defining.” McCreary
31
1 County, Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 874-75 (2005).
2 “In the absence of precisely stated constitutional
3 prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three
4 main evils against which the Establishment Clause was
5 intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial
6 support, and active involvement of the sovereign in
7 religious activity.’” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612
8 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668
9 (1970)). One “‘significant factor in upholding governmental
10 programs in the face of Establishment Clause attack is their
11 neutrality towards religion.’” Good News Club v. Milford
12 Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98, 114 (2001) (quoting Rosenberger
13 v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839
14 (1995)). “‘In distinguishing between indoctrination that is
15 attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not,
16 [the Court has] consistently turned to the principle of
17 neutrality, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range
18 of groups or persons without regard to their religion.’”
19 Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000)
20 (plurality opinion)).
21 Did the presence of the religious displays here violate
22 the Establishment Clause? It is clear that for certain
32
1 displays, in certain places, the government’s “religious
2 object is unmistakable” and a violation apparent. McCreary,
3 545 U.S. at 869. We conclude that an Establishment Clause
4 violation occurred, but given the fact that the state action
5 is limited to a part of the premises, the violation--and the
6 remedy--are limited in the same way and to the same extent.
7
8 (A) The Government Contract
9 The Supreme Court “has never held that religious
10 institutions are disabled by the First Amendment from
11 participating in publicly sponsored social welfare
12 programs.” Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 609 (1988).
13 “It long has been established . . . that the State may send
14 a cleric . . . to perform a wholly secular task.” Roemer v.
15 Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736, 746 (1976). The
16 analysis is governed by the principle of neutrality: “the
17 government may not favor one religion over another, or
18 religion over irreligion, religious choice being the
19 prerogative of individuals.” McCreary, 545 U.S. at 875-76.
20 With respect to the CPU program, the government has
21 espoused a neutral position: it will contract for CPU
22 services with both religious and secular entities; and, as
33
1 to religious entities, the government makes no distinctions
2 between faiths or sects. The fact that a CPU is located in
3 a religious facility, or sponsored by a religious entity, or
4 that its revenues benefit a particular faith, does not
5 offend the Establishment Clause. Any violation must arise
6 from the specific conditions of SYI’s structure and space,
7 and its religious displays.
8
9 (B) The Lemon Test
10 The primary means of evaluating an Establishment Clause
11 challenge to a religious display remains the beleaguered
12 Lemon test, articulated by the Supreme Court in Lemon v.
13 Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). “Under [the] Lemon [test],
14 government action that interacts with religion must: (1)
15 have a secular purpose, (2) have a principal effect that
16 neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not bring
17 about an excessive government entanglement with religion.”
18 Westchester Day School v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338,
19 355 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13); see
20 also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218 (1997).
21 Both parties submit that the Lemon test is the
22 appropriate test for evaluating the Establishment Clause
34
1 challenge here (and the District Court agreed), though a
2 review of relevant case law demonstrates that Lemon is
3 difficult to apply and not a particularly useful test in
4 determining what is permissible under the Establishment
5 Clause. 12 Still, “it is not our role to provoke the Supreme
6 Court into reconsidering its precedent by an aggressive (or
7 fanciful) ruling on a vital subject.” Landell v. Sorrell,
8 406 F.3d 159, 177 (2d Cir. 2005) (Jacobs, J., dissenting
9 from the denial of rehearing en banc). Accordingly, we
10 proceed to a straightforward application of the Lemon test.
12
In 2000, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in an
Establishment Clause case, but Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, dissented from
the denial, expressing frustration with the Lemon test. See
Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Freiler, 530 U.S. 1251
(2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of
certiorari) (“Like a majority of the Members of this Court,
I have previously expressed my disapproval of the Lemon
test. I would grant certiorari in this case if only to take
the opportunity to inter the Lemon test once for all.”)
(citations omitted). Other Justices and courts have
expressed similar frustrations. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (lamenting “the sisyphean task of
trying to patch together the blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier described in Lemon v. Kurtzman”)
(quotations omitted); Roark v. S. Iron R-1 School Dist., ---
F.3d ---, No. 08-1847, 2009 WL 2045683, at *4 (8th Cir. July
16, 2009) (observing that “the Lemon test has had a
‘checkered career’”) (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S.
677, 700 (2005)); Access Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499
F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2007) (“We recognize that the
Lemon test has hardly been sanctified by the Supreme
Court.”).
35
1 We first ask whether there is a secular purpose for
2 displaying religious material on the postal counter. We
3 cannot think of one. The express and admitted purpose of
4 the religious material is to raise awareness for the mission
5 sponsored by the Church and to spread the Church’s Christian
6 message. We have no trouble concluding that the displays on
7 the postal counter soliciting prayer requests and
8 advertising the mission express a distinctly religious
9 purpose, and that they fail spectacularly under the first
10 inquiry of Lemon. Having failed at the first juncture,
11 there is no need to proceed further in the Lemon test,
12 although it is no great stretch to say that the religious
13 materials on the postal counter would also have a principal
14 effect of advancing religion (and might arguably entangle
15 the government excessively with religion). The religious
16 displays on the postal counter clearly fail the Lemon test.
17 Nevertheless, the analysis is complicated by a
18 disclaimer on the postal counter:
19 The United States Postal Service does not
20 endorse the religious viewpoint expressed
21 in the materials posted at this Contract
22 Postal Unit.
23
24 While the presence of this disclaimer informs our review,
25 the precise impact of a disclaimer on Establishment Clause
36
1 analysis is not at all clear, and this Circuit has not
2 directly addressed the issue.
3 Supreme Court jurisprudence on disclaimers is not
4 determinative. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
5 (1989), the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of
6 [i] a crèche inside of a courthouse, and [ii] a menorah and
7 Christmas tree displayed outside of a city building. It was
8 a split decision: the crèche was unconstitutional, but the
9 menorah/Christmas tree display was not. The presence of a
10 disclaimer, however, did not save the crèche:
11 The fact that the crèche bears a sign
12 disclosing its ownership by a Roman
13 Catholic organization does not alter
14 [the] conclusion [that the display
15 violates the Establishment Clause]. On
16 the contrary, the sign simply
17 demonstrates that the government is
18 endorsing the religious message of [the]
19 organization . . . .
20
21 Id. at 600. However, in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors
22 of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Supreme Court
23 permitted the use of public university student-activity
24 funds to print a newspaper for a religions student group.
25 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence took note of an “explicit
26 disclaimer” as a justification for the outcome. Id. at 852
27 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit has likewise
37
1 noted that the perception of impermissible religious
2 endorsement was “less likely . . . because of the [presence
3 of] express disclaimers that [a religious] activity [was]
4 not school-sponsored.” Hills v. Scottsdale Unified School
5 Dist. No. 48, 329 F.3d 1044, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003). “[A]
6 disclaimer arguably distances [government] officials from
7 ‘sponsoring’ [religious] speech . . . .” Lassonde v.
8 Pleasanton Unified School Dist., 320 F.3d 979, 984 (9th Cir.
9 2003). The Sixth Circuit has also cited the presence of a
10 disclaimer as a basis for permitting the display of a Latin
11 cross in a public square during the Christmas season.
12 Pinette v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 30 F.3d
13 675, 679 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Of course, the display at issue
14 here is not a government sponsored display; it is, in fact,
15 privately funded and privately maintained, and carries an
16 express disclaimer of any government support.”). Id.
17 However useful the disclaimer is, the law does not
18 unambiguously allow us to draw the conclusion that the
19 disclaimer prevents or cures a violation.
20
21 V
22 As a general matter, federal courts have leeway to
38
1 fashion appropriate relief, and “[a]ppellate tribunals have
2 accorded district courts broad discretion to frame equitable
3 remedies [for constitutional violations] so long as the
4 relief granted is commensurate with the scope of the
5 constitutional infraction.” Todaro v. Ward, 565 F.2d 48, 54
6 n.7 (2d Cir. 1977). Especially in the Establishment Clause
7 context, courts must endeavor to craft remedies that
8 correspond to the violations. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
9 U.S. 589, 620 (1988) (“The District Court . . . identif[ied]
10 certain instances in which it felt [federal] funds were used
11 for constitutionally improper purposes [under the
12 Establishment Clause], but . . . the court did not
13 adequately design its remedy to address the specific
14 problems it found . . . .”); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530
15 U.S. 793, 865 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
16 (“[E]xtensive violations . . . will be highly relevant in
17 shaping an appropriate remedy . . . . I know of no case in
18 which we have declared an entire aid program
19 unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds solely
20 because of violations on [a] minuscule scale . . . .”)
21 (quotations and citations omitted).
22 Here, the district court ordered SYI to “remove . . .
39
1 any and all religious displays, prayer cards,
2 advertisements, donation solicitations, and
3 telecommunication videos or broadcasts that proselytize or
4 advance the religion of the [Church].” The Postal Service
5 was also directed to prohibit SYI from posting such
6 materials as long as it was “in the course of operating the
7 [CPU].” However, the removal of all religious messages
8 would render the premises a single-use post office, and
9 would prevent the second legitimate use to which the
10 premises are dedicated. This remedy does not correspond to
11 the scope of the violation and the resulting harm.
12 The gravamen of the complaint is that Mr. Cooper was
13 made to feel that he was an unwilling participant in a faith
14 not his own when he entered a space dedicated to two
15 separate functions, only one of which was apparent from the
16 outside. Ordinarily, when CPUs are housed in churches or
17 synagogues or monasteries or mosques, customers are alerted
18 to the facility’s religious status by cues such as
19 ecclesiastical architecture, schedules of religious
20 services, and religious iconography or statuary. SYI gives
21 no visual cues to alert its customers to its function as a
22 Christian outreach facility. So a customer walking into SYI
40
1 might become bewildered as to whether a chapel has been made
2 into a post office, or a post office has been made into a
3 chapel.
4 The district court erred by extending the violation--
5 and then the remedy--to the entire facility. The Manchester
6 CPU is not a classified post office and need not be
7 regulated as such, but the public function it performs is in
8 tension with its (otherwise permissible) sectarian message.
9 A direct, effective and complete remedy for the violation is
10 one that limits the public function to designated public
11 spaces and returns the remainder of the facility to SYI’s
12 private purposes. This can be accomplished short of
13 frustrating either the postal function or the other lawful
14 purposes which the Church pursues on the premises.
15 Since the extent of the state action (and the extent of
16 the Establishment Clause violation) is limited to that part
17 of the CPU fulfilling the Postal Service’s mandated public
18 function, a sufficient remedy need extend no further or
19 elsewhere. Here, the public functions include the
20 acceptance of mail, the processing of mail and packages for
21 delivery, and the sale of postal goods and services. These
22 are performed or fulfilled at the postal counter, in the
41
1 post office boxes, and on the shelving housing postal
2 products; so the postal counter and the surfaces of the post
3 office boxes and shelving units are zones in which the
4 function of religious outreach is out of place. The postal
5 counter, post office boxes and shelving units must therefore
6 be free of prayer cards and messages and must be cleared of
7 religious material. Since the disclaimer is helpful in
8 differentiating the public space and function from the
9 private one, it should remain.
10 In order to differentiate the primary area serving the
11 public function from the remainder of the space operating as
12 a private ministry, SYI is directed to create and install a
13 barrier in front of the postal counter that is a visual cue
14 and gives a sense of passage from one area of the space into
15 another, thereby delineating space exclusively dedicated to
16 the public function from space dedicated to other things.
17 Separation and visual cues will not keep the video from
18 being seen and overheard by postal patrons, but the source
19 will unambiguously emanate from a zone distinct from the
20 post office functions. We need not prescribe the
21 specifications of the barrier, but it would do to use such
22 things as stanchions with hanging ropes (of the kind used in
42
1 a theater), or a low railing. Once the postal counter is
2 cleared and visual cues installed, no more is required to
3 cure the Establishment Clause violation.
4
5 CONCLUSION
6 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
7 court is vacated and the case remanded for the creation of
8 an injunction consistent with this opinion.
43
Cooper v. U.S. Postal Service
Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Date filed: 2009-08-20
Citations: 577 F.3d 479
Copy Citations