Appellee sued to recover on a policy issued by appellant, insuring her against loss of her automobile by theft, and the same was presented to a jury on special issues, and upon their answer thereto the court rendered judgment in favor of appellee for $500. The jury found that the automobile was stolen, by some person not in the employ of appellee or in her household, and that the automobile was of the value of $650. The statement of facts sustains the findings of the jury.
The evidence showed that the automobile was placed in a shop to be repaired; that it was given in charge by appellee to a partner in the repair shop; that she never saw her automobile after delivering it to the repair shop. The proprietor, Smith, claimed that -he had sent the car back, but appellee never saw it. She instituted a search for it, calling in the assistance of city detectives, the sheriff, and the district attorney. What became of the car appellee could not know. She lost it, and, as in other cases of theft, the thief did not leave his name or address. Appellee was not called upon to show who got her automobile, but merely to show that it was hers, and that it disappeared. That character of proof required in a criminal ease, in which a party is charged with theft, from the very nature of things could not be required in a civil case. Appellee showed that the automobile was her property, and was in her possession and was taken without her knowledge or consent, and that was sufficient. The disappearance of the car could not reasonably be accounted for except on the assumption that it was stolen.
Appellant is in no position to he complaining about the value of the car, because *706the facts reveal that it sought the insurance of the ear, and placed its own value upon it, after an inspection, and when appellee was not present. It ought to show at least a modicum of the anxiety to pay the insurance money as it evinced in obtaining the policy and collecting the premium. There was no issue in the trial court, there is none in this court, as to the ownership of the automobile.
The car was delivered to Roy Eagg, an employs or partner in the repair shop, and in no way connected with the .service of appellee. Not one particle of testimony was introduced tending' to show that the car could have been stolen by any one in the employ or belonging to the household, of appellee.
There was ho question about the ownership of the automobile in the lower court, and there is not now, and that question cannot be forced into this case. Appellee swore that she received a paper from her vendor which she called a contract, which from her description was to all intents a bill of sale to the automobile. No effort was made to show that appellee did not have a’bill of sale, and no such question was raised in pleading or evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.