F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
SEP 10 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
COTTRELL, LTD., a Colorado
corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 97-1475
BIOTROL INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a Delaware corporation, and
PRO-DEX, INC., a Colorado
corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 97-S-1479)
Howard J. Beck (Douglas Jaffe with him on the briefs), Beck and Cassinis, P.C.,
Aurora, Colorado.
Richard A. Johnson (Julie S. Schoenfeld with him on the brief), Porzak Browning
& Johnson LLP, Boulder, Colorado.
Before EBEL, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Cottrell, Ltd. (“Cottrell”) filed a Lanham Act claim against Pro-Dex, Inc.
(“Pro-Dex”), and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Biotrol International, Inc.
(“Biotrol”), alleging that they made false and misleading representations with
regard to their hard surface cleaning product, “Birex.” The district court granted
the defendants-appellees’ motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
We now reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
The parties to this litigation manufacture, advertise, and market hard
surface cleaners and disinfectants for use in medical and dental facilities.
Because the parties’ products are antimicrobial pesticides, the cleaners and
disinfectants are regulated by the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),
which must review and approve the text of all labels (“label claims”) on or
accompanying the products before they can be sold. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 & 136a.
As such, manufacturers and sellers of hard surface cleaners and disinfectants are
forbidden by law from using label claims which have not been approved by and
registered with the EPA. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136a(c)(1) & 136j(a)(1)(B) (“it shall
be unlawful for any person . . . to distribute, sell, offer for sale, hold for sale,
ship, deliver for shipment, or receive and (having so received) deliver or offer to
deliver, to any person . . . any registered pesticide if any claims made for it as a
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part of its distribution or sale substantially differ from any claims made for it as a
part of the statement required in connection with its registration under section
136a of this title,” which requires pesticide registrants to file with the EPA
administrator “a complete copy of the labeling of the pesticide, a statement of all
claims to be made for it, and any directions for its use,” in order to qualify for
approval). 1
Cottrell sued Pro-Dex and Biotrol (collectively “defendants-appellees”),
claiming that representations made by defendants-appellees regarding their hard
surface cleaner and disinfectant, which is sold under the name “Birex,” violated
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Specifically, Cottrell
alleged in its complaint that the defendants-appellees’ label claims were
“violative of EPA clearance” and “[a]s such . . . false,” and that the label claims
deceptively imply that “EPA approval or clearance has been obtained.” The
1
Title 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (“Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act” or “FIFRA”) and 40 C.F.R. §§ 152 provide a detailed regulatory
framework for registering pesticides (including antimicrobial pesticides like the
parties’ hard surface cleaners and disinfectants), including provisions for
approving pesticide labels and claims made therein. FIFRA prohibits, inter alia,
the distribution, sale, receipt or delivery of pesticides which have not complied
with the registration requirements, see 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a), and makes unlawful
selling “any registered pesticide if any claims made for it as a part of its
distribution or sale substantially differ from any claims made for it as a part of the
statement required in connection with its registration under section 136a of this
title,” 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(1)(B).
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defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6), which the magistrate judge recommended granting, stating:
Plaintiff’s allegations that the claims are false are based on the
allegation that the claims violate the EPA clearance of the product.
The complaint does not specifically allege, however, that
Defendants’ claim that the efficacy of Birex continues for seven days
after mixing is actually false or misleading. Thus, resolution of
Plaintiff’s claims would involve the determination of whether the
claim that the efficacy of the product continues for seven days after
mixing violates the EPA clearance. Similar to the Mylan [Labs., Inc.
v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130 (4th Cir. 1993)] case, for purposes of a
Lanham Act misrepresentation claim, it cannot be implied from the
fact that the product has been placed on the market that the EPA has
approved Defendants’ label claims. An affirmative representation is
required. Mylan, 7 F.3d at 1139. Based on the above case law,
absent an allegation that the Defendants’ claim regarding the efficacy
of Birex is false, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Cottrell objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation, but “agreed
that an expansion of the existing factual predicate for its claims is warranted.”
Accordingly, Cottrell filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
Cottrell’s proposed amended complaint alleged that the defendants-appellees
affirmatively misrepresented that the EPA gave “clearance and/or approval” to
claims made in Birex literature that “proper use is to discard weekly,” and that
“Biotrol’s product is not known to be effective for that period of time [one week],
nor has it been demonstrated to be effective under those use conditions [weekly
discarding].”
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The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to grant
the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied Cottrell’s motion for leave to file an
amended complaint despite recognizing that “Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) requires leave
to amend be given freely,” on the ground “that the Proposed Amended Complaint
suffers from the same defect as the original complaint.” The district court
identified the “defect” it found in Cottrell’s original and proposed amended
complaint as follows: “[T]his complaint seeks a determination whether the label
claims [of the defendants] violate the EPA clearance. Resolution of the
Plaintiff’s complaint would require the court to interpret and apply regulations
that are exclusively within the province of the EPA.”
Cottrell now appeals the district court’s grant of the motion to dismiss and
denial of its motion for leave to file an amended complaint. We reverse and
remand.
DISCUSSION
Whether the District Court Erred in Dismissing Cottrell’s Lanham Act
Claim.
A. Standard of Review
“We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a cause of action for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Chemical Weapons
Working Group, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1490
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(10th Cir. 1997). “We uphold a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) only
when it appears that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claims
that would entitle him to relief, accepting the well-pleaded allegations of the
complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir.) (quotations omitted),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 55 (1997). “[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure erect
a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim.”
Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359
(10th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted). Granting defendant’s motion to dismiss is
“a harsh remedy which must be cautiously studied, not only to effectuate the spirit
of the liberal rules of pleading but also to protect the interests of justice.” Id.
(quotations omitted).
B. Merits
Cottrell argues that both its original and proposed amended complaint
properly alleged all the elements necessary to make out a claim under the Lanham
Act. 2 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as amended reads, in relevant part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or
services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word,
Because we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Cottrell’s original
2
complaint, we do not reach issues concerning the proposed amended complaint.
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term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or
false or misleading representation of fact, which —
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such
person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities
by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents
the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of
his or her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial
activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Thus, as the district court recognized, in order to state a
claim under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 3 a plaintiff must allege: (1) that
defendant made material false or misleading representations of fact in connection
with the commercial advertising or promotion of its product, see Abbott Labs. v.
Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 13 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Section 43(a)(2) of the
3
The Act “principally provides for two distinct causes of action: false
designation of origin or source, known as ‘product infringement,’ and false
description or representation, known as ‘false advertising.’” Resource Developers,
Inc. v. Statute of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir.
1991) (quoting Johnson & Johnson v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 631 F.2d 186, 188 (2d
Cir. 1980)); see also Stanfield v. Osborn Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir.
1995) (“There are two distinct bases of liability under section 1125: (1) false
representation in advertising concerning the qualities of goods (false advertising
claims); and (2) false representations concerning the origin or endorsement of
goods (false association or product infringement claims).”).
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[Lanham] Act prohibits the use of false or misleading statements or
representations of fact in commercial advertising, and establishes a private
remedy for any violation thereof.”); Sandoz Pharms. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc.,
902 F.2d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 1990); (2) in commerce; (3) that are either likely to
cause confusion or mistake as to (a) the origin, association or approval of the
product with or by another, or (b) the characteristics of the goods or services; and
(4) injure the plaintiff. See generally Charles E. McKenney & George F. Long
III, Federal Unfair Competition: Lanham Act § 43(a), § 6 (11th release 1998).
The dispute in this case involves only whether the plaintiff properly alleged
the first requirement. 4 As the Second Circuit has explained, “Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act encompasses more than literal falsehoods,” because otherwise,
“clever use of innuendo, indirect intimations, and ambiguous suggestions could
shield the advertisement from scrutiny precisely when protection against such
sophisticated deception is most needed.” American Home Prods. Corp. v.
4
Cottrell’s complaint sufficiently alleged the other three elements. In
paragraph 20 of the complaint, Cottrell alleged misrepresentations in commerce.
(“The misrepresentations made by the Defendants Biotrol and Pro-Dex have been
made in commerce.”) In paragraph 16, Cottrell alleged that “customers have been
actually deceived by advertising and promotional materials published by and
continuing to be published by Biotrol and Pro-Dex [by falsely implying EPA
approval of the label].” Finally, in paragraphs 19 and 21, Cottrell alleged
sufficient injury. (“Defendants Biotrol and Pro-Dex’s material misrepresentations
injure Cottrell by causing Cottrell to lose customers and sales, resulting in
business losses . . . .”); (“The actions of Defendants Biotrol and Pro-Dex have and
are likely to continue to cause Cottrell irreparable harm.”)
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Johnson & Johnson, 577 F.2d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 1978). To assess the truth or
falsity of these latter, more amorphous, misleading statements, “the courts favor
testing by consumer reaction surveys, but have also found falsity based on their
own independent reaction and the reaction of witnesses testifying before the
court, including testimony based on test results, consumer surveys, complaints
received, allegations of more than a few instances of misrepresentation, and
otherwise.” McKenney & Long, supra, § 6.03[2], at 6-27 to 6-28 (citing cases)
(footnotes omitted). Notwithstanding the various methods for testing the
accuracy of allegedly misleading advertising, we reiterate that when considering a
motion for dismissal under 12(b)(6), we must assume all facts as alleged.
In its original complaint, Cottrell alleged that the defendants-appellees
made material false or misleading representations, as follows:
12. Standardized “label claims” as to efficacy for products
such as Birex include how long a solution may be used after mixing
and dilution. Birex’s approved and cleared “label claims” require
that it be “mixed and used daily” according to the approved labels on
file with the EPA. 5
5
We note that on appeal the defendants-appellees assert that: “In fact, Birex
is not approved for a mix and use daily label claim, it is approved for a claim that
states ‘[a]s solution becomes dirty, discard and replace with a fresh one . . . .’”
And, in a motion for attorney’s fees filed by defendants-appellees in the district
court, defendants-appellees attached as an exhibit Birex’s approved label which
appears to support defendants-appellees’ position. However, because this case
comes to us on appeal from 12(b)(6) dismissal for failure to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, we must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the
(continued...)
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13. Contrary to the provisions and requirements of its “label
claims” as approved by the EPA, Biotrol, through its product
information material and its sales force, has and continues to assert
in the context, inter alia, of commercial advertising or promotion
that the efficacy of Birex continues for seven days after mixing.
15. Biotrol, under the direction and control of Pro-Dex, has
continued to advertise, market and sell its Birex product under that
and various other names with the full knowledge that the claims
made are violative of EPA clearance. As such, these Defendants’
advertising and promotional materials and claims as included with
the products themselves, as well as on product information sheets and
through sales persons, are false.
16. The Defendants Biotrol and Pro-Dex’s material
representations in commercial advertising and promotion has been
disseminated to their customers and potential customers, many if not
all of whom are also customers or potential customers of Cottrell.
Such customers have been actually deceived by the advertising and
promotional materials published by and continuing to be published by
Biotrol and Pro-Dex. Said claims and misrepresentations further
deceive existing and potential customers of the parties by implying
that EPA approval or clearance has been obtained therefor.
17. Customers for hard surface disinfectants are attracted by
“label claims” which provide for “mixing and using” over longer
periods of time. By making false label claims, inter alia, that Birex
can [be] used for seven days after mixing, Biotrol and Pro-Dex place
Cottrell at a gross, substantial and continuing competitive
disadvantage. Because false and incorrect label claims make their
products appear to be more attractive to customers and ultimately end
users of these products, the Defendants misrepresentations are likely
to influence the purchasing decisions of the persons and entities to
whom disseminated.
(...continued)
5
complaint as true.
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The defendants-appellees argue that “FIFRA is the exclusive federal law
that regulates the labeling of pesticides,” that “Birex is regulated as a pesticide
under [FIFRA],” and that Cottrell’s allegations relate only to Birex’s label claims.
Thus, they argue that Cottrell is attempting to do indirectly what Congress has not
given it the right to do directly — i.e., enforce the requirements of FIFRA (which
only the EPA can do) by way of the Lanham Act. Moreover, the defendants-
appellees argue that resolution of Cottrell’s claims would require a determination
of whether the label claims violate EPA clearance — a determination requiring
EPA expertise, which only the EPA is qualified to make. Accordingly, the
defendants-appellees claim that Cottrell has failed to state a claim on which relief
can be granted in the courts.
Cottrell argues that it is not attempting to enforce FIFRA, but rather to
vindicate its rights under the Lanham Act independent of FIFRA. We agree.
Construing Cottrell’s complaint in the light most favorable to Cottrell, we
recognize at least three allegations of false or misleading statements made by
defendants-appellees which, for purposes of this opinion, we characterize as
claims #1, #2 and #3: #1, that representations made in Birex’s advertisements
violate the EPA clearance obtained under FIFRA by claiming that Birex continues
to be an effective cleaner and disinfectant for seven days; #2, that Birex’s
advertising deceives customers “by implying that EPA approval or clearance has
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been obtained [for the seven-day efficacy claim]”; 6 and #3, that Birex’s claim that
it “can be used seven days after mixing” is factually false.
In resolving defendants-appellees motion to dismiss, the district court
focused on paragraph 15 of Cottrell’s complaint, which contained only allegations
of the first category of falsity that we have identified (claim #1 in the preceding
paragraph). Based on allegations contained therein, the district court “agree[d]
with the Recommendation [of the magistrate judge] that this complaint seeks a
determination whether the label claims violate the EPA clearance. Resolution of
the Plaintiff’s complaint would require the court to interpret and apply regulations
that are exclusively within the province of the EPA.” According to the district
court, this was contrary to the teaching of Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d
1130, 1139 (4th Cir. 1993); Sandoz Pharms., 902 F.2d at 231; Summit Tech., Inc.
v. High-Line Med. Instruments, Co., 933 F. Supp. 918, 933 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 1996);
Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Flavor Fresh Foods, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 714, 715-16
(N.D. Ill. 1989). We agree with the district court that claim #1 is subject to
12(b)(6) dismissal. However, in our view the district court failed to recognize the
6
Claims #1 and #2 are closely related but distinct. As we discuss further
below, claim (1) is an allegation that Birex’s label claims violate FIFRA, related
regulations, and EPA actions taken pursuant to FIFRA. As such, claim #1 is an
impermissible attempt under the Lanham Act to enforce FIFRA’s substantive
provisions. Claim #2, on the other hand, focuses on Birex’s representations
directed at consumers, and asserts that Birex’s label claims put in commerce a
false representation of EPA approval (which Cottrell argues had not been given).
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second and third categories of alleged falsity we have identified (claims #2 and #3
in the preceding paragraph). We reverse the district court’s dismissal of
Cottrell’s case because we find that Cottrell alleged sufficient facts regarding
claims #2 and #3 to state a claim under the Lanham Act.
We find instructive an unpublished memorandum and order from the United
States District Court for the District of Kansas which addressed similar issues in a
case involving the interaction between the Lanham Act and the federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). See Braintree Labs., Inc. v. Nephro-Tech,
Inc., No. 96-2459-JWL, 1997 WL 94237 (D. Kan. Feb. 26, 1997). There, the
plaintiff contended that “the ‘dietary supplement’ designation on defendants’
product [which had not obtained approval for marketing as a drug by the federal
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)] constitute[d] a false or misleading
description in violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Defendants argue[d]
that this claim may not stand because it merely alleges a violation of FDCA, for
which no private right of action exists.” Id. at *2 (citation and footnote omitted).
After discussing Sandoz Pharms., Mylan Labs., Grove Fresh Distribs., and
Summit Tech, the court observed that “[a] general framework may be gleaned
from these cases.” Id. at *6. The court noted that:
Affirmative misrepresentations . . . are generally actionable under the
Lanham Act, even if the product is regulated by the FDA. Most
obviously, a false statement of FDA approval is actionable. It is also
clear that, because no private right of action exists under the FDCA,
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a plaintiff may not use the Lanham Act as an alternative vehicle by
which to seek redress for an FDCA violation. Moreover, claims that
require direct interpretation and application of the FDCA are not
properly recognized because such matters are more appropriately
addressed by the FDA, especially in light of Congress’s intention to
repose in that body the task of enforcing the FDCA. The court
believes that the Tenth Circuit would embrace these general
principles.
Id. Ultimately, in Braintree Labs., the court concluded that the issue of whether
the defendants’ product’s claim to be a “dietary supplement” was false or
misleading involved interpretation and application of the FDA definition of
“dietary supplement”; thus the court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss
plaintiff’s Lanham Act claim. See id. at *7.
The framework announced in Braintree Labs. serves us well in this case.
As to Cottrell’s claim that we have denominated #1, we agree with the district
court that it must be dismissed. First, no party challenges the district court’s
conclusion that “FIFRA is exclusively enforced by the [EPA],” and thus we
accept this proposition for the purposes of this appeal. See Almond Hill Sch. v.
United States Dep’t of Agriculture, 768 F.2d 1030, 1035-38 (9th Cir. 1985)
(stating that “FIFRA does not authorize explicitly or implicitly a private cause of
action to enforce the Act.”); Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1983)
(noting that FIFRA contains no explicit provision for private enforcement and
“legislative history confirms that Congress did not intend to create a private cause
of action under FIFRA,” specifically citing Congress’ rejection of a proposed
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provision permitting private enforcement suits). Thus, this case is like Braintree
Labs. because the EPA stands in a similar enforcement relationship to FIFRA as
the FDA does to the FDCA. Second, we believe that Cottrell’s claim #1 is
properly characterized as an attempt to enforce FIFRA’s labeling requirements.
The “EPA clearance” that Cottrell claims Birex’s advertisement violates was
obtained pursuant to (and only because of) FIFRA. See Lowe v. Sporicidin Int’l.,
47 F.3d 124, 130 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is clear that there is a ‘FIFRA-created
duty’ to file ‘a statement of all [label] claims’ made for a pesticide with the EPA,
§ 136(c)(1)(C), and not to make ‘any claims for it as a part of its distribution or
sale’ that ‘substantially differ from any claims made for it as a part of th[at]
statement.’ § 136j(a)(1)(B).” (first two alterations ours, others in original)).
Independent of FIFRA, an allegation that Birex’s claims of seven-day efficacy
violates EPA clearance has no force because independent of FIFRA no EPA
clearance or approval for label claims would be necessary. Moreover, we believe
that a determination of the scope of EPA clearance, and whether Birex’s
advertisement violates that clearance, would require EPA expertise. Finally, and
most simply, even reading all inferences in Cottrell’s favor, claim #1 fails to
allege any false advertising. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that
Cottrell must not be permitted to bring a FIFRA claim dressed up as a Lanham
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Act claim, and claim #1 must be dismissed. Cf. Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1139;
Sandoz Pharms., 902 F.2d at 231.
As to claims #2 and #3, however, we believe Cottrell has alleged sufficient
facts to support a Lanham Act claim independent of FIFRA. As identified above,
claim #2 alleges that Birex’s advertising deceives customers “by implying that
EPA approval or clearance has been obtained [for the seven-day efficacy claim].” 7
As noted above, this claim is distinct from claim #1 because in addition to
alleging that the label claims did not comport with FIFRA regulations and EPA
approval, claim #2 adds an allegation that Birex’s label claim, in the context in
which the product is advertised, deceives consumers into believing, erroneously,
that the EPA has approved Birex’s one-week efficacy claim. As Braintree Labs.
stated: “Most obviously, a false statement of [EPA] approval is actionable.”
Braintree Labs, 1997 WL 94237, at *6; see also Mylan Labs., 7 F.3d at 1138-39
(in general an allegation of false label claim of FDA approval is sufficient to
survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), but there it was insufficiently alleged “that
defendants[ explicitly] falsely represented that their drugs had been ‘properly
approved by the FDA’” and “that fatal deficiency cannot be cured by contentions
7
We note that an allegation of a mere implication of EPA approval
approaches the type of abstract and unspecific allegation that courts correctly
consider to be insufficient to survive 12(b)(6) dismissal. Thus, unless Cottrell
demonstrates how defendants-appellees “imply” EPA approval, this claim still
might be ripe for dismissal prior to trial.
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that the very act of placing a drug on the market, with standard package inserts
often used for FDA-approved drugs, somehow implies (falsely) that the drug had
been ‘properly approved by the FDA.’”). If Cottrell can establish by consumer
surveys or other means that Birex’s advertising is likely to confuse or actually
confuses consumers, then the effect of the false “implication” of EPA approval
that Cottrell now asserts could be as damaging for Lanham Act purposes as an
express false claim of EPA approval. Thus, in the posture this case now stands,
Cottrell has sufficiently alleged a material misrepresentation under the Lanham
Act.
Defendants-appellees, however, would have us dismiss this case because
Cottrell’s Lanham Act claim touches on issues covered by FIFRA. That is,
because FIFRA prohibits the sale and distribution of products with unapproved or
materially altered labels, defendants-appellees claim that FIFRA should preclude
an independent Lanham Act claim. But, because FIFRA nowhere explicitly
precludes Lanham Act coverage, we refuse to limit the scope of the Lanham Act
absent circumstances that inherently require interpretation of FIFRA regulations
and/or EPA approvals. Cf. Marriott Corp. v. Great America Serv. Trades
Council, 552 F.2d 176, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1977) (refusing to dismiss Lanham Act
claim involving “labor dispute,” and rejecting argument that Labor Management
Relations Act gives exclusive jurisdiction to the National Labor Relations Board
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because “[t]he fact that conduct is involved which may tangentially be covered by
section 7 or 8 of the Labor Management Relations Act is not sufficient to pre-
empt jurisdiction over Marriott’s [Lanham Act] trademark action”); see also
McKenney & Long, supra, § 2.02, at 2-7 to 2-10 & nn. 10-19.2 (citing conflicting
cases). While there might be cases which would require EPA expertise to
determine whether claims made for a product were approved by the EPA, that fact
is not evident from the complaint before us in this case, and at this early stage of
pleadings we will not construe Cottrell’s claim #2 to involve such an allegation.
Claim #2 can be construed to contend simply that the defendants-appellees falsely
imply that the EPA has approved their claim that Birex is effective for seven days
after mixing when in fact the EPA has not given such approval. We believe
courts are capable of resolving such issues. Cf. Grove Fresh Distribs., 720 F.
Supp. at 715-16 (despite fact that FDA regulation provides definition of “orange
juice from concentrate,” court was capable of resolving plaintiff’s Lanham Act
claim that defendants falsely claimed their product was “100% orange juice from
Concentrate” without reference to agency definition or expertise). Accordingly,
as to claim #2, Cottrell has stated a claim under the Lanham Act on which relief
can be granted and the Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal must be reversed.
Likewise, Cottrell’s claim #3 — that defendants-appellees falsely represent
that Birex “can be used seven days after mixing” — alleges sufficient facts to
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state a claim under the Lanham Act and is not the proper subject for Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal. Admittedly, Cottrell’s assertion that “[b]y making false label claims,
inter alia, that Birex can [be] used for seven days after mixing,” is not the most
clear and direct way Cottrell could have alleged falsity. However, construing this
claim in the light most favorable to Cottrell, we must conclude that it sufficiently
alleges that the defendants-appellees falsely represent the efficacy of Birex. This
type of claim — alleging that Birex’s label claims misrepresent facts concerning
the quality of the product — is at the core of what the Lanham Act “false
advertising” prohibition makes actionable. And again, although there may be
circumstances under which EPA expertise would be necessary to determine the
efficacy and longevity of Birex, from the naked pleadings alone we cannot say for
certain that this is such a case. Accordingly, we reverse the Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal as to claim #3.
CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Cottrell’s complaint
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and REMAND this case for further proceedings. 8
8
Because we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Cottrell’s original
complaint, we offer no opinion as to whether the district court erred in denying
Cottrell’s motion for leave to file an amended complaint.
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Cottrell, Ltd. v. Biotrol International, Inc.
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 1999-09-10
Citations: 191 F.3d 1248
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion