Cousin v. Small

REVISED MARCH 27, 2003

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
_______________

m 01-30745
_______________

SHAREEF COUSIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

VERSUS

ANTHONY SMALL, ET AL.,

Defendants,

BYRON BERRY, ROGER JORDAN,
AND HARRY CONNICK,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS CAPACITY AS DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR ORLEANS PARISH,

Defendants-Appellees.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana
_________________________

March 24, 2003
Before SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit an unsuccessful armed robbery. When called
Judges, and FITZWATER,* District Judge. to testify, however, Rowell denied that Cousin
had made such a statement and claimed that
PER CURIAM: his assertions had been coerced by promises of
favorable treatment on pending charges.
Shareef Cousin sued employees of the po-
lice department and the district attorney’s of- The prosecution then called, as impeach-
fice, alleging various violations of his constitu- ment witnesses as to what Rowell had told
tional rights in connection with his prosecution police regarding Cousin, the attorney who had
for the murder of Michael Gerardi. The dis- represented Rowell on the pending charges
trict court found for defendants on immunity and a police officer who was present at the
grounds. Finding no error, we affirm. August 1995 meeting. The prosecution later
relied on this impeachment testimony as sub-
I. stantive evidence of Cousin’s guilt.
On March 2, 1995, Gerardi and Connie
Babin emerged from dinner at a New Orleans The defense presented evidence that at the
restaurant. As they neared Gerardi’s car, three time of the murder, approximately 10:26 p.m.,
black men approached and robbed them; one Cousin was playing in a city recreation depart-
of the men confronted Gerardi and fatally shot ment basketball game. Two recreation depart-
him. ment supervisors, Cousin’s coach, and an op-
posing team’s player testified that the game
Later that month, Cousin, then sixteen had started late and ended late, and the coach
years old, was charged with the murder. At testified that he dropped Cousin off at his
trial, the state relied solely on testimonial ev- house at approximately 10:45 p.m.
idence, including Babin’s identification of
Cousin as the perpetrator. The prosecution al- The jury convicted Cousin and sentenced
so presented testimony from witnesses who him to death. Cousin spent over a year on
claimed to have seen three black men in the death row, but the conviction was overturned
vicinity of the crime. At a photo line-up three for prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Cousin,
weeks after the murder, two of these witnesses 710 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1998).1 The court based
tentatively had identified Cousin as one of the
three men.
1
In his opening brief on appeal, Cousin, with-
Finally, the state presented the testimony of out citation to the instant record, makes the follow-
James Rowell, a friend of Cousin’s. The pro- ing assertion:
secution claimed in its opening statement that
The prosecutorial misconduct identified
in August 1995 Rowell had told police of a
by the Louisiana Supreme Court . . . turned
conversation he had with Cousin in March out to be the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, the
1995, in which Cousin admitted to killing a arrest and conviction were the product of a
man in the New Orleans French Quarter during sustained campaign to frame Cousin. A
significant part of that effort involved
unlawful and unconstitutional actions by
*
District Judge of the Northern District of numerous officers of the New Orleans
Texas, sitting by designation. (continued...)

2
its reversal on the admission of the testimony to retry Cousin, but eventually, in January
of Rowell’s attorney and the police officer as 1999, it dismissed all charges. One year later,
impeachment evidence, holding that “even if Cousin filed the present action under 42
the issue of admissibility was close, we would U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, alleging misconduct
be compelled to reverse this conviction be- by the police and the prosecution. Cousin
cause of the prosecutor’s flagrant misuse of charged that, from the outset, he was the vic-
that evidence for purposes that the prosecutor tim of an effort to frame him for the murder
himself admitted was an improper use of such and that the police had engaged in numerous
evidence” (i.e. the misuse of the testimony as instances of misconduct in an effort to manu-
substantive evidence of guilt). Id. at 1072. facture a case against him. Cousin also con-
tended that the prosecutors, Byron Berry and
The court also noted that Jordan had with- Roger Jordan, had abused their positions in an
held obviously exculpatory material, although effort wrongfully to secure his conviction.
the court did not base its judgment on that Cousin also brought claims against the district
conduct. Id. at 1067 n.2, 1074 n.8. The court attorney, Harry Connick, seeking to hold him
explained that, when questioned on the night liable for the alleged failure adequately to train
of the murder, Babin told the police that she and supervise the prosecutors in his office.
did not get a good look at the gunman and
probably would not be able to identify him. Berry, Jordan, and Connick moved to dis-
She also stated, in an interview three days lat- miss the claims under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
er, that she was not wearing her corrective or for summary judgment. The district court
lenses on the night of the murder and could see granted the motions, holding that Berry and
only patterns and shapes. The prosecutors did Jordan were protected by the doctrine of abso-
not disclose these statements to the defense, lute prosecutorial immunity and that Connick
even though the statements would have cast was entitled to summary judgment because the
serious doubt on the veracity of Babin’s subse- claims against him were barred on grounds of
quent identification of Cousin. qualified immunity. The judgment did not dis-
pose of Cousin’s claims against the police
The state thereafter announced its intention defendants, which have been stayed pending
the resolution of this appeal.
1
(...continued) II.
Police Department. For the most part, the Defendants claim this court lacks jurisdic-
specifics of thse actions are not directly tion over the instant appeal. After the district
before this Court because they support court granted the motions for dismissal and
claims against other defendants in the summary judgment, Cousin filed a notice of
caseSSpolice officersSSwho are not entitled
appeal. The judgment did not dispose of all
to absolute immunity, and whose cases re-
main in the district court.
defendants, and when Cousin filed his notice,
the court had not yet issued an unequivocal
We express no view on the accuracy of this certification under FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). Cou-
statement, except to agree with Cousin that our sin requested, and the court issued, a rule
disposition of the appeal by the current appellants 54(b) final judgment nunc pro tunc. Defen-
is not intended to affect any ongoing proceeding dants contend that Cousin’s notice of appeal is
against certain police officers.

3
defective because it was filed before the court tory rights. Although the section contains no
entered the rule 54(b) judgment and that, as a reference to official immunity, “Congress in-
result, we lack appellate jurisdiction. We dis- tended the statute to be construed in the light
agree. of common-law principles that were well set-
tled at the time of its enactment.” Kalina v.
“A notice of appeal filed after the court an- Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 123 (1997) (citing
nounces a decision or orderSSbut before the Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951);
entry of the judgment or orderSSis treated as Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330 (1983)).
filed on the date of and after the entry.” FED. Therefore, the immunities existing at common
R. APP. P. 4(a)(2). Under rule 4(a)(2), an ap- law at the time of § 1983’s enactment are ap-
peal from a nonfinal decision may serve as an plicable to actions brought under it.
effective notice of appeal from a subsequently
entered final judgment if the nonfinal decision In Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409
“would be appealable if immediately followed (1976), the Court held that prosecutors are
by the entry of judgment.” FirsTier Mortg. shielded from liability under § 1983 for certain
Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. conduct. After analyzing the absolute immu-
269, 276 (1991). nity afforded prosecutors at common law, the
Court concluded that the policy underlying
This court has applied the FirsTier rule in that immunity supports its application to
the context of the entry of a rule 54(b) certifi- § 1983 claims. Id. at 427. Consequently,
cation after a prematurely filed notice of ap- “prosecutors are absolutely immune from
peal, precisely the situation presented by this liability under § 1983 for their conduct in
case. Barrett v. Atl. Richfield Co., 95 F.3d ‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the
375 (5th Cir. 1996). “Because the district State’s case,’ insofar as that conduct is ‘inti-
court’s order would have been appealable if mately associated with the judicial phase of the
followed by Rule 54(b) certification and order, criminal process[.]’”2
rule 4(a)(2) permits this court to exercise its
jurisdiction,” where a final judgment was actu- The prosecutorial immunity recognized in
ally entered subsequent to the filing of the no- Imbler, however, does not apply to any and all
tice of appeal. Id. at 379. Under Barrett, actions taken by a prosecutor. Rather, the
therefore, we have jurisdiction. Court fashioned a functional test under which
prosecutors are absolutely immune with re-
III. spect to activities that are “intimately associ-
Cousin challenges the dismissal of his ated with the judicial phase of the criminal pro-
§ 1983 claims against prosecutors Berry and cess.” Id. at 430. Conduct falling within this
Jordan on the basis of absolute prosecutorial category is not limited “only to the act of
immunity. We review dismissals under rule initiation itself and to conduct occurring in the
12(b)(6) de novo, accepting all well-pleaded courtroom,” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
facts as true. Morin v. Moore, 309 F.3d 316, 259, 272 (1993), but instead includes all ac-
319 (5th Cir. 2002).

Section 1983 creates a damages remedy for 2
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (ci-
the violation of federal constitutional or statu- tations omitted) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-
31).

4
tions “which occur in the course of [the prose- acting as advocates.
cutor’s] role as an advocate for the State,” id.
at 273. 1.
At the summary judgment stage of a § 1983
Therefore, the central question with respect action, a defendant asserting immunity is not
to each of Cousin’s claims against Berry and required to establish the defense beyond per-
Jordan is the nature of the conduct upon which adventure, as he would have to do for other
the claim is based. If the conduct is advoca- affirmative defenses.4 “The moving party is
tory, and therefore related to the defendants’ not required to put forth evidence to meet its
prosecutorial function, absolute immunity ap- summary judgment burden for a claim of
plies, and the district court’s rejection of the immunity. It is sufficient that the movant in
claim was not error. good faith pleads that it is entitled to absolute
or qualified immunity.” Beck v. Tex. Bd. of
A. Dental Exam’rs, 204 F.3d 629, 633 (5th Cir.
Cousin maintains that Berry and Jordan 2000). “Once the [movant] asserts this affir-
coerced and intimidated Rowell so that he mative defense, the burden shifts to the plain-
would give false trial testimony that would tiff to rebut it.” Id. at 633-34 (quoting What-
implicate Cousin in the Gerardi murder. There ley v. Philo, 817 F.2d 19, 20 (5th Cir.1987))
is no indication in Cousin’s complaint, how- (internal quotation marks omitted).
ever, that he alleged a coerced testimony claim
concerning Rowell. Although this complete Defendants asserted, in their summary judg-
failure seems logically to support dismissal for ment motion, that they are entitled to absolute
failure to state a claim, defendants appear to immunity. Accordingly, the burden shifted to
have assumed, in moving for dismissal or Cousin to introduce summary judgment evi-
summary judgment, that Cousin had asserted dence that would permit a reasonable trier of
such a claim; they did not seek dismissal on the fact to find that, when Jordan allegedly told
ground that he had not. And Cousin and Rowell to lie, Jordan was functioning as the
defendants briefed the claim as though it had equivalent of a detective rather than as an
been pleaded. We therefore will not affirm on
the basis of rule 12(b)(6). Defendants, how-
ever, also moved for summary judgment,
3
which we conclude is warranted, because the (...continued)
record establishes that Jordan and Berry3 were position, that he had been present once when Jor-
dan and Rowell met.
4
Cf. Chaplin v. NationsCredit Corp., 307
3
Because the summary judgment evidence F.3d 368, 372 (5th Cir. 2002) (“To obtain
shows that Berry’s involvement was exceedingly summary judgment, ‘if the movant bears the
limited, we restrict our discussion to Jordan. Row- burden of proof on an issue . . . because . . . as a
ell did not refer to Berry in his declaration; in his defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he
trial testimony, he stated that, on one occasion, must establish beyond peradventure all of the
another district attorney had accompanied Jordan essential elements of the . . . defense to warrant
to meet with him. Although Rowell could not iden- judgment in his favor.’” (quoting Fontenot v.
tify the individual, Berry confirmed, in his de- Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986))
(continued...) (omissions in original)).

5
advocate preparing for trial.5 used in evaluating the advocatory nature of
prosecutorial conduct.6
2.
Citing Buckley, Cousin contends that the “There is a difference between the advo-
interrogation of Rowell constitutes investiga- cate’s role in evaluating evidence and inter-
tory activity, because Jordan was seeking to viewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on
acquire evidence for later presentation at trial. the one hand, and the detective’s role in
In Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, however, the searching for the clues and corroboration that
prosecutors sought to develop evidence, in the might give him probable cause to recommend
absence of probable cause, to arrest the sus- that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand.”
pect or initiate judicial proceedings. Although Id. at 273. In this case, therefore, the question
Buckley did not explicitly hold that all witness of absolute immunity turns on whether Cousin
interviews conducted after indictment are ad- had been identified as a suspect at the time
vocatory in nature, the Court’s reasoning Rowell was interviewed and whether the in-
strongly indicates that many, perhaps most, terview related to testimony to be presented at
such interviews are likely to be advocatory trial.
rather than investigative.
In response to the summary judgment mo-
In Buckley, the Court focused on the lack tion, Cousin cited Rowell’s trial testimony7
of probable cause to arrest the suspect as an
indication of the investigative nature of the 6
prosecutors’ conduct and noted that “[a] pro- Cousin cites Moore v. Valder, 65 F.3d 189,
secutor neither is nor should consider himself 194 (D.C. Cir. 1996), which held that absolute im-
munity is inapplicable with respect to allegations of
to be, an advocate before he has probable
witness tampering, because such activity is directed
cause to have anyone arrested.” Id. The nec-
at “the collection of information to be used in a
essary implication is that after probable cause prosecution.” Moore, however, is inconsistent with
has been established, it is more likely that the Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196, 201 (5th Cir.
prosecutor acts as an advocate. Although the 1995), in which we held that the prosecutor
Court noted that a determination of probable retained his absolute immunity even in the face of
cause “does not guarantee a prosecutor abso- allegations that he had directed the intimidation of
lute immunity from liability for all actions tak- witnesses in an effort to suppress their testimony.
en afterwards,” id. at 274 n.5, the Court’s Further, the conclusion of the District of Columbia
treatment of the issue demonstrates that the Circuit, in Moore, that the collection of
existence of probable cause with respect to a information for use in a prosecution is necessarily
particular suspect is a significant factor to be investigative rather than advocatory conduct dem-
onstrates a much narrower conception of the ad-
vocatory role than is justified by Imbler, in which
the Court explicitly recognized that “[p]reparation,
5
See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273 (“We have not both for the initiation of the criminal process and
retreated, however, from the principle that acts un- for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing,
dertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the and evaluating of evidence.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at
initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and 431 n.33 (emphasis added).
which occur in the course of his role as an advocate
7
for the State, are entitled to the protections of Rowell’s trial testimony included an in-
absolute immunity.”). (continued...)

6
and a declaration from Rowell. Rowell’s trial Rowell’s declaration, however, eliminates
testimony addresses in detail his allegations this ambiguity and establishes, without genuine
that prosecutor Jordan and his defense coun- dispute, that Jordan was functioning as an
sel, George Simino, told him to lie about Cou- advocate when he allegedly instructed Rowell
sin to avoid a lengthy sentence for armed to lie. Rowell makes it plain that, before he
robbery. and Jordan ever met, he had already talked to
the police, Simino had already advised him that
It is uncertain from this evidence whether he “needed to give up Shareef on the murder,”
Cousin had already been charged or arrested at and Jordan had already talked with Simino. It
the time of the events alleged. On the one also demonstrates that, when Jordan met with
hand, Rowell seemed to aver that Simino and Rowell, he did so to tell him how he should
Jordan had given him these instructions after testify in court and to rehearse his testimony
Cousin had already been charged with mur- with him. Rowell stated, in relevant part:
der.8 On the other hand, Rowell testified that
when he spoke with two homicide detectives, 2. In my initial statements to the
he had already been told to lie.9 This suggests police, I never said nothing in that state-
that Jordan was still functioning as an investi- ment about no murder because I didn’t
gator, and it might permit a reasonable trier of know anything about it. Later, George
fact to find in Cousin’s favor on the immunity Simno [sic], my lawyer, came to me and
issue. told me I was looking at a [sic] 800
years unless I had something for them
on Shareef committing the murder.
Simno told me, “then you’d get 15
7
years, otherwise life.” I argued about
(...continued)
taking the 15 years and being able to tell
chambers conference that involved the state court,
them nothing since I did not know any-
counsel for the parties, and Rowell. The confer-
ence appeared to relate primarily to admonitions thing. Simno insisted, “you need to give
from the court and from counsel that Rowell not up Shareef on the murder to get the 15
cause a mistrial by testifying about other bad acts years.” It was clear from this exchange
that Cousin had committed. Rowell foreshadowed that he had talked to the prosecutor
in chambers, however, what he would later assert (who turned out to be Jordan) before he
in court: that the district attor ney and Rowell’s ever brought the issue up with me.
attorney had instructed him to implicate Cousin
falsely. 3. I met with Roger Jordan two
8
times. Jordan provided me with the
Rowell testified, “My lawyer came to me with questions I would be asked in court and
a file, and he said the only [w]ay I can get you less- the answers, always telling me “the main
er time is if I testify against Shareef Cousin on a
thing is just to emphasize how Shareef
murder charge.”
was bragging to you all about doing the
9
The colloquy was as follows: “[Question:] murder.” During the time before trial, I
Now, do you also remember telling homicide de- was housed at OPP and would get “at-
tectives . . . about this conversation you had with torney visit” callouts. I would be es-
Shareef Cousin on March 4, 1995? [Answer:] corted to a visitation room at OPP and
I only told them what you all told me to say.”

7
 find Jordan waiting for me there. We B.
would practice what I should say there. Cousin alleges that the prosecution sup-
pressed significant exculpatory evidence in vi-
* * * olation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). Cousin notes Berry’s and Jordan’s
5. Jordan told me to lie about failure to disclose that Babin, the witness who
whether I had a deal with the State. But identified Cousin as the perpetrator, had poor
I knew that the reason my sentencing vision and was not wearing her glasses or con-
date kept getting moved back was to tacts at the time of the murder and that, as a
make sure that it would occur after the result, her subsequent identification of Cousin
trial date, so they could hold that over was suspect. Cousin also alleges that the pro-
me. I knew I had a deal, and they knew secutors failed to disclose information linking
it too. If I testified for them, I would other potential suspects to the crime. Al-
get 15 years. Jordan tried to get me to though these allegations, if true, would estab-
lie on a number of points. He was not lish prosecutorial misconduct, the suppression
asking me what I was going to say; he of exculpatory evidence is shielded by absolute
was telling me what to say. immunity.11

* * * Cousin concedes that absolute immunity
generally applies to Brady violations, but he
(Emphasis added.) notes that prosecutors are not shielded from
liability for conduct beyond the scope of their
The record therefore demonstrates that, at jurisdiction; he contends that, in cases of dras-
the time of Jordan’s (and of Simino’s) conver- tic and systematic departure from the proper
sations with Rowell, in which Jordan allegedly exercise of prosecutorial power, prosecutors
told Rowell to implicate Cousin falsely in the should be deemed to have acted without jur-
murder and co ached him on how to testify, isdiction. In effect, Cousin argues for an egre-
Jordan was acting as an advocate rather than giousness exception to the doctrine of prose-
as an investigator. The interview was intended cutorial immunity.
to secure evidence that would be used in the
presentation of the state’s case at the pending For purposes of immunity determinations,
trial of an already identified suspect, not to however, the presence or absence of jurisdic-
identify a suspect or establish probable cause.10 tion is determined with reference to whether
Jordan therefore is entitled to absolute immu- the challenged activity falls within the category
nity with respect to this claim. of conduct in which a prosecutor is generally
authorized to engage, rather than with refer-
ence to the wrongful nature or excessiveness
10
See Hill v. City of New York, 45 F.3d 653,
662-63 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that the existence
11
of probable cause determines whether fabrication See Henzel v. Gerstein, 608 F.2d 654, 657
is investigatory or advocatory); see also Milstein (5th Cir. 1979); see also Reid v. New Hampshire,
v. Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001) 56 F.3d 332, 336 (1st Cir. 1995); Robinson v.
(holding fabrication not protected because no Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1373 n.4
probable cause). (10th Cir. 1991).

8
of the conduct.12 Wilful or malicious prosecu- have discussed.13
torial misconduct is egregious by definition,
yet prosecutors are absolutely immune from D.
liability for such conduct if it occurs in the ex- Cousin’s final claim of prosecutorial mis-
ercise of their advocatory function. See Im- conduct relates to the alleged detention of sev-
bler, 424 U.S. at 430. eral defense witnesses. Cousin contends that
during trial, Barry and Jordan, without inform-
Absent immunity, the specter of litigation ing the defense, either directly or through in-
could undermine prosecutors’ ability to exer- termediaries, instructed several defense wit-
cise their independent judgment with respect nesses to proceed to the district attorney’s of-
to the initiation and conduct of criminal pro- fice and remain there for the duration of the
ceedings. See id. at 422-28. In essence, the trial. Cousin further avers that, as a result of
existence of the doctrine of absolute prosecu- such interference, he was unable to locate
torial immunity represents a determination that those witnesses and present their testimony,
the need for “vigorous and fearless perfor- depriving him of the right to call witness on his
mance of the prosecutor’s duty,” id. at 427, own behalf, a right that has “long been rec-
justifies its regrettable but necessary cost, ognized as essential to due process.” Cham-
namely, that it may sometimes bar the court- bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
house door to potentially meritorious claims.
We decline to adopt an exception to the doc- The district court held that this conduct,
trine of prosecutorial immunity that upsets that occurring as it did during the trial, was prose-
balance. cutorial in nature and therefore shielded by ab-
solute immunity. Cousin contends the court
C. erred and that, despite the pendency of a judi-
Cousin also challenges Berry’ s and Jor- cial proceeding, the relocation of the witnesses
dan’s allegedly unlawful use of subpoenas to was administrative action to which absolute
interrogate several potential witnesses. Even prosecutorial immunity does not apply.
if these individuals were unlawfully forced to
discuss the case with the prosecution, how- Cousin correctly notes that, because the
ever, Cousin, at most, has alleged a violation test for absolute immunity is functional rather
of their constitutional rights, not his own. Al- than temporal, the mere fact that prosecutors
though Cousin’s constitutional rights may have engage in certain conduct during trial should
been violated by Berry’s and Jordan’s sub- not render them immune. What Cousin fails to
sequent decision to suppress exculpatory acknowledge, however, is that the timing of
evidence obt ained through the use of these events, while not determinative, can be highly
subpoenas, the suppression of exculpatory evi- relevant to the inquiry into function.14 The
dence is shielded by absolute immunity, as we

13
See Henzel, 608 F.2d at 657; see also Reid,
56 F.3d at 336; Robinson, 940 F.2d at 1373 n.4.
12 14
See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 337 (5th See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274 (considering
Cir. 1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. stage of criminal justice process in determining
349, 356-57 (1978)). (continued...)

9
pendency of a judicial proceeding is logically
related to the determination whether a prosecu-
tor’s “activities [are] intimately associated with This result comports with our treatment of
the judicial phase of the criminal process, and other improper attempts to control witness
thus [are] functions to which the reasons for testimony and the presentation of evidence at
absolute immunity apply with full force.” trial.17 Further, the contrary rule would have
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430.15 the anomalous result of extending absolute im-
munity to the prosecutor who silences a wit-
The question of absolute immunity there- ness through coercion or intimidation,
fore turns on whether, given the pending crim- Brandley, 64 F.3d at 201, but denying it to the
inal trial, Berry and Jordan undertook the de- prosecutor who achieves the same result
tention of these witnesses pursuant to their through deceit.
role as advocates. Because their conduct was
directly related to the trial process, was en- IV.
tered into in the context of an ongoing trial, Cousin challenges the summary judgment
and was designed to secure a conviction, it for Connick that was based on qualified
cannot be characterized as anything other than immunity. We review a summary judgment de
advocatory. Therefore, the detention of wit- novo. Green v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., 286
nesses to prevent them from testifying in crim- F.3d 281, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 123
inal proceedings, while unlawful and improper, S. Ct. 132 (2002).
is nonetheless shielded by absolute immunity.16
Even when viewed in the light most
14
favorable to Cousin, the evidence does not
(...continued) raise a genuine issue of material fact. To
functional characterization of the conduct); see
succeed on his claim of failure to train or
also Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir.
supervise, Cousin must demonstrate that “1)
1994) (considering pendency of judicial pro-
ceedings in making immunity determination). the [defendant] failed to train or supervise the
officers involved; 2) there is a causal
15
See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662 (immunity appli- connection between the alleged failure to
cable because conduct occurred “after the prose- supervise or train and the alleged violation of
cutorial phase of the case had begun”); Carter, 34 the plaintiff’s rights; and 3) the failure to train
F.3d at 263 (holding pendency of post-conviction or supervise constituted deliberate indifference
judicial proceedings relevant to immunity deter- to the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
mination); see also Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011 Thompson v. Upshur County, 245 F.3d 447,
(holding conduct unprotected because it occurred
before empanelment of grand jury or determination
of probable cause).
16
(...continued)
16
See House v. Belford, 956 F.2d 711, 721-22 solute immunity despite allegations of witness in-
(7th Cir. 1992) (finding prosecutor entitled to abso- timidation in attempt to suppress testimony).
lute immunity where he denied that he had in-
17
structed deputy to bar courtroom to defendant’s Brandley, 64 F.3d at 201 (witness intimi-
family and potential witnesses); cf. Brandley, 64 dation); Henzel, 608 F.2d at 657 (suppression of
F.3d at 201 (holding that prosecutor retained ab- exculpatory evidence and introduction of perjured
(continued...) testimony).

10
459 (5th Cir. 2001). To satisfy the deliberate training program was adequate. Therefore, it
indifference prong, a plaintiff usually must is his failure to impose sanctions on
demonstrate a pattern of violations and that prosecutors responsible for Brady violations
the inadequacy of the training is “obvious and that must be shown to render his supervision
obviously likely to result in a constitutional inadequate.
violation. Id.
Connick’s enforcement of the policy was
Cousin’s evidence is insufficient to create a not patently inadequate or likely to result in
genuine issue of material fact as to whether constitutional violations. Where prosecutors
Connick’s alleged failure to sufficiently commit Brady violations, convictions may be
enforce the office’s Brady policy constituted overturned. That could be a sufficient
deliberate indifference to the violation of deterrent, such that the imposition of
constitutional rights. As evidence of a pattern additional sanctions by Connick is
of constitutional violations, Cousin relies unnecessary.
primarily on cases in which courts have found
that prosecutors under Connick’s supervision Further, prosecutors exercise independent
failed to disclose exculpatory evidence as re- judgment in trying a case, and they have the
quired by Brady. The district court noted that legal and ethical obligation to comply with
Connick’s office handled tens of thousands of Brady. It is not apparent that these
criminal cases over the relevant time period, prosecutors, who, Cousin concedes, are
and we agree with the court’s conclusion that adequately trained with respect to Brady
citation to a small number of cases, out of requirements, are so likely to violate their
thousands handled over twenty-five years, individual obligations that the threat of
does not create a triable issue of fact with re- additional sanctions is required.
spect to Connick’s deliberate indifference to
violations of Brady rights.18 AFFIRMED.

In any event, Cousin also failed to
demonstrate that the training or supervision
obviously was inadequate and plainly would
result in violations of constitutional rights. As
Cousin concedes, Connick’s policy and

18
On this point, Cousin also points to state-
ments by Connick and other attorneys with respect
to Brady rights, an open letter from a judge to the
office of the district attorney expressing concern
over its discovery practices, and evidence that Con-
nick promoted Jordan despite Jordan’s prior Brady
violations. Even taken together, these pieces of ev-
idence do not create a genuine issue with respect to
a pattern of Brady violations sufficient to establish
deliberate indifference.

11