Cremer v. Cremer Rodeo Land and Livestock Co.

No. 80-170
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1981

KATHRYN B. CREMER, a Special Administratrix
of the Estate of Cornelius M. Cremer, Deceased,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

CREMER RODEO LAND AND LIVESTOCK CO.,
AND LEO J. CREMER, JR.,
Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Sweet Grass,
The Honorable Joseph Gary, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:

William R. Morse, Absarokee, Montana
Arnold R. Berger, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Pedersen, Herndon, Harper & Munro, Billings,
Montana

Submitted on Briefs: January 22, 1931
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f
the Court.

Cremer Rodeo Land and L i v e s t o c k Company a p p e a l s t h e

j u r y v e r d i c t and j u d g m e n t o f a S w e e t G r a s s C o u n t y D i s t r i c t

Court awarding c e r t a i n r e a l p r o p e r t y t o p l a i n t i f f .

K a t h r y n C r e m e r , t h e widow o f C o r n e l i u s Cremer and t h e

special administratrix of his estate, brought this cause

originally to impose a constructive trust and compel the

Cremer Rodeo Land and L i v e s t o c k Company t o d e e d c e r t a i n l a n d

t o her l a t e husband's estate. I n Cremer v. Cremer Rodeo

Land and L i v e s t o c k Co. (1979), Mont. , 592 P.2d

485, 36 St.Rep. 541, this Court held, inter alia, that

K a t h r y n Cremer had p r e s e n t e d a s u f f i c i e n t c a s e of adverse

possession t o submit t o t h e jury. The c a u s e was r e v e r s e d

and remanded f o r a new t r i a l .

On remand a S w e e t G r a s s C o u n t y j u r y f o u n d i n f a v o r o f

Kathryn Cremer on the adverse possession claim, and the

District Court awarded her the real property in issue

pursuant t o t h a t verdict. The company a p p e a l s .

Leo J . Cremer, Sr., and C o r n e l i u s ( C o r n y ) M. Cremer

e n j o y e d c l o s e b r o t h e r l y and b u s i n e s s r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Their

f a t h e r , J o h n C r e m e r , who l i v e d i n Wisconsin, died i n 1936.

Their mother died five years later. After the death of

their mother, another brother, Glynn Cremer, informally

distributed what remained of their father 's estate.

Plaintiff, Corny's s u r v i v i n g s p o u s e , c l a i m s t h a t Leo, Sr.,

r e c e i v e d C o r n y ' s s h a r e o f t h e e s t a t e and u s e d i t t o p u r c h a s e

the land subject of this action which is described as

E1/2 o f S e c . 3 4 , Township 5 N o r t h , Range 1 5 E a s t , M.P.M.

The O c t o b e r 1 4 , 1 9 4 4 , d e e d f r o m t h e p r e v i o u s owner o f

the land, J. Arvid C a r l s o n , named the "Cremer Rodeo, Land
and L i v e s t o c k Company," a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n owned by Leo

Cremer, Sr., as the grantee. The deed was executed in

Merrick County, Nebraska. Plaintiff c l a i m s t h a t Leo, Sr.,

intended t o c o n v e y t h i s l a n d t o Corny b u t f a i l e d t o d o s o

prior t o h i s death i n 1953. She a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t Leo,

Sr.'s, widow, Bertha, delivered a deed to Corny shortly

a f t e r Leo, S r . ' s , d e a t h , b u t t h a t i t was s u b s e q u e n t l y l o s t

i n a lawyer's o f f i c e i n Helena.

Corny, Kathryn, and t h e i r f a m i l y o c c u p i e d , used and

p a i d t a x e s on t h e l a n d f r o m 1947 u n t i l a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1974.

A t t h a t p o i n t i t was d i s c o v e r e d t h a t Leo C r e m e r , J r . , acting

on b e h a l f of t h e company, had e n t e r e d i n t o a n o i l and g a s

lease of Section 34. Upon the death of Corny in 1975,

plaintiff demanded a d e e d t o S e c t i o n 3 4 , a n d , when no d e e d

was d e l i v e r e d , t h i s a c t i o n e n s u e d .

The Cremer Rodeo Land and L i v e s t o c k Company raises

t h e following i s s u e s f o r our review:

1. Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y

on p e r m i s s i v e u s e i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n ?

2. Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y

on t h e d e f e n s e o f l a c h e s ?

3. Did t h e c o u r t e r r i n f a i l i n g t o i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y

on t h e d e f e n s e o f e s t o p p e l ?

4. Was there sufficient evidence of damage to

support t h e v e r d i c t o f $10,000?

The company m a i n t a i n s t h a t i t was reversible error

f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o r e f u s e i t s o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s on

permissive use. W e disagree. I n s o f i n d i n g , our a n a l y s i s

o f t h e r e c o r d f i n d s it w a n t i n g o f any c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t h a t

C o r n e l i u s Cremer ever received express permission to use
Section 34.
This Court has long held and consistently affirmed
the rule that ' [o]rdinarily
I a party has the right to
instructions adaptable to his theory of the case." Meinecke
v. Skaggs (1949), 123 Mont. 308, 313, 213 P.2d 237, 240.
Affirmed, Wollan v. Lord (1963), 142 Mont. 498, 385 P.2d
102. The Meinecke rule is not absolute, however, and this
Court remains mindful of its limitations. In Gunderson v.
Brewster (1970), 154 Mont. 405, 411, 466 P.2d 589, 592, Mr.
Chief Justice Harrison wrote that the "right to instructions
adaptable to a party's theory of the case if there be
credible evidence thereon, belongs to both parties, not just
to one. " Emphasis supplied.
The facts of this case are not uncommon. Family
relationships that proceed through generations on a friendly
and amicable basis frequently become adverse, with familial
tolerance being cast aside over the prospect of enriching
financial position. Although Leo Cremer, Jr ., asserts that
Cornelius Cremer occupied Section 34 with the permission of
the company, his proof does not reveal that express
permission was ever granted.
Implied acquiescence is not the same as permission.
Weldon v. Heron (1967), 78 N.M. 427, 432 P.2d 392;
Ivons-Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe (1964), 347 Mass. 760, 200 N.E.2d
282. On the contrary, possession has been held to be
adverse where possession was with forbearance of the title
holder who was aware of another's possession and failed to
prohibit it. Weldon v. Heron, supra, citing Myran v. Smith
(1931), 117 Cal.App. 355, 4 P.2d 219. Therefore, possession
may be adverse even though the owner does not interfere with
e n t r y and the possessor understands t h a t there w i l l be no

future interference with his possession. Hoelmer v.

H e i s k e l l ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 359 Mo. 2 3 6 , 221 S.W.2d 142.

In 1949 t h e M i n n e s o t a c o u r t capsulized the crucial

distinction between "acquiescence" and "permission" as it

e x i s t s w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e law of a d v e r s e p o s s e s s i o n :

". . . I t m u s t be a p p a r e n t , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t
' a c q u i e s c e n c e ' and ' p e r m i s s i o n ' a s u s e d i n
this connection are not synonymous.
' A c q u i e s c e n c e , ' r e g a r d l e s s o f what i t m i g h t
mean o t h e r w i s e , means, when u s e d i n t h i s
c o n n e c t i o n , p a s s i v e c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t o f
t h e owner o f t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e c o n s i s t i n g
of f a i l u r e on h i s p a r t t o a s s e r t h i s
paramount r i g h t s a g a i n s t t h e i n v a s i o n t h e r e o f
by t h e a d v e r s e u s e r . ' P e r m i s s i o n ' means more
t h a n mere a c q u i e s c e n c e ; i t d e n o t e s t h e g r a n t
of a permission i n f a c t o r a l i c e n s e .
N a p o r r a v . Weckwerth, 1 7 8 Minn. 2 0 3 , 226 N.W.
5 6 9 , 65 A . L . R . 124. See, D a r t n e l l v.
B i d w e l l , 1 1 5 Me. 227, 98 A . 7 4 3 , 5 A . L . R .
1 3 2 0 ; D a v i s v . W i l k i n s o n , 1 4 0 Va. 6 7 2 , 1 2 5
S.E. 700.

" I n t h e c a s e of p e r m i s s i v e u s e , t h e u s e r is
u n d e r t h e owner o f t h e s e r v i e n t e s t a t e ; i n a
c a s e of a c q u i e s c e n c e , i t i s a g a i n s t him.
S e e , Z o l l i n g e r v . F r a n k , 1 1 0 Utah 5 1 4 , 1 7 5
P.2d 714, 170 A.L.R. 770." Dozier v.
K r m p o t i c h ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 227 Minn. 5 0 3 , 5 0 7 , 35
N.W.2d 6 9 6 , 699; r e a f f i r m e d , E h l e v . P r o s s e r
( 1 9 7 2 ) , 293 Minn. 1 8 3 , 1 9 7 N.W.2d 458.

In sum we have reviewed the evidence produced at

trial and find no evidence of permissive use. Cornelius

Cremer t r e a t e d t h e l a n d h e p o s s e s s e d a s h i s own, p a i d t a x e s

on t h e p r o p e r t y , and improved t h e p r o p e r t y . I n t h e absence

of any evidence supporting this portion of the company's

c a s e , w e f i n d t h a t no r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r c o u l d h a v e o c c u r r e d

as a result of the District Court's refusal to give a

permissive use i n s t r u c t i o n .

T h i s Court t a k e s n o t e of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e company

opposed p l a i n t i f f ' s offered i n s t r u c t i o n covering permissive
use f o r t h e reason t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n d e f i n i n g a " h o s t i l e "

holding covered the same subject matter. The company's

reasoning is e q u a l l y a p p l i c a b l e t o i t s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n

on p e r m i s s i v e u s e .

The company also asserts that the District Court

erred in failing to instruct the jury on t h e d e f e n s e s of

laches and estoppel. We find, however, that these legal

i s s u e s were p r e v i o u s l y d e c i d e d by t h i s C o u r t , and i t was n o t

error for the instructions t o be refused. S e e F i s c u s v.

Beartooth Electric Cooperative, Inc. (1979), Mont .
, 5 9 1 P.2d 1 9 6 , 36 S t . R e p . 333.

"The r u l e i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d and l o n g
a d h e r e d t o i n t h i s s t a t e t h a t w h e r e , upon a n
a p p e a l , t h e Supreme C o u r t , i n d e c i d i n g a c a s e
presented s t a t e s i n its opinion a principle
o r r u l e of law n e c e s s a r y t o t h e d e c i s i o n ,
s u c h p r o n o u n c e m e n t becomes t h e l a w o f t h e
c a s e , and m u s t be a d h e r e d t o t h r o u g h o u t i t s
subsequent progress, both i n t h e t r i a l court
a n d upon subsequent appeal; and t h i s ,
a l t h o u g h upon i t s s u b s e q u e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n
t h e Supreme C o u r t may be c l e a r l y o f o p i n i o n
t h a t t h e former d e c i s i o n is erroneous . . .
it is a final adjudication from t h e
c o n s e q u e n c e s o f w h i c h t h i s C o u r t may n o t
d e p a r t , nor t h e p a r t i e s r e l i e v e themselves
[citing cases]." C a r l s o n v. N o r t h e r n Pac. R.
Co. ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 86 Mont. 7 8 , 8 1 , 281 P. 9 1 3 , 914.

Our f i r s t o p i n i o n s t a t e d t h e l a w o f t h e c a s e on t h e s e

issues. It was binding upon the trial court and i s now

b i n d i n g upon u s . A n d e r s o n v. B o r d e r ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 4 , 285

P. 174; A p p l e v. Edwards ( 1 9 4 9 ) , 1 2 3 Mont. 135, 211 P.2d

Our r e v i e w o f t h e f i r s t Cremer o p i n i o n c o m p e l s u s t o

find that the trial of this case did not change its
character in s u c h a way as to free us from o u r original

decision. T h i s C o u r t ' s r u l i n g t h a t " t h i s is n o t a c a s e f o r

the application of" t h e e q u i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s of laches or
e s t o p p e l c o n t i n u e s t o be v a l i d , and w e a r e n o t a t l i b e r t y t o

find error in the District Court's refusal t o instruct the

j u r y on t h e s e t h e o r i e s .

Appellant's final assignment of error alleges that

t h e r e was i n s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e o f t h e amount o f damages t o

s u s t a i n t h e $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 v e r d i c t a g a i n s t t h e company. Our r e v i e w

of t h e r e c o r d p e r s u a d e s u s t h a t t h e r e was i n d e e d s u f f i c i e n t

evidence to support the jury's finding of damages in the

amount o f $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 .

The following evidence was adduced at trial: Leo

Cremer, Jr., t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had r e c e i v e d $1.00 p e r a c r e

i n d e l a y r e n t a l s f o r a p e r i o d of r o u g h l y s e v e n y e a r s . Based

on t h a t t e s t i m o n y t h e j u r y d e t e r m i n e d t h a t Leo C r e m e r , J r . ,

a c t i n g on b e h a l f o f t h e company, r e c e i v e d $320 p e r y e a r f r o m

the delay rentals involving Section 34, and, therefore,

d u r i n g a seven-year p e r i o d t h e company's t o t a l r e c e i p t s from

t h i s s o u r c e would b e i n t h e n e i g h b o r h o o d o f $ 2 , 3 0 0 .

Bill Cremer, grandson of Kathryn Cremer and her

lessee until her ouster in 1977, testified with

particularity about his gross income from S e c t i o n 34 and

the expenses he had incurred in the realization of that

income. He testified that the property had yielded an

average annual n e t income o f $3,862 i n t h e y e a r s he farmed

S e c t i o n 34. By r e a s o n o f the ouster, t h e C o r n e l i u s Cremer

family missed two h a r v e s t s and m a i n t a i n e d t h a t t h e damage

s u s t a i n e d i n l o s t p r o f i t s was $ 7 , 7 2 4 .

When t h e amount o f d e l a y r e n t a l r e c e i p t s i s a d d e d t o

t h e amount of lost profits, t h e $10,000 f i g u r e is a r r i v e d

at.

T h i s C o u r t h a s l o n g h e l d t h a t a judgment f o r damages
must be supported by substantial evidence that is not the
product of mere guess or speculation. See Bjerum v. Wieber
(1967), 149 Mont. 375, 427 P.2d 62. We observe that there
is no uncertainty as to the existence of substantial
damages. Indeed, such damages exist whenever the owner of
property is deprived of the use of that property. Recovery
of damages will not be denied, even if the mathematical
precision of the figure is challenged, provided the evidence
is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis for determining
the specific amount awarded. Accord, Jacquel ine ' s
Washington, Inc. v. Mercantile Stores Co. (1972), 80 Wash.2d
784, 498 P.2d 870. We have reviewed the evidence regarding
the amount of damage incurred by respondent and find the
evidence sufficient to support the verdict.
Accordingly, we affirm.

/

We concur: