United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-2732
EILEEN CROWLEY,
Plaintiff, Appellee,
v.
L.L. BEAN, INC.,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. Gene Carter, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Gibson* and Greenberg,** Senior Circuit Judges.
Peter J. Brann with whom Daniel A. Nuzzi, Kevin J. Beal and
Brann & Isaacson were on brief for appellant.
Rebecca S.K. Webber with whom Linnell, Choate & Webber were on
brief for appellee.
Julie L. Gantz with whom Nicholas M. Inzeo, Acting Deputy
General Counsel, Philip B. Sklover, Associate General Counsel,
Vincent J. Blackwood, Assistant General Counsel, and Susan L.P.
Starr were on brief for amicus curiae Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission.
September 19, 2002
___________
*Of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
**Of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. This matter comes on before
this court on defendant-appellant L.L. Bean's appeal from the
district court's order entered November 8, 2001, denying its motion
for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new
trial. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the
district court and uphold the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff-
appellee Eileen Crowley.
I. BACKGROUND
We briefly describe the facts at the outset, but discuss
them in greater detail where applicable and essential to explain
our determinations. Since 1992, Crowley has worked for L.L. Bean,
a major catalog retailer based in Freeport, Maine, specializing in
outdoor apparel and merchandise. In 1996, she began working as an
"order picker operator" in L.L. Bean's warehouses and in this
capacity drove 22,000-pound forklift-like machines called
transtackers that collect merchandise for packing and shifting.
Crowley claims that from 1996 until July 1998, her co-worker, Paul
Juhl, stalked and harassed her.
Evidence at trial supported a conclusion that during the
period involved, Juhl engaged in disturbing and sometimes peculiar
behavior around Crowley, including grabbing her foot and massaging
it against her will at an L.L. Bean pool party, continually
following her at work even when they were not scheduled to work in
the same warehouse, physically blocking her path and thereby
forcing her to squeeze by him, giving her gifts designed to let her
know that he was watching her, dancing in the aisles near her,
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waiting in the dark for her to come upon him, following her home,
and even breaking into her house. Crowley reported most of these
incidents to her team leaders or supervisors, but she claims that
L.L. Bean did not take timely effective action to protect her from
Juhl and therefore maintained a hostile work environment. L.L.
Bean finally terminated Juhl's employment, but did so only after
Crowley obtained a permanent court protection order against Juhl in
July 1998.
On December 21, 1998, Crowley filed a complaint with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Maine
Human Rights Commission, claiming that L.L. Bean had engaged in sex
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,
and the Maine Human Rights Act, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 4572
(West 2002). After the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter and the
Maine Human Rights Commission determined that L.L. Bean had not
engaged in either sex discrimination or retaliation, Crowley filed
her complaint in the district court on June 22, 2000, asserting
that L.L. Bean had engaged in sex discrimination in violation of
Title VII and the Maine Human Rights Act predicated on her
assertion that she had been subjected to a hostile work
environment.
The jury trial began on June 5, 2001, and concluded on
June 11, 2001.1 L.L. Bean moved for judgment as a matter of law
1
L.L. Bean unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment before the
trial. See Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.
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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 at the conclusion of Crowley's case-
in-chief and renewed the motion after both parties rested. Before
submitting the case to the jury, the court partially granted the
motion but only as to Crowley's claim for punitive damages under
the Maine Human Rights Act.
After one day of deliberations, the jury returned its
verdict on June 13, 2001, finding that L.L. Bean had violated Title
VII by sexually discriminating against Crowley through acts
occurring on or after February 24, 1998. The February 24, 1998
date was critical because Crowley filed her EEOC claim 300 days
after that date and she was required to file the charge within the
300-day period for it to be timely.2 The jury also found that the
unlawful discrimination was the result of a systemic violation, but
not of a serial violation. The jury found, however, that L.L. Bean
had not violated the Maine Human Rights Act by sexually
discriminating against Crowley through acts occurring on or after
June 22, 1998. The June 22, 1998 date was applicable because the
Maine Human Rights Act has a two-year statute of limitations, and
Crowley initiated this action on June 22, 2000. See Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 5, § 4613(2)(C) (West 2002). Finally, the jury awarded
Me. 2001).
2
The 300-day period was applicable because Maine has an entity
with the authority to grant or seek relief with respect to an
alleged unlawful employment practice. See National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, --- U.S. ---, 122 S. Ct. 2061, 2070
(2002).
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Crowley $215,000 in compensatory damages, but denied her any
punitive damages.
On June 26, 2001, L.L. Bean filed a renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50 and 59. On November 8, 2001, the
district court denied the motion and entered an amended final
judgment. On December 3, 2001, L.L. Bean filed a notice of appeal.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Jurisdiction
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1343, and 1367, and we have jurisdiction over this appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
B. Standard of Review
To the extent that L.L. Bean appeals from the district
court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law, our
review of the district court's ruling is plenary, and we must apply
the same standard that the district court applied in considering
the motion. See Mangla v. Brown Univ., 135 F.3d 80, 82 (1st Cir.
1998). Accordingly, we must "view the evidence in the light most
favorable to [Crowley], drawing all reasonable inferences in [her]
favor." McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 299 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Moreover, we must "resolve all credibility issues
in favor of the verdict." United States v. Scharon, 187 F.3d 17,
21 (1st Cir. 1999).
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Our review, however, "is weighted toward preservation of
the jury verdict," for "we must affirm unless the evidence was so
strongly and overwhelmingly inconsistent with the verdicts that no
reasonable jury could have returned them." Rodowicz v. Mass. Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 36, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also White v. N.H. Dep't
of Corr., 221 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2000) ("Once a jury returns
a verdict, a 'heavy burden' is placed on one who challenges it.").
Indeed, we should "not set aside a jury verdict as a matter of law
unless there was only one conclusion the jury could have reached,"
McMillan, 140 F.3d at 299, and that result was contrary to the
verdict, see White, 221 F.3d at 259 ("We may reverse only if a
reasonable person could not have reached the conclusion of the
jury.").
L.L. Bean argues that in the event that we do not grant
it judgment as a matter of law, we should grant it a new trial
based on juror bias, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and improper
jury instructions. L.L. Bean's motion for a new trial in the
district court predicated on juror bias was "committed to the
discretion of [the] district court." McDonough Power Equip., Inc.
v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S. Ct. 845, 850 (1984).
Therefore, "[i]n reviewing the district court's denial of
appellant['s] request for a new trial, we . . . consider only
whether the district court abused its discretion." Dall v. Coffin,
970 F.2d 964, 969 (1st Cir. 1992).
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We review L.L. Bean's challenge of the district court's
rulings to exclude or admit testimony primarily on an abuse-of-
discretion basis. See Cummings v. Standard Register Co., 265 F.3d
56, 62 (1st Cir. 2001); see also United States v. Sposito, 106 F.3d
1042, 1046 (1st Cir. 1997) ("The proper interpretation of the
Federal Rules of Evidence is a question of law and is reviewed de
novo, but the application of [a rule] . . . is reviewed under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.") (citations omitted); United States
v. Paulino, 13 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 1994) ("The court of appeals
reviews a trial judge's admission of evidence over a hearsay
objection only for abuse of discretion."); Alexis v. McDonald's
Rests. of Mass., Inc., 67 F.3d 341, 347 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Rulings
on the admissibility of lay opinion testimony are reviewed only for
manifest abuse of discretion.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, we should reverse the district court's ruling "if we
determine that the judge 'committed a meaningful error in
judgment.'" Ruiz-Troche v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 161
F.3d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862
F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Finally, we review de novo L.L. Bean's contention that
the district court erroneously instructed the jury on the law
relating to systemic violations. See Romano v. U-Haul Int'l, 233
F.3d 655, 665 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 41 (2001).
"[T]he giving of [a jury] instruction is reversible error only if
it (1) was misleading, unduly complicating, or incorrect as a
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matter of law, and (2) adversely affected the objecting party's
substantial rights." Rodowicz, 279 F.3d at 42.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Judgment as a Matter of Law
L.L. Bean challenges the jury verdict as to both
Crowley's hostile work environment claim and her systemic sex
discrimination claim. It contends that Crowley failed to present
sufficient evidence to support either of the jury's findings.
Crowley argues, however, that L.L. Bean has not met its demanding
burden of demonstrating that no reasonable jury, presented with the
evidence adduced at trial, could have found L.L. Bean liable for
maintaining a hostile work environment and committing a systemic
violation.
1. Hostile Work Environment Claim
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides, in
relevant part, that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Supreme
Court has stated that "'[t]he phrase "terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment" evinces a congressional intent to strike
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in
employment,' which includes requiring people to work in a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment." Harris v.
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Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993) (some
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 2404 (1986)). "When
the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment, Title VII is violated." Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 78, 118 S. Ct. 998, 1001
(1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S.
at 21, 114 S. Ct. at 370).
To prove a claim of hostile work environment sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) that she (or he) is a member of a
protected class; (2) that she was subjected to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the
harassment was based upon sex; (4) that the
harassment was sufficiently severe or
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
plaintiff's employment and create an abusive
work environment; (5) that sexually
objectionable conduct was both objectively and
subjectively offensive, such that a reasonable
person would find it hostile or abusive and
the victim in fact did perceive it to be so;
and (6) that some basis for employer liability
has been established.
O'Rourke v. City of Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001).
L.L. Bean asserts that Crowley presented insufficient evidence at
trial to satisfy three elements of her hostile work environment
claim -- namely, that Crowley perceived Juhl's behavior as
"subjectively abusive," that Juhl's conduct was "severe and
pervasive," and that L.L. Bean knew or should have known about
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Juhl's alleged harassment, but failed to take prompt or appropriate
action to remedy the situation. Br. of Appellant at 18-31.
Before addressing the specifics of each claim, however,
it is important to point out that L.L. Bean predicates its
argument on two critical suppositions: (1) Title VII's
administrative filing requirements precluded the jury from
considering allegations of harassment that occurred before February
24, 1998; and (2) the jury's verdict on the state law claim
established that Crowley was not harassed after June 22, 1998.
Thus, L.L. Bean effectively seeks to cabin Crowley's claim to the
end that it is based only on events occurring during a four-month
period. L.L. Bean then argues that the "handful of incidents" that
occurred during that four-month period between February 24, 1998,
and June 22, 1998, are insufficient to support the jury's verdict.
Br. of Appellant at 6.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, --- U.S. ---, 122 S. Ct. 2061 (2002),
severely undermines L.L. Bean's argument. In Morgan, the Court
held that "consideration of the entire scope of a hostile work
environment claim, including behavior alleged outside the statutory
time period, is permissible for the purposes of assessing
liability, so long as any act contributing to that hostile
environment takes place within the statutory time period." Id. at
---, 122 S. Ct. at 2068. The Court explained that a "hostile work
environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that
collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment practice.'" Id. at
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---, 122 S. Ct. at 2074. Thus, "[p]rovided that an act
contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the
entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by
the court for the purposes of determining liability." Id.
Therefore, in the wake of Morgan, the jury not only could
consider Juhl's conduct prior to February 24, 1998, as "relevant
background evidence," United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553, 558, 97 S. Ct. 1885, 1889 (1977), but also could hold L.L.
Bean liable for the alleged acts of harassment that fell outside
the 300-day period for filing an EEOC charge of sexual
discrimination provided that it found that there was an act
contributing to the hostile environment within the 300-day filing
period.3 Notwithstanding the thrust of L.L. Bean's argument that
Crowley's allegations of harassment included only "a few brief
encounters" between her and Juhl that were "scarcely threatening,"
Br. of Appellant at 24, 31, Crowley offered evidence at trial
establishing that Juhl's harassment began in the fall of 1996 and
continued into July 1998, and thus L.L. Bean's argument is flawed.
Consequently, we must review all such evidence offered at trial
when determining whether the jury verdict is supported by the
evidence.
As we have indicated, L.L. Bean also asserts that we must
disregard any evidence of sexual harassment on or after June 22,
1998, because the jury found that it had not violated the Maine
3
The parties agree that the 300-day filing period was
applicable here with regard to the Title VII claim.
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Human Rights Act by sexually discriminating against her by acts
occurring on or after that date. Although this evidence appears to
be of limited significance inasmuch as Crowley alleges only a few
incidents of alleged harassment by Juhl after June 22, 1998, L.L.
Bean is wrong on this point, too. In basing its argument on the
portion of the jury's verdict that L.L. Bean had not sexually
discriminated against Crowley on or after June 22, 1998, L.L. Bean
assumes that the jury concluded that the hostile work environment
ceased to exist on June 22, 1998.
But the jury's determination that L.L. Bean was not
liable for maintaining a hostile work environment under the state
statute based solely on incidents that occurred on or after June 22
does not mean that the jury was -- and, therefore, this court is --
precluded from considering any evidence relating to Juhl's post-
June 22 conduct when determining L.L. Bean's liability under Title
VII. As Crowley argues in her brief, "[t]he fact that the number
of incidents from June 23 forward do not constitute a violation of
state law by themselves has no logical connection to whether those
incidents can be considered, together with earlier incidents, under
federal law." Br. of Appellee at 17.
Moreover, L.L. Bean draws too many conclusions from the
jury's verdict. For instance, the jury may have found for L.L.
Bean on the state law claim because it concluded that Crowley had
not satisfied the employer liability element of the hostile work
environment claim (perhaps because it decided that L.L. Bean
finally took appropriate remedial measures to end the hostile work
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environment on or after June 22, 1998), not because the jury
believed that Crowley failed to prove that Juhl's conduct on or
after June 22, 1998, was "severe or pervasive." In other words,
the jury may have believed that Crowley was subject to a hostile
work environment on or after June 22, 1998, but that L.L. Bean
nevertheless should not be held liable for Juhl's conduct on or
after that date. Because we have no way of knowing the jury's
reason for rendering its verdict on the state law claim, L.L.
Bean's argument that we cannot consider evidence relating to events
on or after June 22, 1998, must fail. Therefore, we will consider
all of the evidence offered at trial regarding Juhl's harassment
from the fall of 1996 through July of 1998 in determining whether
the evidence supports the jury's verdict that L.L. Bean maintained
a hostile work environment.
a. Subjectively Abusive
L.L. Bean first argues that the jury's verdict should be
overturned because Crowley did not offer any evidence demonstrating
that Juhl's conduct was "subjectively abusive." It asserts that
"[s]ince Crowley did not believe that Juhl was sexually harassing
her until June 23, 1998, . . . Crowley did not subjectively believe
that she was being subjected to a hostile work environment during
the statutory period." Br. of Appellant at 19 (citations to the
record omitted). L.L. Bean seizes on the June 23, 1998 date
because Crowley testified that until that date, she thought the
team leaders adequately were taking care of the Juhl situation and
therefore she had no complaints regarding what L.L. Bean was doing.
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We reject this argument, as L.L. Bean misapprehends what
Crowley was required to "subjectively perceive." As Crowley points
out in her brief, although the victim must subjectively perceive
the harasser's conduct to be "hostile or abusive," the victim need
not subjectively believe that the conduct met the legal definition
of unlawful sexual harassment. See Br. of Appellee at 14. At
trial, Crowley testified that she was frightened and feared for her
safety because Juhl was stalking her. See Tr. 94, 109 (she was
"scared"); 93 (she "was scared to death"); 123, 127, 131 (she was
"shaking"); 127 (she "was breaking down"); 130 (she "felt real
shaky inside"); 146 (she was "[r]eally upset"); 135 (she "felt like
[she] was going to get hurt"). Furthermore, Crowley offered into
evidence a copy of L.L. Bean's written warning to Juhl, in which it
informed Juhl that he has "created a hostile environment in which
[Crowley] felt physically threatened." App. 99.
Therefore, although Crowley may not have realized until
June 1998 that Juhl's conduct actually constituted sexual
harassment, she did present evidence establishing that she earlier
considered Juhl's behavior threatening and hostile. Consequently,
contrary to L.L. Bean's assertion, Crowley presented sufficient
evidence for a rational jury to find that she perceived Juhl's
conduct to be "hostile or abusive."
b. Severe or Pervasive
L.L. Bean next argues that Crowley's "eight encounters"
with Juhl during the four-month period were not objectively "severe
and pervasive" enough to create a hostile work environment,
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insisting that Crowley's allegations "'are so trivial, so isolated,
and so far from the paradigmatic case of sexual harassment' that
judgment as a matter of law is 'clearly appropriate.'" Br. of
Appellant at 20-21 (quoting Hartsell v. Duplex Prod., Inc., 123
F.3d 766, 773 (4th Cir. 1997)). L.L. Bean contends that Crowley's
hostile work environment claim is supported merely by
evidence that Juhl gave her a book, came to
the wrong building where she was working on
three occasions, operated his machine in her
vicinity on occasion (and told her once 'it
will cost you' when she asked him to move),
and came out of a tunnel dancing on one
occasion.
Reply Br. of Appellant at 9. As we explained above, Morgan fatally
undermines this argument, for Crowley's allegations do not merely
include eight incidents, but involve alleged acts of harassment and
stalking that spanned nearly one and a half years. Accordingly, we
will review evidence relating to all of Crowley's allegations --
not just those of acts that occurred between February 24, 1998, and
June 22, 1998 -- to determine whether Juhl's conduct was
sufficiently "severe or pervasive" to constitute actionable
harassment.
Crowley presented the following evidence to support her
hostile work environment claim. In 1996, at an L.L. Bean pool
party, Juhl grabbed her foot and massaged it against her will. He
told her that she was the "perfect woman" and that she had "perfect
women's feet." Juhl also gave Crowley gifts intended to let her
know that he was watching her both at and outside of work. He even
followed her home one evening by turning off his headlights and
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pursuing her car in the dark. At an L.L. Bean party in December
1996, he again stated that Crowley was the perfect woman and
pinpointed the exact location of her house on a map, letting her
know that he knew exactly where she lived. Crowley reported these
incidents to her team leader, David Baker.
In January 1997, Juhl followed Crowley at work and
bothered her, sometimes lurking in the dark outside the women's
bathroom while he waited for her to emerge. He often parked next
to her car in the parking lot and followed her to her car when she
was leaving work. He also used L.L. Bean's hand-held computer
units to track Crowley's movement within the warehouse. Juhl
frequently blocked her in the aisles and forced her to squeeze by
him. Crowley reported all of these incidents to her supervisor,
Tim Marong, who remarked that Juhl was stalking her.
On February 16, 1997, Juhl broke into Crowley's home
while she was there. He tried to get her to touch his clothing,
and he grabbed her wrists in an attempt to bring her upstairs with
him. He not only told her that he wanted to date her, but admitted
that he had been at her house previously and described what outfits
she had been wearing on those occasions. Crowley explained that
she had a boyfriend, but Juhl responded, "but he's never here."
After he finally left, Crowley saw him outside peering in different
windows of her house. She hid in the bathroom until he left.
As she had done previously, Crowley reported this
incident to her supervisors. She told her team leaders, her
supervisor Tim Marong, and L.L. Bean's Human Resources personnel
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that she believed she was being stalked. Indeed, Marong testified
that he thought that Juhl's conduct could have constituted sexual
harassment. Marong contacted Pat Bressette-Long, a Human Resources
supervisor, who met with Crowley several weeks later. Crowley
informed Bressette-Long not only about Juhl's uninvited entry into
her home, but also about his intimidating behavior at work. When
Crowley asked whether she should notify the plant manager, Frank
Johnson, about Juhl's conduct, Bressette-Long advised her not to
break the chain of command, but to continue reporting her
complaints to her immediate supervisor. One month after Crowley
met with Bressette-Long, Juhl was reassigned to a separate work
area.
From March 1997 until the summer of 1997, Juhl continued
to work near Crowley, even when he was scheduled to work elsewhere.
He also continued his familiar conduct of blocking her in the
aisles with his transtacker and dancing near her. She reported
Juhl's disturbing and sometimes bizarre behavior to her team leader
and Human Resources, which assured her that Juhl would be scheduled
to work in a different warehouse. Despite these assurances,
however, in May 1997, L.L. Bean permitted Juhl to volunteer to work
shifts in her warehouse.
During the summer of 1997, Juhl's conduct did not change,
as he kept trying to be near Crowley. He not only continued to
corner her and make her ask him to move out of the way, but also
began hiding in dark areas of the warehouse where Crowley would
come upon him. Crowley notified her team leader, Leo Davis, about
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Juhl's conduct, but he did nothing, even though he promised to
investigate the matter. Meanwhile, Juhl's behavior continued
unabated. In July 1997, he appeared unexpectedly in her work area
15 or more times, lingered around the time clock at the end of
Crowley's shift, and stood close to her on numerous occasions.
During the fall and early winter of 1997, Crowley saw
Juhl so often in her work area that she assumed that they were
working the same shift. She later learned that Juhl actually was
working the wrong shift with management's knowledge. Co-workers
also noticed Juhl's conduct, prompting one witness to remark,
"Wherever she was, he was." In fact, one L.L. Bean witness
testified that he believed Juhl was sexually attracted to Crowley,
explaining that "it was kind of obvious the way he handled
himself."
In January 1998, Crowley briefly was assigned to work an
8:00 a.m.-4:30 p.m. shift and therefore maintained little contact
with Juhl. This respite was short-lived, however, for L.L. Bean
soon placed her back on the third shift with Juhl. She notified
her supervisor, Bob Anderson, that she was scared and asked for a
parking space closer to the building so that she would not be alone
with Juhl. Anderson stated that he was aware of her problems with
Juhl, but that he had to put her back on Juhl's shift for business
reasons.
In February 1998, Juhl's contact with Crowley
intensified. He gave her a book on holistic cancer therapy after
her friend's mother died of cancer. Crowley maintains that Juhl
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could have known about the death of her friend's mother only by
following Crowley. Crowley told her team leaders about the
incident and reported that he had grabbed her hands when he tried
to give her the book. Juhl also drove his transtacker up and down
the aisle, shadowing her movements in the adjacent aisle, and used
his transtacker to block her in aisles. Crowley reported these
incidents to her team leaders, David Baker and Steve McCourt, who
assured her that L.L. Bean was taking her concerns seriously.
In March 1998, L.L. Bean consolidated the first and third
shifts of its distributions operation and consequently transferred
Juhl to the morning shift. Despite being assigned to a different
building, Juhl showed up at Crowley's building on March 30 and 31,
and April 1, 1998. As one co-worker testified, Juhl "would
constantly show up in the wrong building" during March and April
1998, and "was constantly following her all the time, he never
stopped."
In April 1998, Juhl continued showing up in Crowley's
work area, following her, and physically obstructing her from doing
her work. One time, he danced in the aisle in front of her.
Another time, he prevented her from passing, and when she asked him
to let her by, he responded that it would "cost her." When Crowley
reported these incidents to her new team leader, Peter Farley, he
joked about Juhl's conduct and referred to him as her "little
stalker."
From April until June 1998, Crowley's interaction with
Juhl was limited, as the two worked on different shifts. Juhl
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nevertheless loitered around the time clock and the warehouse
entrance, waiting for Crowley to come and go. On June 22, 1998,
Juhl was returned to Crowley's shift. Shortly thereafter, Juhl
lapsed back into his familiar pattern of behavior, blocking her in
the aisles, making her beg him to move, and forcing her to squeeze
by him.
On June 23, 1998, a team leader, Leo Davis, witnessed
Juhl blocking Crowley, but did nothing. Instead, Davis laughed
with Juhl in front of Crowley and then looked at her, smiled, and
left. Furthermore, Ken Libby, a fellow employee, warned supervisor
Anderson that Crowley would end up dead if someone did not do
something to stop Juhl. In addition, Bennett Schlaack, a trainer,
advised three team leaders -- John Andretta, Steve McCourt, and
David Baker -- that Juhl was shadowing Crowley and that he was
concerned for her safety. L.L. Bean, however, took no action.
Frustrated with L.L. Bean's ineffectiveness in protecting her from
Juhl, Crowley went to the police a few days after Davis saw Juhl
block Crowley.
In the meantime, Leo Davis was assigned to investigate a
confrontation between Crowley and Juhl that occurred on the same
day that Davis witnessed Juhl blocking Crowley. Aside from Davis,
two other employees witnessed the incident and reported the matter
to management. Crowley explained to Davis that Juhl's conduct was
longstanding, but Davis indicated to her that L.L. Bean "had to
protect Paul's rights." During the course of Davis's
investigation, Crowley was restricted to the dock area, while Juhl
-20-
enjoyed full access to the warehouse. Notwithstanding Crowley's
complaints, management made no effort to keep Juhl away from
Crowley.
On June 30, 1998, L.L. Bean issued a written warning to
Juhl, stating that he had "created a hostile work environment in
which [Crowley] felt physically threatened" and that his
"threatening, intimidating behavior will not be tolerated." The
warning indicated that Juhl "must take action to avoid further
contact with Eileen Crowley." The Human Resources official who
issued the warning, Rebecca Batchelder, testified that she did not
know that L.L. Bean already had issued a directive in the spring of
1997 requiring that Juhl and Crowley work in separate buildings.
During Davis's investigation when Crowley and Juhl were
separated at work and even after Juhl received his written warning
instructing him to stay away from Crowley, Juhl continued following
Crowley around at work. Sometime after June 24, 1998, Crowley
again complained to her team leader, Peter Farley, that Juhl was
violating the standing order that he and Crowley be kept separated,
but Farley took no action other than to suggest that Crowley have
her boyfriend give Juhl a "blanket party." On July 7, 1998, after
Farley again allowed Juhl and Crowley to work in the same area,
Crowley returned to the police department and obtained a temporary
protection order against Juhl. The police served Juhl with the
order at work on the same day.
Thereafter, L.L. Bean placed Juhl on paid leave pending
the court hearing on Crowley's request for a protection order. On
-21-
July 17, 1998, Crowley obtained a permanent court protection order
against Juhl. On July 24, 1998, L.L. Bean terminated Juhl's
employment.
As is quite evident, Crowley presented evidence relating
to more than just eight innocuous encounters between her and Juhl.
In fact, she provided ample evidence to establish that Juhl engaged
in a longstanding pattern of hostile and intimidating behavior
towards her that spanned over one and a half years. To prevail on
this appeal, L.L. Bean must demonstrate that no reasonable person
could have reached the conclusion of the jury, even after viewing
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Based on the evidence adduced at trial, it cannot be said that a
reasonable person could not have concluded that Juhl's conduct
towards Crowley was "severe or pervasive." Indeed, as the EEOC
wrote in its amicus brief, "by focusing only on the specific
incidents which occurred after February 24, Bean fails to capture
the residual and cumulative effect that Juhl's campaign of
harassment had on Crowley's working conditions even on days when
she did not encounter him." Amicus Br. of EEOC at 21.
Consequently, Crowley presented sufficient evidence at trial to
satisfy this element of her hostile work environment claim.
c. Employer Liability
L.L. Bean finally argues with respect to the hostile work
environment claim that Crowley failed to offer sufficient evidence
to establish employer liability. Although this appears to be L.L.
Bean's best argument to the extent that it challenges the
-22-
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, it nevertheless
is unable to meet the onerous burden of proving that a reasonable
person could not have concluded that, after it learned of Juhl's
behavior, it failed to take appropriate steps to stop Juhl's
harassment and stalking of Crowley.
A plaintiff must satisfy different standards for
establishing employer liability in a hostile work environment case
depending on whether the harasser is a supervisor or co-employee of
the victim. In this case, it is beyond dispute that Juhl and
Crowley were co-employees. To establish employer liability for a
non-supervisory co-employee, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
employer "'knew or should have known of the charged sexual
harassment and failed to implement prompt and appropriate action.'"
White, 221 F.3d at 261 (quoting Blankenship v. Parke Care Ctrs.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 1997)). L.L. Bean maintains that
Crowley did not present sufficient evidence to satisfy either
prong.
i. Whether L.L. Bean Knew or Should Have Known
The evidence offered at trial, if viewed in the light
most favorable to Crowley, clearly supports a jury finding that
L.L. Bean knew or should have known that Juhl was harassing and
stalking Crowley. L.L. Bean bases its misguided argument to the
contrary on its restricted temporal view of the evidence, but as we
explained above, the statute of limitations did not preclude the
jury -- and therefore does not preclude us -- from considering
evidence relating to harassment before February 24, 1998, and the
-23-
jury verdict on the state law claim does not preclude us from
considering evidence relating to harassment on or after June 22,
1998. Therefore, we must consider all of the evidence, from 1996
until July 1998, to determine whether it was sufficient to support
a jury finding that L.L. Bean knew about Juhl's conduct.
Crowley presented ample evidence that she reported Juhl's
behavior to her team leaders, supervisors, and Human Resources.
Crowley began notifying her supervisors of Juhl's disturbing
behavior in 1996, when she informed her team leader, David Baker,
that Juhl was harassing and following her both on and off L.L.
Bean's premises. In January 1997, she told her team leader, John
Andretta, and her supervisor, Tim Marong, that Juhl was bothering
her at work, tracking her movements with the hand-held computers,
waiting for her in the dark outside the women's bathroom, blocking
her in the aisles with his transtacker, and forcing her to squeeze
by him. After Juhl broke into her home in February 1997, she
reported the incident to team leaders Andretta and Steve McCourt,
supervisor Marong, and Human Resources.
In the spring of 1997, Crowley advised her new team
leader, Baker, that Juhl was continuing to show up in her building
and block her in the aisles. In April and May 1997, after Crowley
twice told Human Resources about Juhl's stalking behavior, Human
Resources assured her Juhl would be scheduled for work in a
different warehouse.
In the summer of 1997, Crowley notified her team leader,
Leo Davis, that Juhl always was trying to be near her and that he
-24-
hid in the dark, waiting for her to come upon him. In September
1997, she told her team leader, Keith Menard, that Juhl was showing
up repeatedly in her work area, even though he was working a
different shift.
In January 1998, after being put back on the first shift
with Juhl, Crowley informed her supervisor, Bob Anderson, that she
was scared of Juhl and had concerns about working on the same shift
with him. In February 1998, Crowley reported to her team leaders,
Baker and McCourt, that Juhl was shadowing her movements in his
transtacker. During L.L. Bean's shift consolidation in March 1998,
Crowley complained to Baker that Juhl had come to the wrong
building three days in a row.
In April 1998, Crowley told her new team leader, Peter
Farley, that Juhl was physically blocking her from doing her work,
but Farley laughed about Juhl's behavior and referred to him as her
"little stalker." In late June 1998, Crowley again complained to
Farley that Juhl was violating the standing directive that he and
Crowley be kept separated at work, but Farley did nothing to remedy
the situation. In July 1998, after Juhl was issued a written
warning requiring him to stay away from Crowley but before L.L.
Bean placed him on unpaid leave, Farley allowed Juhl to work in
Crowley's vicinity despite her previous complaints.
In addition to Crowley's repeated complaints to her team
leaders and supervisors about Juhl's conduct, Crowley's co-workers
also reported Juhl's behavior and expressed their concerns for her
safety. See, e.g., Sims v. Health Midwest Physicians Servs. Corp.,
-25-
196 F.3d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Notification of sexual
harassment to an employer need not come solely from the victim of
the harassment for knowledge to be imputed to the employer."). For
instance, Ken Libby, a fellow employee, warned supervisor Anderson
that Crowley would end up dead if someone did not do something to
stop Juhl. Another fellow employee, Alan Coffin, alerted Anderson
to Juhl's odd practice of dancing near Crowley. In addition,
Bennett Schlaack, a trainer, advised three team leaders --
Andretta, McCourt, and Baker -- that Juhl was shadowing Crowley and
that he was concerned for her safety.
Furthermore, Crowley presented evidence that L.L. Bean
managers, team leaders, and supervisors were aware of Juhl's
conduct and that at times they even characterized it as harassment.
For example, after Juhl broke into Crowley's home in February 1997,
Crowley spoke with both her supervisor, Tim Marong, and a Human
Resources supervisor, Pat Bressette-Long. Marong's memo notes that
Crowley "felt that Paul was stalking her," and Bressette-Long's
hand-written notes state that "Eileen Crowley feels like she is
being stalked." The Security Department investigated a complaint
Crowley advanced in May 1997 and described her grievance as a
"sexual harassment complaint" in a document distributed to
"management" -- specifically, to manager Tim Parker. After Crowley
asked her supervisor, Bob Anderson, to put her back on the first
shift in January 1998 because she was concerned about Juhl,
Anderson sent an email to other management personnel stating that
everyone was fully aware of the situation between Crowley and Juhl.
-26-
Crowley's team leader, John Andretta, testified at trial that "it
was obvious everybody knew of the Juhl/Eileen situation and how he
was following her around, always being where she was." Finally,
the written warning to Juhl on June 30, 1998, indicated that he had
"created a hostile work environment in which [Crowley] felt
physically threatened" and that his "threatening, intimidating
behavior will not be tolerated."
At bottom, L.L. Bean's contention that Crowley did not
properly notify management of her complaints because she
"bypass[ed] the reporting requirements under L.L. Bean's harassment
policies," Br. of Appellant at 28, is without merit, for Crowley
and her co-workers repeatedly alerted team leaders and supervisors
about Juhl's conduct. L.L. Bean representatives admitted that the
proper procedure for an employee to report a claim of harassment
was to notify his or her team leader. Once a team leader received
a complaint from an employee, it was the team leader's duty to
report the complaint up the chain of command to his or her
supervisor. Therefore, by maintaining a policy that permitted
workers to report sexual harassment claims to team leaders, L.L.
Bean provided these team leaders with actual authority to receive
notice of sexual harassment complaints on behalf of the company,
and their knowledge was imputed to it. See, e.g., Sims, 196 F.3d
at 920 (stating that "employer liability could attach if
information of the harassment had come to the attention of someone
who is reasonably believed to have a duty to pass on the
information"). As such, Crowley provided sufficient evidence for
-27-
a reasonable jury to find that L.L. Bean knew or should have known
about Juhl's harassment.
ii. Whether L.L. Bean Took Prompt and Appropriate
Action
L.L. Bean contends that the evidence offered at trial did
not support a jury finding that it failed to take prompt and
appropriate remedial action after receiving Crowley's complaints.
In fact, it asserts that "[w]hen Crowley conveyed her concerns
previously to a supervisor or a human resources representative,
L.L. Bean took immediate action." Br. of Appellant at 28. L.L.
Bean argues:
Ultimately, Crowley's argument boils down to a
claim that L.L. Bean is strictly liable for
any encounter between Crowley and Juhl because
its prior warnings to Juhl to stay away from
Crowley and not to bother her, and its prior
actions in separating them, were not 100
percent effective in preventing Crowley and
Juhl from ever crossing paths again. Suffice
it to say, this is not the law.
Id. at 31.
To be sure, reasonable jurors might have agreed with L.L.
Bean's argument that, although its remedial actions were not 100%
effective, it did take prompt and appropriate action and therefore
should not be liable for Juhl's unlawful conduct. There is some
force to its argument that inasmuch as Crowley actually conceded in
her testimony that she was pleased with L.L. Bean's responses to
her complaints prior to June 23, 1998,4 it should escape liability.
4
At trial, the following exchange occurred:
Attorney. And so until June 23, 1998, you
-28-
See Br. of Appellant at 28. Having said that, however, we do not
review the jury's findings de novo, but instead must uphold the
jury verdict unless no reasonable person could have reached its
conclusion.
The jury obviously concluded that L.L. Bean did not take
prompt and appropriate action to protect Crowley from Juhl, and
this conclusion was not unreasonable. Aside from suspending and
eventually terminating Juhl after Crowley obtained a permanent
court protection order against him, the only significant remedial
action L.L. Bean ever took to protect Crowley from Juhl was to
schedule Crowley and Juhl in different buildings or on different
shifts. For instance, after Juhl broke into Crowley's home in
February 1997, Human Resources ordered that Juhl and Crowley be
kept separated. Then, after disregarding numerous complaints by
Crowley over the ensuing year and a half, L.L. Bean finally issued
a written warning to Juhl in June 1998 for "creat[ing] a hostile
thought the team leaders were doing
enough to take care of the
situation with Mr. Juhl; is that
fair to say?
Crowley: Yes.
Attorney: And so you did not have complaints
with what L.L. Bean was doing up
until June 23, 1998?
Crowley: Yes.
Tr. 198.
-29-
work environment in which [Crowley] felt physically threatened" and
ordered him to "take action to avoid further contact with Eileen
Crowley." In short, L.L. Bean adopted the same remedial action in
June 1998 as it had in February 1997, even though (1) the earlier
action had proven ineffective, (2) Crowley repeatedly had
complained to her team leaders and supervisors that Juhl wantonly
ignored the directive, (3) supervisors often failed to abide by the
policy and permitted Juhl and Crowley to work together, and (4) the
cumulative effect of Juhl's conduct over the year-and-a-half period
only had exacerbated the hostile work environment in which Crowley
was forced to work.
Consequently, although L.L. Bean may have made a good
faith effort to implement an effective remedial measure in February
1997, it could not turn a blind eye towards the measure's
ineffectiveness over the following 18 months, only to reinstitute
the same inadequate remedial measure in response to its finding
that Juhl had subjected Crowley to a hostile work environment.
Thus, based on L.L. Bean's pattern of indifference towards
Crowley's complaints about Juhl between February 1997 and June
1998, it cannot be said that a reasonable jury could not find that
L.L. Bean failed to take prompt and appropriate action to protect
Crowley from Juhl.
Furthermore, notwithstanding L.L. Bean's assertion that
it "took immediate action" in response to each of Crowley's
complaints, Crowley offered ample testimony supporting her position
that L.L. Bean ignored many complaints she and her co-workers
-30-
submitted concerning Juhl's behavior. Rather than reiterate each
instance in which L.L. Bean failed to respond to Crowley's
complaints, we simply will direct the parties to our summary of the
evidence above. See supra Part III.A.1.b. There, one will see
that L.L. Bean did not respond to Crowley's complaints to Human
Resources in May 1997, to Leo Davis in the summer of 1997, to Bob
Anderson in January 1998, to David Baker and Steve McCourt in
February 1998, to Peter Farley in April 1998, to Leo Davis again in
June 1998, and to Peter Farley again in June 1998.
In the end, we believe that a determination of whether
L.L. Bean should be liable for Juhl's conduct by reason of its
failure to take prompt and appropriate action to protect Crowley
from Juhl raised a question that the jury might have resolved
either way. As already noted, however, our task is not to
determine whether we agree with the jury's verdict, but to
determine whether a reasonable person could have arrived at its
conclusion. In light of the heavy burden placed on L.L. Bean to
overturn the verdict based on sufficiency of the evidence grounds,
we conclude that Crowley presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable person to conclude that L.L. Bean failed to take prompt
and appropriate action to put an end to Juhl's stalking of Crowley.
Therefore, we will not upset the verdict based on L.L. Bean's
argument that the evidence was insufficient to support it, and
thus, we will not reverse the order of the district court denying
L.L. Bean judgment as a matter of law on this basis.
-31-
2. Systemic Violation Claim
L.L. Bean next challenges the jury's finding that it
committed a systemic violation. It argues that Crowley failed to
present evidence that it maintained a "discriminatory policy or
practice." It also contends that its alleged failure to recognize
that Juhl was stalking and sexually harassing Crowley is not
sufficient to hold it liable for a systemic violation. See Br. of
Appellant at 40.
As already explained, Title VII required Crowley to file
her charge of employment discrimination with the EEOC within 300
days of the alleged sexual harassment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(e)(1). The continuing violation doctrine, however, "creates an
equitable exception to the 300-day limitation when the unlawful
behavior is deemed ongoing." Provencher v. CVS Pharmacy, Div. of
Melville Corp., 145 F.3d 5, 14 (1st Cir. 1998). Traditionally we
have recognized that "[c]ontinuing violations may be serial or
systemic" and have distinguished between such violations. Id.
"Systemic violations occur where an employer maintains a
discriminatory policy, responsible for multiple discriminatory acts
that fall outside the limitations period." Rivera-Rodriguez v.
Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, 265 F.3d 15, 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing
Pilgrim v. Trustees of Tufts College, 118 F.3d 864, 869 (1st Cir.
1997)). On the other hand, there is a serial violation "where the
plaintiff experiences a number of discriminatory acts arising from
the same discriminatory animus." Id. at 22. In this case, the
district court in recognition of the case law at the time of the
-32-
trial instructed the jury on the distinction between continuing and
systemic violations. The jury then found that L.L. Bean had
committed a systemic violation, but not a serial violation.
Crowley submits that the jury's verdict is supporatable
because L.L. Bean's sexual harassment policy is fundamentally
flawed insofar as it prohibits only sexually offensive behavior,
not nonsexual conduct motivated by gender bias. Crowley contends
that L.L. Bean's sexual harassment policy "by definition fails to
address a wide range of illegal harassment that is directed at a
victim because of gender but that does not fall within the
stereotypical scenario of pin-ups, breast-grabbing, and lewd
comments." Br. of Appellee at 32. Consequently, according to
Crowley's theory, L.L. Bean committed a systemic continuing
violation by maintaining a sexual harassment policy that led its
managers and supervisors to identify Juhl's stalking and harassment
of Crowley as non-sexual conduct that did not warrant investigation
or remediation.
Clearly there is factual support for Crowley's argument
inasmuch as L.L. Bean's sexual harassment policy focuses primarily
on sex-related conduct, rather than on nonsexual -- yet
inappropriate -- behavior motivated by gender. Indeed, L.L. Bean's
employee guide provides, in relevant part:
Generally speaking, sexual harassment is
defined as conduct or behavior that is
intimidating, hostile, offensive and/or
interferes with an employee's work
performance. It includes conduct that creates
a hostile work environment.
-33-
Some examples of harassing behaviors include,
but are not limited to:
• Offensive sexual flirtations
• Verbal or physical abuse of a sexual
nature
• Sexually suggestive gestures
Advances or propositions
• The display of sexually suggestive
objects, pictures, or written
materials
• Lewd nicknames
• Sexual practical jokes or horseplay
App. 111-12. Furthermore, a Human Resources manager testified that
L.L. Bean's sexual harassment policy related to "sexual acts"
rather than nonsexual conduct motivated by gender and that L.L.
Bean's policy did not prohibit an employee from stalking a person
because of his or her gender.
Nevertheless, it does not appear that L.L. Bean itself
maintained a "discriminatory policy or practice," Megwinoff v.
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya, 233 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 2000), but simply
developed and implemented an anti-sexual harassment policy that
does not adequately protect its employees from all forms of
actionable sexual harassment. L.L. Bean's failure, therefore, is
distinguishable from traditional discriminatory polices and
practices such as refusing to hire women or paying women less than
men. Moreover, L.L. Bean's ineffective sexual discrimination
policy does not discriminate against a certain class of
individuals, such as women or minorities, but rather treats all
employees equally inasmuch as it provides every employee the same
inadequate protection. Crowley has cited no case that supports her
theory that maintaining a substandard sexual harassment policy
-34-
constitutes a "discriminatory policy or practice," and we were
unable to find any caselaw supporting this novel theory. In the
circumstances, we are satisfied that based on the evidence
presented at trial, the jury's conclusion that L.L. Bean committed
a systemic violation is problematic.
We need not resolve the point definitively, however, for
we are satisfied that the jury's possible error in concluding that
there was a systemic violation was harmless in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Morgan. Under the rule of that case it
is no longer necessary for a jury to determine whether a violation
is systemic or serial when considering the timeliness of a hostile
work environment claim. The Court in Morgan explained that a
"hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of
separate acts that collectively constitute one 'unlawful employment
practice.'" Morgan, --- U.S. at ---, 122 S. Ct. at 2074. Based on
that premise, the Court held that "consideration of the entire
scope of a hostile work environment claim, including behavior
alleged outside the statutory time period, is permissible for the
purposes of assessing liability, so long as any act contributing to
that hostile environment takes place within the statutory period."
Id. at ---, 122 S. Ct. at 2068. See also id. at 2074 ("Provided
that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing
period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be
considered by the court for the purposes of determining
liability.").
-35-
Inasmuch as under Morgan the entire period during which
a victim is subjected to a hostile work environment now constitutes
one "unlawful employment practice," Morgan supplants our
jurisprudence on the continuing violation doctrine in hostile work
environment claims, making it no longer necessary to distinguish
between systemic and serial violations. And because the hostile
work environment created by Juhl extended into the statutory period
-- i.e., after February 24, 1998 -- Crowley satisfied the standard
Morgan set forth and therefore was able to pursue her hostile work
environment claim based partially on events that occurred outside
the limitations period.5
B. New Trial
L.L. Bean argues that in the event we do not grant it
judgment as a matter of law, in the alternative we should reverse
the district court's order denying it a new trial. L.L. Bean's
bases for a new trial include juror bias, erroneous evidentiary
rulings, and improper jury instructions. We reject L.L. Bean's
request for a new trial, as none of its arguments has merit.
5
We note that the Supreme Court of New Jersey recently followed
Morgan in construing the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination to
resolve a statute of limitations question in a hostile
environment continuing violation case without mentioning the
distinction between systemic and serial violations, thus
implicitly holding that the distinction does not matter when
resolving the limitations question. See Shepherd v. Hunterdon
Developmental Ctr., 803 A.2d 611, 623 (N.J. 2002). We make
explicit under Title VII what the New Jersey court held
implicitly under the similar New Jersey law.
-36-
1. Juror Bias
L.L. Bean argues that it is entitled to a new trial
because one of the jurors neglected to disclose her "possible bias"
during voir dire by failing to reveal that she is a lawyer
affiliated with the New England Research Institute who not only
represented a female plaintiff in a sex discrimination suit in
federal court, but also investigates and researches legal topics
relating to women's health and quality of life issues. Crowley
responds that L.L. Bean's charges of "possible bias" are purely
speculative and that it has not even tried to demonstrate that the
juror's background would have affected the outcome of the trial.
To secure a new trial based on a juror's inaccurate
answers during voir dire, "a party must first demonstrate that a
juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire,
and then further show that a correct response would have provided
a valid basis for cause." McDonough Power Equip., 464 U.S. at 556,
104 S. Ct. at 850. When seeking a new trial based on non-
disclosure of information by a juror during voir dire, however, a
party "must do more than raise a speculative allegation that the
juror's possible bias may have influenced the outcome of the
trial." Dall, 970 F.2d at 969.
L.L. Bean sets forth the following facts and assertions
to support its argument that the juror failed to disclose her
"possible bias." Following the trial, the juror wrote a letter to
the trial judge asking permission to speak with Crowley's attorney,
explaining that she "found the case to be most interesting, in
-37-
particular because of my training as a psychologist and my interest
as a research scientist." After the judge shared the letter with
the parties, L.L. Bean discovered that the juror (1) worked for the
New England Research Institute; (2) investigated and researched
women's issues, including topics on women's health as well as child
custody in battered-women cases; and (3) as a "family lawyer,"
represented a woman in a federal sexual discrimination case.6
On the basis of the foregoing information, L.L. Bean
contends that the juror was dishonest when she failed to disclose
her background after the judge asked the prospective jurors during
voir dire whether they knew "of any reason whatever, whether I have
asked you about it or not why you would have a concern about your
ability to serve as a fair and impartial juror if you are selected
in this case." Br. of Appellant at 42 (quoting Tr. of Voir Dire at
24). L.L. Bean insists that if the juror had disclosed her
"research interest in this case" as well as her professional
experience as an attorney in a sex discrimination case, it would
have successfully challenged her for cause. Id. at 44.
We reject L.L. Bean's argument for several reasons.
First, notwithstanding its assertions to the contrary, it has not
6
We are surprised that L.L. Bean was in the dark about the
juror's background until she wrote her letter. In this regard,
we point out that in its brief it cites three Maine Supreme
Judicial Court cases in which it indicated that she "acted as a
family lawyer [representing] women in contested family disputes."
Br. of Appellant at 43. All three cases resulted in published
opinions in which her name appeared as an attorney. Moreover,
the federal sex discrimination case produced a Westlaw opinion in
which her name appears as an attorney.
-38-
demonstrated that the juror was dishonest in response to the
court's question. Although L.L. Bean may believe that the juror's
background and experience would make her biased, it does not follow
that she believed that she could not be a fair and impartial juror
because of her experiences.
Second, L.L. Bean bases its charge of possible bias on
its assumption that the juror is biased against all men and all
employers because she researched women's issues and served as an
attorney some years ago in a sexual discrimination suit. We agree
with the district court in its assessment that "[t]he suggestion
that an interest in women's issues naturally correlates to a
dislike for men and employers is" unfounded.
Third, L.L. Bean only speculates as to whether the juror
actually is biased, for it has not "demonstrate[d] actual prejudice
or bias," Dall, 970 F.2d at 969, but only has alleged "possible
bias." Br. of Appellant at 41. As we have stated previously, the
"'burden of proof must be sustained not as a matter of speculation,
but as a demonstrable reality.'" Dall, 970 F.2d at 969 (quoting
United States v. Vargas, 606 F.2d 341, 344 (1st Cir. 1979)).
Therefore, because L.L. Bean has not met the standard for obtaining
a new trial based on actual juror bias, we will affirm the district
court's dismissal of its motion for new trial based on this ground.
2. Evidentiary Rulings
L.L. Bean contends that the district court made several
erroneous evidentiary rulings that entitle it to a new trial. The
district court, however, did not make an error of law or abuse its
-39-
discretion in any of these rulings, and therefore, we reject L.L.
Bean's request for new trial based on these grounds.
a. Team Leader Hearsay
L.L. Bean asserts that the district court erred when it
allowed Crowley to introduce hearsay testimony that her team
leader, Peter Farley, jokingly referred to Juhl as Crowley's
"little stalker" after she reported an incident of harassment by
Juhl in April 1998. L.L. Bean contends that the court improperly
allowed the statement as an admission by a party-opponent under
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2), arguing that team leaders are not
authorized to speak on its behalf, and therefore, "their statements
cannot be considered within the scope of their agency as an
employee of L.L. Bean." Br. of Appellant at 46.
L.L. Bean's argument fails for two reasons. First, the
court did not allow Crowley to introduce the statement as an
admission by a party-opponent under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2).
Rather, the court concluded that the statement did not constitute
hearsay under Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) because it was not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. In other words, Crowley
did not offer Farley's comments that Juhl is her "little stalker"
to prove that Juhl is actually a stalker; she offered the statement
to show that L.L. Bean management was aware of Juhl's behavior.
Second, even if the district court had admitted the
statement as an admission by a party-opponent under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2), we doubt that the court would have erred. Although L.L.
Bean now maintains that team leaders are not supervisors and are
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not responsible for hiring, firing, or disciplining employees, L.L.
Bean admitted at trial that team leaders are, in fact, supervisors.
For instance, Human Resources manager Pat Bressette-Long testified
that team leaders were part of L.L. Bean's "leadership." Moreover,
L.L. Bean's job descriptions state that team leaders are
responsible for communicating and enforcing company policies,
maintaining employee records, making recommendations on hiring,
delivering disciplinary actions to employees, and handling
personnel issues.
b. Inadmissible Lay Opinions
L.L. Bean next argues that the district court improperly
allowed Crowley's witnesses to offer lay opinions by characterizing
Juhl's conduct toward Crowley as "stalking." L.L. Bean describes
these comments as a "drive-by character assassination." Br. of
Appellant at 49.
But Crowley's witnesses were not the only ones to use the
term "stalking." Human Resources manager Pat Bressette-Long and
supervisor David Simmons used the term "stalked" in their notes
from their meeting with Crowley after Juhl broke into her home.
Moreover, even L.L. Bean's attorneys used the term "stalked" at
trial, at one point asking Bressette-Long whether supervisor Tim
Marong ever mentioned "whether or not it was his conclusion that
Ms. Crowley was being stalked or that is what [Crowley] had said to
him." And in response, Bressette-Long stated that Crowley had, in
fact, told Marong that she was being stalked. In the
circumstances, we reject L.L. Bean's argument on this point.
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c. Non-Workplace Conduct
L.L. Bean argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying its motion in limine to exclude evidence of
Juhl's non-workplace conduct, such as Crowley's encounters with him
at a bar and at the L.L. Bean Christmas party in 1996, his
following her home one night in 1996, and his breaking into her
home in February 1997.7 See Br. of Appellant at 51. L.L. Bean
failed, however, to make a timely objection at trial to evidence
relating to Juhl's non-workplace conduct. L.L. Bean only objected
to "time-barred" evidence and actually stated to the district court
that the jury "may take into consideration conduct that occurred
off premises in determining whether the conduct at work was hostile
environment." Thus, L.L. Bean invited the ruling of which it now
complains.
Assuming arguendo that L.L. Bean had preserved its
objection, the district court would not have erred in allowing
evidence relating to non-workplace conduct. L.L. Bean opines that
it cannot prevent and therefore should not be liable for an
employee's off-site behavior. Consequently, L.L. Bean believes
that any evidence of non-workplace conduct and interactions is
irrelevant and should be precluded. Courts, however, do permit
7
L.L. Bean also submits that the district court erred when it
denied its motion to exclude evidence relating to Juhl's conduct
prior to February 24, 1998. See Br. of Appellant at 51. As
discussed repeatedly throughout this opinion, however, the jury
was permitted to consider this evidence and hold L.L. Bean liable
for maintaining a hostile work environment prior to February 24,
1998, as long as the hostile work environment extended into the
statutory period.
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evidence of non-workplace conduct to help determine the severity
and pervasiveness of the hostility in the workplace as well as to
establish that the conduct was motivated by gender. For example,
in O'Rourke, we affirmed a verdict in favor of a sexual harassment
victim who had offered evidence that she had received crank phone
calls at home. See O'Rourke, 235 F.3d at 724. In this case,
Juhl's intimidating behavior and hostile interactions with Crowley
outside of work help explain why she was so frightened of Juhl and
why his constant presence around her at work created a hostile work
environment.
d. L.L Bean's Investigation
L.L. Bean contends that the district court improperly
excluded as hearsay certain documents relating to its investigation
of a confrontation between Crowley and Juhl on June 23, 1998. L.L.
Bean asserts that a report prepared by team leader Leo Davis
"paints a very different picture [of Juhl] than the caricature
presented by Crowley," and the court's exclusion of the report of
the investigation "significantly hamstrung [L.L. Bean] in
presenting its defense." Br. of Appellant at 53.
Aside from explaining how critical it believes that this
report was to its defense, L.L. Bean does not indicate the reasons
why the district court's exclusion of the documents was improper or
the basis for admitting the documents. L.L. Bean mentions in its
brief that Davis interviewed witnesses to the confrontation as well
as Juhl and Crowley. If that is the case, L.L. Bean would have to
overcome a double hearsay problem for the evidence to be
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admissible. See United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1410 (3d
Cir. 1994). L.L. Bean does not, however, attempt to find
exceptions to address the multiple layers of hearsay. Moreover,
L.L. Bean does not explain why the information in the report could
not have been elicited through direct testimony rather than through
the hearsay document. Overall, we are satisfied that L.L. Bean has
not demonstrated on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion in disallowing the documents.
3. Jury Instructions
L.L. Bean's last rationale for requesting a new trial is
to claim that the district court provided flawed jury instructions.
See Br. of Appellant at 55-60. It argues that the court gave
erroneous instructions on the elements of a systemic violation by
failing to make clear that Crowley had to prove that it maintained
a discriminatory policy or practice relating to hiring, training,
promotions, firing, and compensation.
Even if these jury instructions were flawed legally as
L.L. Bean contends, we conclude that the error was harmless in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Morgan. As we already
explained above, Morgan eliminates the need for juries to determine
whether there was a systemic or serial violation in order to invoke
the continuing violations doctrine and thus to allow consideration
of discriminatory acts that fell outside the limitations period.
The Court explained in Morgan that "[p]rovided that an act
contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the
entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by
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the court for the purposes of determining liability." Morgan, ---
U.S. at ---, 122 S. Ct. at 2074. Moreover, the asserted error
would not have contributed to the jury's finding that the violation
was ongoing.
Finally, L.L. Bean argues that the district court erred
by refusing to instruct the jury that it must determine whether a
hostile work environment existed based on Juhl's behavior at work,
not his non-workplace conduct. See Br. of Appellant at 56. As
with L.L. Bean's challenge to the court's evidentiary ruling
allowing evidence of Juhl's non-workplace conduct, Crowley
maintains that L.L. Bean actually waived its objection by telling
the district court that the jury could "take into consideration
conduct that occurred off premises in determining whether the
conduct at work was hostile environment."
Whether or not L.L. Bean waived its objection, it is
inconceivable to us that the jury could have found L.L. Bean liable
for maintaining a hostile work environment by disregarding the
overwhelming amount of evidence of Juhl's harassment on L.L. Bean's
premises and instead basing its verdict on the comparatively few
incidents involving Juhl's non-workplace conduct. As such, we
conclude that even if it would have been advisable to charge the
jury as L.L. Bean had requested, the district court's refusal to
do so did not affect L.L. Bean's "substantial rights" and therefore
amounts to nothing more than harmless error under Fed. R. Civ. P.
61. Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.
2001).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the
district court denying L.L. Bean's motion for a judgment as a
matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial and uphold the
jury verdict in favor of Eileen Crowley.
Affirmed.
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