UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
CYRIL DAVID DANIEL ORAM, JR., DOCKET NUMBERS
Appellant, DC-3443-17-0035-I-1
DC-3443-16-0850-I-1 1
v.
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, DATE: SEPTEMBER 8, 2022
Agency.
THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 2
Cyril David Daniel Oram, Jr., Bellingham, Washington, pro se.
Sandra Fortson, Joint Base Andrews, Maryland, for the agency.
BEFORE
Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
Raymond A. Limon, Member
Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
1
The administrative judge issued an order joining these appeals, finding that it would
expedite processing of the cases without adversely affecting the interests of either
party. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(f)(2) and 5 C.F.R. § 1201.36(a)(2). The administrative
judge designated Oram v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-3443-
17-0035-I-1, as the lead case.
2
A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
2
FINAL ORDER
¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
dismissed his appeals for a lack of Board jurisdiction. Generally, we grant
petitions such as this one only in the following circumstances: the initial decision
contains erroneous findings of material fact; the initial decision is based on an
erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation or the erroneous application of
the law to the facts of the case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either
the course of the appeal or the initial decision were not consistent with required
procedures or involved an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the
outcome of the case; or new and material evidence or legal argument is available
that, despite the petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record
closed. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 ( 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.115). After fully considering the filings in these appeals, we conclude
that the petitioner has not established any basis under section 1201.115 for
granting the petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and
AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R.
§ 1201.113(b).
BACKGROUND
¶2 The agency tentatively selected the appellant for a GS-12 Information
Technology Specialist position at the agency’s Ramstein Air Base in Germany,
which the appellant accepted. Oram v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB
Docket No. DC-3443-16-0850-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0850 IAF), Tab 12
at 10-15. Following his acceptance of the tentative offer, the appellant requested
a Living Quarters Allowance (LQA) for the position, which was denied. 0850
IAF, Tab 11 at 19-32, Tab 12 at 6-8. The agency informed the appellant that he
could file a request for reconsideration of the LQA denial with the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), but that his onboarding for the position would
need to proceed without the inclusion of a LQA while the reconsideration request
3
was pending. 0850 IAF, Tab 11 at 12. The appellant subsequently filed an
appeal with the Board challenging the LQA denial. 0850 IAF, Tab 1 at 5.
¶3 During the pendency of that Board appeal, the appellant requested that the
agency delay his entry on duty (EOD) date until the completion of the appeal of
the LQA determination. 0850 IAF, Tab 11 at 15-16. The agency granted the
initial request for an extension, but denied a second requested extension. Id.
at 5-10. The agency informed the appellant that if he did not appear for his
October 3, 2016 EOD date, it would rescind the job offer. Id. at 6. The appellant
did not appear for the October 3, 2016 EOD date, and on October 5, 2016, the
agency rescinded the job offer. Oram v. Department of the Air Force, MSPB
Docket No. DC-3443-17-0035-I-1, Initial Appeal File (0035 IAF), Tab 1 at 3.
The appellant subsequently filed a second appeal challenging the agency’s job
offer rescission. Id. at 2. The regional office docketed that appeal as MSPB
Docket No. DC-3443-17-0035-I-1. 0035 IAF, Tab 2. In that appeal, the
appellant claimed that the agency rescinded the job offer in retaliation for
challenging the LQA denial and for filing a Board appeal. 3 0035 IAF, Tab 3
at 4-5. The appellant also attached a copy of a complaint he filed with the Office
of Special Counsel (OSC) on October 1, 2016. Id. at 6-12.
¶4 In orders issued in both appeals, the administrative judge identified the
jurisdictional issues presented by the appellant’s appeals and afforded him an
opportunity to address the question of Board jurisdiction. 0035 IAF, Tab 2
at 2-5; 0850 IAF, Tab 2 at 2-4, Tab 17 at 2-4. After joining the appellant’s two
Board appeals, 0035 IAF, Tab 7, and 0850 IAF, Tab 27, and considering the
appellant’s responses to the jurisdictional orders, the administrative judge issued
an initial decision on the written record, 0035 IAF, Tab 16, Initial Decision (ID).
3
The appellant also filed a request to stay the agency’s decision to withdraw his job
offer, which was separately docketed by the administrative judge. Oram v. Department
of the Air Force, MSPB Docket No. DC-3443-17-0035-S-1, Stay File (SF). On
October 25, 2016, the administrative judge issued an order dismissing his request . SF,
Tab 2.
4
Regarding the appellant’s challenge to the LQA denial, the administrative ju dge
determined that as a non-employee Federal contractor, the appellant was not an
“employee” with Board appeal rights as defined under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 and
did not otherwise meet any of the conditions that would entitle him to Board
appeal rights as an applicant for employment. ID at 4-5. Further, the
administrative judge determined that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appeal
of the LQA denial. ID at 5.
¶5 Regarding the appellant’s challenge to the withdrawal of the job offer, the
administrative judge found that the offer was tentative and never finalized, and
that the appellant never entered on duty or performed any job duties in the
position. ID at 6. The administrative judge explained that an agency may revoke
an appointment prior to an appellant’s entrance on duty or performance in the
position and that the agency’s withdrawal of the appellant’s employment offer
was not appealable to the Board. ID at 6-7. Turning to the appellant’s
whistleblower reprisal claim, the administrative judge dete rmined that the
appellant failed to demonstrate that he had exhausted his a dministrative remedies
with OSC and, thus, the Board lacked jurisdiction over his claim as an individual
right of action (IRA) appeal. ID at 8-9.
¶6 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the joined appeals. Petition
for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. 4 The agency has filed a response, and the appellant
has filed a reply to the response. PFR File Tabs 6-7.
4
The appellant also has filed a motion for leave to submit additional evidence. PFR
File, Tab 9. Pleadings allowed on review include a petition for review, a cross petition
for review, a response to a petition for review, a response to a cross petition for review,
and a reply to a response to a petition for review. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a). No other
pleading will be accepted unless the party files a motion with and obtains leave from
the Clerk of the Board. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5). Such a motion must describe the
nature of and need for the pleading. Id. In his motion, the appellant requests to submit
additional evidence, which he claims will clarify his previous filings, “prevent further
misunderstandings[,] and . . . remove or prevent further complication of the data to be
found within.” PFR File, Tab 9 at 4. We find this explanation insufficient and deny the
appellant’s motion.
5
DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge erred in adjudicating
his appeals.
¶7 The appellant asserts on review that he was entitled to a hearing and “do[es]
not recall being afforded the opportunity of a hearing.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 3.
The record reflects that the appellant checked the box indicating that he did not
want a hearing on his initial appeal form, and the administrative judge advised
him in the acknowledgment order that a failure to request a hearing within
10 days would constitute a waiver of his right to a hearing. 0035 IAF, Tab 1 at 3,
Tab 2 at 2. The appellant did not request a hearing. Similarly, in his subsequent
appeal of the rescinded tentative job offer, the appellant also did not request a
hearing and did not respond to the administrative judge’s acknowledg ment order
again affording him the opportunity to request a hearing and informing him that
his failure to request a hearing within 10 days would constitute a waiver of his
right to a hearing. 0035 IAF, Tab 1, Tab 2 at 2. Failure to timely request a
hearing will result in a waiver of that right when the appellant has not shown
good cause for his failure. Spradlin v. Office of Personnel Management,
84 M.S.P.R. 279, ¶ 11 (1999). Accordingly, the administrative judge did not err
by not holding a hearing.
¶8 The appellant also contends that separate docketing of the denial of the
LQA and the rescission of the tentative job offer prevented the administrative
judge from seeing the pattern of discrimination and reprisal. PFR File, Tab 1
at 3, 7. As explained above, the administrative judge joined the two appeals, and
thus, she considered both claims in making her decision. The appellant has not
identified any prejudice to his rights by the administrative judge’s decision to
docket separately the two matters, filed approximately a month apart, and later
join them for adjudication in response to his request. 0850 IAF, Tabs 26-27;
0035 IAF, Tab 7; see Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281,
6
282 (1984) (noting that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s
substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).
¶9 The appellant further argues on review that the administrative judge denied
him discovery, “which would have substantially strengthen[ed] [his] case.” PFR
File, Tab 1 at 3. The record shows that the administrative judge stayed the
initiation of discovery pending a finding of Board jurisdiction. 0035 IAF,
Tab 13. An administrative judge has broad discretion in ruling on discovery
matters, and absent an abuse of discretion, the Board will not find reversible error
in such rulings. Morrison v. Department of the Navy, 122 M.S.P.R. 205, ¶ 12
(2015). The appellant has not shown an abuse of discretion by the administrative
judge’s decision to delay discovery until Board jurisdiction was established.
¶10 Finally, on review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge did
not consider all of the submitted evidence. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3; see PFR File,
Tab 7 at 5-6. An administrative judge’s failure to mention all of the evidence of
record does not mean that she did not consider it in reaching her decision.
Marques v. Department of Health & Human Services , 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132
(1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Table); see Kirkpatrick v. U.S.
Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 583, 589 (1997) (explaining that an administrative
judge is not required to specifically address every poin t raised by an appellant).
¶11 In his reply to the agency’s response to his petition for review, the appellant
argues that he was “denied a benefit or allowance” based on his “marital status to
a person with a mental illness.” PFR File, Tab 7 at 8. As the administrative
judge did, we interpret this argument as a claim that the agency discriminated
against the appellant due to his wife’s medical condition and not an allegation
that his tentative job offer was rescinded due to his marital status. ID at 7. As
the administrative judge correctly found and as discussed in detail below, the
Board lacks jurisdiction over claims of discrimination absent an otherwise
appealable matter.
7
The appellant has not established Board jurisdiction over his appeals.
¶12 The Board’s jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been
given jurisdiction by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 759 F.2d 9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Regarding the appellant’s
challenge to the agency’s LQA determination, as the administrative judge
correctly explained, the Board does not have jurisdiction to review an agency’s
denial of a request for a LQA. Anderson v. Department of the Army, 93 M.S.P.R.
463, 465 n.* (2003), aff’d, 89 F. App’x 707 (2004); Fernandez v. Department of
the Army, 84 M.S.P.R. 550, ¶ 3 (1999), aff’d, 234 F.3d 553 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we agree with the administrative judge’s findings dismissing the
appellant’s LQA appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction. ID at 5-6.
¶13 Concerning the appellant’s challenge to the withdrawal of the tentative job
offer, generally, an unsuccessful applicant for a Federal civil service position has
no right to appeal a nonselection. Kazan v. Department of Justice, 112 M.S.P.R.
390, ¶ 6 (2009). The administrative judge correctly identified the limited
exceptions in which the Board may have jurisdiction over nonselection claims and
found that the appellant did not raise a claim under any of those identified
exceptions. ID at 6-7; see 0850 IAF, Tab 17 at 2-4; 0035 IAF, Tab 2 at 2-5.
Thus, we also agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the Board
lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s appeal as a nonselection claim. ID at 6 -7.
¶14 Regarding the appellant’s claim that the agency’s tentative job offer was
“firm” and thus irrevocable after he accepted it, the appellant has not submitted
anything to support this contention. PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 7. Rather, in its
correspondence extending the offer, the agency clearly identified the offer as
“tentative” and conditioned finality of the offer on a number of additional
requirements, including the establishment of an EOD date, which the appellant
failed to meet. 0850 IAF, Tab 12 at 8-12; 0035 IAF, Tab 1 at 3. Appointment to
a civil service position requires “definite, unconditional action by an authorized
[F]ederal official designating an individual to a specific civil service position.”
8
Horner v. Acosta, 803 F.2d 687, 693 (Fed. Cir. 1986); cf. National Treasury
Employees Union v. Reagan, 663 F.2d 239, 248 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(determining that a subset of the class of appellants became “ employees of the
[F]ederal government” when they were administered the oath of office and their
offers were not revoked prior to their entrance on duty) . There is no evidence of
such action here. Furthermore, the Board has held that it lack ed jurisdiction over
an appeal when an agency withdrew a tentative job offer after an appellant had
accepted it, but before she actually performed in the position. Sapla v.
Department of the Navy, 118 M.S.P.R. 551, ¶¶ 9-12 (2012). 5
¶15 The appellant also argues on review that in rescinding his job offer, the
agency engaged in a prohibited personnel practice. PFR File, Tab 1 at 7 . It is
well settled that absent an otherwise appealable matter, the Board does not have
jurisdiction to consider such claims. Davis v. Department of Defense,
105 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶¶ 15-16 (2007) (explaining that absent an otherwise
appealable action, the Board cannot consider prohibited personnel practice
claims); Wren v. Department of the Army, 2 M.S.P.R. 1, 2 (1980) (holding that
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b) is not an independent source of Board jurisdiction), aff’d,
681 F.2d 867, 871-73 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The appellant has not identified an
otherwise appealable action. See Davis, 105 M.S.P.R. 604, ¶ 15 (stating that a
nonselection is not an otherwise appealable action). Likewise, the Board lacks
jurisdiction over the appellant’s job offer rescission claim as a mixed -case appeal.
PFR File, Tab 1 at 3, 7-8, Tab 7 at 4-8. A mixed-case appeal involves an action
that is appealable to the Board and an allegation that the appealable action is
5
To the extent the appellant is claiming that the withdrawal of his job offer constitut ed
an unfair employment practice, PFR File, Tab 7 at 6, 8, that argument is similarly
unavailing. The appellant has not alleged that his appeal concerns an invalid
employment practice that was applied to him by OPM (or, a valid one that was
misapplied by the agency), or that any agency employment practice violates one of the
basic requirements of 5 C.F.R. § 300.103. See Sauser v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 113 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶¶ 6-7 (2010); 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(a).
9
based on prohibited discrimination. Perry v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017); Lethridge v. U.S. Postal Service,
99 M.S.P.R. 675, ¶ 9 (2005) (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1201.151(a)(1); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.302(a)(2)). As explained above, the appellant has not alleged that he was
subjected to an action that is otherwise appealable to the Board .
¶16 Finally, regarding the appellant’s claim that he suffered reprisal for
protected whistleblowing activity, we agree with the administrative j udge that the
appellant failed to meet his jurisdictional burden over this matter as an IRA
appeal. ID at 8-9. To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal, an
appellant must exhaust his administrative remedies before the OSC and must
make nonfrivolous allegations of the following: (1) he engaged in
whistleblowing by making a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), or
engaged in other protected activity as specified in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D); and (2) the disclosure or activity was a contributing factor in the
agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
§ 2302(a)(2)(A). 6 Hooker v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 629,
¶ 9 (2014); see Yunus v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 371
(Fed. Cir. 2001); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221. Although the appellant
provided a copy of his October 1, 2016 filing with OSC, he did not submit any
evidence proving exhaustion with OSC in response to the administrative judge’s
show cause order, and he has not furnished evidence of exhaustion on review.
0035 IAF, Tab 2 at 5, Tab 3 at 6-12. 7 Accordingly, we agree with the
6
We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
7
On March 26, 2017, the appellant filed a motion to dismiss the joined appeals without
prejudice to refiling, pending the resolution of his separately filed IRA appeal, and
submitted a close-out letter from OSC suggesting that he may have exhausted his
administrative remedies. PFR File, Tab 11; see Oram v. Department of the Air Force,
MSPB Docket No. DC-1221-17-0384-W-1. An initial decision has been issued in the
IRA appeal, and a petition for review in that case is pending before the Board. Given
that the IRA appeal is being separately adjudicated, we see no reason to dismiss these
10
administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to meet his jurisdictional
burden in proving his whistleblower reprisal claims. ID at 9.
¶17 For the above reasons, we deny the petition for review and aff irm the initial
decision dismissing the appeal for lack of Board jurisdiction.
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
joined appeals and deny that request, and have not considered the OSC letter attached to
the motion in adjudicating these joined appeals.
Additionally, on September 16, 2019, the appellant filed a motion titled “Motion to
Withdraw Without Prejudice due to prior EEO election.” Petition for Review (PFR)
File, Tab 12. To determine whether the appellant was seeking to withdraw his petition
for review, and to establish that his request was knowing and voluntary, the Clerk of the
Board ordered the appellant to submit a pleading within 7 days, clarifying whether his
filing was intended as a request to withdraw his petition for review with prejudice to
refiling, or to withdraw his Board appeal. PFR File, Tab 13 at 1 -3. The order informed
the appellant that if he failed to respond, his pleading would be treated a s a request to
withdraw his Board appeal, which would be considered in a decision following the
restoration of a Board quorum. Id. at 1-2. The appellant failed to respond to the order.
Because we ultimately conclude that the administrative judge correctly dismissed the
appellant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction, we deny the appellant’s request.
8
Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
11
Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.
(1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision. 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of partic ular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
(2) Judicial or EEOC review of cases involving a claim of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
12
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017). If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at th eir respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
13
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
Office of Federal Operations
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
131 M Street, N.E.
Suite 5SW12G
Washington, D.C. 20507
(3) Judicial review pursuant to the Whistleblower Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 9 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
9
The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases wi th the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
14
If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
717 Madison Place, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20439
Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
Cyril Oram v. Department of the Air Force
Combined Opinion