United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
No. 95-30443
Summary Calendar.
Ray DAIGLE, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
LIBERTY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
Dec. 11, 1995.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana.
Before JOHNSON, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
JOHNSON, Circuit Judge:
Ray Daigle ("Mr. Daigle") appeals the district court's
judgment entered against him in accordance with the jury verdict in
his discrimination suit against his former employer, Liberty Life
Insurance Company ("Liberty"). Because we believe that the verdict
reached by the jury was more than adequately supported by the
evidence, we affirm the district court's entry of judgment upon
such verdict.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Mr. Daigle filed this suit against Liberty after his
termination from Liberty's employment. Among several other grounds
which have been abandoned on appeal, Mr. Daigle claimed that
Liberty discriminated against him in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA").
Mr. Daigle was working as a District Manager at Magnolia Life
Insurance Company ("Magnolia") in October of 1992 when Magnolia was
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purchased by Liberty. Mr. Daigle retained his position as District
Manager of the Houma region in Louisiana after the sale to Liberty.
After the company's sale, several new policies were implemented by
Liberty with which Mr. Daigle was required to comply. One such
policy was the requirement that all Liberty management memorize
five recruitment talks to be used in recruiting new agents for
employment with Liberty. Mr. Daigle claims that he was unable to
memorize these five talks because he suffers from a learning
disability. He claims that he was eventually fired from his
position with Liberty because of his failure to adequately recite
the talks. Mr. Daigle asserts that his termination violates the
ADA because Liberty unlawfully discriminated against him because he
was suffering from a learning disability.
Liberty, on the other hand, claims that it fired Mr. Daigle
for very different reasons. Liberty asserts that Mr. Daigle was
mistreating his employees in the Houma District. Liberty claims
that Mr. Daigle verbally and physically abused several of his
agents and that he was less than honest with employees and Liberty
officials. Additionally, Liberty claims that Mr. Daigle
successfully completed the memory talks to the company's
satisfaction. It is Liberty's position that any learning
disability Mr. Daigle may have had in no way affected the decision
to terminate him.
During the trial, conflicting evidence was presented as to
both of the above-mentioned positions. After reviewing such
evidence, the jury found that Mr. Daigle had not proven that he was
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fired due to a disability and that he had not proven that Liberty's
proffered reason for the termination was a pretense for
discrimination. Mr. Daigle now appeals the judgment entered by the
district court in accord with the jury verdict on the ground that
the verdict was clearly erroneous.
II. Discussion
The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); see also Daugherty v. City of El Paso, 56
F.3d 695 (5th Cir.1995); Dutcher v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 53 F.3d
723 (5th Cir.1995). The term "qualified individual with a
disability" means an individual with a disability who, with or
without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
A plaintiff may establish a claim of disability
discrimination by presenting direct evidence of discrimination.
Alternatively, the indirect method of proof set for Title VII
actions in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93
S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), may also be utilized. See
Grinstead v. Pool Co., No. 93-2320, 1994 WL 25515 (E.D.La.1994),
aff'd without opinion, 26 F.3d 1118 (5th Cir.1994); Aikens v.
Banana Republic, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 1031, 1036-37 (S.D.Tex.1995).
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Under the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff must first
make out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1)
he or she suffers from a disability; (2) he or she is qualified
for the job; (3) he or she was subject to an adverse employment
action; and (4) he or she was replaced by a non-disabled person or
was treated less favorably than non-disabled employees. See Norris
v. Hartmarx Specialty Stores, Inc., 913 F.2d 253, 254 (5th
Cir.1990); EEOC v. Brown & Root, Inc., 688 F.2d 338, 340-41 (5th
Cir.1982); Aikens, 877 F.Supp. at 1037.
Once the plaintiff has stated a prima facie case, the
defendant must "articulate some legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason" for its action that adversely affected the employee. Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101
S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). While an employer need
not prove the legitimate reason, it must produce some evidence to
support. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----,
113 S.Ct. 2742, 2748, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the employer
produces any evidence "which, taken as true, would permit the
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action," then the employer has satisfied its burden of
production. Id.
Once the employer has met its burden, the shifting burden
scheme is abandoned and becomes irrelevant. The employer's intent
is a question of fact, for which the plaintiff carries the burden
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of persuasion. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.1
Daigle first argues that the district court erred in denying
his motion for partial summary judgment because Liberty failed to
present any evidence to create a disputed fact issue as to the
existence of a disability on the part of Daigle. In Black v. J.I.
Case Co., this Court made clear that it will not review the
pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment where on the basis
of a subsequent full trial on the merits final judgment is entered
adverse to the movant. 22 F.3d 568, 569-70 (5th Cir.1994). As the
Black court noted, "[i]t makes no sense whatsoever to reverse a
judgment on the verdict where the trial evidence was sufficient
merely because at summary judgment it was not." Id. at 572. Once
trial begins, summary judgment motions effectively become moot.
Id. at 571. Thus, in reviewing the case at bar, this Court will
focus on the evidence before the jury at trial on the merits as
opposed to the evidence before the judge during pretrial
activities.
Whether Mr. Daigle met his burdens within his prima facie
case need not be considered at this stage in the litigation because
the case before this Court was tried fully on the merits. This
Court need not consider the adequacy of either party's showing at
1
The issue of whether pretext alone is sufficient for a
successful discrimination claim as opposed to pretext coupled
with further evidence of discrimination is currently before the
en banc Court in the form of Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, No.
92-3770. The analysis dictated by the en banc Court in the final
Rhodes opinion will dictate the degree of proof necessary for a
successful ADA discrimination claim as well. Since there was not
even a showing of pretext in the case at bar, the issue currently
before this Court in Rhodes is not implicated.
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the three stages set forth in St. Mary's, but must instead focus on
the record as a whole to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence.2 See Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust Co., 999 F.2d
950, 957 (5th Cir.1993); Atkin v. Lincoln Property Co., 991 F.2d
268, 271 (5th Cir.1993).
After hearing and reviewing several days worth of evidence,
the jury determined in this case that Mr. Daigle had not met his
burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Liberty's
proffered reason for his termination—his mistreatment of his
employees and his dishonesty—was pretextual. There is certainly
more than enough credible evidence from which a rational fact
finder could make such a determination. Thus, this Court need not
inquire further3 and must affirm the district court's judgment
2
The standard of review when a party attacks a jury
verdict's evidentiary basis is determined by whether the
appropriate motions for directed verdict and judgment have been
made. See FED.R.CIV.P. 50; Purcell v. Seguin State Bank & Trust
Co., 999 F.2d 950, 956-57 (5th Cir.1993). When an insufficiency
of evidence issue is not raised before the district court through
Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b) motions, the standard of review on
appeal is plain error. Purcell, 999 F.2d at 957. The record is
unclear as to whether or not Mr. Daigle made such Rule 50
motions. However, in the present case the result is the same
regardless of whether the analysis entails either whether there
was any evidence to support the verdict or whether there was
substantial evidence to support the verdict since Liberty has, in
fact, provided substantial evidence in support of its successful
position.
3
Because this Court finds that Mr. Daigle did not meet his
overall burden of proving that Liberty fired him under pretextual
reasons, this Court need not further inquire into the more
specific issues for which Mr. Daigle bore the burden of proof
such as the existence of a disability and the essential nature of
the tasks which such disability may have prevented him from
completing.
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entered in accordance with the verdict.4
III. Conclusion
The determination made by the jury in this ADA case as to
whether the proffered reason for the termination decision was
pretextual for discrimination is solely within the jury's province
when there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for such a
determination. Because the evidence in Liberty's favor was more
than sufficient to support such a determination, the district
court's judgment entered upon the jury verdict is in all respects
affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
4
Mr. Daigle additionally appeals the district court's
dismissal of his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim
during pretrial summary judgment proceedings. Because we agree
with the district court that Mr. Daigle has failed as a matter of
law to allege actions of the requisite outrage necessary for a
negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, we believe this
basis for appeal is also without merit. See Moresi v. Department
of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So.2d 1081, 1096 (La.1990)
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