Appellant brought suit against Dallas County, through its proper officials, to re*559strain the enforcement of a 1941 assessment against land owned by it as Trustee, alleging arbitrary, discriminative and fraudulent methods in valuation. Upon a trial to the court, the relief prayed for was denied and the assessment declared valid, with resulting appeal by the Bank.
All issues raised by pleading are revealed in the following résumé of material testimony : The land in question, known as the W. P. Jackson Estate, of some 153 acres, lies in the northern part of Dallas County and adjoins the Preston Road, a cardinal highway extending northward from the Dallas city limits. In May, 1941, Mr. Man-grum, appellant’s trust officer, duly rendered the tract for State, County and school tax purposes, with the Dallas County Assessor, for $4,160, or approximately $27 per acre; the rendition being in effect the same as of previous years. The Assessor indicated his dissatisfaction with appellant’s valuation and proposed an increase to $30,300, or approximately $200 per acre; and here we quote from the trial court’s findings: “In compliance with a notice from the Commissioners Court, the Dallas National Bank appeared before the Commissioners Court, sitting as a Board of Equalization, on July 1st, 1941, and protested the valuation proposed by the Tax Assessor. At the hearing Dallas National Bank called attention to the assessments of property adjoining and nearby the Jackson property. No evidence, however, was introduced by the Bank on the value of the Jackson tract or of any other property in Dallas County. With the exception of Tom Field, the Commissioners and the County Judge were not familiar with the property in question. Nor were the members of the Commissioners Court, except Tom Field, familiar with any property in the vicinity or its value. In 1940 the County condemned two acres of the Jackson tract. In said proceeding the two acres were valued at $500.00 an acre and the County paid said sum for the two acres condemned. These facts were known to all members of the Commissioners Court. There are in Dallas County more than 100,000 pieces of property, which also was known to the Commissioners Court. Prior to the hearing in question, the Commissioners Court had provided that property in Dallas County should be assessed at 55% of its value. Taking into consideration the plan of assessing property throughout the County at 55% of its value and the information which [it had] the Court fixed its value for tax purposes at a total value of $27,400.00, which is approximately $175.00 per acre. In accordance with instructions from the Board of Equalization, Ed Cobb assessed the property at a value of $27,400.00. * * * The tracts of land in the immediate vicinity of the Jackson tract, their acreage and their assessed values for 1941 were as follows:
Tract Assessed Value Acreage per Acre
Henry D. Lindsley 305.59 $35.00
Aronson and Forence 35.91 20.00
S. W. Armstrong 99. 20.00
J. H. Luna 68¼ 29.00
S. J. Schreiber 116.8 28.00
H. A. Schreiber 70.36 28.00
Alvah H. Daniel 102.1 24.00
Each of the above tracts and the Jackson tract are of the same approximate kind and value.” The trial court concluded that no reason existed for holding the assessment void, and that the decision of the Board of Equalization was final.
The tracts just listed had also been valued in previous years at approximately the amounts shown above, obviously as farm property; and the record discloses, by affidavit of 'W. C. Rettick, Deputy Tax Assessor for Dallas County, that, beginning with the tax year 1942, the valuations of said adjoining lands had been raised to $175 per acre. Testimony of witnesses at the trial valued surrounding tracts at from $200 to $300 per acre, and the land in controversy (Jackson estate) at $250 per acre.
Appellant claims injury under § 1, Art. 8, State Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St, and its points of appeal are, in substance, that: (a) The Jackson estate assessment, being fixed at a materially higher percentage of valuation than the values at which other lands in the vicinity were assessed for the year 1941, violates above constitutional provision of equality and uniformity in taxation; (b) the particular valuation of appellant’s land for tax purposes was arbitrary, discriminative, and fraudulent, constituting, under undisputed facts, a taking of property without due process.
Aforesaid valuation of $27,400, standing alone, cannot be considered arbitrary or excessive, for the appraisal was admittedly less than the fair market value of this prop*560erty. Nor does the record support any charge of “fraudulent assessment,” in the sense that same was intentionally made with a view of casting an undue proportion of taxes upon appellant, or pursuant to a scheme whereby inequality has resulted in valuation as compared to similar and adjacent lands. Appellant’s prime complaint, therefore, narrows to the Tax Assessor’s failure to appraise these lands at more nearly their true value at the time of its own increased assessment, charging that such other valuations were so grossly disproportionate as to be fraudulent in law; citing, in support: Lively v. Missouri, K. & T. R. Co., 102 Tex. 545, 120 S.W. 852. The same percentage of valuation (55%) was applied to all property involved after full values had been fixed and equalized by the proper tax authorities; hence, the rule announced in the Lively case was not infringed. In this connection, it is to be noted that the good faith of the Tax Assessor, in making above assessments, is not questioned. Also, the evidence indicates that in appellant’s hearing before the Equalization Board, that body was disposed to increase adjoining values, but, of course, was powerless to do' so without notice; and, consistent with this, the record reveals appropriate steps already taken by the Assessor toward a uniformly higher valuation of all described tracts' for subsequent years.
We are convinced that the valuation of adjoining lands, disproportionate as they were for the one year (1941), when compared to appellant’s valuation, was due solely to the mistaken but honest judgment of the Assessor; at least, a finding to such effect was warranted by the evidence. Likewise, the County Tax Board, not being privileged to increase other assessments (for want of notice — Art. 7206 Vernon’s Ann.Civ.St.), was well within .the exercise of its authority and discretion in arriving at the valuation of which appellant complains; and thus no actionable discrimination is shown. “ * * * mere omissions or errors of judgment of the taxing officials in the exercise of an honest judgment will not invalidate the assessment.” 61 C.J., p. 120; Lubbock Hotel Co. v. Lubbock Ind. School Dist., Tex.Civ.App., 85 S.W.2d 776; Druesdow v. Baker, Tex.Com.App., 229 S.W. 493; Rowland v. City of Tyler, Tex.Com.App., 5 S.W.2d 756; State v. Houser, 138 Tex. 28, 156 S.W.2d 968. It is only when the discrimination (under valuation) is intentional, systematic, and persistent that the taxpayer is entitled to relief, his own property not having been assessed above its fair value. Cooley on Taxation, 4th Ed., §§ 1143, 1650; Phillips Pet. Co. v. Townsend, 5 Cir., 63 F.2d 293; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 38 S.Ct. 495, 62 L.Ed. 1154.
The propositions raised have been somewhat difficult of solution, by reason of the many appellate decisions involving § 1, Art. 8 of our Constitution. However, in the situation here presented, we believe the trial court correctly ruled that the action of the equalization body was conclusive, and accordingly sustain the judgment under review.
Affirmed.