MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 14 2018, 9:13 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ronald J. Moore Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
The Moore Law Firm, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Richmond, Indiana
Evan Matthew Comer
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Dante Faulkner, August 14, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-415
v. Appeal from the
Wayne Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Darrin M. Dolehanty, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
89D03-1706-F5-71
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-415 | August 14, 2018 Page 1 of 10
[1] Dante Faulkner (“Faulkner”) pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle after a
lifetime forfeiture of driving privileges,1 a Level 5 felony, resisting law
enforcement2 as a Class A misdemeanor, false informing3 as a Class B
misdemeanor, and possession of paraphernalia 4 as a Class C misdemeanor, and
he was sentenced to an aggregate executed sentence of fifty months to be served
in the Indiana Department of Correction. Faulkner appeals his sentence,
raising the following issue for review: whether his sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On May 17, 2017, Patrolman Ryan Riggs of the Wayne County Sheriff’s
Department (“Officer Riggs”) was traveling northbound on Salisbury Road in
Richmond, Wayne County, Indiana when he observed a car, driven by a person
later identified as Faulkner, traveling southbound at forty-five miles per hour in
a thirty miles-per-hour zone. Officer Riggs turned his police vehicle around and
initiated a traffic stop of Faulkner’s vehicle. Officer Riggs approached the
vehicle and asked Faulkner for his name and date of birth. Faulkner told
1
See Ind. Code § 9-30-10-17.
2
See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a).
3
See Ind. Code § 35-44.1-2-3(d).
4
See Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3.
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Officer Riggs that his name was La’Ray Faulkner and that his date of birth was
April 1, 1981. Tr. Vol. II at 30, 33. Officer Riggs became suspicious after he
noticed that Faulkner had difficulty remembering how to spell his name and
remembering his date of birth. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 13.
[4] Officer Riggs then returned to his squad car to conduct a BMV inquiry using
the identification information that Faulkner provided. However, after Officer
Riggs stepped away, Faulkner exited his own vehicle and ran from the scene on
foot. Officer Riggs ordered Faulkner to stop, but Faulkner continued to flee.
Officer Riggs began to pursue Faulkner on foot; however, he eventually lost
sight of Faulkner and was unable to locate him.
[5] Officer Riggs later discovered that Faulkner had provided incorrect identifying
information to him. Id. at 14. La’Ray Faulkner, born April 1, 1981, was
actually a female who, at the time of the stop, was married to Dante Faulkner.
Id. After reviewing a booking photograph taken of Faulkner from a prior arrest,
Officer Riggs confirmed that Faulkner was actually the driver of the vehicle that
he had stopped earlier that day. When Officer Riggs had positively identified
Faulkner, he ran a subsequent BMV inquiry, which revealed that Faulkner was
a habitual traffic violator and that his license was subject to a lifetime
suspension. Id.; Tr. Vol. II at 31.
[6] Per department policy, Officer Riggs conducted an inventory search of
Faulkner’s car. During the search, he found a glass pipe with burn marks that
also contained a white residue. Tr. Vol. II at 31-32. Faulkner later admitted
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-415 | August 14, 2018 Page 3 of 10
that he intended to use the pipe to introduce illegal substances into his body. Id.
at 32. Faulkner regularly smokes marijuana, and he had begun using
methamphetamine just a few months prior to the May 17 incident. Id. at 32,
52.
[7] The State charged Faulkner with one count of Level 5 felony operating a motor
vehicle after lifetime forfeiture of driving privileges, one count of Class A
misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, one count of Class B misdemeanor
false informing, and one count of Class C misdemeanor possession of
paraphernalia. On June 15, 2017, a warrant was issued for Faulkner’s arrest.
After Faulkner was arrested, he filed with the trial court a notice of alibi defense
on August 8, 2017, which stated that “on the date and time of the alleged
offense as charged, the Defendant was at his girlfriend’s house on Ridge Street
in Richmond, IN.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 21. A second warrant was issued
for Faulkner’s arrest after he failed to appear for a pre-trial conference on
October 23, 2017. Faulkner eventually pleaded guilty as charged on December
18, 2017.
[8] During the course of the pre-sentence investigation, it was discovered that
Faulkner had fourteen prior misdemeanor convictions and one prior felony
conviction. These included numerous driving-related convictions, including:
Class A misdemeanor operating while intoxicated; Class A misdemeanor
operating while intoxicated endangering a person; Class B misdemeanor
reckless driving; Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic
offender; Class D felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator, and
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Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled
substance in a person’s body. Id. at 43-44. Faulkner had his driver’s license
suspended at least seventeen times between February 18, 2000, and November
8, 2015. Id. at 57-58. At the time of his sentencing, Faulkner had three active
suspensions against his license, which included suspensions for his habitual
traffic violator status, for failure to appear for a driver safety program, and for
failure to comply with an out-of-state violation from Ohio. Id.
[9] A sentencing hearing was held on January 19, 2018. Faulkner testified that he
fled from the scene because he “was afraid of consequences” of his decision to
drive with a suspended license and stated that he “was under a lot of stress at
the time, as far as me and my wife’s relationship went sour, and I just made
some bad decisions which ultimately led to me driving when I knew I wasn’t
supposed to be driving.” Tr. Vol. II at 44. Faulkner admitted to regularly using
marijuana and methamphetamine, but that he was “not ashamed” of his drug
use. Id. at 52. The trial court sentenced Faulkner to fifty months for Count I
and to sixty days for each of the remaining counts. The trial court noted that
Faulkner had taken responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty and ordered
his sentences to be served concurrently. Id. at 69. Faulkner now appeals his
fifty-month sentence.
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Discussion and Decision
[10] Faulkner contends5 that his fifty-month executed sentence for his Level 5 felony
operating a motor vehicle after lifetime forfeiture of driving privileges
conviction6 is inappropriate. Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this
Court “may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of
the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Our
Supreme Court has explained that the principal role of appellate review should
be to attempt to leaven the outliers, “not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result
in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We
independently examine the nature of Faulkner’s offense and his character under
Appellate Rule 7(B) with substantial deference to the trial court’s sentence.
Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). “In conducting our review,
we do not look to see whether the defendant’s sentence is appropriate or if
another sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test is whether the
sentence is ‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), trans. denied. Faulkner bears the burden of persuading us that his
sentence is inappropriate. Id.
5
Initially, the State asserts that Faulkner’s notice of appeal was not timely and that his right to appeal has
been forfeited. Assuming without deciding that Faulkner’s appeal was timely filed, we conclude that his
sentence is not inappropriate.
6
Faulkner acknowledges that this is a general appeal of the sentence, but is only asking for a review of the
sentence on Count I. The remaining sentences, being concurrent and substantially shorter, are not in
question.
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[11] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, the advisory sentence is
the starting point the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the
crime committed. Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015);
Thompson v. State, 5 N.E.3d 383, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Faulkner was
convicted of a Level 5 felony, and the advisory sentence for a Level 5 felony
conviction is three years, with a range of between one and six years. Ind. Code
§ 35-50-2-6(b). Faulkner received a sentence of fifty months, which is
equivalent to four years and two months.
[12] As this court has recognized, “The nature of the offense is found in the details
and circumstances of the commission of the offense and the defendant’s
participation.” Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). On
appeal, Faulkner contends that his sentence is not appropriate as to the nature
of his offense because his offense was not evil by nature and there was no
damage to property or persons due to his offense. He asserts that the sentence
imposed by the trial court is not commensurate with the nature of his offense.
[13] The nature of Faulkner’s offense shows that he was observed operating a
vehicle when his driver’s license had been forfeited for life. After a traffic stop
was initiated, Faulkner gave the officer a false name and birthdate, which
showed that he knew his actions of driving the vehicle were wrong. When the
officer went back to his police vehicle to run a computer check on the
information given to him by Faulkner, Faulkner fled the scene on foot and
failed to stop even after the officer ordered him to do so. These actions further
demonstrate Faulkner’s attempts to avoid apprehension. After fleeing the
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police, Faulkner successfully evaded the police for almost a month. Faulkner
attempted to mislead the trial court after he had been arrested by filing a notice
of alibi defense stating that he was with his girlfriend at the time of the offense,
a statement that he knew to be false. We conclude that the nature of the offense
does not warrant a reduction in Faulkner’s imposed sentence.
[14] “The character of the offender is found in what we learn of the offender’s life
and conduct.” Croy, 953 N.E.2d at 664. When considering the character of the
offender, one relevant fact is the defendant’s criminal history. Johnson v. State,
986 N.E.2d 852, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Although he has a lengthy criminal
history, Faulkner contends that his criminal history is outweighed by his
acceptance of responsibility and the fact that he is employable and willing to
work to further his education. He claims that “[h]is current character is not
reflective of the lengthy misdemeanor record he has amassed” and that “[h]is
single prior felony conviction would suggest an independent review and a
downward departure from the sentence imposed.” Appellant’s Br. at 17.
[15] Regarding Faulkner’s character, he has a lengthy criminal history consisting of
fourteen prior misdemeanor convictions and one prior felony conviction.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 42-44. Faulkner has had six convictions for driving-
related offenses since 2000, including his felony conviction for operating a
vehicle as a habitual traffic violator in 2011, which resulted in a lifetime
suspension of his driver’s license. Because the present offense involved a
driving-related offense and his criminal history contains numerous offenses
involving driving, we also look to Faulkner’s driving record, which shows that
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his driver’s license has been suspended seventeen times since the year 2000. Id.
at 57-58. At the time of his sentencing, three of the suspensions were still active
with an “indefinite” expiration date. Id. Faulkner’s criminal and driving
records show that past punishments, including a lifetime suspension of his
license, have not been deterred him from committing driving-related offenses.
Additionally, when Faulkner’s vehicle was inventoried after he fled the scene of
the traffic stop during the present offense, a glass pipe was discovered that
tested positive for methamphetamine. Faulkner admitted that he used
marijuana regularly and has recently begun using methamphetamine in order to
help him stay awake during his night shifts. Tr. Vol. II at 52. Further, although
Faulkner was employed and was also enrolled in school at the time of the
current offenses, he used his employment as a justification to commit driving-
related offenses by blaming his driving on the fact that he had to drive to work
even though he neglected to pursue legal avenues to restore his driving
privileges. Id. at 45, 68. We do not believe that Faulkner’s character warrants a
revision of his sentence.
[16] Our task on appeal is not to determine whether another sentence might be more
appropriate; rather, the inquiry is whether the imposed sentence is
inappropriate. Barker, 994 N.E.2d at 315. Faulkner has failed to carry his
burden of establishing that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and his character.
[17] Affirmed.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-415 | August 14, 2018 Page 9 of 10
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-415 | August 14, 2018 Page 10 of 10
Dante Faulkner v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion