The cases make it clear that the safety of ships at sea might be seriously endangered were the rule in accordance with the judge’s charge and not as stated in *820 the requested charge. 1 We need not consider whether, in extraordinary circumstances, the well-settled rule might perhaps be inapplicable if orders given were outrageously absurd, for here there were no such circumstances or orders.
Reversed and remanded. 2
Masjulis v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 2 Cir., 31 F.2284; Reskin v. Minnesota-Atlantic Transit Co., 2 Cir., 107 F.2d 743, 745; Storgard v. France & Canada S. S. Corp., 2 Cir., 263 F. 545.
We disagree with B. A. Carroll Stevedore Co. v. Makinda, 1 Cir., 20 F.2d 19, so far as it suggests a contrary rule.
It is immaterial that plaintiff was not disciplined when, after the injury, he refused to continue to obey the order; for he was not obliged’ to eonjec-ture what would be the response of his superiors to disobedience, especially before the occurrence of injuries resulting from bis compliance with the order.