In The
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
No. 06-14-00186-CR
DARRIAN DE’ANTHONY DAVIS-SANDERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 336th District Court
Fannin County, Texas
Trial Court No. CR-12-24246
Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Darrian De’Anthony Davis-Sanders pled guilty to delivery of less than one gram of cocaine
within a school zone. Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the trial court deferred a finding of
guilt, placed Davis-Sanders on community supervision for a ten-year period, and ordered him to
pay $140.00 in restitution. Subsequently, the State alleged that Davis-Sanders violated the terms
and conditions of his community supervision by possessing methamphetamine and a firearm and
moved the trial court to adjudicate his guilt. Finding the State’s allegations “true,” the trial court
revoked Davis-Sanders’ community supervision, adjudged him guilty of the underlying offense,
and sentenced him to ten years’ imprisonment. On appeal from the judgment adjudicating his
guilt,1 Davis-Sanders argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to question
the legality of the search that led police officers to the discovery of the methamphetamine and
firearm. We disagree.
“Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the two-part test formulated
in Strickland, requiring a showing of both deficient performance and prejudice.” Johnson v. State,
432 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d) (citing Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); Fox v.
State, 175 S.W.3d 475, 485 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref’d)). “To prevail on his
1
In our cause numbers 06-14-00187-CR, 06-14-00188-CR, and 06-14-00189-CR, Davis-Sanders also appeals from
(1) a judgment adjudicating him guilty of delivery of less than one gram of cocaine within a school zone, sentencing
him to ten years’ imprisonment, and ordering him to pay $102.00 in restitution; (2) a judgment adjudicating him guilty
of possession with intent to deliver four or more grams, but less than 200 grams of cocaine within a school zone,
sentencing him to sixty years’ imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a $1,450.00 fine; and (3) a judgment
adjudicating him guilty of delivery of less than one gram of cocaine within a school zone, sentencing him to ten years’
imprisonment, and ordering him to pay $140.00 in restitution.
2
ineffective assistance claims, [Davis-Sanders] must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
(1) his counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Tong v.
State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 712 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). A Strickland claim must be “firmly founded
in the record,” and “the record must affirmatively demonstrate” the meritorious nature of the claim.
Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d
137, 142–43 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). “Failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test is
fatal.” Johnson, 432 S.W.3d at 555 (citing Ex parte Martinez, 195 S.W.3d 713, 730 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2006)). Thus, we need not examine both Strickland prongs if one cannot be met. Id.
As for the first Strickland prong, “[w]e indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable, professional assistance and that it was motivated by
sound trial strategy.” Id. (citing Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).
“‘If counsel’s reasons for his conduct do not appear in the record and there is at least the possibility
that the conduct could have been legitimate trial strategy, we will defer to counsel’s decisions and
deny relief on an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.’” Id. (quoting Ortiz v. State, 93
S.W.3d 79, 88–89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). “Rarely will a reviewing court be provided the
opportunity to make its determination on direct appeal with a record capable of providing an
evaluation of the merits of ineffective assistance claims.” Id. (citing Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813).
“‘In the majority of instances, the record on direct appeal is simply undeveloped and cannot
adequately reflect’ the reasoning of trial counsel.” Id. (quoting Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14).
“Only in the rare case ‘in which trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is apparent from the record, may
3
the appellate court ‘address and dispose of the claim on direct appeal.’” Id. (quoting Lopez, 343
S.W.3d at 143).
At the hearing on the motion to adjudicate guilt, Gary Van, an officer with the Garland
Police Department, testified that he drove to a motel known for high drug activity and prostitution
based on two separate tips from informants that two black males holding handguns were selling
methamphetamine in the parking lot. From the motel owner, Van learned that a room was recently
rented by Brittany Guignard. Guignard had outstanding warrants for her arrest.
After backup arrived, Van knocked on the door of Guignard’s room and watched as Davis-
Sanders, who matched the description of one of the methamphetamine sellers, peeked out from the
blinds. Van testified that when Guignard opened the door, he immediately smelled “a lot of”
marihuana smoke and saw marihuana on the table. Van noticed that Davis-Sanders was no longer
in the bedroom and “[h]eard some rustling around inside the bathroom,” which made Van “[f]ear[]
that some drugs were being disposed of at the time.” After Guignard advised Van that she had a
firearm, officers conducted a protective sweep of the room.
As a result of the protective sweep, Van located another male and female who were hiding
underneath a pile of clothing. As he exited the bathroom, Van “for [officer] safety” asked Davis-
Sanders whether he had a firearm. According to Van, Davis-Sanders pointed to a backpack,
claimed it as his, and stated that his handgun was in the large compartment of the backpack. Van
found the loaded handgun and testified that underneath the handgun, “in plain view . . . there was
a clear white plastic baggy that contained a crystal-like substance which [he] recognized from [his]
4
training and experience to be methamphetamine.”2 At that point, Van searched the other
compartments of the backpack and located other bags containing methamphetamine, empty plastic
bags, scales, and a list of ingredients used to make methamphetamine.
Davis-Sanders argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to file a
motion to suppress the evidence found during the search of the backpack. Yet, nothing in the
record explains why trial counsel declined to file such a motion. Counsel could have determined
the motion to be pointless if he had knowledge that the confidential informants, or even co-
defendants, were willing to testify, if necessary, that they saw Davis-Sanders possessing a firearm
and selling methamphetamine in the parking lot. Counsel could have concluded that (1) as a non-
registered guest in the motel room, Davis-Sanders had no expectation of privacy, and, thus, could
not complain about the entry and search of Guignard’s room, or (2) Van had a right to enter the
room to arrest Guignard on her outstanding warrants. See generally Ex parte Moore, 395 S.W.3d
152 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see Green v. State, 78 S.W.3d 604, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, no pet.). Counsel also could have determined that it would not be an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to find that Van legally searched the backpack given the facts of this case, including
Van’s immediate sighting of the marihuana, the presence of a lot of marihuana smoke, his belief
that Davis-Sanders was disposing of contraband, the informant’s tips that a person matching
Davis-Sanders’ physical description was armed and selling methamphetamine, and Davis-
Sanders’ actions in directing Van to the backpack.
2
Brooke Harrison, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified that she tested the
substance and determined that it was methamphetamine.
5
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has said that “[t]rial counsel ‘should ordinarily be
afforded an opportunity to explain his actions’ before being denounced as ineffective.” Menefield
v. State, 363 S.W.3d 591, 593 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392).
Where an appellate record is silent as to why trial counsel failed to take certain actions, the
appellant has “failed to rebut the presumption that trial counsel’s decision was in some way—be
it conceivable or not—reasonable.” Mata v. State, 226 S.W.3d 425, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007);
see Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814. We find that Davis-Sanders has failed to meet the first Strickland
prong. Accordingly, we overrule his sole point of error.
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice
Date Submitted: July 22, 2015
Date Decided: August 4, 2015
Do Not Publish
6
Darrian De'Anthony Davis-Sanders v. State
Combined Opinion