DASS

Interim Decision #3122

MATTER OF DASS

In Deportation Proceedings

A-24287341

Decided by Board September 6, 1989

(1) As an asylum applicant bears the evidentiary burden of proof and persuasion, where
there are significant, meaningful evidentiary gaps, the applications ordinarily will be
denied for failure of proof.
(2) While we adhere to the holding in Matter of Mogharrabt, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA
1987), that the lack of corroboration for an asylum applicant's testimony will not
necessarily be fatal to his application, this does not mean that the introduction of
supporting evidence is purely an option with an asylum applicant in the ordinary case;
the general rule is that such evidence should be presented if it is available.
(3) Background evidence may be needed to evaluate the credibility of an asylum
applicant's testimony; as the basis for an asylum claim becomes less focused on
specific events involving Me alien personally and instead is more directed to broad
allegations regarding general conditions in the alien's country of origin, corroborative
background evidence to establish a plausible context for the claim may become
essential, or alternatively an acceptable explanation for the absence of such evidence
may become necessary.
(4) It was proper to conclude that the asylum applicant failed to establish a well-founded
fear of persecution where his persecution claim was based on sweeping claims about
persecution by the Government of India, as well as on the alien's testimony regarding
his own circumstances, and he did not provide background evidence to corroborate
the claims about the Government of India.

CHARGE:
Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(a)(2) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(x)(2)1—Entered without inspection
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:
Eric Beaudikofer, Esquire Joseph M. Ragusa
910 South Fourth Street General Attorney
El Centro, California 92243

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Dunne, Morris, Vacca, and Heilman, Board Members

In a decision dated January 18, 1984, an immigration judge found
the respondent deportable as charged; denied his applications for
asylum under section 208 of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982), and withholding of deportation under section

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243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1982); denied a request for the
privilege of voluntary departure under section 244(e) of the Act, 8
U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982); and ordered that the respondent be deported
to India. The respondent has appealed. The appeal will be dismissed.
The respondent is a 30 year old native and citizen of India. At
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deportation proceedings convened on November 17, 1983, he conced-
ed deportability under section 241(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2) (1982), on the ground that he entered the United States
without inspection on or about October I I, 1983. Proceedings were
then continued to allow for the filing of an application for asylum. An
application was filed and the immigration judge requested an advisory
opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs
("BHRHA") of the Department of State. Deportation proceedings
reconvened on January 17, 1984, to consider the respondent's
applications for asylum, withholding of deportation, and, in the
alternative, voluntary departure.
To establish eligibility for withholding of deportation pursuant to
section 243(h) of the Act, an alien's facts must show a clear probability
of persecution in the country designated for deportation on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984). This means that
the alien's facts must establish that it is more likely than not that he
would be subject to persecution for one of the grounds specified. Id.
To establish eligibility for asylum under section 208 of the Act, an
alien must meet the definition of a "refugee," which requires him to
show persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion. Section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982); section 208 of the Act. The burden of proof
required to establish eligibility for asylum is lower than that required
for withholding of deportation. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421
(1987). An applicant for asylum has established that his fear is "well
founded" if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances
would fear persecution. Matter of ogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA
1987). Further, asylum, unlike withholding of deportation, may be
denied in the exercise of discretion to an alien who establishes
statutory eligibility for the relief. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, supra;
Matter of Mogharrabi, supra.
The respondent's persecution claim is based upon his claimed
membership in a political party known as the "Dal Khalsa.""

The BHRHA advisory opinion states that the "Akali Dal" and the "Dal Khalsa" are
both factions of the largest Sikh party in India. These names, which were spelled
phonetically in the transcript, were used interchangeably at the hearing.

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According to his testimony, he joined that party when he was 17 years
old, was a party member in India for 2 years, and was still a party
member. His father also was a member of the party and had been so
for approximately 20 years. Neither had ever been an officer of the Dal
Khalsa. The objective of the party was to obtain independence for the
State of Punjab in India. The respondent testified that the party did
not advocate violence and that he and other party members were not
involved in violent demonstrations. As a member of this party, he
went to various villages with several other members and gave speeches
to persuade people to join the party and assist in the efforts to obtain
independence for Punjab. The respondent did this on more than 50
occasions. Approximately "six months or a year" before he left India,
the respondent was arrested along with 10 other party members after
giving a speech in a town in the district where he lived. They were told
they were arrested for advocating violence "and if we stop they won't
say anything to us." They denied that they were advocating violence.
They were kept in jail overnight and were released because the
authorities "were convinced that we didn't do anything wrong." He
testified that based on information published in government newspa-
pers, he believed that he would be kept in jail longer the next time if he
continued his party activities. He continued making speeches after his
arrest, but loft India when the arrests became more frequent. He stated
that he feared being arrested, jailed, or even killed if he returned to
India. He indicated that his wife, who was also a party member, had
not been harmed by the Government but stated that she was "probably
lying at this time that she isn't [a party member]." He acknowledged
that there had been violent demonstrations in India "with quite a
destruction" in August 1982 but stated that the Akali Dal had not been
responsible. He also testified that party members had been blamed for
putting cows' heads in Hindu temples in May 1982 and for hijacking
an airline flight in September 1981 but stated that others were doing
this and blaming the Akali Dal.
The respondent further testified that he had received letters from
his family stating that things in India were very bad. The last letter he
received (approximately 7 months before the hearing) indicated that
his father had been arrested. The respondent assumed that his father
had been arrested on account of his political activities, but the letter
did not explain why his father had been arrested or by whom. He did
not have any of these letters in his possession and introduced no
documentary evidence other than the asylum application itself.
The respondent also requested the privilege of voluntary departure
in lieu of deportation in the event that his other requests were denied.
During his testimony in this regard, he admitted that he had paid a
smuggler $400 to cross the border from Mexico to the United States.
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A BHRHA advisory opinion on the respondent's persecution claim
was obtained pursuant to the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 208.10(b)
(1983). The opinion, which was expressed in a letter dated December
15, 1983, is that the respondent has not established a well-founded fear
of persecution in India within the meaning of the United Nations
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 2 Accord-
ing to a background statement attached to this letter, the campaign to
win greater autonomy for Punjab is occurring within the framework of
India's democratic institutions. Prior to the date of the advisory
opinion, there had been very few arrests, even among the handful of
extreme secessionists, and those arrests took place only in response to
acts of violence. The background statement indicates that the Dal
Khalsa faction, to which the respondent allegedly belongs, is an
extreme fringe of this movement. It demands an independent Punjab
state and advocates violence to achieve this end. Five members of this
faction hijacked an Indian Airlines domestic flight to Lahore in
September of 1981, for which they were awaiting trial in Pakistan. In
May of 1982, the Government of India banned the Dal Khalsa after it
placed severed cows' heads in Hindu temples, deliberately provoking
mob violence. Dal Khalsa members have also been arrested on charges
of murder. Nevertheless, constitutional safeguards protect everyone in
India. The background statement concludes by stating that even the
extremists arrested for alleged criminal acts receive the full protection
of the law.
The immigratioh judge concluded that the respondent had not met
his burden of proof with regard to asylum under section 208 of the Act
or for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) and denied the
respondent's applications for relief from deportation under those
provisions of the Act. In this regard, the immigration judge observed
that the respondent had not presented any objective evidence in
support of his claims and and that his application was solely supported
by his own testimony. The immigration judge also denied the
respondent's request for voluntary departure in lieu of deportation. He
found that the respondent had failed to establish that he was willing to
leave the United States and additionally concluded that the respon-
dent was unworthy of such discretionary relief in view of the fact that
he had entered the United States surreptitiously with the assistance of
a professional smuggler.
The respondent appealed, challenging the denial of his applications
for asylum and withholding in very general terms, and submitting that

2 united Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150; United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31,
1967, [1968] 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 268.

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the immigration judge "erroneously ignored my testimony that the
lives of Dal IChalsa's are in danger only because I could not provide
government publications." It is stated on the Notice of Appeal (Form
I-290A) that "[b]ecause of my incarceration I could not produce them
and such publications are widely known." The respondent also
challenged the denial of voluntary departure and indicated that, if
given the opportunity, he "could arrange for other countries to accept
me since Indians can enter many nations without entry visas."
Before turning to the particular facts of this respondent's case, we
note two preliminary matters. First, the general rule regarding the
consideration of asylum applications by immigration judges and the
Board, as with other matters in deportation and exclusion proceedings,
is that they must be evaluated based on matters of record (i.e., based
on the evidence introduced by the parties to the case under consider-
ation). As the asylum applicant bears the evidentiary burden of proof
and persuasion, where there are significant, meaningful evidentiary
gaps, applications will ordinarily have to be denied for failure of proof.
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.5. 242.17(c) (1988).
Secondly, in determining whether an asylum applicant has met his
burden of proof, we have recognized the difficulties that may be faced
by aliens in obtaining documentary or other corroborative evidence to
support their claims of persecution. Consequently, in Mauer of
Mogharrabi, supra, we held that the lack of such evidence will not
necessarily be fatal to an application. We noted, as have various courts
of appeals, that an alien's own testimony may in 'some cases be the
only evidence available, and it can suffice where the testimony is
believable, consistent, and sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible
and coherent account of the basis for his alleged fear. See, e.g.,
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984); Matter of
Mogharrabi, supra. These cases, however, do not stand for the
proposition that the introduction of supporting evidence is purely an
option with an asylum applicant in the ordinary case. Rather, the
general rule is that such evidence should be presented where available.
See Bolanos-Ifernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1984)
(comparing "lack of direct corroboration of specific threats" to general
corroboration of "whether there is reason to take the threat serious-
ly"); Sarvia Quintanilla v. INS, 767 F.2d 1387, 1392 (9th Cir. 1985);
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Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, supra; Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523, 1529
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. If an intelligent
assessment is to be made of an asylum application, there must be
sufficient information in the record to judge the plausibility and
accuracy of the applicant's claim. Without background information
against which to judge the alien's testimony, it may well be difficult to
evaluate the credibility of the testimony. We note that this problem is

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addressed in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees para. 42 (Geneva, 1979)
(handbook'), which includes the following observations:
The applicant's statements cannot, however, be considered in the abstract, and must
be viewed -in. the context of the relevant background situation. A knowledge of
conditions in the applicant's country of origin—while not a primary objective—is an
important element in assessing the applicant's credibility.
The Handbook further notes that an asylum applicant should "[m]ake
an effort to support his statements by any available evidence and give
a satisfactory explanation for any lack of evidence." Id. at para.
205(a)(ii).
Particularly when the basis of an asylum claim becomes less focused
on specific events involving the respondent personally and instead is
more directed to broad allegations regarding general conditions in the
respondent's country of origin, corroborative background evidence
that establishes a plausible context for the persecution claim (or an
explanation for the absence of such evidence) may well be essential.
The more sweeping and general a claim, the clearer the need for an
asylum applicant to introduce supporting evidence or to explain its
absence. Furthermore, there is a greater likelihood that corroborative
evidence will be available if the claim is of longstanding, widespread
persecution.
In addressing this respondent's appeal from the denial of his
application for asylum, we note that there are two aspects to his
testimony. First, he testified to factual matters involving himself
personally (e.g., his activities and his arrest). Secondly, he testified in a
far more general and conclusory manner regarding the situation, or his
views of the general situation, concerning Dal Khalsa/Akali Dal
members in India. As noted by the immigration judge, no supporting
documentation or evidence of any kind was introduced in support of
the claim.
The respondent clearly failed to establish a well-founded fear of
persecution based on the evidence regarding his own circumstances.
His testimony in this regard reflects that he was a member of the Dal
Khalsa from the age of 17 until he left India in 1982. He was active in
giving speeches and encouraging party membership. Over the entire
period of his activities in India, the only incident with the police in
which he was involved arose when he was accused of advocating
violence along with 10 others, was detained overnight, and was
released when the authorities were satisfied that he had not done
anything wrong. Six months to a year later, he left India with nothing
having occurred to him in the interim. He testified that he considered

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articles in government newspapers threatening but did not indicate
with any specificity what those articles stated. He testified that other
party members were being arrested prior to his departure but provided
no specific information on the reasons, circumstances, or conse-
quences of such arrests. While denying any responsibility on the part
of the Dal Khalsa or the Akali Dal, he acknowledged that inflammato-
ry acts and violence were occurring in India in 1981 and 1982, acts
which could cause legitimate governmental concern over those who
were advocating or thought to be advocating violence. The respondent
further testified that after he left India he received a letter advising
him that his father had been arrested, but the letter did not reflect why
the arrest occurred or who had arrested his father. He, in fact, had no
evidence that any family member had been subjected to mistreatment
by the Government. Even if his testimony were deemed "believable",
it does not demonstrate facts on which a reasonable person would fear
persecution on account of a basis protected by the Act. 3
We do not find this application enhanced by the respondent's
general allegations regarding conditions in India. He has not providcd
background evidence of any kind to corroborate his sweeping claim
that the Government of India persecutes members of the Dal Khalsa
or Akali Dal. This is, in fact, the sort of factual claim, which, if true,
one would expect could be supported by corroborative evidence. The
unexplained absence of such information may well indicate an
exaggerated or unfounded claim. Moreover, we do not find any
credible explanation for the absence of such supporting evidence in
this case. The respondent states in his appeal statement that he could
not get corroborating evidence, which includes, by his description,
"widely known" government publications, because he was detained.

3 We note that there are major gaps or inconsistencies in the chronology of events
testified to by the respondent. The respondent testified that he was born in India in
April 1959. He stated that he joined the Dal Khalsa when he was 17 years old (1976 or
1977), was a member of the party for 2 years in India, and was still a party member at
the time of the deportation proceedings. He testified that he had been arrested about 6
months to a year before he left India in July or August 1982 The arrest would have
been, at the earliest, in 1981, and the respondent would have been a member of the party
for some 5 or 6 years when he left India, purportedly out of fear of persecution based on
his then party membership. Additionally, the respondent testified that he lived in the
village where he was born for 17 or 18 years and then was in Greece for 2 years or 18
months before coming to the United States via Mexico in 1983. He indicated on his
asylum application that he was in Greece and Mexico for a total of some 19 to 20
months prior to his entry into the United States in October 1983. Alternatively, he
stated on the Biographic Information (Form G - 325A), filed with his asylum application,
that he resided in his hometown in India from 1959 to 1983. These various stories leave
unexplained gaps in his chronology from months, in some instances, to many years in
others.

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Respondent's counsel, however, entered an appearance in his case on
October 14, 1983. The initial hearing was conducted on November 17,
1983, during which a continuance was granted to permit the filing of
an application for asylum. The hearing on the merits was not
conducted until January 17, 1984. Not only does the record not
include any "widely known" supporting evidence, it does not reflect
that any effort was ever made to obtain such information. Moreover,
the information provided by the Department of State indicates to the
contrary that members of the Dal Khalsa are punished only for
criminal conduct and that this is done in accordance with the
constitutional protections of the Indian system of criminal justice.
We conclude that the respondent has failed to establish a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of his alleged political
activities, and, therefore, that he has not established eligibility for
asylum under section 208 of he Act. Matter of Mogharrabi, supra. We
find further that in view of his failure to satisfy that burden of proof
with respect to asylum, he also has failed to satisfy the higher burden
of proof for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the
Act. Id.
The respondent also has contended that his request for the
voluntary departure privilege was denied erroneously on the basis of
his unwillingness at the time of the hearing to leave immediately. He
claims that he appeared unwilling to leave at that time because he was
too ill to travel, and he anticipated that his asylum application would
be granted. According to the respondent, he can arrange for his
acceptance by some country, other than India, which will accept
Indian nationals without entry visas.
The appeal from the denial of voluntary departure, however, does
not address the immigration judge's discretionary denial of that relief.
The record reflects that the respondent entered the United States with
the assistance of a professional smuggler, and he has not established
equities in his behalf -which would warrant a favorable exercise of
discretion in view of that serious adverse factor. See Matter of Rojas,
15 I&N Dec. 492 (BIA 1975). Consequently, we affirm the immigra-
tion judge's discretionary denial of the respondent's request for the
privilege of voluntary departure.
Accordingly, the following order will be entered.
ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

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