In an action, inter alla, to recover damages for breach of contract and fraud, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Mahon, J.), dated May 1, 2012, which granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
In November 1990, the plaintiffs obtained a loan from the defendant Citimortgage, Inc. (hereinafter Citimortgage), and in return gave Citimortgage a mortgage on their home in Hemp-stead. In 2009, the plaintiffs began experiencing financial difficulties and, on July 28, 2009, they entered into a trial period
Immediately after Citimortgage denied the plaintiffs a permanent HAMP loan modification, the plaintiffs filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy protection (see 11 USC §§ 1301-1330) and, in their bankruptcy petition, they listed the original Citimortgage mortgage, but not the TPP agreement. Approximately one year later, in May 2011, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs’ bankruptcy petition for failure to make plan payments.
The plaintiffs commenced this action in September 2011 against Citimortgage and Citibank, N.A., alleging in their amended complaint that the defendants breached the TPP agreement, and asserting causes of action alleging, inter alla, breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, promissory estoppel, and a violation of General Business Law § 349. The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a), arguing that there was no private right of action against a lender or loan servicer under the HAMfj that the plaintiffs were judicially estopped from pursuing this action since they failed to disclose the TPP agreement in their bankruptcy petition, and that each of the causes of action asserted in the amended complaint failed to state a cause of action. The Supreme Court granted the motion, concluding that the plaintiffs’ failure to list the “outstanding mortgage obligation” in their bankruptcy petition judicially estopped them from prosecuting this action. The plaintiffs appeal. We affirm, albeit on a different ground.
“The doctrine of judicial estoppel or estoppel against inconsistent positions precludes a party from taking a position in one legal proceeding which is contrary to that which he or she took in a prior proceeding, simply because his or her interests have changed” (Festinger v Edrich, 32 AD3d 412, 413 [2006]; see
Here, the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ bankruptcy proceeding for failure to make plan payments was not the functional equivalent of a discharge, as such dismissal did not constitute an adoption by the Bankruptcy Court of the plaintiffs’ characterization of their assets (see Saini v Cinelli Enters., 289 AD2d 770, 773 [2001]; McIntosh Bldrs. v Ball, 264 AD2d 869, 870 [1999]). Accordingly, although it is undisputed that the plaintiffs did not disclose, in their bankruptcy petition, the existence of the TPP agreement that forms the basis of their claims in this action, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not bar this action (see Koch v National Basketball Assn., 245 AD2d 230 [1997]; Matter of Miller [Berti], 1 AD3d 885 [2003]).
Nevertheless, we affirm the order on the ground that the amended complaint fails to state a cause of action, since no private right of action exists under HAMB “When, as here, a statute does not provide an express private right of action, the courts will imply a private right of action only upon examination of the following three factors: (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether recognition of a private right of action
As to the first factor, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (12 USC §§ 5201-5261 [hereinafter the EESA]), which authorized the United States Department of the Treasury to promulgate the HAMP was enacted “to immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States” (12 USC § 5201 [1]) and “to ensure that such authority and such facilities are used in a manner that (A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings; (B) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic growth; (C) maximizes overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States; and (D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such authority” (12 USC § 5201 [2]). Similarly, section 201 (a) (2) (A) (i) of the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 (Pub L 111-22, § 201 [a] [2] [A] [i], 123 US Stat 1632, 1638) simply articulated a congressional finding that, in order to reduce the number of foreclosures and stabilize real property values, mortgage lenders should be given authorization to modify mortgage loans consistent with applicable guidelines promulgated by the United States Department of the Treasury pursuant to EESA. Thus, although financially struggling homeowners may derive a benefit from the HAMP that program was not promulgated solely for their particular benefit (see Miller v Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F3d 1113, 1116 [11th Cir 2012]). As to the second factor, the underlying purpose of the HAMP is to incentivize mortgage loan servicers to reduce monthly mortgage payments and, thus, prevent avoidable home foreclosures (see id.). Accordingly, a private right of action against a lender or loan servicer arising from an alleged breach of a TPP agreement is inconsistent with the purpose of HAMP as judicial recognition of such a private right of action would deter lenders and loan servicers from participating in the HAMP (see id.). As to the third factor, the EESA expressly provides for civil actions by the Secretary of the Treasury (see 12 USC § 5229 [a] [1]) and for actions seeking equitable relief against the Secretary of the Treasury (see 12 USC § 5229 [a] [2], [3]), but makes no reference to private rights of action by borrowers against mortgage lenders or loan servicers. Moreover, given that, as noted above, private rights of action could conceivably deter lenders and loan servicers from participating in the HAMP which would, in turn, undermine the HAMP’s purpose, allowing for a private right of action would
In light of our determination, we need not reach the parties’ remaining contentions. Rivera, J.P, Lott, Roman and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.