Debro v. State

Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee
Michael J. Spencer Steve Carter
Deputy Public Defender Attorney General of
Indiana
Bloomington, Indiana
Richard C. Webster
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

____________________________________________________________________________
__

In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________

No. 53S04-0308-CR-388

Sherman C. Debro,
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT BELOW),

v.

State of Indiana,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
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Appeal from the Monroe Circuit Court I, No. 53C01-0103-DF-206
The Honorable E. Michael Hoff, Judge
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On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 53A04-0208-
CR-388
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January 27, 2005

Rucker, Justice.

We grant transfer in this case to address the question of whether a
plea agreement based on a withheld judgment is a nullity per se and thus
void ab initio. We conclude it is not.
Fact and Procedural History

On March 10, 2001, after consuming some amount of alcohol, Sherman C.
Debro became involved in a physical altercation with T.M., his live-in
girlfriend, causing T.M. to sustain bodily injury. Apparently the parties’
twelve-year-old daughter attempted to intervene and she too was injured.
As a consequence, Debro was arrested and charged with battery as a Class D
felony for the conduct resulting in injuries to his daughter and domestic
battery as a Class A misdemeanor for the conduct resulting in injuries to
T.M. Plea negotiations between Debro and the State ensued thereafter. As
a member of the Indiana National Guard, Debro was concerned that if he
proceeded to trial and was found guilty of either offense, then he “could
not possess a firearm” which would interfere with his military service.[1]
Appellant’s App. at 25. In any event, on September 13, 2001, the State
filed an amended charge of criminal recklessness as a Class B misdemeanor
for Debro’s conduct resulting in injuries to T.M.[2]

The agreement reached between Debro and the State required Debro to
plead guilty to criminal recklessness and in exchange the State would
dismiss the battery charges. As for sentencing, Debro and the State
executed a document in open court on September 17, 2001, entitled “Deferred
Sentencing Agreement.” Id. at 14. Among other things the agreement
provided in relevant part that Debro would: (1) commit no criminal offenses
for a period of one year from the date of the agreement; (2) attend and
successfully complete the Batterer’s Treatment Program; and (3) not use any
illicit, mood altering, or controlled substances and not use alcohol while
enrolled in the Program. The trial court explained to Debro the
consequences of pleading guilty and advised him that under the terms of the
agreement, “the Court will not enter a judgment of conviction, and will not
enter a sentence at this time, as long as you comply with all of the
conditions in this Deferred Sentencing Agreement . . . . If you comply
with the Agreement, that will be the end of it.” Id. at 27-28. After
making several inquires of the trial court, Debro pleaded guilty to the
amended charge and provided the trial court with a factual basis for the
plea. The trial court accepted Debro’s plea of guilty declaring, “I’m
going to find that there is a basis of fact for the plea, and I’m going to
withhold the imposition of judgment on the terms and conditions set out in
the Agreed Deferred Sentencing Agreement.” Id. at 35.

Six weeks later Debro was alleged to have again physically assaulted
T.M., which required a visit to the hospital where she was diagnosed as
suffering a “left orbital blowout fracture.” Id. at 106. As a result, the
State moved to impose judgment on the ground that Debro had violated the
terms of the agreement by committing battery, a criminal offense. After
conducting a hearing, which was continued several times because T.M. failed
to appear, the trial court concluded that the “motion to impose the
judgment has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence . . . .” Id.
at 137. The trial court then sentenced Debro to 180 days in jail, with 150
days suspended, and placed Debro on probation for one year. Id. at 143.

Debro appealed raising three issues for review, which we consolidate
as two and restate as follows: (1) whether the trial court erred in
enforcing the plea agreement, and (2) whether the trial court erred in the
admission of hearsay evidence. Addressing the first issue only, a divided
panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court on
the ground that “Debro’s plea agreement was void ab initio . . . .” Debro
v. State, 784 N.E.2d 1029, 1030 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Having previously
granted transfer, we now affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Discussion
I.

In Lighty v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1094 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. not
sought, the defendant pleaded guilty to battery and entered a plea
agreement which provided that judgment would be withheld for one year if
the defendant was not “arrested based upon probable cause within that
period” and if he successfully completed the Batterer’s Program. Id. at
1095. The defendant enrolled in the program but was dismissed after he got
into an altercation with a counselor. Consequently, the State filed a
motion to reinstate judgment. Id. at 1095-96. The trial court determined
that the defendant had violated the terms of the plea agreement and
sentenced him to 180 days in jail to be followed by the balance of his
original one-year sentence on probation. Id. at 1096. On review, the
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court holding:

We are aware that some trial courts withhold judgment as a case
management device for various purposes. While it may be useful,
this informal practice finds no sanction in the law. Trial
courts may not withhold judgment nor indefinitely postpone
sentencing. As a matter of law, a “withheld judgment” or
“judgment withheld” (also commonly known as a “JW”) is a
nullity.

Id. at 1096 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals in this case also
relied on Lighty for the proposition that “conditioning a plea agreement
upon the trial court’s ability to withhold judgment rendered that agreement
void ab initio.” Debro, 784 N.E.2d at 1033.

Underlying Lighty as well as the instant case is the general rule that
a plea agreement entered in violation of a statute is void and
unenforceable. See Tolliver v. Mathas, 512 N.E.2d 187, 189 (Ind. Ct. App.
1987), trans. denied. Indiana Code § 35-38-1-1(a) provides, “[A]fter a
verdict, finding, or plea of guilty, if a new trial is not granted, the
court shall enter a judgment of conviction.” (Emphasis added). Debro
acknowledges that the statute does not explicitly set a time limit. He
argues however that it nonetheless forbids trial courts from withholding
judgment. Implicit in Debro’s argument is that his plea agreement was in
violation of I.C. § 35-38-1-1(a) and thus is void. The State counters that
the statute mandates only the entry of judgment of conviction, but does not
say when judgment must be entered. Thus, according to the State, there is
no specific time limit within which a trial court is required to enter
judgment.

We first observe that although the plea agreement in this case
provided for a “deferred sentence” as opposed to a “withheld judgment” the
end result is the same. The judgment of conviction on which the sentence
was to be based was not entered immediately. In fact, the way in which
such agreements are customarily used by trial courts throughout this State,
no judgment of conviction is ever entered provided the defendant carries
his or her end of the bargain. This is a tremendous benefit to the
defendant because, provided the defendant faithfully observes the terms of
the agreement, there is no conviction on the defendant’s record. See,
e.g., Carter v. State, 750 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ind. 2001) (“A verdict of
guilty can certainly be a significant legal event, but only if a court
later enters judgment on it.”) The same was intended here. As the trial
court explained, “If you comply with the Agreement, that will be the end of
it.” Appellant’s App. at 28. In any event the statute is indeed silent on
the question of timing. However that is not to say the statute anticipates
that the entry of judgment of conviction can be withheld indefinitely.
Eight decades ago, addressing a statute similar to I.C. § 35-38-1-1, this
Court held:

[T]he rule is well settled that it is the duty of the court upon
a plea of guilty or upon a finding or verdict of guilty, to
impose sentence at that time unless there is reasonable excuse
for delay . . . and that an indefinite postponement of rendering
judgment or pronouncing sentence will deprive the court of
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, from which it
follows that a subsequent sentence is void.

Warner v. State, 194 Ind. 426, 143 N.E. 288, 290 (1924) (construing Section
2073, Burns’ 1914, which provided, “If the accused plead guilty, said plea
shall be entered on the minutes, and he shall be sentenced, or he may be
placed in the custody of the sheriff until sentenced.”). In like fashion,
addressing a predecessor to I.C. § 35-38-1-1, this Court has held,
“[C]ourts may defer temporarily final action upon a plea of guilty or upon
a conviction to a subsequent day or term, when it appears that the interest
of justice demands it or as said ‘for cause shown’ . . . .” Smeltzer v.
State, 243 Ind. 437, 185 N.E.2d 428, 431 (1962) (quotation omitted)
(construing Section 9-2201, Burns’ 1956, which provided, “After a finding
or verdict of guilty, against the defendant, if a new trial be not granted,
or the judgment be not arrested, the court must pronounce judgment.”).

Generally at issue in these early cases was an alleged untimely
sentencing as opposed to an alleged untimely entry of judgment. And in
that regard there have been various statutory enactments over the years as
well as the adoption of procedural rules that provide further guidance on
the trial court’s authority to delay sentence on a plea or verdict of
guilty. See, e.g., I.C. § 35-38-1-2(b) (requiring trial court to set a
sentencing date within thirty days after entering a conviction, unless for
good cause shown an extension is granted); accord Ind. Crim. Rule 11
(requiring trial court to sentence a defendant within thirty days after
entering a conviction, unless an extension for good cause is shown); I.C. §
35-35-3-3(a) (requiring the trial court to consider presentence report
before accepting a defendant’s plea agreement); I.C. § 35-38-1-8(a)
(requiring the trial court to consider presentence report before sentencing
a defendant convicted of a felony). Still, neither the current statute nor
its predecessors speak to the question of timing. We are of the view that
as slightly modified the rule long ago expressed is still applicable: the
trial court may not withhold judgment but is required to enter judgment of
conviction immediately unless a temporary postponement is dictated by good
cause shown or the interest of justice so requires.[3] We thus disapprove
of language in Lighty declaring that the practice of withheld judgments
“finds no sanction in the law” and suggesting that a withheld judgment is a
nullity per se. 727 N.E.2d at 1096.

In this case, as we have mentioned, the plea agreement contemplates
not a “withheld” judgment but that no judgment would ever be entered. If
Debro had fulfilled the terms of his agreement, then the charge to which he
pleaded guilty would have been dismissed. The agreement was thus in clear
violation of I.C. § 35-38-1-1(a). That does not mean however that Debro is
entitled to relief. A plea agreement is contractual in nature, binding the
defendant, the State and the trial court. Pannarale v. State, 638 N.E.2d
1247, 1248 (Ind. 1994). As we recently explained, “[D]efendants who plead
guilty to achieve favorable outcomes give up a plethora of substantive
claims and procedural rights, such as challenges to convictions that would
otherwise constitute double jeopardy. Striking a favorable bargain
including a consecutive sentence the court might otherwise not have the
ability to impose falls within this category.” Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d
35, 40 (Ind. 2004) (quotation omitted). Withheld judgments and deferred
sentences fall into this category as well.[4] The agreement Debro reached
with the State provided him with a significant benefit: the possibility of
no criminal conviction for his admitted criminal conduct. Having failed to
fulfill his part of the agreement, Debro may not now be heard to complain.

II.

Debro also challenges certain hearsay statements the trial court
allowed into evidence. Because the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment
of the trial court on other grounds, it did not reach this issue. We do so
now.

Debro’s complaint is based on the following facts. On November 9,
2001, the State sought to impose judgment against Debro by filing a
document entitled “Motion To Set For Sentencing.” Appellant’s App. at 15.
The motion alleged that Debro violated the terms of his plea agreement by
committing the offense of battery against T.M. A hearing on the motion was
scheduled for January 31, 2002. On that date the State called as a witness
Officer William Jeffers of the Bloomington Police Department. He testified
without objection that on November 2, 2002, he responded to a dispatch to
proceed to a local nightclub “in reference to a female that had been
previously battered.” Id. at 41. According to Officer Jeffers, he arrived
on the scene and spoke with a person who identified herself as T.M. and
“she was crying, she told the deputies that she had been beaten up.” Id.
When the State sought further inquiry into the details of the conversation
between the officer and T.M., Debro objected on the grounds of hearsay.
After an extended discussion the trial court sustained the objection, at
which time the State moved for a continuance in order to secure T.M.’s
presence. The hearing was continued until February 14, 2002. However, on
that date and two occasions thereafter, the hearing was again continued
when T.M. failed to appear although she was subpoenaed to do so.

A hearing was finally held on May 1 and May 2, 2002, in T.M.’s absence
when T.M. once again failed to appear despite being served with a subpoena.
Officer Jeffers continued his testimony from the first hearing and
testified that after arriving at the nightclub he noticed injuries to
T.M.’s face, and that “[h]er eye was black and it was almost completely
shut. She had blood around her mouth and her nostrils.” Id. at 74. Debro
did not object to this testimony. However, over Debro’s objection, the
State introduced into evidence hospital records for medical treatment T.M.
received on November 2, 2002. Among other things, the records included a
doctor’s medical diagnosis that T.M. suffered a “left orbital blowout
fracture.” Id. at 106. The State also introduced, over Debro’s objection,
a sworn statement T.M. had given to a victim’s advocate in the Prosecutor’s
office. The statement, written in T.M.’s own hand, detailed the
circumstances surrounding the event of November 2, 2002. Id. at 149. In
his own defense, Debro introduced into evidence two documents also written
in T.M.’s own hand. Both identify “Debro” or “Sherman” as the person with
whom T.M. had been in an altercation “on the night in question.” See id.
at 151, 153.

Debro argues that the admission of T.M.’s hearsay statements offered
by the State violated his right to confront witnesses under both the state
and federal constitutions. Under our state Constitution the accused must
have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness during a “face to face”
confrontation. Ind. Const. art. I, § 13; Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d 39,
49 (Ind. 1997). The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause provides that,
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI.

Any right of confrontation to which Debro may have been entitled is
largely dependant on the precise nature of these proceedings. Both the
State and the trial court referred to the proceedings as a “sentencing
hearing.” We have held that the rule against hearsay does not apply to
sentencing. See Dumas v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1113, 1120 (Ind. 2004); Letica
v. State, 569 N.E.2d 952, 957 (Ind. 1991). And at least with respect to
the federal constitution, the Seventh Circuit has determined that the
Confrontation Clause does not apply to sentencing proceedings. “The Sixth
Amendment accords an accused the right to confront the witnesses against
him in a ‘criminal prosecution.’ A sentencing hearing, however, is not a
‘criminal prosecution’ within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment because
its sole purpose is to determine only the appropriate punishment for the
offense, not the accused's guilt.” U.S. v. Francis, 39 F.3d 803, 810 (7th
Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that the
use of hearsay testimony during his sentencing hearing violated the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment).[5]
We need not determine today whether our state constitution affords a
defendant a right of confrontation in a sentencing hearing. And that is so
because we do not view these proceedings as a sentencing hearing. The
purpose of a sentencing “is to determine the type and extent of
punishment.” Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ind. 2002) (citing
Thomas v. State, 562 N.E.2d 43, 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)). Here, it is true
the trial court ultimately sentenced Debro after considering the evidence
presented. However, imposition of sentence was the result of, not the
reason for, the proceedings. Rather, the proceedings were held to
determine whether Debro had violated the terms and conditions of his plea
agreement, specifically: “commit no criminal offenses for a period of one
year from the date of the agreement.” Although not precisely the same, the
evidentiary hearings in this case were more analogous to a probation
revocation proceeding than a sentencing hearing. For example, a provision
requiring a probationer to engage in no criminal conduct is typically
included as a term of probation. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1(b). Also, as
with a defendant committed to probation, Debro was granted a conditional
liberty, contingent upon his compliance with the terms of his agreement.
See Rivera v. State, 667 N.E.2d 764, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“Probation
is conditional liberty dependent upon the observance of the terms of
probation.”); see also Carswell v. State, 721 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1999) (“Probation is a criminal sanction wherein a convicted defendant
specifically agrees to accept conditions upon his behavior in lieu of
imprisonment.”). By complying with the conditions of probation and making
a sincere effort at rehabilitation, the probationer avoids serving a
sentence. Debro is similarly situated. Also, as in a probation revocation
proceeding, here the trial court determined the State proved the allegation
against Debro by a preponderance of the evidence. See Cox v. State, 706
N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999) (“A probation hearing is civil in nature and
the State need only prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the
evidence.”)

Although probationers are not entitled to the full array of
constitutional rights afforded defendants at trial, “the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment [does] impose [] procedural and substantive
limits on the revocation of the conditional liberty created by probation.”
Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 549 (Ind. 1999) (citing Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606,
610 (1985)). In the context of a probation revocation, this Court has
said:

There are certain due process rights, of course, which inure to
a probationer at a revocation hearing. These include written
notice of the claimed violations, disclosure of the evidence
against him, an opportunity to be heard and present evidence,
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and a
neutral and detached hearing body. Indiana code § 35-38-2-3(d)
also ensures the probationer the right to confrontation, cross-
examination, and representation by counsel.

Isaac v. State, 605 N.E.2d 144, 148 (Ind. 1992) (citations omitted).[6] We
are of the view that these same due process rights inure also to the
benefit of a defendant in a proceeding to enforce a deferred sentence or
withheld judgment.

In this case the record is clear that Debro had no opportunity to
cross-examine T.M. concerning her written statement to the prosecuting
attorney. Nor did Debro have the opportunity to test by cross-examination
the hearsay within hearsay contained in the hospital medical records.
However, even assuming, and without deciding, that the trial court erred by
allowing the documents into evidence, we hold the admission was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24
(1967) (declaring that a constitutional error may be harmless if it is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt). The record shows that the testimony of
Officer Jeffers, introduced into evidence without objection, established
that T.M. was battered. The same is true for the medical records. T.M’s
hearsay statement merely confirmed that fact and included details of the
event. Combined with the exhibits Debro introduced on his own behalf,
there was sufficient evidence of probative value before the trial court to
demonstrate that Debro violated the terms of his plea agreement by
committing battery, a criminal offense.

Conclusion

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur.

-----------------------
[1] The Federal Firearms Act makes possession of a firearm illegal for
anyone, “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence.” 18 U.S.C.S. § 922(g)(9).

[2] Counsel for Debro commented that the State had “generously filed” the
criminal recklessness charge. Appellant’s App. at 21.
[3] Under some circumstances a trial court is expressly authorized to
withhold judgment. See, e.g., I.C. § 35-48-4-12 (allowing a court to defer
judgment following a plea of guilty to possession of marijuana or hashish
as a Class A misdemeanor and place the person under the court’s custody
subject to conditions); I.C. § 12-23-14.5-15 (allowing a drug court to
defer proceedings without entering a judgment of conviction following a
guilty plea to an offense in which the use of alcohol or drugs was a
contributing factor or material element of the offense and place the person
under the court’s custody subject to conditions).

[4] We therefore expressly overrule Miller v. State, 783 N.E.2d 772 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2003), trans. dismissed. There the Court of Appeals held: “a plea
agreement, like the agreement in Lighty and in this case, which requires
the trial court, after a plea of guilty, to withhold judgment rather than
enter judgment constitutes a contract made in violation of Indiana Code
Section 35-38-1-1(a). As a result, such plea agreements are void and
unenforceable.” Id. at 779 (citation omitted).
[5] This view is also consistent with those of several other federal
circuit courts addressing whether the Confrontation Clause applies to
sentencing. See, e.g., United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Tardiff, 969 F.2d 1283, 1287 (1st Cir. 1992);
United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 397-98 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc);
United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1510 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc);
United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
502 U.S. 991 (1991); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3rd
Cir. 1990); United States v. Beaulieu, 893 F.2d 1177, 1180 (10th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990).
[6] See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (declaring that
in a parole revocation proceeding, a defendant is entitled to minimum
requirements of due process, which include “the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witness (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation) . . . .”).