Deodati v. M.M. Winkler & Associates (In Re M.M. Winkler & Associates)

                         Revised February 6, 2001

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                        FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT


                               No. 99-60904


                        In the Matter of:
   M.M. WINKLER & ASSOCIATES, BILL MORGAN, AND OKEE MCDONALD,

                                                                  Debtors.

                              BRUNO DEODATI,

                                                                Appellant,

                                    v.

   M.M. WINKLER & ASSOCIATES, BILL MORGAN, AND OKEE MCDONALD,

                                                                Appellees.


      Appeal from the United States District Court for the
                Northern District of Mississippi


                             February 1, 2001

Before JOLLY, JONES and SMITH, Circuit Judges.

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:

          At issue is whether a debtor whose partner committed

fraud may discharge in bankruptcy the liability to the fraud

victim.   The bankruptcy and district courts held that 11 U.S.C. §

523(a)(2)(A) does not bar innocent partners from discharging fraud

liability unless 1) they benefitted from the fraud; and 2) the

perpetrator   of   the    fraud   acted   in   the   ordinary   course   of

partnership business.        Fraud victim Bruno Deodati (“Deodati”)
appeals.      We reverse and remand for entry of judgment in favor of

appellant.

                                         FACTS

              The facts of this case are undisputed. Bill Morgan, Okee

McDonald, and Patsy McCreight formed the Mississippi accounting

partnership M.M. Winkler and Associates (“Partnership”).                        Deodati

became a client of McCreight.             Only McCreight worked on Deodati’s

file.

              Deodati      authorized    the     Partnership     to     buy    and    sell

certificates        of   deposit    on   his    behalf.        McCreight       used    the

authorization       to     place   Deodati’s      money   in    her   personal        bank

account. She generated fictitious income statements to conceal the

fraud.      Morgan and McDonald (“the Innocent Partners”) were unaware

of    the   fraud    and    did    not   receive    any   of    the     stolen       money

individually or through the Partnership.

              The Partnership did receive roughly $3,500 from Deodati

for “accounting services rendered.” These services were related to

certificate of deposit transactions and inflated tax returns that

McCreight filed for Deodati.

              Morgan discovered the fraud and reported it to Deodati.

Deodati filed suit in state court.                In their answer, the Innocent

Partners admitted to the vicarious liability imposed by law.

Deodati filed an unopposed motion for partial summary judgment.

The   court    granted      the    motion   and    imposed      joint    and    several



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liability against the Partnership and the individual partners for

over $ 290,000.   The $3,500 in accounting services was not part of

this judgment.    The Innocent Partners filed for bankruptcy under

Chapter 7, and Deodati sought to prevent them from discharging this

debt because it arose from fraud.

          Citing Luce v. First Equip. Leasing Corp. (In re Luce),

960 F.2d 1277, 1283 (5th Cir. 1992), the bankruptcy court applied

a   three-part    test    to    determine       whether   the     debt   was

nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A), (4), and (6).            It looked to

1) whether the Innocent Partners were partners with McCreight; 2)

whether McCreight acted in the ordinary course of business of the

Partnership; and 3) whether the Innocent Partners received a

benefit from the fraud.     The court, finding that Deodati failed to

establish the second and third elements, permitted the Innocent

Partners to discharge the debt.         The district court affirmed.

                                DISCUSSION

          Deodati   first      argues    that   §   523(a)(2)(A)    of   the

Bankruptcy Code bars the Innocent Partners from discharging the

debt even if they did not benefit monetarily from the fraud.             We

agree.

          Section 523 lists “Exceptions to discharge.”           It states:

     (a) A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual
     debtor from any debt– . . .

          (2) for money, property, services, or an extension,
          renewal, or refinancing of credit, to the extent
          obtained by–

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                  (A) false pretenses, a false representation,
                  or actual fraud, other than a statement
                  respecting the debtor’s or an insider’s
                  financial condition.

          The language of the statute includes no “receipt of

benefit” requirement.    The statute focuses on the character of the

debt, not the culpability of the debtor or whether the debtor

benefitted from the fraud.       See Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious

Thrills: The Case for Application of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy

Dischargeability Litigation, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2515, 2542 (1996)

(arguing that § 523(a)(2) makes all debts that are the product of

fraud nondischargeable). Thus, the plain meaning of the statute is

that debtors cannot discharge any debts that arise from fraud so

long as they are liable to the creditor for the fraud.

          The Supreme Court did not require receipt of benefits in

a similar case.    See Strang v. Bradner, 114 U.S. 555, 561 (1885).

The bankruptcy statute at the time barred discharge for a “debt

created by the fraud or embezzlement of the bankrupt.”      See id. at

556.   The Court stated that each partner was the agent and

representative of the firm, and it imputed fraud by one partner to

the innocent partners.     See id. at 561.     It stated, “[t]his is

especially so when, as in the case before us, the [innocent

partners] received and appropriated the fruits of the fraudulent

conduct of their associate in business.”     See id.   The Court barred

the innocent partners from discharging the debt in bankruptcy. See



                                  4
id.    Strang thus indicates that benefit to an innocent partner is

an     aggravating     factor     and   not    a   requirement    to    impute

nondischargeable fraud liability.

            Strang is still good law.         In recent years, this circuit

and others have relied on it to bar discharge on behalf of innocent

debtors for a partner’s fraud.          See BancBoston Mortgage Corp. v.

Ledford (In re: Ledford), 970 F.2d 1556, 1561 (6th Cir. 1992) (no

dischargeability where debtor benefitted from partner’s fraud);

Luce, 960 F.2d at 1282.          Section 523(a)(2)(A) applies even more

directly to innocent partners than the statute in Strang, since now

the “bankrupt” need not perpetrate the fraud.

            A more recent Supreme Court case also suggests that

receipt of benefits is irrelevant to whether innocent debtors may

discharge fraud liability.         In Cohen v. de la Cruz, the Court held

that § 523(a)(2)(A) prevents debtors from discharging statutory and

punitive fraud damages.         See Cohen v. de la Cruz, 523 U.S. 213, 220

(1998).    The Court rejected a fraud perpetrator’s contention that

he could discharge any liability above the amount he received. See

id. at 222.       It held that “[o]nce it is established that specific

money or property has been obtained by fraud . . . ‘any debt’

arising therefrom is excepted from discharge.”            Id. at 218-19.      It

relied on     a    “straightforward     reading”   of   the   statute   and   on

legislative intent to make fraud victims whole.               See id. at 217-

220.    Cohen indicates that whether the debt arises from fraud is

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the only consideration material to nondischargeability.               It also

indicates that we should not read requirements like receipt of

benefits into § 523(a)(2)(A) and that the discharge exceptions

protect fraud victims rather than debtors.

           This court’s decision in Luce v. First Equip. Leasing

Corp. (In re Luce), 960 F.2d 1277, 1283 (5th Cir. 1992), is not

necessarily   inconsistent    with        Cohen   and,   in   any   event,   is

superseded by Cohen to the extent of any inconsistency.              In Luce,

a debtor tried to discharge imputed fraud liability because she was

unaware of her partner/husband’s fraud. Relying principally on the

imputed partnership liability discussion in Strang, the court held

that Mrs. Luce was responsible under § 523(a)(2)(A) regardless of

her knowledge or involvement.        See Luce, 960 F.2d at 1282.

           Mrs. Luce also argued that the discharge exception did

not apply because she never actually obtained money for herself by

fraud.   See id. at 1283.    The court stated,

     [t]he test under section 523(a)(2)(A), however, is not
     whether the debtor actually procured the money, property,
     services or credit for him or herself. 3 Collier on
     Bankruptcy § 523.08[1] (15th ed. 1991). Rather, the Code
     dictates that a particular debt is nondischargeable ‘[i]f
     the debtor benefits in some way” from the money,
     property, services or credit obtained through deception.’
     Century First Nat’l Bank v. Holwerda (in re Holwerda), 29
     B.R. 486, 489 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that
     debtor who was a principal of a corporation “‘obtained
     money” within the meaning of § 523(a)(2)’” when the
     creditor approved a loan to the corporation).




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Id. The court then rejected this argument because Mrs. Luce shared

in the fraud proceeds through the Luce partnership.

              The court was not creating a receipt of benefit test.

There was no question that Mrs. Luce had indirectly benefitted

through the       partnership.      Mrs.     Luce    was   making   the     distinct

argument that she could discharge the debt unless she directly

obtained money for herself through fraud.             See Holwerda, 29 B.R. at

489 (discussing a line of cases that supports this view, but

ultimately rejecting the argument). The court rejected Mrs. Luce’s

argument by observing that even an indirect benefit is sufficient.

It   cited      Holwerda    and    Collier    §     523.08[1],      which     reject

distinctions between direct and indirect benefits.                  See Holwerda,

29 B.R. at 489; 4 Collier on Bankruptcy § 523.08[1] (rev. 15th ed.

2000).       In Holwerda, for instance, the debtor who was a corporate

principal “obtained money” within § 523(a)(2) when the creditor

lent money to the corporation.

              While Luce does not discuss pure imputed liability among

partners, its finding of an indirect benefit is consistent with a

recognition that a partnership that actually benefits from a fraud

inherently benefits its members.             As in Strang, the presence of

some personal, albeit indirect benefit supplemented but was not a

precondition for Mrs. Luce’s imputed partnership liability.

              Luce, therefore, stands at least for the proposition that

where    a    partner’s    fraud   benefits    the    partnership,     all     other


                                        7
partners necessarily receive a benefit from the fraud.               To the

extent that Luce does not specifically hold that a partner is

deemed to benefit even absent a showing of actual benefit to the

partnership, that gap is amply filled by the Supreme Court’s

superseding decision in Cohen.

           The Sixth Circuit has nonetheless interpreted Luce to

establish a receipt of benefit test.       In BancBoston Mortgage Corp.

v. Ledford (In re Ledford), 970 F.2d 1556, 1561 (6th Cir. 1992), an

innocent partner received fraud proceeds through a partnership and

sought to discharge liability.       The court understood Luce to bar

innocent debtors from discharging imputed fraud debts when: 1) the

debtor   and    perpetrator   of   the   fraud    are   partners;    2)   the

perpetrator acts in the ordinary course of partnership business;

and 3) the innocent debtor receives a benefit from the fraud.              It

“adopted” this analysis, and held that § 523(a)(2)(A) prevented the

innocent partner from discharging the debt because he received a

benefit.   See id. at 1561.

           The Eleventh Circuit has also cited receipt of benefits

in a case that did not involve imputed partnership liability.             The

debtor perpetrated the fraud but did not directly benefit from it.

The court barred dischargeability of the debt because the debtor

indirectly     benefitted   from   the   fraud.     See   HSSM   #   7    Ltd.

Partnership v. Bilzerian (In re Bilzerian), 100 F.3d 890, 891 (11th

Cir. 1996); see also In re Ashley, 903 F.2d 599, 604 (9th Cir.


                                     8
1990) (holding that a non-partner benefitted indirectly from his

fraud in a case that preceded Luce).              Like the benefits passage in

Luce, these cases reject the idea that a perpetrator of fraud can

discharge liability unless she directly benefits from it.

              Ledford and Bilzerian may be distinguishable because

those debtors did benefit from fraud, and Bilzerian did not involve

a partnership.        To that extent, both cases were narrowly written

and simply did not decide whether innocent debtors who did not

benefit monetarily from fraud might discharge imputed partnership

liability.

              Confronted with this precise question, we hold that

§523(a)(2)(A)        prevents    an   innocent      debtor    from      discharging

liability for the fraud of his partners, regardless whether he

receives a monetary benefit.          A rational legislator might conclude

that an innocent debtor should be able to discharge debts in these

situations, but § 523(a)(2)(A) does not permit this.                     The plain

meaning of the statute, fortified by the Supreme Court’s decisions

in   Strang    and    Cohen,     argues       against   a   receipt     of   benefit

requirement.      We have no warrant to add elements to bankruptcy

statutes.     See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) (relying

on   plain    meaning    to     reject    an     implicit    “ongoing     business”

requirement for Chapter 11 debtors even though the structure and

legislative history of the statute suggested one).




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            For similar reasons, the bankruptcy court erred in adding

an “ordinary course of business” requirement in § 523(a)(2)(A)

imputed partnership liability cases.1            Mississippi law requires

this element to impute fraud to partners, see Miss. Code Ann. § 79-

12-27, but the element is          not part of § 523(a)(2)(A).              The

Bankruptcy Code gives no indication that the debt must arise in the

ordinary course of business.

            Nor did Luce create such a requirement.               No existing

state court judgment in that case established the debt, so the

bankruptcy court made its own fact findings.          See Luce, 960 F.2d at

1280.     It found that Mrs. Luce’s partner acted in the course of

business as a basis for imputed liability.            Mrs. Luce argued that

this finding of fact was clearly erroneous, and the court responded

by observing that her partner did act in the course of business.

See id. at 1282-83.        The court was refuting Mrs. Luce’s factual

argument, not adding an element to § 523(a)(2)(A).

            Finally, it is worth noting the limits of the maxim that

exceptions to dischargeability are to be construed narrowly in

favor of the debtor. See Fezler v. Davis, 194 F.3d 570, 573 (5th

Cir. 1999) (describing the maxim).         This maxim cannot overcome the

plain     language    Congress     used    to    define    exceptions      from

dischargeability.       In § 523(a)(2)(A), Congress chose, as Cohen


      1
            Strang mentions “in the conduct of partnership business” in its
discussion of imputed liability, not its discussion of bankruptcy discharge. See
Strang, 114 U.S. at 561.

                                      10
says, to protect victims of fraud.           Further, Congress’s choice of

words effectuates important state law policies regarding imputed

liability.     Discharging the debts of the Innocent Partners under

these circumstances would undermine that principle.                Like many

states, Mississippi “requires that one partner make good for

another partner’s misappropriation of money or property while in

the custody of the partnership.”              Duggins v. Guardianship of

Maurice Kendall, 632 So. 2d 420, 427 (Miss. 1993).             States premise

these laws on the notion that partners can best foresee and control

the conduct of their agents.       See Lawrence Ponoroff, Vicarious

Thrills: The Case for Application of Agency Rules in Bankruptcy

Dischargeability Litigation, 70 Tul. L. Rev. 2515, 2542 (1996).

Creditors are entitled to rely on the assets of the Innocent

Partners “as a hedge against the perfidy of the agent with whom the

creditor deals.”    See id. at 2549.     This system of risk allocation

and   cost   internalization   would    be    subverted   by    allowing   the

Innocent Partners to discharge their fraud liability.

             We conclude that if a debt arises from fraud and the

debtor is liable for that debt under state partnership law, the

debt is nondischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A). Receipt of benefits

and the ordinary course of business are irrelevant to this inquiry




                                   11
as matters of federal law. The bankruptcy court erred by requiring

these elements in this case.2

            Because of the effect of the state court judgment, there

is no question that the debt to Deodati arose from fraud and that

the Innocent Partners are liable.           Section 523(a)(2)(A) prevents

them from discharging this debt.            We need not address Deodati’s

§ 523(a)(4) and (6) arguments.         We REVERSE and REMAND for entry of

judgment in Deodati’s favor consistent with this opinion.

            REVERSED and REMANDED with Instructions.




      2
            To the extent that Ledford relies on Luce to create a three-part test
for imputed partnership liability under § 523(a)(2)(A), we cordially disagree
with its interpretation.

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