UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 93-2017
HOGAR AGUA Y VIDA EN EL DESIERTO, INC., ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JORGE SUAREZ-MEDINA, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Perez-Gimenez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges,
and Pieras,* District Judge.
Nora Vargas Acosta, with whom Sabana Litigation & Civil Rights
Project, Ruth E. Harlow, William B. Rubenstein and American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation were on brief for appellants.
David W. Roman, with whom Ramon A. Alfaro was on brief for
appellee Suarez.
Peter J. Porrata for appellee Dolittle.
September 28, 1994
*Of the District of Puerto Rico, sitting by designation.
CYR, Circuit Judge. Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto,
CYR, Circuit Judge.
Inc. ("HAVED"), a nonprofit organization which operates group
homes for persons infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
("HIV"), brought a civil action in the United States District
Court for the District of Puerto Rico alleging discriminatory
conduct by defendants-appellees in violation of the Fair Housing
Act, 42 U.S.C. 3601-3617 (1993) ("FHA"). The district court
ruled that the principal defendants, Jorge Suarez Medina and
Baudilla Albelo Suarez (hereinafter: "Suarez" or "Suarezes"),
were exempt from liability under the FHA by virtue of the "pri-
vate individual owner" provision which applies to persons who own
less than four "single-family houses," see id. 3603(b)(1). For
the reasons discussed in this opinion, we vacate the district
court judgment and remand for further proceedings.
I
BACKGROUND
In September 1992, appellant HAVED entered into an oral
agreement with Suarez to rent, with option to buy, two houses
located on an undivided lot in the Los Llanos section of Corozal,
Puerto Rico. Upon learning that HAVED intended to use the site
as a group home for persons infected with HIV, defendants Milton
Dolittle and Antonio Padilla organized neighborhood opposition
and threatened and coerced Suarez into reneging on the rental-
sale agreement. HAVED, along with its directors and a prospec-
tive resident of the proposed group home, initiated the present
action charging defendants Suarez, Dolittle and Padilla with
violations of FHA 3604 and 3617, and Suarez with breach of
contract under P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 3371-3589 (1993).1
HAVED demanded declaratory and injunctive relief as well as
compensatory and punitive damages.
Suarez moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, citing FHA 3603(b)(1):
(b) Nothing in . . . [section 3604 of this title]
(other than subsection (c)) shall apply to
1Section 3604 of the FHA provides, in pertinent part:
[E]xcept as exempted by sections [3603(b) and 3607], it
shall be unlawful ---
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after making a bona
fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the
sale or rental of, or otherwise make un-
available or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race, color, religion, sex, famil-
ial status, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. 3604(a) (emphasis added). The FHA amendments enacted
in 1988 extended comparable protection to persons with a "handi-
cap," see, e.g., id. 3604(f), including persons infected with
HIV. See Stewart B. McKinney Found., Inc. v. Town Plan and
Zoning Comm'n, 790 F. Supp. 1197, 1209-10 (D. Conn. 1992) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2179). Section 3617 makes it unlawful to
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any
person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account
of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of
his having aided or encouraged any other person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protect-
ed by [section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606].
42 U.S.C. 3617.
3
(1) any single-family house sold or rented by an
owner:
[1] Provided, That such private individual owner
does not own more than three such single-family
houses at any one time:
[2] Provided further, That in the case of the sale
of any such single-family house by a private indi-
vidual owner not residing in such house at the
time of such sale or who was not the most recent
resident of such house prior to such sale, the
exemption granted by this subsection shall apply
only with respect to one such sale within any
twenty-four month period:
[3] Provided further, That such bona fide private
individual owner does not own any interest in, nor
is there owned or reserved on his behalf, under
any express or voluntary agreement, title to or
any right to all or a portion of the proceeds from
the sale or rental of, more than three such sin-
gle-family houses at any one time:
[4] Provided further, That after December 31,
1969, the sale or rental of any such single-family
house shall be excepted from the application of
this title only if such house is sold or rented
(A) without the use in any manner of the
sales or rental facilities or the sales or
rental services of any real estate broker,
agent, or salesman, or of such facilities or
services of any person in the business of
selling or renting dwellings . . . and
(B) without the publication, posting or mail-
ing, after notice, of any advertisement or
written notice in violation of [section 3604-
(c) of this title] . . . .
42 U.S.C. 3603(b)(1) (emphasis added; clause numbers added;
indentation altered from original).
4
A. The Suarez Properties
At the time of the September 1992 rental-sale agreement
with HAVED, Suarez owned four separate parcels of land on which
were located five structures. First, the "Los Llanos Property,"
the subject of the abortive rental-sale agreement, consists of
one undivided lot containing two unattached residences. Suarez
holds undisputed title to the entire lot and one residence (House
A) where the Suarezes once resided. Their son built the second
house on the lot (House B) as a residence for his own family.
However, Mr. Suarez, Sr., was robbed while residing in House A,
and the Suarezes and their son moved away from Los Llanos.
Houses A and B remained unoccupied at the time of the HAVED-
Suarez rental-sale agreement.
Second, the "Guarico Residence," located in the Guarico
section of Corozal, was designed as a two-story house with a
separately equipped, single-family apartment on each floor.
Suarez held title to the lot and the house. At the time of the
rental-sale agreement, the Suarezes resided primarily in the
second-floor apartment, and the son and his family resided in the
first-floor apartment. Due to his physical impairments, however,
Mr. Suarez, Sr., sometimes lived "interchangeably" with his son's
family in the first-floor apartment. The district court ruled
that the Guarico Residence constituted one single-family house.
Third, the "Guarico Rental" is a two-story, single-
family structure located near the Guarico Residence but on a
5
separate lot. At the time of the rental-sale agreement, Suarez
held title to the house and the lot, and the house was being
rented to a single family.
The fourth real estate parcel, the "La Aldea Rental,"
is a single lot in the La Aldea section containing a one-story
structure which Suarez purchased in April 1991, and rented to a
single family (Apartment 1). Prior to the rental-sale agreement,
however, Suarez renovated the basement of the building into a
separate apartment (Apartment 2), and it was rented to another
tenant.
B. The District Court Proceedings
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
dismissed the HAVED complaint for lack of "subject matter juris-
diction," citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Pursuant to
Provisos 1 and 3 of FHA 3603(b)(1), the court ruled that at the
time of the rental-sale agreement with HAVED in September 1992,
Suarez had a bona fide ownership interest in only three "single-
family houses" (hereinafter: "SFH" or "SFHs"): (i) the Guarico
Rental, (ii) the La Aldea Rental (Apartment 1), and (iii) the La
Aldea Rental (Apartment 2).2
2The district court also found, under Proviso 4 and 42
U.S.C. 3603(c), that Suarez did not qualify as a "person in the
business of selling or renting dwellings," id., because he had
not participated in more than two real estate transactions
between September 1991 and September 1992. Because Suarez must
satisfy all four provisos in order to qualify for the 3603(b)-
(1) exemption, we need not reach this issue.
6
Thus, the district court explicitly declined to treat
three abodes as SFHs. First, the court ruled that the Guarico
Residence is not a SFH under FHA 3603(b)(1) because only SFHs
that are "sold or rented" can be counted toward the four-SFH
threshold. In other words, in the district court's view a defen-
dant's current residence is not counted as an SFH under Provisos
1 and 3 unless it is the subject of the sale or rental transac-
tion giving rise to the cause of action under the FHA, or it is
"on the market" at the time of the challenged transaction. See
Hogar Agua y Vida en el Desierto, Inc. v. Suarez, 829 F. Supp.
19, 22 (D.P.R. 1993) (citing Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282,
285 (E.D. Ky. 1976)). Second, since Suarez, Sr., had been forced
to vacate House A at the Los Llanos Property after the robbery,
and to acquire the Guarico Residence, the district court conclud-
ed that it would be "inequitable" to treat House A as a SFH under
either Proviso 1 or 3. Id. at 22-23. Finally, relying on the
same equitable grounds noted in relation to House A, the district
court ruled that House B on the Los Llanos Property should not be
treated as a SFH. The court ruled, in the alternative, that
House B should not be treated as a SFH because the Suarezes's
son, who constructed House B, was its bona fide owner under
Puerto Rico law; whereas the Suarezes simply held an unexercised
"right of accession" based on their ownership of the land on
which House B is situated. Id. at 23 (citing Castro Anguita v.
7
Figueroa, 103 P.R. Dec. 847, 850-51, 3 Official Translations
1188-89 (1975)).3
II
DISCUSSION
Since the only dispute on appeal concerns the legal
sufficiency of undisputed jurisdictional facts, we review the
Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal de novo. See Heno v. FDIC, 20 F.3d 1204,
1205 (1st Cir. 1994). We conclude, as a matter of law, that the
Suarezes's claim to exemption is precluded by the FHA. See FDIC
v. Keating, 12 F.3d 314, 316 (1st Cir. 1993) (statutory interpre-
tations reviewed de novo).
We employ traditional tools of statutory interpreta-
tion, particularly the presumption that ambiguous language in a
remedial statute is entitled to a generous construction consis-
tent with its reformative mission. See, e.g., Cia. Petrolera
Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 428-29 (1st
Cir. 1985) (noting that this canon of construction represents an
"especially reliable and legitimate" indicator of congressional
intent); see generally 3 Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Statuto-
ry Construction 60.01 (5th ed. 1992) [hereinafter Sutherland].
3The district court implicitly concluded as well that
HAVED's claims against codefendants Dolittle and Padilla under
FHA 3617 should be dismissed because the Suarezes are exempt
from liability under FHA 3604. See supra note 1. Although
this ruling is contested by HAVED, we need not reach it.
8
This presumption has been relied on consistently by the courts in
interpreting the omnibus remedial provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, which prominently include the Fair Housing Act
itself. See Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of Puerto Rico,
988 F.2d 252, 257 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1972)); see
also City of Edmonds v. Washington State Bldg. Code Council, 18
F.3d 802, 804 (9th Cir. 1994). An important corollary for
present purposes is that ambiguous exemptions from FHA liability
are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., id.; Elliott v. City of
Athens, Georgia, 960 F.2d 975, 978-79 (11th Cir.) cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 376 (1992); United States v. Columbus Country Club,
915 F.2d 877, 882-83 (3d Cir. 1990) (collecting cases), cert.
denied, 501 U.S. 1205 (1991).
From this appellate perspective we consider which
Suarez properties were "single-family houses" within the meaning
of Provisos 1 and 3 of FHA 3603(b)(1). The parties agree that
two properties the Guarico Rental and the La Aldea Rental
qualify as "single-family houses" within the meaning of the
exemption.4 Thus, given the four-SFH limen established in
4Absent appellate briefing, we hazard no view on the cor-
rectness of their stipulation. The burden of proving entitlement
to an FHA exemption rested with Suarez. See Massaro v. Mainlands
Section 1 & 2 Civic Ass'n, 3 F.3d 1472, 1475 (11th Cir. 1993)
(FHA); Columbus Country Club, 915 F.2d at 882 (FHA); Singleton v.
Gendason, 545 F.2d 1224, 1226 (9th Cir. 1976) (FHA); see also 2A
Sutherland 47.11, at 165 (general rule of construction).
Whatever its legal elements, entitlement to an FHA exemption
9
section 3603(b)(1), the FHA exemption cannot stand if the Suar-
ezes were bona fide "owners" of two SFHs in addition to the
Guarico Rental and the La Aldea Rental.
A. Los Llanos Property, House A
First, HAVED argues that the district court exceeded
its authority by fashioning an "equitable" exception which
resulted in the exclusion of Los Llanos, House A, from the four-
SFH calculus on the ground that the Suarezes had been forced to
vacate the Los Llanos area due to neighborhood crime. See In re
Shoreline Concrete Co., 831 F.2d 903, 905 (9th Cir. 1987)
("Courts of equity are bound to follow express statutory commands
to the same extent as are courts of law.") (citing Hedges v.
Dixon County, 150 U.S. 182, 192 (1893)).
Although courts have on occasion engrafted equitable
exceptions where rigid adherence to literal legislative language
clearly would disserve legislative intent, see, e.g., Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) (equitable tolling
of filing deadlines), generally courts are loath "to announce
turns on highly fact-dependent inquiries (e.g., the structural
design or usage of each dwelling), such that Suarez is bound to
these stipulations for purposes of the present litigation. Cf.
Railway Co. v. Ramsey, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 322, 327 (1874) ("Con-
sent of parties cannot give the courts of the United States
[subject matter] jurisdiction, but the parties may admit the
existence of facts which show jurisdiction, and the courts may
act judicially upon such an admission."). By the same token, no
precedential significance should be ascribed to our acceptance of
these stipulations.
10
equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions
that are unqualified by the statutory text." Guidry v. Sheet
Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)
(emphasis added). Moreover, "[w]here Congress explicitly enumer-
ates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of contrary
legislative intent." Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S.
608, 616-17 (1980) (emphasis added). Further, exemptions from
the requirements of a remedial statute like the FHA are to
be construed narrowly to limit exemption eligibility. See
Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984) (rejecting
taxpayer plea for "nonliteral reading" of tax statute "on grounds
of equity to the repentant taxpayer," and noting that, faced with
a statute "which must receive a strict construction," "[c]ourts
are not authorized to rewrite [the] statute because they might
deem its effects susceptible of improvement."); supra pp. 8-9.
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to endorse the
equitable exception adopted by the district court, especially
since Congress elected not to do so when it undertook to narrow
FHA liability in 42 U.S.C. 3603(b). Nothing in section 3603-
(b), nor in its legislative history, manifests a congressional
intent to temper either the inflexible four-SFH formula or the
categorical "ownership" standard. Thus, we believe these FHA
provisions reflect the sort of "considered congressional policy
choice" that elevates the "effectuation of certain broad social
11
policies . . . over the desire to do equity between particular
parties." Guidry, 493 U.S. at 376. Guidry cautions against
creating equitable exceptions to comprehensive remedial statutes
in an effort to protect individual defendants from occasional
inequities, even inequities attributable to misfeasance by the
plaintiffs. Id. (holding that the district court had no equita-
ble power to contravene ERISA's unqualified anti-garnishment
provision by imposing a constructive trust upon pension benefits
payable to a former union official who embezzled union funds).
The Guidry admonition holds even stronger sway where, as here,
defendant-Suarez's misfortunes were in no sense due to HAVED's
conduct. The Court recognized in Guidry that any attempt to
calibrate the precise point at which an individual defendant's
vicissitudes are so "'especially' inequitable" as to outweigh the
broad prophylactic policies underlying the congressional decision
to protect the plaintiff class would immerse the courts in an
inappropriate and "impracticab[le]" task. Id. (emphasis add-
ed).5
5The cases Suarez cites in support of the equitable excep-
tion fashioned by the district court, see, e.g., FTC v. Security
Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1314 (8th Cir. 1991),
concerned the equitable remedies a district court may impose
after a defendant has been found in violation of a statutory
prohibition. For example, if the statute empowers the court to
restrain violations, and neither expressly nor "by a necessary
and inescapable inference [] restricts the court's jurisdiction
in equity," Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398
(1946), the court could utilize all its traditional equitable
powers or even desist from extending any equitable relief to the
plaintiff where the equities warrant. See Williams v. Jones, 11
12
B. The Guarico Residence
HAVED next contends that the district court committed
reversible error in not treating the Guarico Residence as a SFH
under Provisos 1 and 3 of FHA 3603(b)(1). HAVED argues that
nothing in FHA 3603(b)(1) excludes "owner-occupied" houses from
the term "single-family house." Furthermore, HAVED notes,
Proviso 2 explicitly qualifies the term SFH ("any such single-
family house by a private individual owner not residing in such
house at the time of such sale"), a qualification that would be
entirely unnecessary if the term "SFH" itself excluded owner-
occupied houses.
On the other hand, Suarez says that the Guarico Resi-
dence is excluded from consideration under Provisos 1 and 3
because the prefatory clause in FHA 3603(b)(1) (exempting "any
single-family house sold or rented by the [defendant]" in a
discriminatory manner) suggests that Congress did not intend that
any property of the defendant count toward the four-SFH threshold
unless that property itself was up for sale or rent at the time
F.3d 247, 256 (1st Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, the latter rubric
provides no basis for extending an FHA exemption by withholding
from HAVED all relief against Suarez's alleged discriminatory
refusal to sell or rent the Los Llanos Property. Moreover, even
if the court were permitted to withhold injunctive relief, Suarez
would be answerable for legal damages (actual and punitive) for
any FHA violation. See 42 U.S.C. 3613(c). More importantly,
however, Suarez could have asserted no cognizable equitable
defense in light of the fact that his misfortunes while residing
in Los Llanos were in no sense attributable to HAVED.
13
of the allegedly discriminatory transaction.6 Suarez argues
that this must be so because the references to "such [SFHs]" in
Provisos 1 and 3 can only relate back to the prefatory clause,
and incorporate the requirement that only "sold or rented" SFHs
are to be included in calculating the four-SFH threshold. Thus,
Suarez says, a defendant's residence normally would not be
included as a SFH unless it were on the market at the time of the
alleged discriminatory sale or rental. Suarez discounts the
value of Proviso 2 as a tool for interpreting the prefatory
clause in FHA 3603(b)(1), since Proviso 2 creates a
considerably "narrower" and altogether independent exemption that
allows one discriminatory sale (but not a rental) of an owner-
occupied SFH to be excluded within any two-year period. Proviso
1, on the other hand, creates a "broader exemption" for owners
who own no more than three SFHs that are either for sale or rent
by the owner.7
6As with his other concessions, see supra note 4, Suarez
stipulates that the Guarico Residence would qualify as a "single-
family house" in all respects, but for its status as his current,
off-market residence. We take no position respecting the basis
for Suarez's stipulation, but confine our consideration to the
two issues briefed by the parties.
7Alternatively, Suarez argues that the Guarico Residence is
excluded under the so-called "Mrs. Murphy" exemption in FHA
3603(b)(2), which exempts "rooms or units in dwellings contain-
ing living quarters occupied or intended to be occupied by no
more than four families living independently of each other, if
the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living
quarters as his residence." 42 U.S.C. 3603(b)(2) (emphasis
added). The "Mrs. Murphy" exemption is totally inapposite,
however. It provides an exemption from section 3604 liability.
14
The present dispute prompts two inquiries. The first
is whether a defendant's current residence is excluded from the
threshold four-SFH calculus under Provisos 1 and 3 simply because
it is his primary or current residence, even though all other
SFHs owned but not occupied by the defendant are included without
regard to whether they were concurrently "on the market." The
second inquiry is whether Congress meant to exclude from the
threshold four-SFH calculus all SFHs owned by the defendant
(including the primary residence) not on the market at the time
the defendant for discriminatory reasons refused to sell or
rent a different SFH to the plaintiff. We turn to these ques-
tions.
1. Exclusion for Residence Qua Residence
As its prefatory clause makes clear, the FHA 3603-
(b)(1) exemption assuming its four provisos are satisfied
applies to any "single-family house sold or rented by the owner"
in a discriminatory manner. For section 3603(b)(1) purposes,
therefore, the relevant SFHs in this case are Houses A and B,
located on the Los Llanos Property Suarez refused to rent or sell
to HAVED. Section 3603(b)(1) neither defines the term "SFH," nor
It does not exclude a structure from the Proviso 1 and 3 analyses
under FHA 3603(b)(1). See id. 3604(b) ("nothing in section
[3604] . . . shall apply to . . . rooms and units . . . .").
Thus, the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption could have relevance only if,
for example, Suarez had refused to sell or rent one unit in the
Guarico Residence to HAVED.
15
does its prefatory clause expressly limit the term "SFH" to
structures in which the defendant does not reside. Conversely,
as Suarez acknowledges, if the Suarezes had refused to rent or
sell their Guarico Residence to HAVED, the prefatory clause would
not have debarred the Suarezes from a section 3603(b)(1) exemp-
tion merely because the property being rented or sold was their
residence.
The statutory context in which the prefatory clause
appears undermines the Suarez contention as well. See Skidgel v.
Maine Dep't of Human Servs., 994 F.2d 930, 937 (1st Cir. 1993)
(meaning of particular statutory language assessed in light of
entire statute). The four FHA 3603(b)(1) provisos do not give
rise to four independent exemptions, as Suarez suggests, but
represent four cumulative preconditions to the single exemption
set out in the prefatory clause. If any of the four provisos is
not satisfied, no section 3603(b)(1) exemption is appropriate.
Proviso 2 refers specifically to a discrete subset of
the "discriminatory" SFH sales focused upon in the section
3603(b)(1) prefatory clause, namely, sales of SFHs in which the
defendant is not residing. If the unqualified term "SFH" in the
prefatory clause were intended to embrace only SFHs in which the
defendant is not residing, no such further qualification would be
needed in Proviso 2. See Mosquera-Perez v. INS, 3 F.3d 553, 556
(1st Cir. 1993) (court should avoid interpretations which render
any part of statute meaningless). Thus, if the term "SFH," as
16
used in the prefatory clause, applies to residences and non-
residences, the pendent references to "such [SFHs]" in Provisos 1
and 3 also necessarily encompass the Suarezes's Guarico Residence
qua residence.
Finally, the legislative history discloses no basis for
second-guessing the "plain language" of section 3603(b)(1). See
Laracuente v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 891 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir.
1989) ("Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the
contrary, the plain language of the statute is conclusive."). As
initially introduced in Congress, the FHA contained few signifi-
cant exemptions from liability, see, e.g., supra note 7 (describ-
ing "Mrs. Murphy" exemption), and the breadth of the FHA's
coverage caused vigorous Senate opposition. See generally Jean
E. Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspec-
tive, 8 Washburn L.J. 149 (1969). Senator Everett M. Dirksen
proposed to assuage opposition by exempting sales and rentals of
"any single-family house sold or rented by an owner residing in
such house at the time of such sale or rental, or who was the
most recent resident of such house prior to such sale or rental."
See 114 Cong. Rec. 4571 (1968). Yet even the "Dirksen substi-
tute," later modified and enacted as Proviso 2, failed to gain
enough Senate support. To break the deadlock, Senator Robert C.
Byrd proposed the expanded four-part exemption, later codified as
present section 3603(b)(1). During floor debate, Senator Byrd
offered two illuminating hypotheticals to demonstrate the cover-
17
age which would be provided under his proposal, but not under the
Dirksen substitute:
A widow owns and lives in a single-family
dwelling. She also owns a single-family
dwelling across the street, the tenant there-
in being her daughter. The daughter moves to
another State. The widow cannot qualify for
exemption under the Dirksen substitute be-
cause she neither resides in the house across
the street of which she is the owner
nor is the "most recent resident" of such
dwelling prior to a subsequent sale or rent-
al.
An individual lives in his own single-family
dwelling located on a three-quarter-acre lot.
He decides to build a second house on the
lot. Ten years later misfortune forces him
to parcel the lot and sell the house thereon.
He does not qualify under the Dirksen substi-
tute exemption because he is neither "resid-
ing in" the adjacent dwelling nor was he the
"most recent resident" thereof.
114 Cong. Rec. 5640 (1968) (emphasis added).
Asked why "it was necessary to raise the number of
houses owned by one party to three," Senator Byrd referred to
these two hypotheticals, and noted that he had "already discussed
situations in which there would be at least two [single-family]
houses involved." Id. (emphasis added). Significantly, both
hypotheticals assumed that the houses in which the seller cur-
rently resided would be counted toward the four-SFH threshold in
Provisos 1 and 3. See Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 728 (1983)
(noting that interpretation of statute by sponsor is "'authori-
tative guide to the statute's construction'") (citation omitted);
see also Brock v. Pierce County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986)
18
(sponsor's statements credited if consistent with statutory
language). Other senators likewise recognized that the "more
than three" threshold would include houses in which the seller
resided. See 114 Cong. Rec. 5641 (1968) ("I know we have people
who have a summer home or a winter home. . . . One could easily
have three homes.") (statement of Senator Jordan). Since this
legislative history, at the very least, precludes our finding "a
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,"
Laracuente, 891 F.2d at 23, we must conclude that a defendant's
residence, qua residence, is not to be excluded under Provisos 1
and 3 of section 3603(b)(1).8
2. Exemption for "Off Market" SFHs
8The legislative history contains a reference arguably
supportive of the Suarez interpretation of Provisos 1 and 3.
Senator Byrd suggested that he chose "three" as the threshold
figure under Provisos 1 and 3 to match the "Mrs. Murphy exemp-
tion," see supra note 7, which provides an exemption to a resi-
dent landlord of multi-family quarters (containing not more than
four family quarters) who refuses to rent any family quarters in
the building. Senator Byrd noted that "Mrs. Murphy" must live in
one of the four family quarters, so as to confine the "protective
reach" of the "Mrs. Murphy" exemption "to three units other than
the one in which she lives. In my amendment, therefore, I use
'three' as the number, in order to have parallel construction."
114 Cong. Rec. 5640.
We note two sound reasons for devaluing this statement.
First, as noted, see supra p. 19, inconsistent expressions of
sponsor intent are insufficient to override the plain import of
the statutory language. Second, Senator Byrd's more generalized
statements concerning a rough numerical symmetry in statutory
construction were preceded by his detailed recitation of the two
fact-specific hypotheticals discussed above. See supra p. 18.
19
Suarez proposes to exclude the Guarico Residence under
Provisos 1 and 3 because it was neither for rent nor sale at the
time he refused to sell the Los Llanos Property to HAVED. See
Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282, 285 (E.D. Ky. 1976). The
theory is that the term "such [SFHs]" in Provisos 1 and 3 unam-
biguously relates back to the complete phrase "single-family
house sold or rented by an owner" in the section 3603(b)(1)
prefatory clause. The language of the statute is not dispositive
on this issue, and the interpretation proposed by Suarez is at
least plausible.
Although it is conceivable that Congress's choice of
the indeterminate modifier "such" was intended only to require
the counting of residences qua residences under Provisos 1 and 3
in direct contrast to the more constricted scope of the term
"SFH" under Proviso 2 Provisos 1 and 3 reasonably might be
read to impose the additional, distinct requirement that any SFH,
regardless whether it is the defendant's "residence," be counted
under Provisos 1 and 3 only if it is a "single-family house sold
or rented by an owner." Indeed, Congress's choice of words
"sold or rented" in the section 3603(b)(1) prefatory clause is
a most curious usage. In order for liability to attach under FHA
3604, a defendant need never have consummated the discriminato-
ry rental or sale of the SFH to which the section 3603(b)(1)
prefatory clause adverts. Rather, FHA liability attaches as soon
as the defendant "refuses to sell or rent after [the plaintiff
20
makes] a bona fide offer," see supra note 1, without regard to
whether the SFH is ever "sold" or "rented" to anyone. With these
linguistic difficulties in mind, it seems arguable at least, in
keeping with the structure and language of the statute, that the
term "such," as used in Provisos 1 and 3, imports the same "on
the market" qualification necessarily implicit in the section
3603(b)(1) prefatory clause.
As noted earlier, however, normally latent ambiguity in
a statutory modifier like "such" should be construed in further-
ance of the statute's remedial goals. See Cia. Petrolera, 754
F.2d at 428. ("When Congress uses broad generalized language in
a remedial statute, and that language is not contravened by
authoritative legislative history, a court should interpret the
provision generously so as to effectuate the important congres-
sional goals.") Not only does the authoritative legislative
history not contravene the HAVED interpretation, see supra
Section II.B.1, it contradicts the Suarez contention. Most
importantly, neither hypothetical advanced by Senator Byrd
assumed or intimated that the seller's residence was "on the
market" at the time the discriminatory sale of the second house
took place, yet Senator Byrd included both these SFHs under
Provisos 1 and 3. Notwithstanding a conceivable vestige of
literal ambiguity, therefore, we are persuaded to the view that
the Guarico Residence must be included in the four-SFH calculus
21
under section 3603(b)(1) consistent with the FHA's legislative
history and its broad remedial design.9
9The only case to address this precise issue, see Lamb v.
Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976), reached the opposite
conclusion, without reference to the legislative history and
without analysis. Id. at 285 ("The Court has found no authority
construing [section 3603(b)(1)] and counsel for the respective
parties have cited none.").
22
III
CONCLUSION
At the time HAVED was denied the opportunity to acquire
the Los Llanos Property, allegedly on discriminatory grounds,
Suarez held an undisputed ownership interest in "more than three"
"single-family houses": the Guarico Rental, the La Aldea Rental,
the Los Llanos Property, House A, and the Guarico Residence.
Since Suarez cannot satisfy either Proviso 1 or Proviso 3, the
alleged discriminatory refusal to proceed with the HAVED rental-
sale agreement relating to the Los Llanos Property did not
qualify for exemption under FHA 3603(b)(1).
The district court judgment is vacated. The case is
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs to appellant.
23