F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
FEB 1 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
SHARON M. DETERS, also known as
Sharon M. Anderson,
No. 97-3340
Plaintiff - Appellee,
vs.
EQUIFAX CREDIT INFORMATION
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 96-2212-JWL)
981 F. Supp. 1381
Scott A. McCreight, (and Korey A. Kaul, Sprenger & McCreight, L.C., Kansas
City, Missouri, and Michael S. Ketchmark and Joseph K. Eischens, Davis,
Ketchmark & Eischens, Kansas City, Missouri, with him on the brief), for
Plaintiff-Appellee.
Michaela M. Warden (and Jack L. Whitacre and William C. Martucci, Spencer,
Fane, Britt & Browne, L.L.P., Overland Park, Kansas, with her on the brief), for
Defendant-Appellant.
Before BALDOCK, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant, Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc.
(“Equifax”), appeals from a $300,000 judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor
of Plaintiff-Appellee, Sharon Deters (“Ms. Deters”), on her sexual harassment
claim. The jury awarded Ms. Deters $5,000 in compensatory damages, and
$1,000,000 in punitive damages, later reduced by the court to $295,000 based on
the cap established by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The district court denied
Equifax’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively for a
new trial or remittitur. See Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Servs., 981 F.
Supp. 1381, 1384 (D. Kan. 1997). On appeal, Equifax contends that (1) the
evidence is insufficient to support punitive damages based upon a supervisor’s
alleged failure to investigate and take prompt corrective action to stop the
harassment; (2) it is not responsible for the conduct of its supervisor either
because it had no knowledge of that conduct or the supervisor was not a policy
maker and was acting in accordance with corporate policy, (3) the district court
erred in denying its post-trial motion for a new trial or remittitur, and (4) the
district court erred in admitting a videotape recounting sexual harassment, thereby
depriving it of a fair trial. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we
affirm.
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Background
Ms. Deters worked in the administration department of Equifax in the
Lenexa, Kansas office. That office is engaged in the debt collection business.
Debt collectors were supervised by assistant department managers (ADMs) and
both were considered the “revenue producers.” Ms. Deters presented evidence at
trial that during her tenure at Equifax, from August 1994 to October 1995, she
was repeatedly subject to sexual harassment, which she perceived as abusive, by
three male co-workers, and her original male supervisor.
I. The Harassment
Ms. Deters testified that one of her daily functions was to supply numbers
to the ADMs on the collection floor, on which their bonuses were based. When
one ADM (first ADM) did not like the numbers he saw, he twisted her arm and
made her recalculate them. If she would not recalculate them or walked away, the
ADM would yell “hey you F’ing B, get back here” or “come here you C.” 1 Aplt.
App. 397, 410. This was a daily occurrence. See id. at 398, 470. This ADM also
told crude sexually-oriented jokes. According to Ms. Deters, another ADM
(second ADM) began the same type of activities directed toward her after the first
ADM started. See id. at 414-15; 529-33. She testified that both men leered at her
1
Repeated use of such epithets in the workplace can contribute to a
finding of sexual harassment. See Winsor v. Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996,
1000 (10th Cir. 1996).
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as she walked through the entire office handing out numbers to the ADMs. See
id. at 415.
The first ADM frequently talked about sexual acts and breasts. When he
told another female employee “that she had perky tits that looked right at him,”
Ms. Deters stared at him in shock only to be told “‘what are you looking at, you
F’ing B.’” Id. at 401. This ADM also grabbed Ms. Deters’ arm, telling her “‘my
you’re a frail thing . . . if I was ever to have sex with you, I’d crush you like
grapes.” Id. at 406. Ms. Deters complained about the first ADM and the second
ADM. See id. at 401, 407, 531. She took her complaints to Jim Taylor, the
general manager of the Lenexa office. Ms. Deters also complained when she
overheard these ADMs discussing having sex with her. The first ADM made a
bet with her original supervisor about “who [was going] to sleep with her first.”
Id. at 401-04, 433. The original supervisor claimed to have won the bet. See id.
at 404, 432.
Ms. Deters also testified that her original supervisor frequently called her at
home “at any hour of the night and he’d want to talk,” making it very clear that he
wanted to go out with her, even though she told him she was engaged and not
interested. Id. at 425-27. Ms. Deters complained to Mr. Taylor. See id. at 431.
According to Ms. Deters, when she unexpectedly needed two days off, her
original supervisor told her job was at risk and that she needed to meet him at a
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restaurant to discuss it. See id. at 428. No business was discussed, Ms. Deters
testified that she drove him home because he was intoxicated; when she was
leaving, he grabbed her and kissed her. See id. at 430. Ms. Deters complained to
Mr. Taylor again, but to no avail. Her original supervisor later stared at her chest
and asked if she wanted to take off her jacket. See id. at 432.
Ms. Deters also testified that that she also had problems with a male
collector because he would touch her or grab her hand and tell her “I love
redheads.” Id. at 433. She viewed his conduct as “very aggressive,” despite her
saying “no,” or “I’m busy” or walking away, the collector followed her or
approached her again. Id. at 434. The collector frequently asked Ms. Deters’ to
see him play in a band; squeezing her arm or hands in a suggestive manner; she
would pull away and refuse. See id. at 435. She complained to Mr. Taylor telling
him that the collector’s actions made her “very uncomfortable and that he (the
collector) wouldn’t let it be. That he was just being persistent and persistent and
persistent.” Id. at 435. She also complained when the collector came into her
office, sat next to her, pushed her skirt up and begin rubbing her leg before she
fought him off. Id. at 493.
II. The Response
Just as the record is replete with testimony of co-workers corroborating Ms.
Deters version of the harassment, so too is it with testimony that she routinely
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complained to Mr. Taylor, who indicated that he would take care of it. Mr.
Taylor was the highest managerial officer in the Kansas City office, overseeing
the entire staff, with the power to hire, fire, approve salaries, and discipline
individuals in the office. He was designated specifically by Equifax to implement
its human resources policies, which included the sexual harassment policy. Ms.
Deters presented evidence at trial that entitled the jury to believe that (1) Mr.
Taylor had personal knowledge of the harassment occurring including the
epithets, see id. at 471, and (2) Mr. Taylor’s responses to her persistent
complaints were seriously deficient. Ms. Deters testified that Mr. Taylor:
told me . . . that these were revenue producers. These were people
producing revenue for the company. That I needed to remember that
I was a non-revenue person or that I was in a non-revenue producing
department.
Id. at 412. She further testified that the harassing conduct was explained to her as
a by-product of the “hard core” and “rough around the edges” personality type
necessary to be a collector, and that she had to tolerate the name calling and the
language. Id. at 413, 473-74. In response to the groping incident, she was told
“that [the collector] was friendly, that [she was] reading too much into it.” Id. at
494.
Evidence was also presented that Equifax’s home office in Atlanta was
aware that Ms. Deter’s co-worker, Angel Pernice, was subject to sexual
harassment in the same time period, by the second ADM who persistently
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harassed Ms. Deters. The human resources officers in Atlanta delayed
investigation of Pernice’s allegations for six months, and only commenced their
investigation after Ms. Deters severed her employment with Equifax.
Discussion
We review the district court’s denial Equifax’s motion for judgment as a
matter of law de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. See
Baty v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 172 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 1999).
Equifax is only entitled to judgment as a matter of law if the “‘evidence points
but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party
opposing the motion.’” Id. (quoting Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d
1442, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997). In our review of the record, we will not weigh
evidence, judge witness credibility, or challenge the factual conclusions of the
jury. Id. Judgment as a matter of law in favor of Equifax is appropriate only if
“‘there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis ... with respect to a claim or
defense ... under the controlling law.’” Id. (quoting Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard
Dep’t Stores, 82 F.3d 1533, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotes and citation
omitted). We consider the evidence, and any inferences drawn therefrom in favor
of Ms. Deters, the non-moving party. Id.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial for abuse
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of discretion, reversing only if it clearly erred, or ventured beyond the limits of
permissible choice. Id. We review the district court’s denial of remittitur for
“‘manifest abuse of discretion’”. Id. (quoting Vining v. Enterprise Fin. Group,
Inc., 148 F.3d 1206, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998).
Equifax does not argue, nor could it, that the conduct of the ADMs, the
collector and the original supervisor as portrayed by Ms. Deters is insufficient to
constitute hostile work environment sexual harassment. See Harris v. Forklift,
Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (requiring that the conduct be severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment
and that the victim perceive it as such); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). Nor does it argue
that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action. See Hirschfeld v. New
Mexico Corrections Dep’t, 916 F.2d 572, 577 (10th Cir. 1990); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(d).
III. Evidence of “Reckless” or “Malicious” Conduct
Rather, Equifax argues, as a matter of law, that Ms. Deters is not entitled to
punitive damages because Mr. Taylor was merely negligent, and there is not
sufficient evidence to support a finding that his conduct was “reckless” or
“malicious.” Equifax argues that Ms. Deters’ testimony that she complained to
Mr. Taylor regularly, describing the nature of the harassment, is not credible, and
urges us to consider its version of what Mr. Taylor knew, rather than the evidence
-8-
Ms. Deters’ presented at trial. 2 Equifax claims that Mr. Taylor did not know the
extent to which Ms. Deters suffered sexual harassment; he did not know the types
of sexually charged, vulgar language that co-workers used, nor was he privy to
fact that Ms. Deters was subject to further unwanted groping by a co-worker
(second ADM) whom Mr. Taylor had previously admonished for similar conduct.
Equifax asserts that Mr. Taylor merely failed to communicate effectively with his
staff. In sum, Equifax concludes that such inadvertence, mistake, and errors of
judgment are at most simple negligence, and do not satisfy the recklessness or
malice requirement for the award of punitive damages.
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a punitive damages award is
a question of law which we review de novo. See Fitzgerald v. Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 1995). To be eligible for punitive
damages, a complaining party must show that the respondent engaged in
discriminatory practice or practices with malice or with reckless indifference to
federally protected rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); See also Knowlton v.
Teltrust Phones, Inc., 189 F.3d 1177, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999). “Malice” and
2
Equifax also argues that the behavior of one of Ms. Deters’ harassers is
beyond our consideration, as it transpired more than 300 days before the filing of
Ms. Deters’ charges. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)(1). However, Equifax fails to
note that the jury found that Ms. Deters was subject to a continuing violation.
Therefore, we may consider these events by virtue of the “continuing violation”
exception to the limitations period. See Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266
(10th Cir. 1993).
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“reckless indifference” in this context refer not to the egregiousness of the
employer’s conduct, but rather to the employer’s knowledge that it may be acting
in violation of federal law. See Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 119
S.Ct. 2118, 2124 (1999). More specifically, recklessness and malice are to be
inferred when a manager responsible for setting or enforcing policy in the area of
discrimination does not respond to complaints, despite knowledge of serious
harassment. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1244-45.
In the instant case, Ms. Deters introduced evidence that entitled the jury to
believe that she persistently complained to Mr. Taylor, describing to him in
excruciating detail, the nature of the sexual harassment to which she was
subjected. Moreover, she introduced evidence, including the testimony of two
witnesses, that Mr. Taylor personally observed instances in which Ms. Deters was
verbally abused with vulgar language, and lewd jokes and comments were made
in her presence. According to this evidence, Mr. Taylor was wholly unresponsive.
When Ms. Deters complained about co-workers insulting her using vulgar sexual
language, Mr. Taylor responded that these men were “hardcore” and reminded
Ms. Deters that they were revenue producers, and that she was not. On another
occasion when Ms. Deters complained about being groped and fondled by a co-
worker, Mr. Taylor responded that he was just friendly, and that she was reading
too much into it. By his own testimony, Mr. Taylor stated that he knew that this
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type of conduct constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, Ms. Deters presented
evidence from which a reasonable jury could have inferred that management not
only did not respond to her complaints, but also minimized and disregarded them
so as to protect the “revenue producers” in the operation. On this evidence a jury
could reasonably conclude that Equifax acted with malice or reckless indifference
with respect to sexual harassment, entitling Ms. Deters to punitive damages. See
Baty, 172 F.3d at 1244-45.
Equifax argues that Ms. Deters’ evidence is not credible, and that we
should instead consider that Mr. Taylor denied that Ms. Deters ever complained
with specificity, and that he contradicted her testimony and the testimony of
others that he witnessed acts of sexual harassment. However, in making this
argument, Equifax ignores our standard of review. We are compelled to draw
every reasonable inference in Ms. Deters’ favor. See Baty, 172 F.3d at 1241.
The credibility of witnesses is for the jury to evaluate, and we will not disturb its
conclusion. See Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 104
F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 1997); see also FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 860
(10th Cir. 1997) (“We are not empowered to undertake a review of the evidence
which would amount to a trial de novo”). We thus reject Equifax’s argument that
the evidence was insufficient to support an award of punitive damages.
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IV. Mr. Taylor’s Managerial Status and Equifax’s Knowledge
Equifax next argues that even if Taylor did act in a reckless and malicious
fashion, liability for punitive damages may not be imputed to Equifax itself, as
Mr. Taylor is not a managerial-level employee, and that his alleged non-
responsiveness is contrary to Equifax’s good-faith policies against sexual
harassment. Additionally, Equifax argues that it is not liable for punitive
damages, as it had no notice of the misconduct Ms. Deters alleges.
We note at the outset that employer malice or reckless indifference in
failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which
management-level employees knew or should have known is premised on direct
liability, not derivative liability, according to the doctrine of respondeat superior. 3
See generally Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, 144 F.3d 664, 673 (10th Cir. 1998)
(discussing direct liability in the context of compensatory damages). Thus, the
district court’s discussion of direct liability was neither novel nor in error, as
3
An employer is vicariously liable for a supervisor’s creation of a sexually
hostile work environment, but may be able to raise the affirmative defense “‘that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior.’” Baty, 172 F.3d at 1242 (quoting Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 2270 (1998)). Thus, vicarious liability
applies to situations in which a supervisor perpetrates harassment himself,
whereas a theory of direct liability is more appropriate where an employer fails to
respond adequately to harassment of which a management-level employee knew
or should have known. This distinction is subtle, but proves to be crucial to our
discussion of Equifax’s invocation of a “good-faith” defense.
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Equifax claims. The relevant inquiry for Equifax’s liability in the instant case is
whether Equifax had actual or constructive knowledge of the harassment, and
whether its response was adequate. Id.
In evaluating a company’s liability for punitive damages, Congress has
imposed a stricter standard than prevails in evaluating a company’s liability for
compensatory damages. In the area of liability for punitive damages we must be
governed by the statutory language recently enacted by Congress in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. This statutory standard reads as follows:
A complaining party may recover punitive damages
under this section against a respondent . . . if the
complaining party demonstrates that the respondent
engaged in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory
practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1). The statute speaks in terms of an employer acting
recklessly or maliciously. Thus, we are required to determine who qualifies as the
employer for purposes of imposing direct punitive liability.
Here, we need not decide whether Mr. Taylor was a sufficiently highly
ranked managerial or policy-making employee such that his knowledge of the
harassment Ms. Deters suffered would be imputed as a matter of law to Equifax.
It is sufficient here that Equifax had specifically designated Mr. Taylor as a final
representative of the company to implement the sexual harassment policy in its
Lenexa branch, and to process complaints of sexual harassment. Equifax’s
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policy, as published to its employees in its handbook, reads as follows:
If you feel that you are being harassed in any way by another
employee . . . you should talk to your supervisor immediately. The
matter will be thoroughly investigated, and where appropriate,
disciplinary action will be taken. If you do not feel that you can
discuss the matter with your supervisor or if you are not satisfied
with the way your complaint has been handled, please contact either
your human resources officer or Becky Padgett, vice
president–Corporate Human Resources. You will not be penalized in
any way for reporting such conduct whether it involves yourself or
another person.
Mr. Taylor was the human resources officer for Equifax’s Lenexa branch.
When a company specifically designates a particular employee within the
company as a final person responsible for enforcing that company’s policy against
discrimination, then by the company’s own designation, information provided to
such an employee is knowledge to the company.
Further enhancing Equifax’s knowledge of sexual harassment, occurring in
its Lenexa branch is the fact that the human resources employees at the Equifax
home office in Atlanta had been made aware of Ms. Pernice’s allegations against
a second ADM who also perpetrated harassment against Ms. Deters, similar in
nature and near in time. See Hirase-Doi v. U.S. West, 61 F.3d 777, 784 (10th Cir.
1995). The second ADM was accused by Ms. Pernice of surreptitiously looking
down her blouse while on a business trip in Atlanta, and then memorializing the
event by discussing it with another co-worker on a videotape. Ms. Deters was
being harassed during the same period, the summer of 1995, when Ms. Pernice
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complained of harassment. Ms. Pernice made complaints both to Mr. Taylor, and
to human resources employees at the Equifax home office in Atlanta, describing
the contents of the videotape. Equifax vice-president William Cheeks was
visiting the Lenexa office at the time Mr. Taylor received the complaint and
videotape. Thus, following our reasoning in Hirase-Doi, Ms. Deters may rely on
Equifax’s notice of evidence of sexual harassment perpetrated against Ms.
Pernice. Id.
Thus, having determined that Equifax had knowledge of the ongoing
harassment suffered by Ms. Deters, we must evaluate its response. We look to the
responses of Mr. Taylor to Ms. Deters’ persistent complaints. See Adler, 144
F.3d at 677 (evaluating responses of management-level employees for purposes of
imputing direct liability to employer). Our previous discussion of Mr. Taylor’s
responses amply demonstrates that Equifax’s responses to Ms. Deters’ complaints
were not merely inadequate, but rather reckless and malicious. See supra Part III.
In sum, Mr. Taylor - the manager specifically charged by Equifax with the
enforcement and implementation of the sexual harassment policy at the Lenexa
office - responded to Ms. Deters’ numerous complaints with utter disregard of her
rights, actually condoning the harassment for the sake of protecting Equifax’s
revenue producing employees.
Finally, Equifax argues that even assuming that Mr. Taylor was a
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management-level employee for purposes of imputing punitive liability, his
misconduct is not attributable to Equifax, because it goes against the company’s
good-faith policies against sexual harassment. It is certainly true, as the Supreme
Court recently stated, that in the context of punitive damages, an employer may
not be liable for the discriminatory employment decisions of management-level
employees where these acts are contrary to good-faith efforts on the part of the
employer to comply with Title VII. See Kolstad, 119 S. Ct. at 2129. This
principle is meant to advance the purposes of Title VII by encouraging the
remediation and prevention that lie at the heart of the statute’s goals. Id. It
would defeat these purposes to hold an employer strictly liable for the acts of
rogue managers when it has made every effort to comply with Title VII’s
requirements. However, Kolstad was a case involving vicarious liability, unlike
this case which is premised on a theory of direct liability. Thus, the good-faith
defense does not apply. It is negated by a showing of direct malice or reckless
indifference to federally protected rights of Ms. Deters, by Mr. Taylor who was
designated by the company as a final decision-making authority responsible for
implementing the company anti-discrimination policy in the Lenexa office.
V. Excessiveness of Punitive Damages Award
Equifax next argues that even if Ms. Deters is entitled to punitive damages,
the award is excessive and contrary to constitutional, common law, and statutory
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criteria. Equifax thus requests a remittitur or a new trial. Equifax claims that the
size of the award is excessive because, even assuming Mr. Taylor had notice
requiring further investigation, the sexual harassment involved was minor and
innocuous, not involving any unwanted touching, egregious or blatant kidding or
chiding or embarrassing sexual references in the workplace. Thus, it was
impossible for Equifax to be on notice that it would be exposed to a punitive
award of this magnitude. Equifax concedes that if punitive damages are
permissible in this case, under the facts as it renders them, an award of $50,000
would be appropriate. Equifax also argues that the ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages is excessively disproportionate. Equifax finally argues
that because the conduct in question was not egregious, the district court should
have further reduced the punitive award below the amount remaining under the
statutory cap, after compensatory damages were calculated.
The Supreme Court has articulated the standard for constitutionally
excessive punitive damages awards. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 116
S.Ct. 1589, 1595 (1996); see also Continental Trend Resources Inc. v. OXY USA
Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 636 (10th Cir. 1996). One must receive fair notice both that
certain conduct will subject him to punishment, and the possible severity of the
punishment that may be imposed. See Continental Trend, 101 F.3d at 636
(quoting BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1598). There are three “guideposts” involved in this
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fair notice calculus. See id. First, and most important, is the reprehensibility of
defendant’s conduct. See id. Second, is the ratio of the punitive damages
awarded to the actual harm inflicted on the plaintiff. See id. The third guidepost
is a comparison of the punitive damages award with “‘the civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct.’” Id. (quoting BMW,
116 S.Ct. at 1603). Additionally, in analyzing a punitive damages award for
excessiveness, we must consider the goal of deterrence. Id. at 641 (citing BMW,
116 S.Ct. at 1603). The size and wealth of the defendant are relevant factors in
this regard. Id.
Applying this analysis to the instant case, we are unpersuaded by Equifax’s
arguments. Equifax certainly had notice that it could be subject to punitive
damages for involvement in discriminatory practices with malice or with reckless
indifference to an individual’s federally protected rights, by virtue of the plain
language of Title VII itself. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1); see also Baty, 172 F.3d
at 1244 (holding that the provision for punitive damages in the statute itself
constitute notice.). Equifax argues that it could not have anticipated that it would
be exposed to the statutory maximum for damages, given what occurred here.
However, Equifax’s argument relies on our accepting its rendering of the facts,
rather than following our standard of review, reviewing the facts in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. See Anaeme v. Diagnostek, Inc., 164 F.3d
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1275, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999). Evidence was presented to the jury that Equifax had
repeated notice of severe and pervasive sexual harassment. Instead of taking
immediate appropriate and corrective action reasonably calculated to end the
harassment, Mr. Taylor offered Ms. Deters legally indefensible reasons why the
harassment should be overlooked, i.e. the ADMs and the collectors were revenue
producers and she was not; the ADMs were “hard core” and such an attitude was
necessary to a successful collector. Though its responses were wanting, it is
evident that Equifax had fair notice that it could be exposed to the statutory
maximum for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1981a(b)(3).
Equifax argues that the award should be reduced because the ratio of
compensatory to punitive damages is wholly disproportionate. Equifax claims
that under controlling precedents, a punitive damages ratio of 6:1 is the maximum
constitutionally permissible. However, Equifax misconstrues the relevant
precedent. Both BMW and Continental Trend noted that these firm ratios are
most applicable to purely economic injury cases where injury is not hard to detect.
See Continental Trend, 101 F.3d at 639. Moreover, both the Supreme Court and
this court acknowledge that low awards of compensatory damages may support a
higher ratio if a particularly egregious act has resulted in a small amount of
economic damages. See id. (citing BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1602). Additionally, as in
cases such as Ms. Deters’, where the injury is primarily personal, a greater ratio
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may be appropriate. Id. at 638. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has held that punitive
damages are available for sexual harassment under Title VII, even in the total
absence of compensatory damages. See Timm v. Progressive Steel Treating, Inc.,
137 F.3d 1008, 1010 (7th Cir. 1998). Despite Equifax’s arguments to the
contrary, the jury certainly could have perceived Equifax’s lack of an effective
response as recklessly indifferent. We are not persuaded that the ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages in the instant case is unconstitutionally
disproportionate. Thus, the district court’s refusal to further reduce the punitive
damages was not an abuse of discretion.
In assessing the reasonableness of the punitive damages award in the
instant case, we must consider the purposes of such a remedy, namely to punish
and deter. See BMW, 116 S.Ct. at 1595. In this respect, the wealth and size of
the defendant are relevant considerations. See Continental Trend, 101 F.3d at
641. We agree with the district court that Equifax’s gross operating revenue of
$1.8 billion in 1996 could be considered in levying a substantial punitive damages
award.
Finally, Equifax argues that the district court should have reduced the
punitive damages award below the remainder left under the cap provided by
1981a(b)(3), because the statutory maximum should be reserved for the most
severe misconduct. See Hennessy v. Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d
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1344, 1355 (7th Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Luciano v. The
Olsten Corp., 110 F.3d 210 (2nd Cir. 1997), relied upon by the district court, is
persuasive. Section 1981a establishes a regime whereby the jury will set the
damages, without reference to the statutory cap. Then, if the damages awarded
exceed the relevant limit, the district court shall reduce the amount so that it
conforms to the statutory cap. The statutory cap is not the limit of a damages
spectrum, within which the judge might recalibrate the award given by the jury.
See Luciano, 110 F.3d at 221 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
72 (1991), reprinted in, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 610). To treat it as such would be to
invade the province of the jury, something explicitly contrary to the purposes of
1981a. See id. Thus, only when an award would “‘shock the judicial conscience,
and constitute a denial of justice,’ for example because it would ‘result in the
financial ruin of the defendant’ or ‘constitute a disproportionately large
percentage of a defendant’s net worth,’” will we reduce the award below the
statutory cap. See id. (quoting Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2nd Cir.
1992)); see also Baty, 172 F.3d at 1245. Given the facts of this case, the punitive
award, being the remainder left under the statutory cap, does not shock the
conscience. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
reducing the punitive award to conform with the limits established by 1981a.
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VI. Admission of the Video Tape
Equifax argues that the district court erroneously admitted a videotape of
the second ADM describing how he leered at Ms. Pernice’s breasts and body
during a cab ride on an out-of-town business trip. Equifax argues that the district
court wrongly admitted the videotape under the theory that it was evidence of
notice to Equifax in Ms. Deters’ case. Equifax argues that this tape could not
constitute notice because the harassment on the tape was different in kind from
that alleged by Ms. Deters. Moreover, Equifax argues that the videotape was
irrelevant, because the Atlanta office of Equifax only received a recitation of the
tape’s contents. Finally, Equifax argues that the videotape was unfairly
prejudicial and inflamed the jury against Equifax.
As stated previously, Ms. Deters is entitled to rely on Equifax’s notice of
any evidence of sexual harassment by a perpetrator that is similar in nature and
near in time to his harassment of Ms. Deters for purposes of imputing liability.
See generally Hirase-Doi, 61 F.3d at 784. Ms. Deters presented evidence that
entitled the jury to believe that the second ADM on the Pernice videotape also
harassed her in a similar manner. The events involving Ms. Deters corresponded
in time with the rendition of events captured on videotape. Moreover, Mr. Taylor
and possibly Mr. Cheeks personally viewed the videotape. Thus, the district court
properly admitted the videotape into evidence to show that Equifax was on notice
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that Ms. Deters was being sexually harassed.
Equifax’s argument that the admission of the videotape was unfairly
prejudicial is likewise without merit. Evidence should be excluded under Rule
403 only if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. Peters, 978 F.2d
1162, 1171 (10th Cir. 1992). In performing the 403 balancing, the court should
“‘give the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum
reasonable prejudicial value.’” Id. (quoting 1 J. Weinstein & M. Burger,
Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 403 [3], at 403-25 to 403-26 (1982). The district court is
clearly in a superior position to perform this analysis, and thus is accorded broad
discretion in making such decisions. Id. Reversal is not warranted absent a
showing of clear abuse of discretion. Id. We find no such abuse in the instant
case. The videotape was probative of Equifax’s knowledge, for the reasons given
above, and resulted in no unfair prejudice to Equifax. As has been stated many
times, Rule 403 does not protect a party from all prejudice, only unfair prejudice.
The videotape was properly admitted, and the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
AFFIRMED. Equifax’s motion to include an item in the record pursuant to
10th Cir. R. 10.3.3 is GRANTED and Equifax’s letter request for permission to
provide additional transcript citations in response to oral argument is GRANTED.
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