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D&F Afonso Realty Trust v. Garvey

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date filed: 2000-07-18
Citations: 216 F.3d 1191, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 348
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                  United States Court of Appeals

               FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

        Argued April 7, 2000        Decided July 18, 2000 

                           No. 99-1129

                    D&F Afonso Realty Trust, 
                            Petitioner

                                v.

       Jane F. Garvey and Federal Aviation Administration, 
                           Respondents

            On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
                 Federal Aviation Administration

     Rachel B. Trinder argued the cause for petitioner.  With 
her on the briefs was Craig M. Cibak.

     William G. Cole, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, 
argued the cause for respondent.  With him on the brief were 
David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, and 
Robert S. Greenspan, Attorney.

     Before:  Silberman, Ginsburg and Sentelle, Circuit 
Judges.

     Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Sentelle.

     Sentelle, Circuit Judge:  D&F Afonso Realty Trust peti-
tions for review of the Federal Aviation Administration's 
issuance of an aviation hazard determination declaring the 
roof of a house constructed by the petitioner to be a naviga-
tional hazard.  The FAA defends the procedure and evidence 
underlying its determination and also argues that the peti-
tioner lacks standing to bring its case before this court.  
After considering several affidavits submitted by the petition-
er, we conclude that it has Article III standing.  We further 
conclude, based on a review of the administrative record, that 
the FAA inexplicably failed to follow established agency 
procedure, did not adequately explain its decision, and acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in making its hazard determina-
tion.  Therefore, we vacate and remand the agency's determi-
nation.

                          I. Background

     D&F Afonso Realty Trust ("D&F"), a husband and wife-
owned construction company, decided to build a single family 
home in Hopedale, Massachusetts near a small, privately-
owned airport.  In October 1997, construction on the house 
began after the town of Hopedale issued construction permits 
to the company.  After building commenced, D&F learned 
from the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission that it need-
ed to notify the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") 
about the structure in order for the FAA to determine 
whether the house would violate any federal regulations.  
D&F informed the New England Regional Office of the FAA 
about the house-in-progress in late December 1997 by having 
its engineering firm file with the agency a Notice of Proposed 
Construction or Alteration (FAA Form 7460-1) required by 
14 C.F.R. s 77.17 to be submitted at least thirty days before 
the earlier of either the start date of construction or the 

construction permit's filing date.  In early January, D&F 
informed the FAA of the house's completion.

     After reviewing D&F's filing, the FAA determined that the 
completed house exceeded one of the air navigation obstruc-
tion standards listed in 14 C.F.R. s 77.25.  Specifically, the 
FAA found that 16.1 feet of the house's roof penetrated one 
of the "imaginary surfaces" around the airport.  An imagi-
nary surface is essentially an artificial engineering boundary 
"drawn" in the air around airports.  The imaginary surface at 
issue here is the "transitional surface" which extends "out-
ward and upward at right angles to the runway centerline 
and the runway centerline extended at a slope of 7 to 1 from 
the sides of the primary surface and from the sides of the 
approach surfaces."  14 C.F.R. s 77.25(e).  Because the roof 
penetrated the transitional surface, the FAA initiated an 
administrative inquiry to ascertain whether the structure 
would present a hazard to air navigation around the airport.

     Specifically, the FAA began an "aeronautical study" be-
cause the house exceeded a Part 77 obstruction standard.  
Part 77 of the Federal Aviation Regulations "establishes 
standards for determining obstructions to air navigation."  14 
C.F.R. s 77.21(a).  The FAA uses the standards to evaluate 
whether an object represents a hazard to air navigation.  See 
id. ss 77.31-39 (Subpart D).

     At the conclusion of the study, the FAA made a finding 
that the house had a substantial adverse effect on air naviga-
tion and issued a determination of hazard.  The FAA conclud-
ed, without further explanation, that because the house "is 
immediately adjacent to the final approach course" for the 
runway, "it represents a hazard to all aircraft landing on [the] 
runway."  In justifying the substantial adverse effect finding, 
the FAA concluded, without explanation, that the house would 
adversely affect all arrivals using Visual Flight Rules.  Given 
the FAA's cursory reference to some aerial photographs 
showing the house's proximity to the runway's final approach 
course, the agency apparently relied sub silentio on the 
photographs as the core support for its hazard determination.

     D&F sought administrative review of the FAA's determina-
tion and requested a hearing.  The FAA denied D&F's 
request for a hearing and issued a final determination uphold-
ing its prior conclusions.  In explaining its position, the FAA 
stated:

     [T]he proposed structure would lie within the Hopedale 
     ... runway ... traffic pattern buffer.  This buffer area 
     is designed to provide a degree of protection for those 
     pilots, departing and landing at an airport, operating in 
     accordance with visual flight rules (VFR)....  [B]ecause 
     of the proposed structure's height and its relative posi-
     tion within the traffic pattern buffer, it is the FAA's 
     position that the planned structure would be a distraction 
     to pilots during a critical phase of flight.
     
To effectuate its findings, the FAA published a warning to 
pilots to "use extreme caution when landing ... due to a two-
story house located approximately 400' northwest of the 
runway threshold."

     In addition to the FAA finding the house to be a hazard to 
air navigation, the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission 
determined that the house penetrated certain protected air-
space in violation of the Code of Massachusetts Regulations.  
After the administrative findings came to light, the Hopedale 
Airport asked the town to remove the house.  Currently, the 
town of Hopedale refuses to issue an occupancy permit to 
D&F.  In light of the foregoing events, D&F seeks review of 
the FAA's hazard determination and asks this court to re-
verse the FAA's determination in an effort to obtain an 
occupancy permit from the town as a result.1

__________
     1  Subsequent to D&F's filing a Petition for Review in this 
court, the FAA issued a new policy which, with certain exceptions, 
makes exceeding "[t]he height of the transition surface (other than 
abeam the runway)" a per se hazard.  Policy Memorandum 99-02.  
We will not analyze this case under the new policy.  We leave 
consideration of the new policy to the FAA because the agency, not 
this court, must interpret and apply a new agency policy in the first 
instance.  See NLRB v. Food Store Employees Union, Local 347, 
417 U.S. 1, 10 n.10 (1974).

                          II. Discussion

A.    D&F's Standing

     The FAA challenges D&F's standing to bring this appeal.  
In order to establish Article III standing, D&F must show 
that "(1) it has suffered an 'injury in fact' that is (a) concrete 
and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural 
or hypothetical;  (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant;  and (3) it is likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be re-
dressed by a favorable decision."  Friends of the Earth, Inc. 
v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 704 (2000) 
(citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 
(1992));  see also Florida Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 
658, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc).  D&F established an 
actual and concrete and particularized injury consisting of a 
diminution in property value due to its inability to obtain an 
occupancy permit from the town.  The FAA argues, however, 
that D&F has not shown a causal link between the agency's 
hazard determination and D&F's injury, given the Massachu-
setts Aeronautics Commission and airport's independent ob-
jections to the house.  The FAA also challenges the ability of 
this court to redress D&F's injury by reversing the agency 
because the town, not the agency, controls permit issuance.

     If the FAA hazard determination independently diminished 
the house's property value or constituted the only factor 
motivating the town's denial of the occupancy permit, causa-
tion and redressibility would be non-issues because our rever-
sal of the FAA would either provide a remedy for the 
financial injury caused by the FAA or prompt the town to 
issue the permit.  However, neither the record nor the briefs 
submitted to this court established which of the events among 
the FAA's findings, the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commis-
sion's findings, the airport's complaint, or some combination 
thereof prompted the town's denial of the occupancy permit 
and the diminution in property value.  However, at oral 
argument, D&F asserted that the FAA's hazard determina-
tion in and of itself caused a diminution in property value and 
that the town was withholding the occupancy permit solely 

due to the FAA's hazard determination.  Therefore, we af-
forded D&F the opportunity to submit affidavits supporting 
its allegations, if true.

     Upon review of D&F's submissions, we conclude that D&F 
alleges facts satisfying the standing requirements of causation 
and redressibility.  D&F supplied an affidavit explaining that 
"a real estate broker ... informed [D&F] that the FAA's 
Hazard Determination has resulted in a diminution of value to 
the Afonso House independent of whether an occupancy 
permit is granted."  In addition, D&F submitted an affidavit 
establishing that the Massachusetts Aeronautics Commission 
would "defer to the outcome of the FAA-related proceedings 
currently before this Court."  Moreover, D&F supplied an 
affidavit from the Hopedale Building Commissioner declaring 
that "the only obstacle to issuance of the occupancy permit is 
the FAA's Hazard Determination.  But for that Determina-
tion, the occupancy permit would have already issued.  If the 
FAA's Hazard Determination is withdrawn or reversed, [the 
town] will issue an occupancy permit for the Afonso House 
forthwith."  We must construe the statements made in the 
affidavits in the light most favorable to the petitioner.  See 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).  Taken together, 
the statements show that the FAA's hazard determination 
causes D&F injury in the form of diminished property value 
and comprises the sole obstacle between D&F and an occu-
pancy permit.  Therefore, we conclude that D&F has stand-
ing to challenge the FAA's hazard determination.

B.   The Hazard Determination

     We review decisions of federal agencies, including the FAA, 
under the standards set forth by the Administrative Proce-
dure Act.  See Public Citizen, Inc. v. FAA, 988 F.2d 186, 196 
(D.C. Cir. 1993).  That Act provides that a reviewing court 
must set aside agency action if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."  
5 U.S.C. s 706(2)(A).  As we have often held, "[t]he require-
ment that agency action not be arbitrary or capricious in-
cludes a requirement that the agency adequately explain its 
result...."  Public Citizen, 988 F.2d at 197.  In the hazard 

determination under review, the FAA has offered no such 
explanation.  As we have stated before, we must strike down 
agency action if the agency failed to consider relevant factors 
or made a clear error of judgment.  See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983);  Starr v. FAA, 589 F.2d 307, 311 (7th Cir. 1978).

     The FAA made a finding that the house penetrated an 
imaginary surface, specifically the transitional surface.  How-
ever, mere penetration, and even evidence of adverse effect 
alone, do not provide adequate support for a hazard determi-
nation.  In dealing with obstruction standard violations, the 
FAA follows a handbook entitled "Procedures for Handling 
Airspace Matters," FAA Procedures 7400.2D (1993) ("Hand-
book"), which mandates conducting aeronautical studies, in 
accordance with Subpart D of Part 77, of proposed structures 
exceeding Part 77 obstruction standards.  See Br. for FAA at 
4 (citing chapter 5 of Handbook).  According to Subpart D of 
Part 77, "[i]n the aeronautical studies, present and future ... 
aeronautical operations and procedures are reviewed and any 
possible changes in those operations and procedures and in 
the construction proposal that would eliminate or alleviate the 
conflicting demands are ascertained."  14 C.F.R. s 77.31.  
Pursuant to the Handbook, objects exceeding an obstruction 
standard are "presumed to be hazards to air navigation 
unless an aeronautical study determines otherwise."  Id. at 
s 7-1(b).  In order to issue a hazard determination, the FAA 
must find by a clear showing that the penetration in question 
will have a "substantial adverse effect" on air navigation.  See 
id. at ss 7-2 to 7-5, 8-2.  The Handbook provides that 
"substantial adverse effect" occurs when a structure has or 
would have an "[a]dverse effect" and "a significant volume of 
aeronautical operations would be affected."  Id. at s 7.4.

     A substantial adverse effect finding requires three ele-
ments.  First, the structure in question must have exceeded 
the relevant obstruction standards or have been found to have 
a physical or electromagnetic radiation effect on the operation 
of air navigation facilities.  See id. at s 7.3.  Second, the 
structure will be considered to have an adverse effect if it 
would, inter alia, "require a [Visual Flight Rules] operation," 

that is, an operation in which the pilot lands an aircraft or 
takes off using visual approach procedures only, "to change 
from a regular flight course or altitude," "[d]erogate airport 
capacity/efficiency," or "[a]ffect future [Visual Flight Rules] 
... operations indicated by plans on file."  Id.  Third, the 
structure must affect a significant volume of aeronautical 
activity;  the FAA considers the type of activity involved and 
the frequency of occurrence.  See id. at s 7.5.  In addition, a 
study must include, inter alia, an evaluation regarding mark-
ing and lighting the structure, see id. at s 7-9, and every 
hazard finding is supposed to include "a clear, but brief, 
statement why aviation can or cannot accommodate the pro-
posal."  Id. at s 8-2.

     Here, the FAA first sought comments from twenty-four 
interested parties concerning the effect the house would have 
on aviation.  Apart from the manager of the Providence, 
Rhode Island Traffic Control Tower who declared, without 
further elaboration, that the house "would result in a negative 
impact to air traffic operations," the responding parties either 
did not object to the house or failed to provide any comments 
pertaining to the hazardousness of the structure.

     Based on the FAA's explanation, or lack thereof, in the 
issuance of this hazard determination, we conclude that the 
FAA acted arbitrarily by issuing a hazard determination 
inconsistent with established standards.  Thus, we hold that 
the FAA exceeded the permissible bounds of agency action.

     Nowhere in the record before us can we find a link between 
established hazard determination standards and the hazard 
determination reached by the FAA in this case.  The FAA 
made a finding that the house penetrated an imaginary 
surface.  However, as we previously noted, mere penetration, 
and even evidence of adverse effect alone, cannot support a 
hazard determination.  See Handbook ss 7-3, 7-4, 8-2.  Ac-
cording to the Handbook, the FAA is to conduct a "substan-
tial adverse effect" inquiry and only upon a clear showing of 
substantial adverse effect issue a hazard determination.  See 
id. at ss 7-1, 7-3, 7-4, 8-2(b)(3).  However, here, the FAA 

failed both to conduct a complete inquiry and make a clear 
showing of substantial adverse effect.

     More specifically, the FAA arbitrarily based its hazard 
finding on an unsupported pilot distraction finding instead of 
following the policy outlined in the controlling Handbook.  
"We review the FAA's findings of fact merely to see whether 
they are 'supported by substantial evidence.' "  Public Citi-
zen, 988 F.2d at 196 (quoting 49 U.S.C. App. s 1486(e) 
(1988)).  Here, if there is substantial evidence, the FAA has 
not alluded to it.

     The FAA also acted contrary to its own procedure by 
failing to explicitly apply the established multi-factor test 
which considers adverse effect and the volume of operations 
affected.  See Handbook ss 7-3 to 7-5.  For example, the 
FAA based its finding on the house's effect on VFR opera-
tions but failed to consider the relevant VFR adverse effect 
factors of potential changes in flight course and potential 
effects on future VFR operations.  See id. at s 7-3.  In 
addition, the agency did not investigate the available airport 
traffic figures and instead based its "significant volume" 
finding on the "proximity of [the] structure to the final 
approach course."  Even assuming the FAA's reference to a 
traffic buffer zone in the order affirming the hazard determi-
nation has meaning as a technical and practical matter, the 
agency did not do its job of connecting the buffer zone 
concept to the "substantial adverse effect" inquiry.  In short, 
the FAA did not consider relevant factors or sufficiently 
explain the basis of its hazard determination.

     The FAA's post hoc rationalizations for deviating from 
procedure and for failing to substantiate its hazard determi-
nation cannot pass muster as a matter of law.  For example, 
the Handbook requires that every aeronautical study include 
an evaluation regarding the marking and lighting of the 
structure in question.  See id. at s 7-9.  However, the agen-
cy did not make any findings concerning the marking or 
lighting of the house.  The agency cannot claim to be engag-
ing in reasoned analysis when it cavalierly brushes off specific 
mandates such as a marking and lighting evaluation.  Nor 

can it claim to be acting reasonably when it ignores, without 
explanation, policy provisions such as the one establishing the 
inclusion of "a clear, but brief, statement why aviation can or 
cannot accommodate [a] proposal."  See id. at s 8-2.

     Moreover, the agency inexplicably refused to take into 
consideration the trees and other structures in the vicinity 
also apparently intruding into the transitional surface in the 
surrounding terrain which might alter the geometry of its 
calculations.  In Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association v. 
FAA, 600 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1979), we recognized that 
surrounding terrain could possibly "mitigate what might oth-
erwise have been a potential hazard to aircraft."  Id. at 973.  
In other words, the FAA should have considered the land-
scape in its entirety when making its hazard determination.  
See id.  Yet, according to the FAA, only D&F's house 
presents cause for concern.  All in all, the FAA failed to 
rationally substantiate or explain its process and findings.

     In essence, the FAA adopted an ipse dixit approach to 
making a hazard determination:  the house creates a naviga-
tional hazard because the agency says so.  Even our highly 
deferential standard of review requires more than the FAA 
offers.  Thus, the FAA's abandonment of its own established 
procedure and its lack of reasoned analysis on the record 
constitute arbitrary and capricious agency action in violation 
of the law.  Due to the shortcomings in the FAA's hazard 
determination, we reverse and remand D&F's case to the 
agency in order for it to undertake an appropriate hazard 
analysis.

                         III. Conclusion

     In sum, we hold that D&F has alleged facts sufficient for 
standing to challenge the FAA's hazard determination.  Upon 
review, we vacate and remand the FAA's determination due 
to the agency's engaging in an arbitrary and capricious 
hazard determination procedure.