DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
August 9, 2005
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 04-30861

DIRECTV INC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MARC ROBSON,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BARKSDALE, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

DIRECTV, Inc. (“DTV”) appeals the district court’s grant of

summary judgment on its claims for illegal interception of its

satellite transmissions in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and 18

U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), and for modification and assembly of pirate

access devices in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4). We affirm as

to the interception claims and vacate as to the device claims.1

I

DTV is a nationwide provider of direct-to-home satellite

1
We heard oral argument in this case on May 11, 2005, with two related
cases, which are also issued today. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Budden, No. 04-20751,
--- F.3d ---- (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2005); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Minor, No. 04-50793, ---
F.3d ---- (5th Cir. Aug. 9, 2005).
programming, including movie channels, sports, major cable

networks, and local channels. DTV offers products on both a

subscription and pay-per-view basis, and it encrypts--that is,

digitally scrambles--its satellite broadcasts to guard against

unauthorized access. A typical system consists of a small DTV-

compatible satellite dish, a DTV receiver (also known as an

“integrated receiver/decoder” or “IRD”), and a DTV access card.

The dish connects to the receiver, which in turn connects to the

user’s television. A DTV access card, when inserted into the

receiver, allows the receiver to decrypt the various channels or

services that the user has purchased. A DTV access card is a smart

card, similar in size and shape to a credit card, and also contains

an embedded computer and memory.

Numerous “pirate access devices”2 have been developed to

circumvent the necessity of a valid access card, thereby allowing

users to illegally decrypt the DTV satellite signal and thus obtain

DTV programming without purchasing it. Such piracy can take

various forms, including modifying a valid access card or using a

device to take the place of a valid access card.

Defendant Marc Robson is a self-employed computer consultant

who has, in the past, taken numerous technical education classes

2
See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Nicholas, 403 F.3d 223, 224 (4th Cir. 2005) (“pirate
access devices” are those devices “that can surreptitiously steal DIRECTV’s
transmissions”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Brown, 371 F.3d 814, 816 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“pirate access devices” are those used “to circumvent this conditional access
technology and allow users to receive the satellite transmissions provided by DTV
without paying DTV any fees”); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Barnes, 302 F. Supp. 2d
774, 776 (W.D. Mich. 2004).

2
related to computers, taught classes on how to use various software

packages, and done work for IBM. DTV has presented evidence

indicating that Robson possessed an emulator, which is a printed

circuit board that is inserted into the receiver in place of an

access card. An emulator--used in conjunction with a personal

computer, special software, a smart card reader/writer, a DTV

access card, and a DTV receiver--allows an individual to intercept

DTV’s satellite programming without paying for it.3

According to DTV, on February 27, 2001, Robson posted a

message at an internet website that acts as a clearinghouse of

information regarding, among other things, pirate access devices

and the pirating of satellite transmissions. The post read: “Just

got my mc1489 chip and putting together an emulator. But haven’t

done anything like this before. When placing the chip into the pcb

does the copper side go up or down?” The post was made under the

username “dobson”--a username that had been registered utilizing

the e-mail address of Robson’s wife. Robson denies having an

emulator, making the web post or even visiting the website. Robson

also denies that emulators are primarily used for pirate

activities.

DTV first became aware of Robson following its execution of a

3
The computer, running the special “pirate” software, is connected via two
separate cables to the emulator (which is inserted into the receiver) and to the
reader/writer (into which the access card is inserted). With this system, the
emulator is able to mimic the behavior of an access card unlocking the full range
of DTV programming.

3
writ of seizure at a mail shipping facility used by a device

merchant named Card Unlooping. Records seized indicated that

Robson purchased a PS2 Plus SU2 Unlooper (“the unlooper”), worth

$249.00, on March 5, 2001. According to DTV, the unlooper can be

used to alter or restore functionality to DTV access cards that

have been disabled by misuse or by an ECM;4 it acts as a smart card

reader/writer, but with additional capabilities. DTV maintains

that the unlooper has no commercially significant purpose other

than piracy.

Robson admits to purchasing the unlooper, but claims he did so

to program smart cards for security purposes.5 Robson invokes his

position as a consultant and his desire to anticipate prospective

clients’ needs to justify his interest in learning smart card

technology. He maintains that he threw the unlooper away after

being unable to make it work.

Before us are DTV’s claims against Robson for violations of

the Communications Act of 1934,6 as well as for violations of Title

4
In order to combat the proliferation of illegally modified access cards,
DTV periodically sends out electronic countermeasures (“ECMs”) embedded within
its satellite transmissions. ECMs detect and disable modified access cards,
sending them into an infinite “loop.” See Minor, No. 04-50793, at 3 n.3, ---
F.3d at ---- n.3.
5
Robson has presented evidence, including “whitepapers,” suggesting that
the unlooper he purchased is merely one of the many smart card reader/writers
that have legitimate uses. DTV counters that the unlooper in question is not a
run-of-the-mill smart card reader/writer, but rather has additional
functionality--voltage and clock manipulation, or “glitching”--with the “sole
function” being “to program and manipulate DIRECTV access cards.” DTV maintains
that the “SU2” designation in the unlooper’s name is an indication that the
unlooper has such additional capabilities.
6
48 Stat. 1064, as amended (codified in relevant part at § 605).

4
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968

(Wiretap Act).7 Specifically, DTV alleged illegal interception of

DTV’s satellite transmission per 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) and 18 U.S.C.

§ 2511(1)(a), and illegal modification and assembly of pirate

access devices in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4).8

The district court granted summary judgment to Robson on these

claims.9 As to § 605(a) and § 2511(1)(a), the district court held

that “[m]ere possession of unloopers and emulators is insufficient

to raise an inference of illicit use of these devices.”10 The

district court held that § 605(e)(4) does not apply to “individual

users.”11 DTV timely appeals.

II

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the

same standard as the district court.12 “Summary judgment is proper

when the pleadings and evidence demonstrate that no genuine issue

of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as

7
Pub. L. No. 90-351, tit. III, § 802, 82 Stat. 211, 212-23, as amended
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522).
8
DTV voluntarily dismissed its claims for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2512
and state civil conversion law.
9
See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Robson, 333 F. Supp. 2d 589 (W.D. La. 2004).
10
Id. at 594.
11
Id. at 595.

12
See Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.
2005); Caboni v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2002); FED. R.
CIV. P. 56.

5
a matter of law.”13 “An issue is material if its resolution could

affect the outcome of the action.”14 A dispute as to a material

fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury

could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.15

The district court was obligated to “consider the evidence in

the light most favorable”16 to DTV as the nonmovant, and to “indulge

every reasonable inference from the facts” in favor of DTV.17 If

a movant alleges an absence of specific facts necessary for a

nonmovant to establish an essential element of its case, then the

nonmovant “must respond by setting forth ‘specific facts showing

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”18 “After the nonmovant

has been given an opportunity to raise a genuine factual issue, if

no reasonable juror could find for the nonmovant, summary judgment

will be granted.”19

III

13
Pluet v. Frasier, 355 F.3d 381, 383 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing FED. R. CIV.
P. 56(c)).
14
Weeks Marine, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 233, 235 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).
15
See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.
16
Caboni, 278 F.3d at 451 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994).

17
Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 F.3d 1058, 1064 (5th Cir. 1993).

18
Slaughter v. S. Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1991) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
19
Caboni, 278 F.3d at 451 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).

6
 DTV challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment

on its interception claims under § 605(a) and § 2511(1)(a). Robson

counters that DTV cannot succeed on these claims because there is

insufficient evidence to support a finding that Robson actually

intercepted or otherwise unlawfully appropriated DTV’s

transmissions. We are persuaded that DTV’s relatively weak

circumstantial evidence fails to forestall summary judgment in this

case.

A

DTV’s interception claims implicate the criminal provisions in

§ 605(a) and § 2511(1)(a), in conjunction with their respective

civil remedies.

Section 605(a) provides, in part, that

no person receiving [or] assisting in
receiving . . . any interstate or foreign
communication by wire or radio shall divulge
or publish the . . . contents . . ., except
[in authorized circumstances.] No person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept
any radio communication and divulge or publish
the . . . contents . . . of such intercepted
communication to any person. No person not
being entitled thereto shall receive or assist
in receiving any interstate or foreign
communication by radio and use such
communication . . . for his own benefit or for
the benefit of another not entitled thereto.20

Section 605(e)(3)(A), in turn, provides a civil remedy for “[a]ny

person aggrieved by any violation of [§ 605(a)] or [§ 605(e)(4)].”21

20
47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (emphasis added).
21
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(A).

7
 Similarly, § 2511(1)(a) imposes criminal liability upon any

person who “intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or

procures any other person to intercept or endeavor to intercept,

any wire, oral, or electronic communication.”22 A civil action is

provided in § 2520(a): “[A]ny person whose wire, oral, or

electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or

intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil

action recover from the person or entity, other than the United

States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be

appropriate.”23

To prevail on its claims for violations of § 605(a) and

§ 2511(1)(a), DTV must demonstrate that Robson intercepted or

otherwise unlawfully appropriated DTV’s transmission.24 DTV has not

presented any direct evidence that Robson engaged in illegal

interception, or that Robson even had the DTV equipment necessary

for interception--specifically, a DTV access card, DTV receiver,

and DTV satellite dish.

Circumstantial evidence can support a finding that a

22
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a).
23
18 U.S.C. § 2520(a).
24
See, e.g., Forsyth, 19 F.3d at 1537 (holding that plaintiffs, asserting
violations of § 2511, had not produced “evidence sufficient to demonstrate the
existence of a material fact issue on whether the appellees intentionally
intercepted their conversations”). We refer to this necessary element simply as
“interception.”

8
communication was intercepted, even absent direct evidence.25 In

some contexts we have indicated that circumstantial evidence must

be relatively strong to successfully avert summary judgment.26

Today we address whether the circumstantial evidence presented is

sufficient to allow an inference of actual interception. One court

recently noted that to the best of its knowledge,

no court has expressly addressed the
sufficiency of circumstantial proof required
for DIRECTV to establish actual interception
of its satellite signals when a defendant
admits that he purchased a device to receive
free DIRECTV but denies that he was [able] to
use the Pirate Access Device to actually

25
See, e.g., Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1578 (11th Cir. 1990)
(addressing interception claim under § 2520 and noting that “[d]irect evidence
may not have been available based on the stealthiness of the invasion” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Scutieri v. Paige, 808 F.2d 785, 790
(11th Cir. 1987) (Reynaldo Garza, J., sitting by designation); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Gemmell, 317 F. Supp. 2d 686, 693 (W.D. La. 2004) (citing Cmty. Television Sys.,
Inc. v. Caruso, 284 F.3d 430, 436 (2nd Cir.2002)); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Boonstra, 302
F. Supp. 2d 822, 833 (W.D. Mich. 2004); Barnes, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 782; see also
Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960) (“[D]irect evidence
of a fact is not required. Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but
may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence.”).
26
For example, in Thomas v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 233 F.3d 326
(5th Cir. 2000), we held summary judgment improper where plaintiff had “adduced
strong circumstantial evidence to establish an essential element of her claim,
and the defendant, in contrast, has offered evidence that, although direct, is
weak or highly suspect.” Id. at 329. In that dram shop case, the key issue was
whether there was sufficient evidence to find that a patron had actually consumed
beer purchased at the defendant liquor store. Based on the strong circumstantial
evidence of the patron’s drunken state upon making the purchase and upon the
patron’s more thoroughly drunken state later in the evening, we held that a
reasonable jury could conclude that he drank his purchase in the meantime,
notwithstanding the defendant liquor store’s direct evidence--consisting of self-
serving affidavits from the patron and patron’s companion--indicating that the
patron did not drink the beer.
In Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d at 171-73, we addressed the use
of circumstantial evidence to avoid summary judgment on claims of exposure to
asbestos. We held that summary judgment as to one defendant was proper, but not
as to the other defendant because the circumstantial evidence “indicated a
significant probability that plaintiffs worked in close proximity to [asbestos-
containing] insulation, even though no witness testified to seeing plaintiffs
work near [it].” Id. at 171-72.

9
 receive or intercept DIRECTV’s signal.27

Although the defendant here never admitted to illicit intentions in

purchasing the pirate access device, we echo this sentiment in the

face of a similar paucity of guiding caselaw.

DTV put forth the following circumstantial evidence as bearing

upon its interception claims: (1) Robson posted a message on an

internet website devoted to piracy indicating that he possessed an

emulator and that he needed help in assembling it; (2) roughly six

days later Robson purchased an unlooper for $249.00; and (3) both

of these devices--emulators and unloopers--are designed for the

purpose of pirating DTV’s satellite transmission, and neither of

these devices can be used for other legitimate, commercial

purposes.28

This circumstantial evidence of interception is confined

largely to demonstrating the purchase and possession of the devices

at issue, rather than the use of those devices to intercept DTV’s

transmissions. Even indulging all reasonable inferences, we are

persuaded that the evidence here falls short of the quantum

necessary on the key element of interception.

B

Along this line, we note that there is conspicuously no civil

action for merely possessing or purchasing a pirate access device.

27
Barnes, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 782; see also Boonstra, 302 F. Supp. 2d at
833.
28
DTV also calls into question Robson’s credibility.

10
Neither § 605(a) nor § 2511(1)(a) is violated by such conduct.29

By comparison, § 2512(1)(b) does makes it a crime to “intentionally

. . . possess[] . . . any electronic, mechanical, or other device,

knowing or having reason to know that the design of such device

renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious

interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications[.]”30

Tellingly, however, the civil cause of action embodied in § 2520

does not cover such possessory violations.31 Had Congress wanted

to provide a civil action for possessing or purchasing pirate

access devices, it could have done so, subject of course to

constitutional constraints.32 The impulse to conclude from the

29
Section 605(e)(4), addressed infra, also does not address possession and
purchase.
30
18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b).
31
See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (providing civil action for person whose
“electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in
violation of this chapter”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Treworgy, 373 F.3d 1124, 1129 (11th
Cir. 2004) (no private right of action under § 2520 against a person for
possession of pirate device in violation of § 2512(1)(b)); accord DIRECTV, Inc.
v. Deskin, 363 F. Supp. 2d 254, 260 (D. Conn. 2005) (“Claims based on evidence
of mere possession are expressly excluded from the list of grievances subject to
civil remedy through § 2520(a).”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. DeCroce, 332 F. Supp. 2d 715,
719 (D.N.J. 2004); Gemmell, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 691 n.2 (collecting cases);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Boggess, 300 F. Supp. 2d 444, 448 (S.D.W.Va. 2004); DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Beecher, 296 F. Supp. 2d 937, 940-43 (S.D. Ind. 2003); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Hosey, 289 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1262-64 (D. Kan. 2003); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Amato, 269
F. Supp. 2d 688, 691 (E.D. Va. 2003); cf. Flowers v. Tandy Corp., 773 F.2d 585,
588 (4th Cir. 1985) (interpreting pre-1986 version of § 2520 and finding “no
merit in [the] assertion that § 2520 expressly provides a private cause of action
for violations of the criminal proscriptions of § 2512”); but see, e.g., DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Gatsiolis, 2003 WL 22111097, at *1-*2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2003);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. EQ Stuff, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
32
See, e.g., Treworgy, 373 F.3d at 1127 (noting possible constitutional
difficulties were 18 U.S.C. § 2520 to be read as giving civil right of action
against a defendant for possession of pirate access device).

11
possession or purchase of pirate access devices that the defendant

must have used them--why else would he buy them?--is a powerful

one. However, the danger lurking therein is in effectively

creating a de facto civil action for possession or purchase.

Allowing the claims for interception to proceed in the present case

would indicate that little more than mere possession or purchase is

needed to give rise to civil liability under these statutes.

C

The evidence here is largely confined to the possession and

purchase of the pirate access devices themselves, as opposed to the

use thereof to actually intercept DTV’s signals. DTV has been

unable to produce evidence that defendant had the DTV equipment

necessary to intercept a signal--specifically, a DTV dish, receiver

and access card. This is not to suggest that there always must be

direct evidence as to each and every piece of necessary equipment.

After all, the components--perhaps with the exception of a dish on

the outside of a house--are capable of being kept and used in

stealth.33 However, the additional circumstantial evidence beyond

purchase and possession here is slim.

The evidence that Robson was “putting together” the emulator

33
Cf. United States v. Harrell, 983 F.2d 36, 38 (5th Cir. 1993)
(addressing satellite piracy crime, per § 2512(1)(b), involving devices primarily
for “surreptitious interception”); United States v. Lande, 968 F.2d 907, 910 (9th
Cir. 1992) (“Satellite transmissions could not be intercepted any more
‘surreptitiously’ than by these [pirate] devices which cannot be detected by
producers of electronic television programming.” (brackets omitted)); cf. C.A.
Articulos Nacionales de Goma Gomaven v. M/V Aragua, 756 F.2d 1156, 1159 n.7 (5th
Cir. 1985).

12
does not get us much further than to conclude that he eventually

possessed a functional emulator.34 It is true that the possession

of two purported pirate devices (the unlooper and the emulator)

strengthens the circumstantial evidence somewhat. From the

timeline associated with these two devices, it would perhaps not be

unreasonable to infer that the unlooper was acquired to restore

functionality to a damaged access card. Even so, at root, the

evidence of these two devices--as opposed to one--gets us little

closer to actual interception and is still confined largely to

possession of pirate access devices.

D

Although caselaw addressing the quantum of evidence necessary

to survive summary judgment on interception claims is less than

robust at the circuit level,35 our conclusion finds additional

support in recent district court cases. On one hand, contrary to

our holding today, some district courts have found possession of

pirate devices sufficient to give rise to an inference of

34
Of course, such evidence might have a significant impact on DTV’s claim
for violation of § 605(e)(4), discussed further below.

35
DTV points us to our decision in United States v. Harrell, 983 F.2d 36
(5th Cir. 1993), wherein we affirmed a defendant’s conviction for manufacturing
and selling pirate access devices in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) and 18
U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b). DTV emphasizes our statement in Harrell that “[w]e find it
unreasonable to believe that an individual, having illegally spent about $300 for
the modified chip, will still primarily limit himself to his originally paid
programming,” id. at 38, to support its argument that, essentially, any
possession of a pirate access device gives rise to an inference of interception.
However, in Harrell, our focus was on determining whether the devices were
“primarily designed for electronic eavesdropping proscribed by § 2512(1)(b)” and
we were not addressing the measure of evidence required to sustain an
interception claim. Id. Harrell sheds little light on the present case.

13
interception for summary judgment purposes.36 On the other hand,

we are persuaded by the many courts that have indicated explicitly

or implicitly that some additional evidence beyond mere possession

is necessary for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment on an

interception claim.37

36
See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Weikel, No. Civ. 03-5300(JBS), 2005 WL
1243378, at *13 (D.N.J. May 25, 2005) (denying summary judgment to defendant on
§ 605(a) and § 2511 claims, noting that from “circumstantial evidence of
possession” of pirate access devices, DTV “can argue actual use and unauthorized
interception of its satellite signals” and that “[i]ndeed, use is easily implied
from mere possession of such a device, given the nature of the instrument and its
sole function”); cf. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Neznak, 371 F. Supp. 2d 130, 134 (D. Conn.
2005) (holding in granting default judgment to DTV that “defendant’s purchase of
five emulators and one unlooper supports an inference of six separate violations
of § 605(a)”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hendrix, No. C-04-0370 JSW (EMC), 2005 WL 757562,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2005) (where defendant purchased a very large number of
devices (200) there was a “strong inference that these purchases were made not
for personal use but to assist others in intercepting transmission” and thus
there is a “valid claim for a violation of § 605(a)”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Huynh,
318 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128 (M.D. Ala. 2004) (holding in granting default judgment
to DTV that “the court can infer from his possession of the [pirate access]
devices that [defendant] received DIRECTV’s signal without authorization in
violation of § 605(a)”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Albright, No. Civ.A. 03-4603, 2003 WL
22956416, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 9, 2003) (holding in granting default judgment to
DTV that defendant’s purchase of pirate access device leads “to the natural
inference that he used it to pirate DirecTV’s television transmissions for his
own personal benefit”).

37
See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Tadlock, No. Civ.A. 03-1456, 2005 WL
1458645, at *2-*3 (E.D. La. May 24, 2005) (granting summary judgment to defendant
on interception claims where there was evidence of purchase of a “Viper Unlooper
with WT2 Code,” and defendant was a DTV subscriber who had all the necessary
equipment, but where there was no evidence that he used the device to access more
services than he had purchased); Deskin, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 258-59 (granting
summary judgment to defendant even though defendant, a DTV subscriber, had an
unlooper and all necessary DTV equipment); DIRECTV, Inc. v. McCool, 339 F. Supp.
2d 1025, 1034-35 (M.D. Tenn. 2004) (denying summary judgment for defendant where
evidence showed defendant purchased unlooper, and where it was undisputed that
defendant had all DTV equipment necessary for interception and shortly after the
purchase of the unlooper downgraded his DTV programming package); DIRECTV, Inc.
v. Jones, No. A-03-CA-706-SS (W.D. Tex. May 5, 2004) (refusing to grant summary
judgment to defendant where there was evidence not only of the illicit device,
but also of the necessary DTV equipment, in addition to evidence that the
defendant ended his subscription at the same time as the purchase of the device);
Gemmell, 317 F. Supp. 2d at 693 (granting summary judgment where DTV had not
presented evidence of “actual interception”--i.e. that defendant “actually used
the equipment it allegedly possessed”--but noting that, in general, “computer
records that show the purchase and installation of equipment designed to

14
 For example, the court in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Barnes, in

ultimately denying summary judgment, acknowledged that

it is not enough for a plaintiff merely to
show that a defendant possessed equipment
capable of intercepting a communication in
order to show that the defendant actually
received or intercepted the plaintiff’s
communication. Rather, the plaintiff must
produce circumstantial evidence sufficient to
support the conclusion that there was an
actual interception.38

unlawfully intercept electronic communications will suffice to create a
rebuttable presumption of a violation of Section 605” (emphasis added) (citing
Caruso, 284 F.3d at 436)); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Garnett, No. C-03-346, at 10 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 26, 2004) (granting summary judgment to defendant, a DTV subscriber,
despite defendant’s purchase of an unlooper and defendant’s possession of all
necessary DTV equipment where defendant’s “subscriber records do not raise an
inference of pirate activity” and there was “no correlation between [defendant’s]
purchase of the device . . . with a corresponding decline in DIRECTV billing or
use”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Spokish, No. 6:03-CV-680-ORL-22DAB, 2004 WL 741369, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2004) (denying summary judgment where there was evidence
that defendant possessed the necessary DTV equipment and also purchased three “MK
Unlooper-SU2s,” purportedly “as part of a computer engineering experiment”);
Boonstra, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 835-36 (denying summary judgment where evidence
indicated not only possession of all necessary equipment, but also purchase of
unlooper, awareness of unlooper’s nature, actual attempt to use unlooper, and
contemporaneous cancellation of DTV subscription, in addition to purchase of
reader/writer for express purpose of modifying access cards to receive DTV
programming); Barnes, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 784-86 (similar); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Bush,
No. H-03-1765 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2003) (granting summary judgment for the
defendant where, apart from possession of the pirate device, the plaintiff had
failed to produce any evidence of the other components necessary for
interception--i.e. the DTV dish, receiver, and access card); DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Karpinsky, 274 F. Supp. 2d 918, 921-22 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (denying summary
judgment where the defendant had purchased all the necessary DTV equipment, in
addition to a pirate access device); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Presgraves, No. SA-04-CA-
92-RF (W.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2003) (denying summary judgment to defendant where
defendant, a DTV subscriber, had a pirate access device and all the necessary DTV
equipment to intercept transmissions); see also Caruso, 284 F.3d at 432-33
(affirming district court’s judgment for plaintiff where there was evidence of
possession and installation of equipment necessary for interception, in addition
to negative inferences permissibly drawn in civil case from defendants’ refusal
to testify under the Fifth Amendment), affirming 134 F. Supp. 2d 455 (D. Conn.
2000); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Getchel, 2004 WL 1202717, at 1 (D. Conn. May 26, 2004)
(inferring interception in default judgment context, noting that “[t]he unlooper
device, working in conjunction with the satellite dish, satellite receiver, and
other equipment that [defendant] had in his possession, made it possible for
[defendant] to intercept and receive DIRECTV’s signals without authorization”).
38
302 F. Supp. 2d at 783-84.

15
In Barnes the court was faced with evidence not only that the

defendant purchased and possessed a pirate access device (an

unlooper), but that he was a DTV subscriber who possessed all the

necessary DTV equipment; admitted that he purchased the device “for

the purpose of attempting to obtain free DIRECTV programming and

that he actually attempted to use the device”; and had a suspicious

subscriber history--a record of “frequent suspending and

reactivating of his DIRECTV services[, which] is consistent with

unauthorized interception of DIRECTV’s satellite signals.”39 The

present case is devoid of such additional evidence.

In DIRECTV, Inc. v. Morris,40 the court granted summary

judgment to a defendant who had purchased a smart card

reader/writer and later an unlooper, despite the defendant’s having

been a DTV subscriber and thus, presumably, possessed of the

necessary equipment for interception.41 The defendant attempted to

modify his access card with the smart card reader/writer;

39
Id. at 784. The same district court judge as in Barnes issued a number
of opinions along similar lines on the same day--in each case denying defendants’
summary judgment motions on § 605(a) and § 2511 claims, but placing significant
weight on the defendants’ possession of all necessary equipment for interception,
as well as other evidence in excess of mere possession and purchase of the pirate
access devices themselves. See DIRECTV, Inc. v. Gilliam, 303 F. Supp. 2d 864,
871-72 (W.D. Mich. 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Brower, 303 F. Supp. 2d 856, 863 (W.D.
Mich. 2004); Boonstra, 302 F. Supp. 2d at 832-36; DIRECTV, Inc. v. Vanderhoek,
302 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820-21 (W.D. Mich. 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pluskhat, 302 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 807, 808-10 (W.D. Mich. 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Hyatt, 302 F. Supp.
2d 797, 803-04 (W.D. Mich 2004); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Beauchamp, 302 F. Supp. 2d 786,
794-96 (W.D. Mich. 2004).
40
357 F. Supp. 2d 966 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
41
See id. at 969-73.

16
apparently “messed up his system”; sought advice from a “pirate”

website; and, on that advice, purchased an unlooper to fix the

card. Nonetheless, the court granted summary judgment to the

defendant on the § 605(a) and § 2511 claims, holding no actual

interception could be shown: “There is no evidence that Morris ever

intercepted any satellite transmissions. The fact that he had the

opportunity is wholly deficient to sustain an award for statutory

damages.”42

Whether or not the cases cited above strike precisely the

correct pose in assessing the necessary quantum of evidence in

addition to purchase and possession, we are persuaded that the

present case falls short. Where, as here, the evidence

demonstrates little more than mere purchase and possession of the

two pirate access devices--particularly where there is no evidence

as to other DTV components required for interception--such evidence

is insufficient to withstand summary judgment on DTV’s claims of

actual interception.

IV

DTV also argues that summary judgment should not have been

granted as to its claims under § 605(e)(4), per the corresponding

civil action provided for in § 605(e)(3)(A), for assembly or

modification of a pirate access device. We agree.

A

42
Id. at 972 (emphasis added).

17
 Section 605(e)(4) reads:

Any person who manufactures, assembles,
modifies, imports, exports, sells, or
distributes any electronic, mechanical, or
other device or equipment, knowing or having
reason to know that the device or equipment is
primarily of assistance in the unauthorized
decryption of satellite cable programming, or
direct-to-home satellite services, or is
intended for any other activity prohibited by
[§ 605(a)], shall be [criminally liable].43

In its brief on appeal, DTV describes its claim for violation of

this provision as follows:

DIRECTV alleges that Robson violated 47 U.S.C.
§ 605(e)(4) by assembling a device called an
“emulator” which, when used in conjunction
with a computer and certain software, will
allow an individual to decrypt DIRECTV’s
satellite transmissions and receive DIRECTV
programming without paying for it. DIRECTV
also alleges that Robson violated 47 U.S.C.
§ 605(e)(4) by using a different device called
an “unlooper” to modify a DIRECTV access card
to enable it to illegally decrypt DIRECTV’s
satellite transmissions.

With respect to this claim, the district court held that

Robson’s “assembly of the emulator is not actionable under

§ 605(e)(4)” because “[§] 605(e)(4) is a provision relating to

manufacturers and sellers, rather than to individual users as

Defendant is alleged to be.”44

B

We are persuaded that the district court erred by

43
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (emphasis added).
44
Robson, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (citing Caruso, 284 F.3d at 435 n.6).

18
categorically removing all “individual users” from the reach of

§ 605(e)(4). A number of courts have adopted a similar

construction, holding that § 605(e)(4) exempts individual users--

that is, the provision “targets upstream manufacturers and

distributors, not the ultimate consumer of pirating devices.”45 We

reject this view. Nothing on the face of §605(e)(4) suggests such

a limitation. Indeed, it provides that “[a]ny person” who engages

in the prohibited activities is liable.46 Section 605(e)(4), in its

disjunctive list of prohibited activities, clearly covers the

modification or assembly of pirate devices as separate and self-

contained offenses by whoever commits them. While such activities

are, no doubt, commonly within the purview of a “manufacturer” or

“seller,” there is no indication that the statute is intended to

condone it when the actor is instead an “individual user.” Lending

45
Albright, No. Civ.A. 03-4603, 2003 WL 22956416, at *2; see, e.g.,
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Oliver, No. 04-3454 SBA, 2005 WL 1126786, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May
12, 2005) (“[Section] 605(e)(4) is meant to target upstream manufacturers and/or
distributors of illegal pirating devices.”); Neznak, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 133
(“Congress intended in [§ 605(e)(4)] to penalize manufacturers and distributors,
not mere consumers of pirate access devices.”); DIRECTV, Inc. v. McDougall, No.
Civ.A. SA-03-CA-1165, 2004 WL 2580769, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004) (“Courts
that have addressed the issue have concluded that mere purchasing and use of
pirate access devices does not constitute a violation of section 605(e)(4).”);
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Borich, No. Civ.A. 1:03-2146, 2004 WL 2359414, at *3 (S.D.W.Va.
Sept. 17, 2004) (“[T]he court does not find that the act of ‘removing and
inserting Pirate Access Devices and/or inserting illegally programmed Access
Cards into valid DIRECTV Receivers’ is the type of assembly or modification
prohibited by the statute. . . . Borich’s act of installing and activating the
pirate access device does not convert him into the type of manufacturer or
distributor of these devices contemplated by [§] 605(e)(4).”); cf. Morris, 357
F. Supp. 2d at 973 (noting that § 605(e)(4) “deals with conduct of merchants in
the pirate trade, not necessarily the ultimate end users,” but acknowledging that
perhaps DTV “could argue that an individual end user could be liable for
modification of equipment”).
46
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4) (emphasis added).

19
weight to our interpretation, we have previously noted in a

different context that “it is clear that [§ 605(e)(4)] pertains to

commercial as well as individual users.”47

While the statute is clear on its face, it bears mention that

prior to 1988 the provision read:

The importation, manufacture, sale, or
distribution of equipment by any person with
the intent of its use to assist in any
activity prohibited by subsection (a) shall be
subject to penalties and remedies under this
subsection to the same extent and in the same
manner as a person who has engaged in such
prohibited activity.48

Among other changes, the 1988 amendments to this section introduced

three new terms: “assembles,” “modifies,” and “exports.”49 The

district court’s reading effectively nullifies these additions and,

indeed, all of the terms listed in § 605(e)(4) other than

“manufactures” and “sells.”

The district court’s reliance on a footnote from the Second

Circuit’s decision in Community Television Systems, Inc. v. Caruso

is misplaced.50 Caruso is focused on determining how to assess the

number of § 605(a) violations and only mentions § 605(e)(4) in

47
Harrell, 983 F.2d at 40.
48
47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(4) (1988) (current version at § 605(e)(4)); see Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 5(a), 98 Stat. 2779,
2803.

49
See Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. II,
§ 205, 102 Stat. 3949, 3959-60.
50
See 284 F.3d at 435 n.6.

20
passing as an example of a provision that bases the number of

violations on the number of devices.51 Caruso notes that

§ 605(e)(4) is “the provision relating to manufacturers and

sellers, rather than users, of cable descramblers, which states

that ‘each such device shall be deemed a separate violation.’”52

At best, this comment is dictum. In any case, it appears that the

Second Circuit is speaking in broad strokes in this footnote and a

sensible reading of the court’s comment is simply that § 605(e)(4)

does not apply to mere users--i.e. tautologically anyone who does

not perform one of the activities mentioned: manufacturing,

assembly, modification, etc. There is no indication in the context

of Caruso that the court intended by its remarks to limit the clear

reach of § 605(e)(4) or to introduce a distinction not found in the

statute.

In short, we hold that § 605(e)(4) prohibits each of the

activities listed therein, and provides no exception for

“individual users.”

C

Robson did not defend the district court’s ruling with regard

to “individual users.” Instead, Robson asserts on appeal that, in

order to demonstrate that DTV is a “person aggrieved” who can bring

a device claim for violation of § 605(e)(4), DTV “must demonstrate

51
See id. at 435 & n.6.
52
Id. at 435 n.6 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(4)).

21
actual interception.” Robson argues that “[a]ctual interception of

DirecTV’s programming is required in order for DirecTV to be a

‘person aggrieved’ under 47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6) as is required to

recover damages.”53 While it is not clear that Robson raised this

argument below,54 even assuming that such an argument is properly

before us,55 it is equally unavailing.

Plainly, nothing on the face of § 605(e)(4) indicates that

interception is a required element for a violation. Further, no

interception is required for DTV to qualify as a “person aggrieved”

under the terms of § 605(e)(3)(A).56 Robson’s argument to the

contrary essentially amounts to an assertion that § 605(d)(6) is an

53
47 U.S.C. § 605(d)(6) provides:
[T]he term “any person aggrieved” shall include any
person with proprietary rights in the intercepted
communication by wire or radio, including wholesale or
retail distributors of satellite cable programming, and,
in the case of a violation of [§ 605(e)(4)], shall also
include any person engaged in the lawful manufacture,
distribution, or sale of equipment necessary to
authorize or receive satellite cable programming.
54
We are pointed to no place in the record where it was raised; only by
stretching the language in Robson’s summary judgment motion can such an argument
be found. Cf. Robson, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 592 (noting, in discussing § 605(a)
claim, that “[f]or purposes of this motion I believe and will assume DTV is a
‘person’ with proprietary rights in its satellite programming”).
55
See Holtzclaw v. DSC Communications Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 258 (5th Cir.
2001) (“We may affirm a summary judgment on any ground supported by the record,
even if it is different from that relied on by the district court.”); Johnson v.
Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1316 (5th Cir. 1997) (“Although we can affirm a summary
judgment on grounds not relied on by the district court, those grounds must at
least have been proposed or asserted in that court by the movant.”); Thompson v.
Ga. Pac. Corp., 993 F.2d 1166, 1167-68 (5th Cir. 1993) (“If this Court determines
that the district court erred in its stated reason for granting summary judgment,
the judgment of the district court can nonetheless be affirmed provided other
adequate grounds for granting summary judgment appear.”).
56
See 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)(A) (“Any person aggrieved by any violation of
[§ 605(a)] or [§ 605(e)(4)] may bring a civil action in a United States district
court or in any other court of competent jurisdiction.”).

22
exhaustive list of those who fit within the scope of “any person

aggrieved.” We rejected such a contention today in a related case

and need not retrace the same path here.57

Having rejected both the district court’s stated reasons for

granting summary judgment on DTV’s § 605(e)(4) claim and Robson’s

proffered alternate grounds, we decline to go further. That is, we

offer no opinion at this time on whether Robson’s alleged actions

in inserting a chip into an emulator qualify as “assembl[y]”58 or

whether the alleged use of an unlooper to alter a DTV access card

qualifies as “modifi[cation]”59 within the meaning of § 605(e)(4).

We leave that to the district court to consider again in the first

instance.

V

To summarize, the inferences from the facts in this case

cannot stretch to “interception,” per § 605(a) and § 2511(1)(a);

summary judgment on these claims in favor of Robson was proper.

However, the district court erred in categorically excluding

“individual users” from claims under § 605(e)(4); summary judgment

on this claim is vacated, affording the district court the

opportunity to consider in the first instance whether the evidence

is sufficient to demonstrate assembly or modification within the

57
See Budden, No. 04-20751, at 9-14, --- F.3d at ----.
58
See Robson, 333 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (noting that posting on the website
“[a]t first blush . . . may raise a justifiable inference as to assembly”).

59
Cf. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225
(1994); United States v. Crawford, 52 F.3d 1303, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1995);
Harrell, 983 F.2d at 37-39.

23
meaning of § 605(e)(4).60

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, and REMANDED; SANCTIONS DENIED.

60
Robson’s request for sanctions for a frivolous appeal is denied. We
further note that Robson’s narrative of facts in his brief on appeal arrives
unadorned with citations to the record, contrary to FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(7).

24