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Domtar Maine Corp. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Court: Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
Date filed: 2003-10-28
Citations: 347 F.3d 304, 358 U.S. App. D.C. 193
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       United States Court of Appeals
                  FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT




Argued September 11, 2003                  Decided October 28, 2003

                               No. 97-1300

                 DOMTAR MAINE CORPORATION, INC.,
                          PETITIONER

                                     v.

            FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION,
                        RESPONDENT

                        PASSAMAQUODDY TRIBE,
                             INTERVENOR



                           Consolidated with
                              No. 02-1178



             On Petitions for Review of Orders of the
             Federal Energy Regulatory Commission



 Catherine R. Connors argued the cause for petitioner.
With her on the briefs was Matthew D. Manahan.
 Bills of costs must be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment.
The court looks with disfavor upon motions to file bills of costs out
of time.
                              2

  David H. Coffman, Attorney, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, argued the cause for respondent. With him on
the brief were Cynthia A. Marlette, General Counsel, and
Dennis Lane, Solicitor. Susan J. Court, Special Counsel,
entered an appearance.
   Gregory W. Sample argued the cause and filed the brief for
intervenor.

  Before: EDWARDS, RANDOLPH, and TATEL, Circuit Judges.
  Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL.
   TATEL, Circuit Judge: The Federal Power Act of 1920, 16
U.S.C. § 791a et seq., requires licensing of all dams operated
on navigable waters for the purpose of generating electric
power, except those authorized by a valid pre-Act permit. In
this case, we must decide whether two dams are exempt from
licensing because their owner operates other dams down-
stream pursuant to such a permit. The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission found them not exempt. Because we
agree, and because we find no error in FERC’s challenged
orders, we deny the petitions for review.


                              I.
   Section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act (FPA) authorizes the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to ‘‘issue licenses
TTT for the purpose of constructing, operating, and maintain-
ing dams, TTT reservoirs, TTT or other project works neces-
sary or convenient for the TTT development, transmission, and
utilization of power across, along, from, or in any TTT bodies
of water over which Congress has jurisdictionTTTT’’ 16
U.S.C. § 797(e) (2000). Section 23(b)(1) makes it ‘‘unlawful
TTT, for the purpose of generating electric power, to con-
struct, operate, or maintain any dam, TTT reservoir, TTT or
other works incidental thereto across, along, or in any of the
navigable waters of the United States,’’ unless FERC has
issued a proper license. Id. § 817(1). That section, however,
exempts any facility operating ‘‘under and in accordance with
                               3

the terms of a permit or valid existing right-of-way granted
prior to June 10, 1920,’’ the date the FPA became law. Id.
   Petitioner, Domtar Maine Corporation, owns several hydro-
electric facilities in eastern Maine. Its Forest City facility,
located along the U.S.-Canadian border on the east branch of
the St. Croix River, includes ‘‘a 16-foot-high, 500-foot-long
dam, and a 16,070-acre reservoir.’’ Ga.-Pac. Corp., 78
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,223, 61,953 (1997). Domtar’s West Branch
facility, located on the west branch of the St. Croix, comprises
two developments, each of which also includes a dam and a
reservoir. Id. Both of Domtar’s facilities enhance the pow-
er-generating capabilities of two downstream projects that
Domtar also operates, Woodland and Grand Falls. Forest
City is thirty-five miles upstream from Grand Falls and forty-
seven from Woodland; West Branch is ten miles upstream
from Grand Falls and twenty-two from Woodland. Id. Al-
though FERC licensed the two upstream facilities in 1980, it
never licensed the downstream projects because they operate
pursuant to a 1916 Act of Congress, see Pub. L. No. 64–234,
39 Stat. 534 (1916), and thus qualify for the exception to the
FPA’s licensing requirement. (Domtar actually acquired the
licenses to the upstream facilities in 2001, well after the
previous licensee, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, initiated the
proceedings in this case. See Ga.-Pac. Corp., Domtar Me.
Corp., 97 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,078, 64,114–15 (2001). For simplicity,
we will refer to the petitioner as Domtar regardless of the
time period under discussion.)
  In 1995, Domtar started down what would prove to be a
long and complex procedural path culminating in the proceed-
ings now before us. The company petitioned FERC to
declare that the two upstream facilities, though already li-
censed, actually fell outside FERC’s jurisdiction because the
downstream projects that they benefited were themselves
exempt from the licensing requirement. FERC declined to
do so, holding that the downstream projects’ exemption had
no effect on the jurisdictional status of the upstream dams.
See Ga.-Pac. Corp., 77 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,189 (1996) (‘‘Ruling 1’’),
reh’g denied, 78 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,223 (1997) (‘‘Ruling 2’’).
                                4

   Although Domtar petitioned this court to review Rulings 1
and 2, we stayed those proceedings after Domtar filed a
second petition with FERC. In that petition, Domtar asked
the Commission to reverse its previous decisions and hold
that the upstream facilities needed no licenses. Domtar
based its request on new evidence purportedly showing that
the upstream facilities did not enhance the power-generation
capabilities of the downstream projects. According to Dom-
tar, this meant that neither facility was part of any ‘‘project,’’
defined by FPA section 3(11) as a ‘‘complete unit of improve-
ment or development, [including] all TTT dams [and] reser-
voirs TTT the use and occupancy of which are necessary or
appropriate in the maintenance and operation of such unit.’’
16 U.S.C. § 796(11) (emphasis added). Based on Domtar’s
new evidence, FERC agreed that the upstream facilities did
not enhance downstream power generation and thus required
no licenses. See Ga.-Pac. Corp., 81 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,222 (1997)
(‘‘Ruling 3’’).
   The following month, several groups that had previously
sought to intervene in the proceedings—including the U.S.
Department of the Interior and the Passamaquoddy Tribe—
petitioned FERC to rehear Ruling 3. In response, FERC
asked Domtar for additional data regarding the upstream
facilities, and after analyzing the data, FERC again reversed
itself, concluding that the facilities in fact required licenses.
See Ga.-Pac. Corp., 91 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,047 (2000) (‘‘Ruling 4’’),
reh’g denied, 98 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,312 (2002) (‘‘Ruling 5’’). Dom-
tar then filed a second petition for review with this court, but
simultaneously asked FERC to rehear two aspects of Ruling
5—its refusal to offer the company any guidance on how to
operate the facilities so as to avoid the licensing requirement,
and its decision to solicit other applicants to replace Domtar
as the licensee. Responding to Domtar’s request, FERC
issued a final order, again declining to provide the requested
advice and standing by its decision to solicit other license
applicants, but ruling that it would give Domtar an incum-
bent’s preference in any re-licensing proceedings. See Dom-
tar Me. Corp., 99 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,276 (2002) (‘‘Ruling 6’’).
                                5

   Domtar then filed a third petition for review with this
court, in which it listed Ruling 6 as the ruling under review.
At the time, the company’s second petition for review was still
pending, but we subsequently dismissed that petition as
premature, explaining that when Domtar filed the petition,
the company was still pressing its case before the Commis-
sion. See Domtar Me. Corp. v. FERC, Nos. 97-1300, 02-1126,
02-1178, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 18,157 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29,
2002) (unpublished order). We also consolidated Domtar’s
first and third petitions. Id. FERC subsequently filed a
motion to dismiss the third petition, which we now address
along with Domtar’s first and third petitions. We also consid-
er intervenor Passamaquoddy Tribe’s argument that we
should remand the case so that FERC can determine whether
the upstream facilities occupy ‘‘reservations of the United
States,’’ and thus require a license under FPA section
23(b)(1).

                                II.
   In its motion to dismiss, FERC points out that Domtar’s
third petition for review seeks review only of Ruling 6—a
ruling that was, according to FERC, nothing more than a
denial of a rehearing request. It is true that ‘‘an order which
merely denies rehearing of another order is not itself review-
able.’’ Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d
385, 387 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974). It is also true that ‘‘a petition
for review of an agency order must specify the order or part
thereof to be reviewed,’’ and that ‘‘[f]ailure to specify the
correct order can result in dismissal of the petition.’’ Entra-
vision Holdings, LLC v. FCC, 202 F.3d 311, 312 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). That said, ‘‘a party
may TTT appeal from one order despite referring only to a
different order in its petition TTT if the petitioner’s intent can
be fairly inferred from the petition or documents filed more
or less contemporaneously with it.’’ Martin v. FERC, 199
F.3d 1370, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
   Under the circumstances of this case, we believe that
Domtar’s intent to seek review of Ruling 4, the underlying
                               6

aggrieving order, can be ‘‘fairly inferred.’’ We did not dis-
miss Domtar’s second petition for review, which listed Ruling
4, until several months after the company filed its third
petition. Thus, at the time it filed that petition, Domtar
already had a petition pending that sought review of Ruling 4.
In light of this, Domtar’s decision to list only Ruling 6 in its
third petition is more reasonably viewed, both now and at the
time it was filed, as evincing the company’s effort to ensure
that all of the Commission’s orders would be reviewed, rather
than as a sudden decision to reverse course and abandon any
attempt to have this court review Ruling 4. To be sure, the
wiser course of action would have been for Domtar to dismiss
the second petition voluntarily when it filed the third, and
then to list Ruling 4 in the third petition. We are neverthe-
less convinced that FERC could fairly infer not only that
Domtar still wished to challenge Ruling 4 when it filed its
third petition, but also that the company had simply made a
mistake when it listed only Ruling 6 in that petition. More-
over, FERC does not claim that it suffered any prejudice
because of Domtar’s decision to list Ruling 6 instead of Ruling
4. It does contend that Domtar’s decision reflected a strate-
gic choice, rather than a mistake, but we think that assertion
unconvincing: Domtar had nothing to gain—and much to
lose—by pursuing the course it did. We will therefore deny
FERC’s motion to dismiss Domtar’s third petition.
   Turning to the merits of the petitions, we begin with
Domtar’s argument that Rulings 4, 5, and 6 were all beyond
FERC’s power to issue, and that we should therefore regard
Ruling 3—the only one in which the company prevailed—as
final. Domtar points out that only parties can petition FERC
for rehearing, see 16 U.S.C. § 825l(a), and that when the
would-be intervenors asked the Commission to rehear Ruling
3, they were not yet parties to the case. They were not yet
parties because FERC did not grant their motions to inter-
vene until Ruling 4, see 91 F.E.R.C. at 61,170 n.19, over two
years after they petitioned for rehearing. Therefore, Domtar
concludes, Ruling 3 became final when the thirty-day window
to seek rehearing closed, and Rulings 4, 5, and 6—all of which
stem from the would-be intervenors’ petition for a rehearing
                              7

of Ruling 3—are invalid because the Commission did not
issue them in response to a proper request for rehearing.
   In response, FERC insists that the requests for rehearing
were procedurally proper because in Ruling 4 it granted the
motions to intervene retroactive to the date of Ruling 3, a
date prior to the filing of the requests. See Ga.-Pac. Corp.,
98 F.E.R.C. at 62,339 n.40. According to the Commission,
this is not the first time that it has granted intervention
retroactively. In the first case in which it did so, the Com-
mission justified the procedure on the ground that otherwise
a party would have to move to intervene prior to an initial
ruling by the Commission. See Mohawk Paper Mills, Inc.,
33 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,291, 61,584 (1985). This is so because a
party could almost never move to intervene, have the motion
granted, and then petition for rehearing all within the thirty-
day window established for the filing of rehearing petitions.
See id.
   Not only have we never approved FERC’s practice of
granting intervention retroactively, but the practice seems
inconsistent with the statutory limitation that only a party
can petition FERC for rehearing. Indeed, one could argue
that Congress crafted that limitation for the very purpose of
requiring parties to intervene before an initial Commission
ruling, thus precluding them from waiting until FERC ruled
and then raising new arguments that might, if brought forth
initially, have saved the Commission and the parties from
spending time and money on a second proceeding. Here,
however, the would-be intervenors did move to intervene
prior to Ruling 3—the Commission’s initial ruling on Dom-
tar’s second petition; it was FERC’s failure to grant inter-
vention in Ruling 3 that later required the Commission to
resort to the procedural gimmick of retroactive intervention.
So even if Congress wanted to require parties to present
arguments to FERC as early as possible, that objective was
not subverted here. Moreover, Domtar does not claim that
the retroactive grant deprived it of the ability to present any
of its arguments to the Commission. Thus, while we are
unprepared to say that a retroactive grant of intervention is
always permissible, we conclude that in the circumstances of
                                8

this case, it was. Accordingly, we reject Domtar’s assertion
that Rulings 4, 5, and 6 are invalid.
   Domtar next claims that its two upstream facilities are
covered by the 1916 law that exempts the downstream pro-
jects from the licensing requirement, and that the upstream
facilities are therefore also exempt. We are unpersuaded.
The 1916 statute speaks in specific terms, authorizing only
the operation of ‘‘the two dams’’ at Woodland and Grand
Falls. 39 Stat. at 534. It mentions no other facilities. Given
that the upstream dams existed in 1916, we expect that
Congress would have referred to them had it wanted the law
to cover them. Reinforcing this conclusion, the upstream
facilities are ten and thirty-five miles, respectively, from the
nearest downstream project, and it seems implausible that
Congress, by using the word ‘‘dams,’’ intended to encompass
not only the two downstream dams but also other facilities so
far away. ‘‘If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matterTTTT’’ Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
   Domtar argues that even if the permit does not expressly
cover the upstream facilities, FERC’s decision to require
licenses for those facilities violates FPA section 23(a), which
provides in part that the Act ‘‘shall not be construed as
affecting any permit TTT granted prior to June 10, 1920.’’ 16
U.S.C. § 816. According to Domtar, if the two upstream
facilities enhance the power-generating capability of the
downstream projects, then requiring licenses for the up-
stream facilities would ‘‘affect’’ the projects’ permit. It would
do so, Domtar asserts, because the permit conferred the right
to use all existing assets to generate power, and since those
assets include the two upstream facilities, requiring licenses
for those facilities would limit that right, thereby affecting the
permit.
   Because Domtar first advanced this section 23(a) argument
in its reply brief, FERC has moved to strike the argument on
the ground that it was raised too late. See, e.g., A.J. McNul-
ty & Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 283 F.3d 328, 338 (D.C. Cir. 2002)
                               9

(‘‘[B]ecause this point appears for the first time in the compa-
ny’s reply brief, we will not consider it.’’). Domtar responds
that the argument is just a variation on those that it has
made from the outset. We disagree. Domtar claims in its
response to FERC’s motion to strike that it has ‘‘consistently
referenced ‘section 23’’’ of the FPA. But this claim is mis-
leading because section 23(b), which Domtar has referred to
throughout these proceedings, and section 23(a), which it has
not, are codified in two separate sections of the U.S. Code—
sections 817 and 816 of Title 16, respectively. This is not, in
other words, a situation in which a party cites a particular
statutory section, and then later cites a subsection of that
section. Domtar now cites an entirely different section, one
that we can find no citation to in the record. Even the table
of authorities in the company’s initial brief omits section 816,
which corresponds to section 23(a), further belying Domtar’s
claim that it has relied on section 23(a) throughout. More-
over, while there is some nexus between the section 23(a)
argument and the ones that Domtar did raise earlier, those
other arguments do not, in our view, fairly raise the section
23(a) issue. Put simply, none of the other arguments re-
quired FERC to explain why its orders did not ‘‘affect’’ the
authority that Congress conferred in the 1916 permit. Thus,
FERC never had a chance to address the section 23(a) issue,
either during its own proceedings or in its brief to this court.
We will therefore not consider the argument now.
  Next, Domtar claims that Rulings 1 and 2 constitute a
departure from Union Water Power Co., 68 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,180
(1994), reh’g denied, 73 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,296 (1995). According
to Domtar, that case established a test for determining
whether a facility falls within FERC’s jurisdiction and there-
fore requires a license: is the facility’s link to ‘‘a licensed
project’’ strong enough to invoke FERC’s jurisdiction? Id. at
61,888. In other words, Domtar says that Union Water held
that the Commission would examine the ‘‘relationship be-
tween the facilities in question and the already-identified
jurisdictional components of the hydropower project.’’ Id. at
61,889 (emphasis added). Noting that its upstream facilities
                               10

are linked only to two downstream projects that FERC
concedes require no licenses, Domtar argues that under
Union Water, the upstream facilities also require no licenses
because they are not linked to any ‘‘licensed project.’’
    FERC responds that in Lake Ontario Land Development
and Beach Protection Ass’n v. Federal Power Commission,
212 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1954), we affirmed the Commission’s
authority to license only some parts of a project. In that
case, we held that FERC’s predecessor, the Federal Power
Commission, could require licenses for those parts of a pro-
ject that were in the United States even though it clearly
could not require other parts to be licensed because they
were in Canada. Lake Ontario, Domtar replies, was different
because there the parts that were in the United States (and
hence within the agency’s jurisdiction) generated power.
Here, by contrast, the only facilities that might fall within
FERC’s jurisdiction—the upstream ones—generate no pow-
er. Although FERC insists that Lake Ontario ‘‘did not turn
on what part of a project was jurisdictional,’’ Respondent’s
Br. at 20, it points to nothing either in the opinion or in later
cases to support that assertion. FERC also points out that
Lake Ontario ‘‘required that any jurisdictional facilities be
licensedTTTT’’ Id. That is true, but unhelpful because Dom-
tar argues that its upstream facilities are simply not within
FERC’s jurisdiction. Moreover, Lake Ontario’s affirmation
of FERC’s licensing authority does not foreclose the possibili-
ty that FERC later, i.e., in Union Water, interpreted the
FPA to mean that a non-generating facility needs no license if
it is linked only to generating facilities that are themselves
exempt from the licensing requirement.
    As to Union Water, FERC asserted in Ruling 2 that the
‘‘licensed project’’ and ‘‘already-identified jurisdictional com-
ponents’’ language from Union Water was ‘‘simply des-
cri[bing]’’ the actual projects in that case. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 78
F.E.R.C. at 61,955. That assertion, however, seems inconsis-
tent with the actual structure of the ruling: The quoted
language appears in the first two paragraphs of the ruling’s
discussion section; the third paragraph then begins with,
‘‘[t]urning to the facilities at handTTTT’’ Union Water, 68
                               11

F.E.R.C. at 61,889. In other words, in the first two para-
graphs FERC seems to have been speaking in general terms
and laying out guiding principles of law before turning in the
third paragraph to the facts of the case before it. The
Commission’s use of the indefinite phrase ‘‘a licensed project’’
instead of the more definite phrase ‘‘the licensed project’’
further undermines FERC’s claim that it was talking about
the specific facilities in the case rather than in general terms.
Nevertheless, Domtar cites no case in which FERC held, as
Domtar wants us to hold here, that the Commission lacked
jurisdiction over a non-generating installation because the
generating facilities to which the installation was connected
were themselves exempt from the licensing requirement.
Absent any such inconsistency between previous Commission
rulings and FERC’s orders in this case, we will not overturn
FERC’s interpretation of its own ruling. See United Mun.
Distribs. Group v. FERC, 732 F.2d 202, 211–12 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (‘‘[T]he Commission’s decision TTT is not inconsistent
with prior Commission precedent. We therefore reject [the]
invitation to overturn the Commission’s orders on that
ground.’’).
   Domtar next argues that FERC’s orders are arbitrary and
capricious because the Commission lacks a coherent test for
deciding whether a facility requires a license. The company
points out that FERC exercised jurisdiction over the two
developments that comprise its West Branch facility even
though those developments, when viewed in isolation, enhance
downstream power generation by an average of only 0.5 and
1.8 percent, respectively. Domtar then cites two cases in
which FERC declined to exercise jurisdiction over facilities
that enhanced downstream generation by similar percentages.
See Me. Dep’t of Conservation, 95 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,015 (2001)
(0.6 to 0.9 percent); Matagamon Lake Ass’n, 94 F.E.R.C.
¶ 62,195 (2001) (1.3 to 2.1 percent). Domtar’s comparison
misses the mark, however, because in each of the other two
cases—as here—there were several upstream facilities, and
the figures that Domtar cites from those cases were aggre-
gate enhancement levels. Domtar, in other words, seeks to
compare the separate enhancement levels of its facilities to
the combined enhancement levels of the facilities in the two
                               12

cited cases. The proper comparison is with the combined
enhancement level in this case, and because that level (for
West Branch and Forest City combined) ranges from 2.4 to
4.9 percent, well above the levels in the other cases, those
cases provide no support for Domtar’s charge of arbitrari-
ness.
   Domtar also relies on Chippewa and Flambeau Improve-
ment Co., 95 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,017 (1998), reh’g denied, 95
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,327 (1998), aff’d, 325 F.3d 353 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
In that case, unlike here, FERC considered the impact of two
upstream facilities separately even though the same entity
owned both. The Commission replies that it did so because
one of the two facilities enhanced downstream power genera-
tion by less than one tenth of one percent. In other words,
the Commission employs two separate thresholds when deter-
mining jurisdiction: one for the collective impact of all up-
stream facilities owned by the same entity and a second for
the impact of individual facilities. With the former, FERC
declines jurisdiction over all of the facilities when their aggre-
gate average impact falls below a threshold that appears from
FERC’s cases to lie somewhere between 2 and 2.5 percent.
With the latter, FERC declines jurisdiction over an individual
facility and excludes its effect on downstream generation
from any aggregate calculations if its impact falls below some
lower threshold, i.e., 0.1 percent. This latter threshold ex-
plains Chippewa. Applying this two-threshold framework
here, FERC considered Domtar’s upstream facilities together
because they were owned by the same entity and neither fell
below the 0.1 percent threshold. The Commission then exer-
cised jurisdiction because the average aggregate impact of
the two facilities is 3.4 percent, far above the 2-to-2.5 percent
threshold. To be sure, FERC does not explicitly advance this
framework—a framework that we believe is sufficiently rea-
sonable and predictable that we may sustain it—but we think
that it ‘‘may reasonably be discerned’’ both from the Commis-
sion’s explanation of Chippewa and from its decisions in other
cases. See Jost v. Surface Transp. Bd., 194 F.3d 79, 85 (D.C.
Cir. 1999) (‘‘We may not supply a reasoned basis for the
agency’s decision that the agency itself has not given. We
                               13

will, however, uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the
agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’’) (quoting Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
  Attempting to bolster its arbitrary-and-capricious argu-
ment, Domtar notes that in Union Water, FERC declined
jurisdiction over a facility that impounded 4.78 percent of the
usable storage in a river’s storage system. According to the
company, this reveals FERC’s arbitrariness here because its
facilities—over which FERC did exercise jurisdiction—en-
hanced downstream generation by an average of 3.4 percent,
and 4.78 is higher than 3.4. Domtar is comparing apples and
oranges: 4.78 was not the percentage by which the facility in
Union Water enhanced downstream power generation, but
rather the percentage of the river’s usable storage that the
dam impounded. If Domtar wants to make a useful compari-
son, it can compare 4.78 to the usable-storage figure for its
two upstream facilities, which FERC says is 72.26 percent.
(FERC did not determine the generation-enhancing percent-
ages in Union Water, so generation-enhancement figures for
the two cases cannot be compared.)
   Domtar also points to the Commission’s decision in Union
Water to assess the impact of several facilities individually, as
in Chippewa, instead of aggregating their effects, as it did
here. But the company failed to make this argument to
FERC, and our review is limited by statute to those objec-
tions that FERC has had an opportunity to consider. See 16
U.S.C. § 825l(b). To be sure, the company did argue to
FERC that its rulings are inconsistent because the Commis-
sion sometimes considers facilities in isolation and other times
aggregates their effects. Yet it did not point to Union Water
in making this argument, thus depriving the Commission of
an opportunity to explain its own ruling. Having failed to
mention Union Water before the Commission, Domtar may
not use that case to support its argument now.
                              14

   For its last argument, Domtar contends that Rulings 4 and
5 conflict with FPA section 23(b)(1), which makes it unlawful
to operate a facility without a license ‘‘for the purpose of
generating electric power.’’ 16 U.S.C. § 817(1). Domtar
asserts that the purpose of its upstream facilities is not power
generation, but the advancement of flood control, recreation-
al, and environmental objectives. According to Domtar,
FERC refused to consider the purpose of its facilities when
determining whether they had to be licensed, thereby effec-
tively reading the ‘‘purpose’’ language out of the statute.
   This argument is also waived. Domtar did not make its
purpose argument in its first petition to FERC, nor did it
contest either the statement in Ruling 1 that the purpose of
the upstream facilities was held in 1980 to be power genera-
tion, see 77 F.E.R.C. at 64,351, or the statement in Ruling 2
that the upstream facilities were still being operated for that
purpose, see 78 F.E.R.C. at 61,954. True, in response to the
would-be intervenors’ request for rehearing of Ruling 3, the
company argued that ‘‘[s]ection 23(b)(1) provides for manda-
tory jurisdiction only if the reservoir is operated for the
purpose of developing electric power—and the headwater
benefits analyses demonstrate that the Reservoirs in this case
are not operated for that purposeTTTT’’ But Domtar never
expanded on that assertion. In particular, it failed to men-
tion FERC’s earlier statements that the purpose of the
upstream facilities was power generation—which, again, it did
not object to at the time. Because a party has ‘‘at least a
modicum of responsibility for flagging the relevant issues
which its documentary submissions present[ ],’’ AT&T Corp.
v. FCC, 317 F.3d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003), Domtar had an
obligation, especially in light of its earlier silence, to state
clearly that it was either disavowing any prior concessions it
might have made about the facilities’ purpose or contending
that new evidence showed that the purpose had changed. Its
failure to do so left FERC with no reason to think that
Domtar was advancing an argument about section 23(b)(1).
                               15

   Domtar did make a detailed purpose argument during
FERC’s consideration of the company’s second petition, an
argument that FERC responded to in Ruling 5. See 98
F.E.R.C. at 62,335–36. But that argument addressed how
the purpose of the upstream facilities informed the question
of whether they were ‘‘necessary or appropriate’’ to the
operation of the downstream projects, and hence a part of
those projects under FPA section 3(11). At oral argument,
agency counsel contended that making a section 3(11) purpose
argument is insufficient to raise a section 23(b)(1) purpose
argument. In Ruling 4, however, FERC itself stated that the
two arguments are closely related. Responding to an asser-
tion by one of the intervenors, the Commission wrote that
‘‘[w]ere we to find that the [upstream facilities] are not
necessary or appropriate with regard to the downstream
projects, this would equate to a finding that the reservoirs are
not being maintained for the purpose of generating electrici-
ty, so that Section 23(b) would not apply.’’ Ga.-Pac. Corp., 91
F.E.R.C. at 61,172 n.25. We are thus somewhat skeptical of
the Commission’s claim that because Domtar only raised a
section 3(11) purpose argument, FERC had no notice of the
section 23(b)(1) purpose argument. That said, we do not
think that a concession by FERC that two arguments are
closely related (if not equivalent) allows a litigant to make one
argument to the Commission and then the other on appeal.
If Domtar wished to argue that FERC was ignoring the
language of section 23(b)(1), it had an obligation to make that
argument to the Commission. Having failed to do so, it may
not ask us to entertain the argument now. See 16 U.S.C.
§ 825l(b).

                               III.
   This brings us finally to the Passamaquoddy Tribe’s con-
tention that we should remand the case so that FERC can
decide whether Domtar’s upstream facilities occupy ‘‘reserva-
tions of the United States.’’ 16 U.S.C. §§ 797(e), 817(1). If
they do, then FERC would have an additional basis for
requiring that the facilities have licenses, see id. § 817(1), as
well as several more requirements to satisfy before it could
                              16

issue a license, see id. §§ 797(e), 803(e). But because FERC
has already determined that it has jurisdiction over the
facilities, nothing would be gained by finding another basis
for jurisdiction. As to the additional requirements, the Com-
mission tells us (and Domtar agrees) that it can address them
during re-licensing proceedings. Since Congress has not
spoken directly to this issue, and since the Commission’s
position represents a reasonable interpretation of the Federal
Power Act, we must defer to it. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at
842–43. Moreover, we have long given agencies broad discre-
tion as to the manner in which they carry out their duties,
including the timing of their own proceedings. See Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1056 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (‘‘[T]he agency TTT alone is cognizant of the many
demands on it, its limited resources, and the most effective
structuring and timing of proceedings to resolve those com-
peting demands. An agency is allowed to be master of its
own house, lest effective agency decisionmaking not occur in
any proceedingTTTT’’). Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for
the Tribe agreed that FERC’s approach would make no
substantive difference, saying that while there may be effi-
ciency considerations, ultimately this is simply ‘‘a question of
now or later.’’ Under these circumstances, we decline the
Tribe’s invitation to remand the case for further proceedings.


                              IV.
  The petitions for review are denied.
                                                    So ordered.