Dunlop v. State

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Patricia Caress McMath Jeffrey A. Modisett

Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Christopher L. LaFuse
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

In The
INDIANA SUPREME COURT

)
TRACEY T. DUNLOP, )
Defendant-Appellant, )
)
v. ) 49S00-9704-CR-273
)
STATE OF INDIANA, )
Plaintiff-Appellee. )

________________________________________________

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jan Helbert, Judge Pro Tem
Cause No. 49G02-9410-CF-127146
_________________________________________________

On Direct Appeal

February 18, 2000

DICKSON, Justice

The defendant, Tracey T. Dunlop, appeals his convictions for the
murder[1] of Carolyn Hawkins, two counts of robbery, both as class B
felonies,[2] and two counts of criminal confinement, both as class B
felonies,[3] and his sentence of life imprisonment without parole. In this
direct appeal, he claims: (1) erroneous instruction on the defense of
voluntary intoxication; (2) erroneous instruction on life without parole;
and (3) improper sentence.

Instruction on Voluntary Intoxication Defense
The defendant first contends that the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury on the defense of voluntary intoxication. He argues
that it invaded the province of the jury, mandated a conviction upon the
finding of certain facts, and mandated a minimum degree of intoxication, in
violation of Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana Constitution.[4]
The defendant challenges the following language from Final Instruction
No. 34 regarding the defense of voluntary intoxication, given over his
objection at trial:
Mere intoxication is not sufficient unless there is some mental
incapacity resulting therefrom as will render a person incapable of
thinking deliberately and medi[t]ating rationally. A defendant should
not be relieved of responsibility if he could devise a plan, operate
equipment, instruct behavior of others or carry out acts requiring
physical skill.

Record at 208. Citing Curran v. State, 675 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind. Ct. App.
1996), the defendant contends that this instruction impermissibly invaded
the province of the jury, violating Article I, Section 19 by mandating a
conviction upon the finding of certain facts and by requiring the jury to
find specific facts in order to accept the voluntary intoxication defense.

The Curran court found that this same instruction invaded the province
of the jury in violation of Article I, Section 19 of the Indiana
Constitution because it “‘[bound] the minds and consciences of the jury to
return a verdict of guilty upon finding certain facts,’” Curran, 675 N.E.2d
at 344 (quoting Pritchard v. State, 248 Ind. 566, 575, 230 N.E.2d 416, 421
(1967)),[5] and because it “improperly required a certain degree of
intoxication be proven before the jury could accept the defense.” Id.
Nevertheless, the Curran court held that the erroneous instruction was
harmless because “the evidence is such that the jury could not have
properly found that Curran was so intoxicated that he was incapable of
forming the requisite criminal intent.” 675 N.E.2d at 345. In White v.
State, 675 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), the Court of Appeals addressed
the same issue and found a similar instruction likewise erroneous but not
harmless in light of the evidence.
A contrary view was recently expressed in Cheshier v. State, which
expressly disapproved of Curran. 690 N.E.2d 1226, 1228 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998). The Cheshier majority observed that we have repeatedly used the
challenged language in our opinions. Id. at 1228 (citing Legue v. State,
688 N.E.2d 408, 410 (Ind. 1997); Miller v. State, 541 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind.
1989); Terry v. State, 465 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. 1984)). See also Horan
v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 509 (Ind. 1997). As Judge Sullivan noted in his
separate opinion concurring in result in Cheshier, however, in none of
these cases did we approve of a jury instruction containing this language.
690 N.E.2d at 1229. Rather, we were evaluating whether the evidence
supported the giving of an intoxication instruction or was sufficient for
the resulting conviction. While articulating our appellate rationale for
these issues, we did not intend to create a trial standard for application
by juries. The mere fact that language appears in appellate opinions does
not necessarily make it proper for jury instructions. See Spence v. State,
429 N.E.2d 214, 216 (Ind. 1981); Meek v. State, 629 N.E.2d 932, 933 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1994). Cf. Myers v. State, 532 N.E.2d 1158, 1159 (Ind. 1989). We
hold that it was error to instruct the jury that the intoxication defense
was unavailable if the defendant “could devise a plan, operate equipment,
instruct behavior of others or carry out acts requiring physical skill.”
Record at 208.
As noted in Curran, however, such an erroneous instruction will not
require reversal on appeal if we find the error to be harmless in light of
the trial evidence. 675 N.E.2d at 344. The evidence at trial included the
defendant’s audio-taped statement given to police shortly after he was
taken into custody. In the defendant’s statement, he detailed the place
where he obtained the knife before he went to the victim’s home, the
sequence of events surrounding the stabbing, the locations where he found
each item of jewelry he took from the home, and where the police would find
the items he did not sell for cocaine. Having obtained a knife from a jar
under the microwave in his mother’s kitchen, he then took his mother’s
bicycle and rode to the victim’s house. He knocked on her door, entered,
and asked where her children were. Learning that the children were asleep,
he began to stab the victim, but one of the children entered while he was
stabbing the victim. The victim told her daughter to run out the back door
and tried to get herself out the front door, but the defendant grabbed the
child and threatened to kill her because he “knew [the victim] wouldn’t go
out that door and sacrifice her daughter’s life like that [be]cause . . .
she [was] probably thinking . . . [I would] stab [her daughter] too.”
Record at 568. The defendant then grabbed the daughter and demanded that
she help him find money or other valuables. While they were looking for
money, a younger child awoke, and the defendant tried to keep her from
seeing her mother, but ran from the house when he was unable to keep the
child out of the room. The defendant returned to his mother’s house by
bicycle. He washed the knife and replaced it in the kitchen. Noticing
that his shirt was bloody, he removed it and hid it behind a chair. Then
he went into the bathroom and washed blood from his hands and the rings
that he had taken.
From this evidence, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not have
found that the defendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of
forming the requisite intent. The instruction error was harmless.

Instruction on Life Imprisonment Without Parole
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting the
jury not to make a recommendation as to whether the defendant should
receive life imprisonment without parole. He argues that when the jury was
unable to reach a recommendation, the court should have required the jury
to recommend against life imprisonment without parole. Instead, the trial
court discharged the jury without receiving any jury recommendation and
proceeded to sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole.
The defendant cites Burris v. State, 465 N.E.2d 171 (Ind. 1984), to
support his argument that the jury does not have the option to decline to
make a recommendation. In Burris, an instruction stated that if each juror
found that the requisite circumstances necessary to support a
recommendation for the death penalty were not present, the recommendation
"may" be against the death penalty. Id. at 189. We held the instruction
erroneous because, in the case of a unanimous vote against the death
penalty, the jury has no optionCit must report its recommendation against
the death penalty. Id. However, Burris did not address the question of
the jury's inability to reach any kind of recommendation, as occurred here.

The defendant further argues that the jury was given conflicting
instructions regarding whether it was required to recommend against life
without parole in the event it could not reach a unanimous agreement.
Sentencing Phase Preliminary Instruction No. 46 included the sentence: "If
you do not reach this unanimous decision [that a proven aggravating factor
outweighs any mitigating factors found], you must recommend against
sentencing Tracey Dunlop to life imprisonment without parole." Record at
223. In contrast, Sentencing Phase Final Instruction No. 55 stated in
part: "In order to return a recommendation you must all agree." Record at
235.
The applicable statute provides: "If a jury is unable to agree on a
sentence recommendation after reasonable deliberations, the court shall
discharge the jury and proceed as if the hearing had been to the court
alone." Ind. Code ' 35-50-2-9(f) (1993). The statute does not require the
jury to recommend against life imprisonment when it cannot reach an
agreement on the recommendation. Although the quoted portion of
Preliminary Instruction No. 46 was inconsistent with the statute, the error
favored the defendant.
Any error on this issue was therefore harmless.

Sentencing
The defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding and
weighing mitigating circumstances; that his sentence violates
constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment[6] and
requiring proportionality; and that his sentence is manifestly
unreasonable.
The jury found the defendant guilty on all six counts charged, but, as
to Count I, it returned a verdict of guilty of murder but mentally ill at
the time of the offense. The evidence established that the defendant
obtained a weapon, rode his bicycle to a former co-worker's house in search
of money to purchase cocaine, and placed his bicycle where it could not be
seen from the street. He then went inside the house, stabbed Carolyn
Hawkins twenty-seven times with a knife and threatened to harm her twelve-
year-old daughter, an action which he later admitted he knew would stop
Carolyn from leaving. He also forced her daughter to search the house for
valuables, which he took. He then returned to his house, hid his blood-
covered shirt behind a chair, and washed the knife used in the attack.
Mental health professionals testified that the defendant was mentally
impaired at the time of the murder as a result of drug addiction. Other
evidence showed that the defendant was under the influence of drugs at the
time he committed the crime, that he came from a very dysfunctional family,
and that he had expressed remorse for the crime.
Acknowledging that the trial court properly found a valid aggravating
circumstance (intentional killing committed during a robbery) and numerous
mitigating circumstances, the defendant argues that the trial court failed
to give sufficient weight to all the mitigators and any mitigating weight
to the evidence that he could be rehabilitated and reformed. In its
thoughtful sentencing decision, the trial court found and weighed as
mitigating circumstances the jury's verdict of guilty but mentally ill, the
defendant's dysfunctional family background, his decision not to flee the
jurisdiction, and his confession and expressions of guilt and remorse.
The determination that a circumstance is mitigating is within the
trial court's discretion, and the court is not obligated to explain why it
finds a circumstance not to be mitigating. Taylor v. State, 681 N.E.2d
1105, 1112 (Ind. 1997); Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ind.1995).
The trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered
mitigating circumstances as the defendant does. Thacker v. State, 709
N.E.2d 3, 10 (Ind. 1999); Montgomery v. State, 694 N.E.2d 1137, 1142 (Ind.
1998); Battles v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1230, 1236 (Ind. 1997). The trial
court's determination of the proper weight to be given aggravating and
mitigating circumstances and the appropriateness of the sentence as a whole
is entitled to great deference and will be set aside only upon a showing of
a manifest abuse of discretion. Thacker, 709 N.E.2d at 10; Willsey v.
State, 698 N.E.2d 784, 796 (Ind. 1998). The record of the sentencing
proceeding does not demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion
in considering and weighing the mitigating evidence presented by the
defendant. We find no error in the sentence imposed by the trial court.
The defendant argues that his sentence of life imprisonment without
parole violates Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution, which
declares in part: "Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted.
All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense."
The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments
proscribes atrocious or obsolete punishments and is aimed at the kind and
form of the punishment, rather than the duration or amount. Ratliff v.
Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 542 (Ind. 1998); Wise v. State, 272 Ind. 498, 502,
400 N.E.2d 114, 117-18 (1980). Punishment is cruel and unusual under
Article I, Section 16 if it "'makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable goals of punishment, but rather constitutes only purposeless and
needless imposition of pain and suffering.'" Ratliff, 693 N.E.2d at 542
(quoting Douglas v. State, 481 N.E.2d 107, 112 (Ind. 1985)). The sentence
of life imprisonment without parole does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.
We will find a sentence not proportional "'only when a criminal
penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of an offense.'"
Conner v. State, 626 N.E.2d 803, 806 (Ind. 1993) (quoting Hollars v. State,
259 Ind. 229, 236, 286 N.E.2d 166, 170 (1972)). Given the circumstances
presented in this case, we decline to find the penalty of life imprisonment
without parole to be disproportional to the nature of the offense
committed.
The defendant also claims that his sentence is manifestly
unreasonable. A reviewing court may review and revise a criminal sentence,
but only when the sentence is "manifestly unreasonable in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender." App. R. 17(B).
To warrant modification of an otherwise proper trial court sentence, we
must find it to be clearly, plainly, and obviously unreasonable. Thacker,
709 N.E.2d at 10; Brown v. State, 698 N.E.2d 779, 784 (Ind. 1998)); Prowell
v. State, 687 N.E.2d 563, 568 (Ind. 1997). The sentence imposed in this
case is not manifestly unreasonable.

Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SHEPARD, C.J., and BOEHM, J., concur. SULLIVAN, J., concurs and
dissents with separate opinion in which RUCKER, J., concurs.

Attorney for Appellant

Patricia Caress McMath
Indianapolis, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee

Jeffery A. Modisett
Attorney General of Indiana

Christopher L. LaFuse
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
INDIANA SUPREME COURT

TRACEY T. DUNLOP,
Appellant (Defendant below)

v.

STATE OF INDIANA,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).

)
) Supreme Court No.
) 49S00-9704-CR-273
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jan Helbert, Judge Pro Tem
Cause No. 49G02-9410-CF-127146

ON DIRECT APPEAL

February 18, 2000

SULLIVAN, Justice, concurring and dissenting.

I concur with the Court=s opinion except as to the sentence of life
without parole.
The law permits sentence of life without parole only if the State proves
that the mitigating circumstances are outweighed by the aggravating
circumstances.[7] See Ind. Code ' 35-50-2-9(i)(2) (Supp. 1994). I do not
believe the standard was met in this case.

The sole aggravating circumstance proved by the State in this case was
the so-called Afelony murder@ aggravator C that A[the] defendant committed
the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or
attempting to commit . . . Robbery.@ See id. ' 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(G) (Supp.
1994). While this is a serious aggravator, we have never accorded it
weight in the Ahighest range,@ a designation we have heretofore only given
the Amultiple murder@ aggravating circumstance of Ind. Code ' 35-50-2-
9(b)(8).[8] In any event, I would assign the mitigating circumstances here
C Defendant=s youth, dysfunctional upbringing, drug and alcohol addiction,
extreme remorse and the fact that the jury unanimously found him to be
mentally ill C equal if not greater weight. I think it is also worthy of
note that the jury was unable to make a unanimous recommendation in favor
of a life without parole sentence.

The trial court found Athere were many mitigating circumstances@ in
this case. First, the trial court found that A[D]efendant suffered from
the effects of an extremely dysfunctional family.@ (R. at 1067.) I will
discuss the expert testimony on this point below. Second, the trial court
took into consideration that the jury unanimously found Defendant to be
mentally ill.[9] Third, the trial court found that Defendant Awas very
remorseful@ and noted that, rather than fleeing the jurisdiction, he
immediately went home where he showed Asigns of conscience guilt.@ (R. at
1070.)

In addition to the trial court=s findings, I would assign mitigating
weight to Defendant=s youth C he was twenty at the time of his crime C and
to the expert testimony presented at trial.

At trial, Dr. Robert Smith, who holds doctorate degree in psychology,
testified for the defense. Dr. Smith is a clinical psychologist and
specializes in the treatment of alcohol and other drug addictions. He
practices in five hospitals and maintains a full-time private practice in
the Cleveland area. In Dr. Smith=s opinion, Defendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect at the time the killing occurred. It was also Dr.
Smith=s opinion that Defendant=s capacity to appreciate the criminality of
his conduct was impaired as a result of his intoxication and use of
cocaine.

Dr. Smith=s opinion was based on a two day examination of Defendant,
including a diagnostic interview, a series of psychological tests, a
personality test, and an assessment of Defendant=s use of alcohol and
drugs.[10] According to Dr. Smith=s testimony, Defendant experienced a
traumatic childhood, enduring a neglected home life. During his younger
years, Defendant witnessed his mother abuse alcohol, marijuana, and
cocaine. After his father abandoned him, his mother began a series of
relationships with abusive men. At one time, Defendant saw his step-father
hold a gun to his mother=s head. Additionally, Defendant had a long
history of serious alcohol and drug abuse. His abusive step-father
introduced him to marijuana at the impressionable age of seven and by the
age of fourteen, he was abusing alcohol. Defendant was placed in a foster
home for several months, and afterwards resided with his grandmother whose
husband was also an alcoholic. Defendant dropped out of high school at the
tenth grade level.

Dr. Smith testified that Defendant suffered from several psychological
disorders, cocaine dependence, cannabis dependence, alcohol abuse, and a
personality disorder at the time the murder occurred. In addition, the
personality test showed that Defendant had a Amixed personality disorder@
meaning that Defendant suffered from two distinct disorders, paranoia and
anti-social behavior. This personality test, along with an alcohol
screening test, uncovered that Defendant did in fact abuse alcohol. Dr.
Smith testified that Defendant could be rehabilitated.

Mr. Rick Gustafson, a psychiatric social worker who earned a masters
degree in social work at Indiana University, also testified for the
defense. Mr. Gustafson maintains a private practice and has counseled at
psychiatric hospitals as well as chemical dependency centers. At trial,
Mr. Gustafson=s testimony corroborated with that of Dr. Smith=s regarding
Defendant=s dysfunctional childhood. He testified that Defendant suffered
from depression with thoughts of dying.

Dr. Rodney Deaton, a court-appointed psychiatrist, diagnosed Defendant
with a psychiatric disorder called Apolysubstance dependence,@ a disorder
recognized in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (fourth edition). Dr. Deaton testified
that a person suffering from polysubstance dependence is dependant on at
least three different substances. In Defendant=s case, he suffered from
long-term usage of cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol that led to a
Asignificant impairment.@ Dr. Deaton stated that Defendant was Aclearly
suffering@ from this psychiatric disorder at the time the killing occurred.
Dr. Deaton further testified that cocaine intoxication can produce a
delusional state, recognized as a mental disorder and paranoia. Dr. Deaton
also stated that alcohol can have an adverse affect on a person=s ability
to understand the consequences of his or her actions. Finally, Dr. Deaton
testified that Defendant had expressed remorse over the killing of the
victim. Another court-appointed psychiatrist, Dr. Carrie Dixon,[11] found
that because Defendant was under the influence of cocaine and alcohol,
Defendant was not of sound mind on the night of the killings. However, it
was the opinion of Dr. Dixon that Defendant was not suffering from a mental
disease or defect on the night of the killings.

After weighing the numerous mitigating factors identified by the trial
court and expert testimony — Defendant was twenty years old at the time of
the offense, Defendant expressed extreme remorse, Defendant grew up in a
severely dysfunctional family full of violence and drug abuse, Defendant
suffered from cocaine, marijuana, and alcohol addictions, and Defendant
suffered from personality disorders — as well as the jury=s unanimous
determination that Defendant was mentally ill and the jury=s inability to
reach a unanimous recommendation that Defendant be sentenced to life
without parole, I would find that the sole aggravating circumstance does
not outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

RUCKER, J., concurs.

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[1] Ind. Code ' 35-42-1-1 (1993).

[2] Ind. Code ' 35-42-5-1 (1993).

[3] Ind. Code ' 35-42-3-3 (1993).

[4] Section 19 provides: "In all criminal cases whatever, the jury
shall have the right to determine the law and the facts."
[5] Pritchard is principally concerned with instruction language that
is mandatory in nature, thereby taking from a jury its right to determine
the facts and the law under Section 19. Pritchard, 248 Ind. at 575, 230
N.E.2d at 421. The voluntary intoxication instruction in the present case
does not contain directive language equivalent to that in Pritchard, 248
Ind. at 568, 230 N.E.2d at 417 ("then you shall find such defendant
guilty"). But see Parker v. State, 698 N.E.2d 737, 742 n.9 (Ind. 1998).
[6] Although the defendant cites the Eighth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, he provides no authority regarding any applicable principles
and makes no separate argument. Such claim is thus forfeited. Ind.
Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7); Kindred v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1161, 1168 (Ind.
1989).

[7] The statute requires a finding by the trial court that Aany
mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating
circumstances,@ that is, the trial court must find that aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The trial court
applied an erroneous standard in this case, finding it sufficient that the
mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstance.
See R. at 1071 (“I cannot say in good conscience that [all of] those
[mitigators] outweigh the aggravating factor.”). The point is, of course,
that under the statute, if the weight of the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances is equal, life without parole may not be imposed; under the
standard enunciated by the trial court, if the weight is equal, life
without parole is available.

While erroneous, I would not reverse or remand on this basis. First,
at no point does the trial court actually find the weight of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances to be equal. Second, Defendant=s
counsel C one of the ablest to practice before us C does not challenge the
sentence on this basis from which I infer that she was satisfied that the
trial court considered the weight of the aggravating circumstance to
outweigh the mitigating factors. Third, despite this error, the trial
court=s sentencing statement is careful and complete, showing concern for
and attention to the special requirements of this particular statute.

[8] See Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528, 543 (Ind. 1996) (Dickson,
J.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078 (1998); Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170,
1182 (Ind. 1992) (DeBruler, J.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893 (1993); Roche
v. State, 596 N.E.2d 896, 902 (Ind. 1992) (concurring opinion of DeBruler,
J., in which Krahulik, J., joined).

[9] I recognize that the trial court did not find the degree of
Defendant=s mental illness to entitle him to sufficient mitigating weight
to overcome the aggravating circumstance. See R. at 1068-70.

[10] In particular, Dr. Smith based his evaluation on the following
administered tests: the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test, the Substance
Abuse Suddel Screening Inventory Two Test, the Adult Intelligence Scale
Test, and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory Test (MMPI).

[11] Dr. Dixon also conducted an I.Q. test, the Westler Adult
Intelligence Scale test, in which Defendant scored below average.

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