MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Dec 11 2018, 10:05 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Christopher L. Clerc Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Columbus, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Angela N. Sanchez
Assistant Section Chief for
Criminal Appeals
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Edwin A. Castro, December 11, 2018
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-502
v. Appeal from the Bartholomew
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable James D. Worton,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
03D01-1603-F6-1700
Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-502 | December 11, 2018 Page 1 of 7
Case Summary
[1] Edwin A. Castro appeals his convictions for level 6 felony domestic battery,
level 6 felony strangulation, level 6 felony criminal confinement, and level 6
felony battery on a person less than fourteen years old. Castro, who was born
in Honduras, asserts that the trial court erred in admitting his recorded
statement to police by declining to conduct a suppression hearing on whether
he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, which had been read
to him in English rather than Spanish. We conclude that if there was any error
in admitting the recorded statement, that error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On March 18, 2016, Castro’s ex-wife Rosa Serrano Diaz went to work with the
understanding that Castro was going to watch their children. Diaz had
previously obtained a protective order against Castro. When Diaz returned
home, she found Castro in the guest room and asked him to leave because of
the protective order. He refused, and they got into an argument about child
support. When Diaz attempted to give Castro the child support documents, he
threw them aside. She asked him again to leave, and he again refused. She
tried to go to the children’s room, but Castro would not let her pass. Castro hit
her and pushed her against a wall. She fell backwards and landed in a laundry
basket. Diaz got up and said, “[P]lease leave, if you are going to start again,
please leave.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 76. Diaz tried to move away, but Castro pushed
her down three times. Diaz begged him to leave, but Castro was “furious.” Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-502 | December 11, 2018 Page 2 of 7
at 78. He grabbed her by the hair, threw her against the wall, and put both his
hands on her neck. Diaz pleaded with him to let her go and tried to fight back.
She tried hitting him with her knee and her fist and scratched him, but she
could not get away. When she felt like she was unable to breathe any more, she
yelled for their son (“Son”). Son responded and started hitting Castro on the
head and telling him “let go of mommy.” Id. at 85. Diaz’s daughter
(“Daughter”) also arrived and started “begging” Castro to let her mother go or
she would call the police. Id. at 86. Castro kept one hand on Diaz and used his
other hand to grab Son and throw him. Son landed on the bed, rolled off, and
hit the closet door. Diaz kept fighting Castro, scratching and hitting him
without success. Daughter continued to beg Castro to let her mother go, to no
avail, and Daughter ultimately called the police. Castro then threw Diaz out of
his way and ran out of the home.
[3] Columbus Police Officer Angela Owens responded to a domestic disturbance
report and was advised that the male party had left the scene of the disturbance.
Officer Owens went to the address where the male party had reportedly gone
and encountered Castro, who had red marks on his face and blood on his lip.
Officer Owens placed Castro under arrest for battery and violation of the
protective order. Officer Owens read him his Miranda rights in English. She
asked him if he understood his rights, and he replied affirmatively. Id. at 220;
State’s Ex. 27. She asked him if he wished to speak with her, and he said yes.
Tr. Vol. 2 at 221; State’s Ex. 27. Officer Owens recorded their conversation,
during which Castro explained in English that Diaz had attacked and injured
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him and that he had not touched her or the children. Tr. Vol. 2 at 225-28;
State’s Ex. 27. When this conversation took place, Castro had been in the
United States for approximately nine years.1
[4] The State charged Castro with level 6 felony domestic battery, level 6 felony
strangulation, level 6 felony criminal confinement, and level 6 felony battery on
a person less than fourteen years old. At Castro’s jury trial, the State sought to
admit Castro’s recorded statement as State’s Exhibit 27. Defense counsel
requested that a foundation be laid to establish that Castro understood his
Miranda rights. Officer Owens testified that she read a full Miranda advisement
in English from a card she had in her pocket. She also testified that she carried
a card with the Miranda rights in Spanish, but she chose to read them in English
because Castro had been communicating with her in English and she believed
that he knew English. Tr. Vol. 2 at 215-16. She further testified that she
believed that Castro understood her when she advised him of his Miranda rights
and that she had asked him if he understood his rights and he indicated that he
did. Id. at 217. Officer Owens also testified that she asked Castro if he wished
to speak with her and he indicated that he did. Id. at 218. Defense counsel
requested that the trial court conduct a suppression hearing. The trial court
denied the request, and the recording was played for the jury. Tr. Vol. 2 at 225-
28; State’s Ex. 27.
1
At his sentencing hearing in February 2018, Castro testified that he had been in the United States for eleven
years. Tr. Vol. 3 at 151.
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[5] In closing argument, defense counsel made the following statements:
[I]f … Castro was the aggressor [Diaz] would have been hurt.
She would have been in worse shape than she was, because he’s a
man, supposedly according to her she is so scared of him, so
fearful of him, but he is so much stronger than she is, you saw
that lie, well look at her injuries versus his. He’s bleeding, when
Police arrive and take pictures of him, he’s crying, he’s crying
because he’s just been abused, it just happened.
….
[Castro] is not the aggressor, [Castro] is trying to escape the, the
room and she is blocking every exit. He doesn’t testify today, for
a reason, it’s his right. You are going to get an instruction that
says, you cannot hold that against him, as jurors, I know I would
too, he didn’t talk, he must be hiding something. He doesn’t
have to talk, he’s the one who is being accused, in fact, it is a
right not to talk. In fact, he did talk, he talked on a recording
when it happened fresh that day. And he decided he was going
to rest on that, that’s enough, I am not going to do this, I don’t
need, he doesn’t need to subject himself to the interrogation of
the Prosecutor, who is going to try and tear him apart. He is on
trial, when maybe in fact [Diaz] should be the one.
….
You will get an instruction, you can’t hold it against [Castro] that
he didn’t testify, but he did, he testified to that Police Officer that
showed up. And he is the most creditable person, so far, that
we’ve heard from, in that video, in that audio.
Tr. Vol. 3 at 81, 90-91, 99.
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[6] The jury found Castro guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Castro to a
four-year aggregate term. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Castro challenges the admission of his recorded statement in the absence of a
suppression hearing on whether he knowingly and voluntarily waived his
Miranda rights. Statements made by those in police custody in response to
police interrogation are inadmissible at trial unless the State proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his
privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel and that the
statements themselves were voluntarily given. Johnson v. State, 584 N.E.2d
1092, 1098-99 (Ind. 1992) (citations omitted), cert. denied. We review a trial
court’s decision to admit a defendant’s custodial statement for an abuse of
discretion. Horan v. State, 682 N.E.2d 502, 509 (Ind. 1997).
[8] However, we need not address whether any error occurred in admitting the
recording because if any error occurred it was harmless. “Statements obtained
in violation of Miranda and erroneously admitted are subject to harmless error
analysis.” Alford v. State, 699 N.E.2d 247, 251 (Ind. 1998).
A federal constitutional error is reviewed de novo and must be
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The State bears the burden
of demonstrating that the improper admission of a defendant’s
statement did not contribute to the conviction. To say that an
error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find that error
unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on
the issue in question, as revealed in the record. If the State has
presented other overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt,
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then an erroneously admitted statement may be deemed
harmless.
Finney v. State, 786 N.E.2d 764, 768 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citations and
quotations omitted).
[9] In his recorded statement, Castro did not say anything inculpatory, but rather
asserted that his ex-wife was the aggressor and consistently denied touching her
or his children. Moreover, in closing argument, defense counsel relied on the
recording to advocate for Castro’s innocence and to argue that his version of
events was the most credible. Accordingly, we have no difficulty concluding
that the recording did not contribute to the guilty verdicts and was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirm Castro’s convictions.
[10] Affirmed.
Najam, J., and Pyle, J., concur.
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Edwin A. Castro v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion