Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909
____________________________________________________________________________________________
Chie f Justice Justices
Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh
Opinion
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
FILED MARCH 26, 2003
DENNIS EGGLESTON, as Personal
Representative of the Estate
of LOUISA EGGLESTON, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v No. 121208
BIO-MEDICAL APPLICATIONS OF
DETROIT, INC. and FRESENIUS
MEDICAL CARE,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
JAMES LAWSON, D.O., and JAMES
LAWSON, D.O., P.C.,
Defendants.
________________________________
PER CURIAM
This case presents the question whether a successor
personal representative has two years after appointment to
file an action on behalf of an estate under the wrongful death
saving statute, MCL 600.5852, or whether the two-year period
is measured from the appointment of the initial personal
representative. The Court of Appeals affirmed summary
disposition for defendants, holding that the plain language of
the statute refers only to one set of letters of authority
issued to the personal representative. 248 Mich App 640; 645
NW2d 279 (2001). However, the Court of Appeals misread the
statute and then relied on that erroneous reading in reaching
its decision. We reverse the judgments of the circuit court
and the Court of Appeals because the statutory language simply
provides that the two-year grace period is measured from the
issuance of letters of authority.
I
Decedent received kidney dialysis treatment from
defendants-appellees on June 21, 1996. She died the next day.
Decedent’s widower was appointed temporary personal
representative and issued letters of authority on April 4,
1997. He died on August 20, 1997.
Plaintiff, the son of the decedent and the first personal
representative, was appointed successor personal
representative, and letters of authority were issued to him on
December 8, 1998. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging
medical malpractice on June 9, 1999.
Defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7). Defendants argued that the action is barred by
the two-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5838a(2), which,
they claimed, expired on June 21, 1998, two years after
decedent’s last treatment. Defendants also argued that the
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wrongful death saving statute, MCL 600.5852, does not apply
because the complaint was not filed within two years after the
appointment of the first personal representative on April 4,
1997. Plaintiff responded that another two-year period began
when he was appointed as successor personal representative.
The circuit court agreed with defendants and granted summary
disposition.
On appeal as of right, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Court characterized plaintiff’s argument as one advocating
an “expansive reading” of the statute, whereas the law
requires that the saving provision be given a “narrow
reading,” citing this Court’s decision in Lindsey v Harper
Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 65; 564 NW2d 861 (1997). The Court held
that the statute should instead be construed and applied
according to its plain terms.1
Furthermore, the plain language of the saving
clause refers to one set or “the” letters of
authority, not multiple letters of authority. The
statute applies to “the” personal representative,
not “a” personal representative, which might
suggest that any personal representative who
receives letters of authority, initially or as a
successor, has two years to file a claim. Clearly,
if the Legislature had intended that the two-year
grace period begin anew each time an appointment is
terminated and a new appointment made, it could
have easily done so by specifically stating as
much. Absent language to that effect, we are bound
to construe the saving provision strictly: the
two-year limitation period begins when the probate
court issues the letters of authority to the
1
The Court of Appeals did not explain how, if at all, a
“narrow reading” of the statute would differ from its plain
meaning.
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personal representative, regardless of whether the
court later appoints one or more successor personal
representatives. [248 Mich App 649.]
Plaintiff has applied for leave to appeal.
II
We review de novo the interpretation and application of
a statute as a question of law. If the language of a statute
is clear, no further analysis is necessary or allowed. Miller
v Mercy Mem Hosp, 466 Mich 196, 201; 644 NW2d 730 (2002).
III
The question presented is of first impression. Although
the Court of Appeals purported to construe and apply the plain
language of MCL 600.5852, the Court misquoted the statute by
inserting “the” before “letters of authority.”
If a person dies before the period of
limitations has run or within 30 days after the
period of limitations has run, an action which
survives by law may be commenced by the personal
representative of the deceased person at any time
within 2 years after [the] letters of authority are
issued although the period of limitations has run.
But an action shall not be brought under this
provision unless the personal representative
commences it within 3 years after the period of
limitations has run. [Id.]
The Court relied on this misquotation in holding that a
personal representative must bring an action within two years
after the initial letters of authority are issued to the first
personal representative. This is not, however, what the
statute says. The statute simply provides that an action may
be commenced by the personal representative “at any time
within 2 years after letters of authority are issued although
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the period of limitations has run.” Id. The language adopted
by the Legislature clearly allows an action to be brought
within two years after letters of authority are issued to the
personal representative. The statute does not provide that
the two-year period is measured from the date letters of
authority are issued to the initial personal representative.
Plaintiff was “the personal representative” of the estate
and filed the complaint “within 2 years after letters of
authority [were] issued,” and “within 3 years after the period
of limitations ha[d] run.” MCL 600.5852. The action was
therefore timely.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgments of the circuit
court and the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the
circuit court for further proceedings. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
Maura D. Corrigan
Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Clifford W. Taylor
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman
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