Ellingson v. CRICK COMPANY

No. 12824

I N T E SUPREME COURT O T E STATE O MONTANA
H F H F

1975

STEVEN G. ELLINGSON,

Claimant and Respondent,

-vs -
CRICK COMPANY, Employer,

and

A G N U NORTHWEST INSURANCE COMPANY,
ROAT

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Hon. Robert J. Boyd, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record :

For Appellant :

H a r r i s , Jackson and Utick, Helena, Montana
Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana

For Respoddent:

H a r r i s o n , Loendorf and Poston, Helena, Montana
Jerome T. Loendorf argued, Helena, Montana

Submitted: January 15, 1975

Decided : APR 1 0 1975
fip2 1 l$ib
Filed :
M r . J u s t i c e Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

This i s an a p p e a l from t h e o r d e r of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
Powell County, a f f i r m i n g an award of workmen's compensation
b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t , Steven G. E l l i n g s o n . The f a c t s g i v i n g
rise t o t h e c l a i m a r e n o t d i s p u t e d .
On June 7, 1972, c l a i m a n t was i n j u r e d i n a two v e h i c l e

a c c i d e n t on U.S. Highway 1 2 , n e a r Avon, Montana. A t the t i m e
of t h e a c c i d e n t , he was e n r o u t e t o h i s p l a c e of employment i n h i s
private vehicle. H i s employer Crick Company was then engaged i n
a highway c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t j u s t west of G a r r i s o n , Montana.
Claimant was l i v i n g i n Helena and commuted t h e f o r t y - , f i v e miles
every day.
The p a r t i e s s t i p u l a t e d t h a t c l a i m a n t was n o t a union member, b u t
was working under t h e terms of t h e 1971-1974 Heavy Highway Construc-
t i o n Agreement between t h e Montana C o n t r a c t o r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n , I n c .
and t h e Laborers' I n t e r n a t i o n a l Union of North America. Consistent
w i t h t h e terms of t h a t agreement, c l a i m a n t was paid f i v e d o l l a r s
p e r day a s " t r a v e l allowance". The amount of t h e allowance was
determined by a c o n t r a c t u a l schedule computed on t h e b a s i s of mileage
between t h e c e n t e r of t h e job s i t e and t h e n e a r e s t county courthouse.
The amount t h u s computed w a s paid t o a l l employees, independently
of t h e mileage a c t u a l l y t r a v e l e d by any p a r t i c u l a r employee.
I t i s c l e a r t h i s allowance was n o t intended t o be compensation
f o r t h e time spent i n t r a v e l . Not only was i t computed w i t h o u t
c o n s i d e r a t i o n of time and d i s t a n c e a c t u a l l y inolved i n each employee's
c a s e , b u t t h e c o n t r a c t c l e a r l y provided:
" ~ m ~ l o ~ e h a l l t r a v e l t o and from t h e i r d a i l v
ses
i n i t i a i r e p o r t i n g p l a c e on t h e i r own time and by
means of t h e i r own transportation."(Emphasis
supplied).
 A l l t h e s e f a c t s were b e f o r e t h e h e a r i n g examiner of t h e

Workmen's Compensation D i v i s i o n when he e n t e r e d f i n d i n g s of f a c t
and c o n c l u s i o n s of law f a v o r i n g c l a i m a n t . The d e c i s i o n was
appealed t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Powell County on t h e r e c o r d of
t h e e a r l i e r h e a r i n g , w i t h o u t t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l evidence.
The d i s t r i c t c o u r t adopted a l l of t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclu-
s i o n s o f law e n t e r e d by t h e ~ i v i s i o n ' sh e a r i n g examiner. That
judgment i s now appealed, a l l e g i n g t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d
i n allowing t h e claim.
Before d i s c u s s i n g t h e s i n g l e i s s u e r a i s e d , we n o t e t h a t t h e
d e c i s i o n s of t h e h e a r i n g examiner and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t were made
p r i o r t o our d e c i s i o n i n McMillen v. McKee & Co., Mon t . 2

P.2d , 32 S t . Rep. 319. A s recognized by t h e p a r t i e s i n
t h e i r arguments b e f o r e t h i s Court, t h e McMillen d e c i s i o n i s per-
t i n e n t t o t h i s a p p e a l , although t h e q u e s t i o n remains whether i t i s
c o n t r o l l i n g under t h e s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n here.
I n McMillen and t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , c l a i m a n t s were i n j u r e d i n
t r a f f i c a c c i d e n t s w h i l e e n r o u t e t o t h e i r jobs. Claimants i n both
c a s e s were r e c e i v i n g an allowance f o r t r a v e l under t h e terms of a
union c o n t r a c t . I n b o t h c a s e s , we a r e c a l l e d upon t o determine
I1
whether t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d a r o s e o u t of and i n t h e c o u r s e of1'
t h e c l a i m a n t s ' employment. S e c t i o n 92-614, R.C.M. 1947.
I n McMillen t h e Court adopted t h e g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t :
'I* ** a workman i s u s u a l l y e n t i t l e d t o compensation
when i n j u r e d d u r i n g t r a v e l t o o r from h i s employment
where he r e c e i v e s a s p e c i f i c allowance t o g e t t o and
from h i s job. I*
Appellant would have u s e i t h e r d i s t i n g u i s h o r o v e r r u l e McMillen
here. The argument advanced f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h i s c a s e from
McMillen i s t h e acknowledged d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e c o n t r a c t u a l
methods of computing t h e r e s p e c t i v e t r a v e l allowances. I n McMillen,
t h e computation was p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e m i l e s a c t u a l l y t r a v e l e d
by t h e i n d i v i d u a l employee, w h i l e hxe i t i s based on t h e d i s t a n c e
from the job site to the nearest county courthouse. The disparity
results in McMillen employees receiving Varying amounts of compensa-
tion depending on the distance traveled, while the employees here
all received a uniform amount.
We cannot see where that distinction varies the applicability
of the test enunciated in McMillen . The fact that the travel
allowance here was based on a distance other than mileage between
residence and job site is not important. The union contract singled
out transportation as the subject of a specific allowance. When
transportation is thus singled out in the employment contract, the
travel to and from work is brought within the course of employment.
Injuries sustained enroute are therefore compensable. McMillen,
supra; 1 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 16.30.
Although McMillen was expressly limited to the facts therein
presented, the facts presented here are so similar as to mandate
a similar result. No new arguments were advanced which would require
a reconsideration of our position in McMillen, neither as to its
facts nor the legal theories there involved.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Justice

We Concur:

....................................
Justices.
M . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles d i s s e n t i n g :
r

I d i s s e n t a s I did i n McMillen, r e l i e d on here i n the
majority opinion.

Chief J u s t i c e James 'I1. H a r r i s o n t o o k no p a r t i n t h i s O p i n i o n .