Under our decisions, the instrument in question contains a sufficient description of the property (Patton v. Sluder, 167 N. C., 500), and on the facts presented, the same creates a lien thereon in plaintiff’s favor for the amount found to be due and unpaid, enforcible by judgment o:f foreclosure, the relief awarded to plaintiff on the record. Whether the paper-writing is an equitable or legal mortgage is not now of the substance, though under many recent cases with us upholding the principle that a deed should, as a general rule, be interpreted so as to affect the clear intent of the parties as expressed in the entire instrument, this would seem to constitute a regular legal mortgage, as it is declared to be in his Honor’s judgment. Jones & Philips v. McCormick, 174 N. C., 82; Williamson v. Bitting, 159 N. C., 321; Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C., 394; Harris v. Jones, 83 N. C., 318.
It is chiefly objected for appellant that, although the instrument should be properly considered as a mortgage on realty, there is a defect of registration in that the same is recorded in the book labeled and used for agricultural liens and chattel mortgages. Inasmuch as the only litigated questions thus far presented in the record or in the ease on appeal are between the alleged mortgagee, plaintiff, and mortgagor, the original defendant, the case might very well be disposed of by the position that, as between these parties, the matter of a correct registration is not essential, this being now required only in reference to the rights and claims *297•of creditors and subsequent purchasers. Eevisal, secs. 980-81-82. But as a subsequent mortgagee, admitted by defendant to bold a valid claim and lien on the property, bas been made party defendant, it is well, and perhaps required, that the-exception be directly disposed of that a proper •distribution of the fund may be bad.
An examination of this question will disclose that there are few subjects presented for consideration about which there is greater contrariety •of decision than on the construction .and application of the registration laws as affecting the validity of deeds and written instruments. In ¡soine of the States it is held that when the holder of the title presents the instrument to the recording officer, properly proven, and the same is received by him pursuant to the statute, the holder has done all that the law requires and his title is unaffected by mistake, etc., on the part of the officials in recording the paper. In others, the authorities are to the effect that the holder of such a paper so presenting it is charged with the duty of seeing that the same is recorded on the proper books with substantial accuracy in essentials, i. e., the names of the parties, the property embraced in the instrument, and if a mortgage, the true .amount of the debt — a view that seems to have been approved by our own decisions on the subject. Smith v. Lumber Co., 144 N. C., 47; Royster v. Lane, 118 N. C., 156.
Again, there is pronounced conflict on the question whether, under ¡statutes requiring an index and cross-index of registered instruments by the officer, this index should be considered and construed as an essential part of a completed registration. On this question much the larger number of cases hold that such an index as ordinarily expressed in the laws on the subject form no part of a valid and completed registration, but are only intended as an aid to facilitate investigation on inquiry for the true title. Our own Court so holds in Davis v. Whitaker, 114 N. C., 279, a ease that has since been unquestioned in our decisions and which seems to be in accord with the weight of authority in other jurisdictions. Greene v. Garvington, 16 Ohio, 548, reported also in 91 American Decisions, p. 103, with an informing note on the questions presented here.
' On the other hand, there are strong and well-reasoned opinions in authoritative courts to the effect that such an index constitutes an essen•tial part of a completed and valid registration, and basing their de- ■ cisions on the language of their registration laws and also on the reasoning that these indexes are commonly resorted to for the ascertainment • of titles, and that a different ruling with the large number of books and .more accumulating, would render a satisfactory examination well-nigh -impossible and practically render valueless our registration laws in their *298primary purpose of protecting creditors and subsequent purchasers for value. Koch v. West, 118 Iowa, 468; Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa, 110; Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash., 429, and tbe construction of our statute-tbat tbe indexing and cross-indexing is a necessary part of a docketed judgment tends to support tbis position. Dewey v. Sugg, 109 N. C., 328.
In cases upholding tbis view, it is held, “That an index will bold a subsequent purchaser to notice thereof if enough is disclosed by the-index to put a careful or prudent examiner upon inquiry, and if, upon such inquiry, tbe instrument would have been found. Jones v. Berkshire, 15 Iowa, 248, syllabus quoted from report of case in 83 Amer.. Rep., p. 412.
"Whatever may be tbe ultimate and correct view on these much disputed questions, we have no hesitation in holding that the instrument' before us has had valid registration and will bind subsequent purchasers in the distribution of the fund. The only objection urged against' it being that it is registered in a book commonly known and used for-recording chattel mortgages and agricultural liens, and so labeled. It' was no doubt put in that book because it also contained an' agricultural' lien, but, so far as we have examined, there is nothing in our '-legislation-applicable either in case of deeds, agricultural liens, chattel mortgages- or other instruments which requires that they, or any of them, should: be put in any special book or one of any particular kind of description.. Undoubtedly they should be put in a book recognized and used in the-office for recording instruments, but there is no suggestion in this case-that the instrument was not accurately recorded. The index and cross-index, properly kept, points clearly and correctly to its placing, and, to-our minds, the official data are a full and sufficient compliance with, our statutory requirements and serve every purpose that our laws on this subject were designed to promote. While there is diversity of’ ruling on this subject also, the position accords with the reasonable and. correct interpretation of the statute and has the support of well-considered authority in other jurisdictions. Fairabee v. McKerrehan, 172 Pa. St., 234; Swepson v. Bank, 77 Tenn., 713; Armstrong v. Austin, 45 S. C., 69.
There is no error, and the judgment in plaintiff’s favor must be-affirmed as entered.
No error.