Present: All the Justices
CHRISTOPHER SCOTT EMMETT
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 020314 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR.
September 13, 2002
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge
In a bifurcated trial conducted pursuant to Code § 19.2-
264.3, a jury convicted Christopher Scott Emmett of the capital
murder of John Fenton Langley in the commission of robbery, Code
§ 18.2-31(4), and fixed Emmett’s punishment at death. The trial
court imposed the death sentence in accordance with the jury’s
verdict. Code § 17.1-313(A) mandates that we review the
imposition of a death sentence. 1
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Emmett was also convicted of robbery and sentenced to life
imprisonment for that crime. Emmett noted an appeal of his
convictions, but on February 8, 2002 he filed a motion to
withdraw that appeal. Pursuant to the February 22, 2002 order
of this Court, the case was returned to the trial court with
instructions to determine whether Emmett’s decision to waive his
appeal was voluntarily and intelligently made. At a hearing on
March 4, 2002, the trial court accepted Emmett’s voluntary
waiver of his right to appeal, finding that he fully understood
the consequences of doing so. On March 8, 2002, the trial court
entered an order to that effect and returned the record to this
Court in order that we might conduct the mandated review of
Emmett’s death sentence.
BACKGROUND
Weldon Roofing Company employed Emmett and Langley as
laborers for its roofing crews. During late April 2001, both
men were assigned to a project in the City of Danville and
shared a room at a local motel where the roofing crew was
staying. On the evening of April 26, 2001, Emmett, Langley,
Michael Darryl Pittman, and other members of the roofing crew
cooked dinner on a grill at the motel, played cards, and drank
beer. During the course of the evening, Langley loaned money to
Emmett and Pittman, who used the money to buy crack cocaine.
At approximately 11:00 p.m. that evening, Rainey Bell,
another member of the roofing crew, heard a noise he described
as “bang, bang” coming from the room Emmett and Langley shared.
Shortly after midnight, Emmett went to the motel office and
asked the clerk to call the police, saying that he had returned
to his room, “seen blood and stuff . . . and didn’t know what
had took place.”
The police arrived at the motel at 12:46 a.m. on April 27,
2001 and accompanied Emmett back to his room. There they
discovered Langley’s dead body lying face down on Langley’s bed
beneath a comforter. Blood spatters were found on the sheets
and headboard of Langley’s bed, on the wall behind it, and on
the wall between the bathroom and Emmett’s bed. A damaged brass
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lamp stained with Langley’s blood was discovered beneath
Langley’s bed.
In his initial statement to police, Emmett denied killing
Langley. He stated that he had returned to the room and gone to
bed. Emmett claimed to have discovered the blood and Langley’s
body later that night when he got up to use the bathroom.
Observing what appeared to be bloodstains on Emmett’s personal
effects, the police took possession of Emmett’s boots and
clothing with his permission. Emmett suggested that the blood
might be his own because he had injured himself earlier in the
week. Subsequent testing, however, revealed that Emmett’s boots
and clothing were stained with Langley’s blood.
Later in the morning of April 27, Emmett voluntarily
accompanied the police to the Danville police station. There he
agreed to be fingerprinted and gave a sample of his blood.
Emmett admitted to the police that he had been drinking and
using cocaine on the previous evening. Over the course of the
next several hours, Emmett related different versions of the
events of the previous evening to the police. He first
implicated Pittman as Langley’s murderer, but ultimately Emmett
told the police that he alone had beaten Langley to death with
the brass lamp.
Emmett was given Miranda warnings and he gave a full, taped
confession. Emmett stated that he and Pittman decided to rob
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Langley after Langley refused to loan them more money to buy
additional cocaine. Emmett stated that he struck Langley five
or six times with the brass lamp, took Langley’s wallet, and
left the motel to buy cocaine.
PROCEEDINGS
Emmett was indicted for capital murder and robbery. In the
guilt-determination phase of a bifurcated jury trial beginning
on October 9, 2001, the Commonwealth presented evidence in
accord with the above-recited facts. In addition, the
Commonwealth presented evidence from the medical examiner that
based upon the amount of blood and bruising of the victim’s
brain tissue at the point of impact, Langley was not killed
immediately by the first blow from the lamp. The medical
examiner conceded, however, that Langley might have been
unconscious after the first blow was struck and may have
suffered “brain death” prior to actual death.
After the jury convicted Emmett of capital murder and
robbery, during the penalty-determination phase of the trial,
the Commonwealth presented evidence of Emmett’s prior criminal
history. This evidence included an account of an instance in
which, while incarcerated in a maximum-security juvenile
detention facility, Emmett participated in an escape that
involved a guard being “rushed” and locked in a closet. In
addition, the criminal history evidence showed that while
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driving a vehicle under the influence of alcohol, Emmett was
involved in an accident in which the driver of a motorcycle was
killed in 1996. After the accident Emmett said “that there was
no need to worry about the man on the motorcycle. He was
already dead, and that [Emmett] could do nothing to help him.”
Emmett was convicted of involuntary manslaughter.
The Commonwealth also presented extensive victim-impact
testimony from members of Langley’s family. Emmett objected to
various statements made by the victim-impact witnesses who
appeared to urge the imposition of the death penalty. The trial
court sustained these objections and directed the jury to
disregard the statements.
Emmett presented evidence in mitigation from his mother,
sister, and a family friend. Emmett’s mother testified that
Emmett’s father had been abusive, and “he just never took care
of his family.” Both Emmett’s mother and sister testified that
Emmett had become withdrawn in the months prior to Langley’s
murder. The friend described Emmett as “a caring person” who
had helped her disabled husband with yard work and had assisted
her in caring for her son when he was injured and unable to
walk.
The jury returned its verdict imposing the death sentence
based upon both the statutory aggravating factors of future
dangerousness and vileness. Following consideration of a
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presentence report, the trial court imposed the jury’s sentence
of death.
DISCUSSION
As we have previously noted, Emmett has voluntarily waived
his right to appeal his convictions and, thus, to have the
proceedings of his trial reviewed for reversible error. The
Commonwealth contends that this waiver bars Emmett from
asserting that the death sentence was imposed as a result of
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors because certain
evidence was erroneously admitted or that certain remarks by the
Commonwealth’s Attorney during the penalty-phase closing
argument were improper and should have been stricken from the
record.
We agree with the Commonwealth that, having waived his
right of appeal, Emmett may not assert that his sentence of
death is improper merely on the ground that there may have been
reversible errors committed in his trial. We consistently
adhere to the contemporaneous objection requirement of our Rule
5:25 and the further requirement of Rule 5:27 that trial error
must be the subject of an assignment of error. See, e.g.,
Overton v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 599, 604, 539 S.E.2d 421, 423
(2000) (applying Rule 5:25 to failure to object to victim impact
testimony or introduction of photographs in Code § 17.1-313(C)
review of death sentence); George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264,
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284, 411 S.E.2d 12, 23-24 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973
(1992) (consolidation of charges not the subject of assignment
of error not considered in passion and prejudice review); see
also Rule 5:17(c). Emmett’s waiver of appeal implicates both of
these procedural requirements for our review of potential trial
errors, and we decline to create an exception to these
requirements.
However, “[t]he review process mandated by Code § 17.1-
313(C) cannot be waived. Rather, the purpose of the review
process is to assure the fair and proper application of the
death penalty statutes in this Commonwealth and to instill
public confidence in the administration of justice.” Akers v.
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 358, 364, 535 S.E.2d 674, 677 (2000).
The review process mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) is
meaningless without the recognition that the erroneous admission
of some evidence or some other error in an incident of trial
might result in a prejudicial verdict. Indeed, the import of
the review mandated by Code § 17.1-313(C)(1) is that a sentence
of death may be imposed erroneously as the result of passion,
prejudice, or other arbitrary factors even where there is, or
could be, no finding of reversible error in the trial
proceedings. Accordingly, in this case, while we will not
consider the merits of any assertion that evidence was
improperly admitted or that the Commonwealth’s Attorney made
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improper statements, we will nonetheless consider the potential
impact such evidence and statements may have had on the jury’s
decision to impose the death sentence.
Emmett makes several arguments in support of the contention
that the sentence of death was imposed upon him as the result of
passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. Chiefly, he
points to the emotionally charged testimony of the victim’s
family members and their statements that appeared to urge the
imposition of the death penalty. However, each time a victim-
impact witness’s testimony broached this subject, Emmett
objected, and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard
the witness’s statement. A jury is presumed to follow the
instructions of the trial court. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S.
225, 234 (2000); LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589,
304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063 (1984).
Accordingly, we do not believe that this testimony unduly
influenced or prejudiced the jury in its determination whether
to impose the death sentence.
In further support of his assertion that his death sentence
was imposed as a result of passion or prejudice, Emmett points
to misstatements by the Commonwealth’s Attorney during his
closing argument in the penalty-determination phase of the trial
to the effect that any one of the blows to the victim could have
proven fatal, and a reference to Emmett’s prior conduct as
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having occurred in a prison rather than as in a maximum-security
juvenile detention facility. He further contends that the
Commonwealth’s Attorney intended to inflame the jurors’ passions
by telling them that “nobody is safe from this guy” and that
Emmett is dangerous because “[h]e has nothing to lose.”
We agree that the Commonwealth’s Attorney mischaracterized
the medical examiner’s testimony and that he inaccurately
referred to the juvenile detention facility as a prison.
However, these misstatements were minor and not unduly
prejudicial in light of the trial court’s instruction to the
jury that the argument of counsel was not evidence. Reviewing
the Commonwealth’s Attorney’s argument as a whole, we do not
believe that any of the instances cited by Emmett, individually
or cumulatively, created an atmosphere of passion or prejudice
that influenced the jury’s sentencing decision. See Burns v.
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 344, 541 S.E.2d 872, 896, cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 621 (2001).
Emmett further contends that crime scene and autopsy
photographs admitted into evidence were unduly gruesome and
would have inflamed the jury’s passion in favor of imposing the
death sentence. While undoubtedly shocking and gruesome,
photographs that accurately depict the crime scene and the
condition of the victim are relevant to show motive, intent,
method, malice, premeditation, and the atrociousness of the
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crimes. Payne v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 216, 223, 509 S.E.2d
293, 297 (1999). They also are relevant to show the likelihood
of Emmett’s future dangerousness. Id. Having reviewed these
exhibits, we cannot say that they would have unduly prejudiced
the jury or improperly inflamed the jurors’ passions so as to
taint their decision in favor of imposing the death sentence.
Emmett also contends that the admission of his prior
inconsistent statements to the police denying responsibility for
the murder and attempting to shift the blame to Pittman was
unduly prejudicial. These statements were clearly relevant to
show Emmett’s consciousness of guilt. See Rollston v.
Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 535, 548, 399 S.E.2d 823, 831 (1991)
(“A defendant's false statements are probative to show he is
trying to conceal his guilt, and thus is evidence of his
guilt”); see also Carter v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 528, 532, 290
S.E.2d 865, 867 (1982) (holding that trier-of-fact need not
believe a defendant’s explanation of events and may infer
consciousness of guilt from his false testimony). There is no
indication in the record that the Commonwealth introduced these
statements for any improper purpose, and we perceive nothing in
the record to support the suggestion that the jury was unduly
influenced by this evidence in considering whether to impose the
death sentence.
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Finally, Emmett asserts that the evidence was insufficient
for the jury to have found that either aggravating factor
necessary under Code § 19.2-264.2 to the imposition of a death
sentence was present in this case and, thus, that the sentence
of death must have resulted from passion, prejudice, or other
arbitrary factors. There is no merit to this assertion.
With regard to the future dangerousness predicate, the
Commonwealth introduced evidence of Emmett’s prior participation
in an escape from a maximum-security juvenile detention
facility, which included an assault on a guard, and his
subsequent conviction as an adult for involuntary manslaughter.
The evidence also showed that Emmett lacked remorse for this
earlier violent crime and for the instant killing of a co-
worker. Indeed, Emmett himself confessed that he killed Langley
simply because it “just seemed right at the time.” Such lack of
regard for a human life speaks volumes on the issue of future
dangerousness and leaves little doubt of its probability.
With regard to the statutory vileness predicate, the
Commonwealth’s evidence supports two of the alternative
circumstances that can support a finding of vileness, i.e.,
aggravated battery and depravity of mind. See Goins v.
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 468, 470 S.E.2d 114, 131, cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996) (proof of any one of these statutory
components will support a finding of vileness). Aggravated
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battery is “a battery which, qualitatively and quantitatively,
is more culpable than the minimum necessary to accomplish an act
of murder.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 478, 248 S.E.2d
135, 149 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). The use of
a blunt object to batter the skull of the victim repeatedly and
with such force that blood spatters several feet from the victim
is clearly both qualitatively and quantitatively more force than
the minimum necessary to kill the victim.
Emmett’s actions also established depravity of mind, that
is, a “degree of moral turpitude and psychical debasement
surpassing that inherent in the definition of ordinary legal
malice and premeditation.” Id. The evidence established that
Emmett violently attacked a co-worker with whom he had
apparently enjoyed an amicable relationship. The brutality of
the crime amply demonstrates the depravity of mind involved in
the murder of Langley. Cf. Akers, 260 Va. at 364, 535 S.E.2d at
677.
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) we must also determine
whether Emmett’s death sentence is “excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases,
considering both the crime and the defendant.” Emmett first
notes that Code § 17.1-313(E) directs this Court to consider
“such records as are available as a guide in determining whether
the sentence imposed in the case under review is excessive.” He
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asserts that because records of unappealed capital murder
convictions in which a sentence of life imprisonment was imposed
are not collected for consideration during our proportionality
review, the review is inadequate because the comparison base is
skewed in favor of the death penalty. We have previously
rejected this argument and determined that the statute does not
require us to collect data from unappealed cases. Bailey v.
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 741-42, 529 S.E.2d 570, 580-81, cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000). In Bailey, we held that Code
§ 17.1-313(E) grants this Court the discretion to determine what
records to accumulate for our review process and that, “so long
as the methods employed assure that the death sentence is not
disproportionate to the penalty generally imposed for comparable
crimes, due process will be satisfied and the defendant's
constitutional rights protected.” Id.
Emmett further contends that sentencing bodies in the
Commonwealth generally have not imposed the death penalty in
capital murder cases where the predicate crime was robbery. In
support of this contention, Emmett asserts that a review of the
50 most recent capital murder appeals in this Court would reveal
that 17 of the 26 convictions where robbery was the gradation
offense resulted in life sentences. Moreover, he contends that
the facts of the cases in which life sentences were imposed are
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comparable or similar to the facts involved in his own crime or
more egregious.
Our proportionality analysis encompasses all capital murder
cases presented to this Court for review and is not limited to
cases selectively chosen by a defendant. “The test is not
whether a jury may have declined to recommend the death penalty
in a particular case but whether generally juries in this
jurisdiction impose the death sentence for conduct similar to
that of the defendant.” Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260,
283-84, 257 S.E.2d 808, 824 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972
(1980). Additionally, the question of proportionality does not
turn on whether a given capital murder case “equal[s] in horror
the worst possible scenario yet encountered.” Turner v.
Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 556, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490, cert.
denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988).
“The purpose of our comparative review is to reach a
reasoned judgment regarding what cases justify the imposition of
the death penalty.” Orbe v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519
S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000).
Although we cannot insure that “complete symmetry” exists among
all death penalty cases, “our review does enable us to identify
and invalidate a death sentence that is ‘excessive or
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases.’ ”
Id. (quoting Code § 17.1-313(C)(2)); see also Akers, 260 Va. at
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365, 535 S.E.2d at 677. The purpose of performing a comparative
review is not to search for proof that a defendant’s death
sentence is perfectly symmetrical with others, but to identify
and invalidate a death sentence that is aberrant. Orbe, 258 Va.
at 405, 519 S.E.2d at 817.
Emmett’s assertion that a raw statistical analysis of the
most recent capital murder cases reviewed by this Court
involving the gradation offense of robbery compels the
conclusion that a sentence of death would be inappropriate in
his case represents an overly simplistic and unwarranted
application of the proportionality review process. We do
include consideration of the predicate gradation offense or
status of the defendant or victim that elevates a murder to a
capital crime in narrowing our focus to determine
proportionality. However, we also take into account other
factors including, but not limited to, the method of killing,
the motive for the crime, the relationship between the defendant
and the victim, whether there was premeditation, and the
aggravating factors found by the sentencing body. In doing so,
we fulfill the statutory mandate to consider “both the crime and
the defendant.” By merely considering the most recent capital
murder cases appealed to this Court where the gradation offense
was robbery, Emmett has not based his argument on a probative
15
selection of prior cases, but on an incidental ratio that has
little or no bearing on the crime or the defendant in this case.
Having conducted the appropriate proportionality review, we
find that other sentencing bodies generally impose the death
penalty for comparable or similar crimes. See, e.g., Akers, 260
Va. 358, 535 S.E.2d 674; Graham v. Commonwealth, 250 Va. 79, 459
S.E.2d 97 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 997 (1996); Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 385 S.E.2d 50 (1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1074 (1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 237 Va. 126, 376
S.E.2d 288, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989); Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 229 Va. 469, 331 S.E.2d 422 (1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1099 (1986); Poyner v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 401, 329
S.E.2d 815, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865 (1985). Accordingly, we
hold that the sentence of death imposed in this case was not
disproportionate.
CONCLUSION
Having reviewed the sentence of death pursuant to Code
§ 17.1-313, we decline to commute that sentence. Accordingly,
we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 2
2
The United States Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, ___
U.S. ___, ___ 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002), recently held that
the execution of mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
The Court did not establish an express standard for determining
when an individual would be considered mentally retarded and
left to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to
16
Affirmed.
enforce this constitutional restriction upon executions.
Atkins, ___ U.S. at ___, 122 S.Ct. at 2250. The General
Assembly has not had the opportunity to address this matter
following the decision in Atkins.
At trial, Emmett did not assert that he is mentally
retarded. Moreover, our review of the record reveals nothing
that even suggests that he is mentally retarded. Emmett
received a high school equivalency diploma, attended a community
college, and was regularly employed during his adult life prior
to committing the murder in question. Accordingly, we conclude
that Emmett does not suffer from any mental retardation that
would constitutionally restrict the imposition of the death
sentence in this case.
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