In an action pursuant to RPÁPL article 15 to compel a determination of a claim to real property, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Sherwood, J. ), dated August 14, 2006, which granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied its cross motion for summary judgment on the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff is the owner of a parcel of real property (herein
The plaintiff claims that it has fee title to the centerline of parcel II and an easement over the whole of parcel II, based on the general rule that, “[w]hen an owner of property sells a lot with reference to a map, and the map shows that the lot abuts upon a street, the conveyance presumptively conveys fee ownership to the center of the street on which the lot abuts, subject to the rights of other lot owners and their invitees to use the entire area of the street for highway purposes” (Lehrman v Lake Katonah Club, Inc., 18 AD3d 514, 514 [2005]; see Bissell v New York Cent. R.R. Co., 23 NY 61, 64 [1861]; Sullivan v Markowitz, 239 AD2d 404 [1997]).
The presumption, however, that the grantor intended to pass title to the center of the street can be rebutted “by determining the intent of the parties gathered from the description of the premises [conveyed] read in connection with the other parts of the deed, and by reference to the situation of the lands and the condition and relation of the parties to those lands and other lands in the vicinity” (Sullivan v Markowitz, 239 AD2d at 405 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Mott v Mott, 68 NY 246 [1877]). Thus, the presumption can be rebutted by a showing in the deed of a contrary intent to exclude from the grant the bed of the street (see City of Albany v State of New York, 28 NY2d 352, 356 [1971]).
Here, the original common grantor of parcel I and parcel II, nonparty Stoney Point Technical Park, Inc., specifically conveyed to nonparty J.R. Warren Industries of Rockland, Inc., the grantee in each parties’ chain of title, by deed dated June 25, 1992, in fee simple title, two separate and distinct parcels described by metes and bounds. The grant of parcel I was limited by its metes and bounds description to the exterior line
In opposition to the defendant’s prima facie showing of entitlement to summary judgment, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and denied the plaintiffs cross motion for summary judgment (see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557 [1980]). Spolzino, J.P., Skelos, Florio and Dickerson, JJ., concur.