No. 80-149
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
VANESSA ESLINGER and LANETTE ESLINGER,
individually and as Co-Personal Representatives
of Estate of Walter and Clare Eslinger,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
VS.
RINGSBY TRUCK LINES, INC., and STATE
OF MONTANA,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Missoula
Hon. James Wheelis, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellants:
Morrison Law Offices, Missoula, Montana
Carey Matovich argued and Joan Jonkel argued, Missoula,
Montana
For Respondents:
Garlington, Lohn and Robinson, Missoula, Montana
Gary Graham argued, and Paul Meismer argued, Missoula,
Montana
J. Michael Young, Dept. of Administration, Helena,
Montana
Submitted: September 18, 1981
Decided : W ~ 1 2 198f
V
Filed: K'OV 1 r f m
g
Mr. J u s t i c e Gene B . D a l y d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n o f t h e C o u r t .
T h i s i s a w r o n g f u l d e a t h a c t i o n i n which p l a i n t i f f s
a p p e a l f r o m a f i n a l judgment and d e n i a l o f t h e i r m o t i o n f o r
a new trial of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the Fourth J u d i c i a l
District, f o l l o w i n g a j u r y v e r d i c t which found p l a i n t i f f s '
d e c e d e n t 1 0 0 p e r c e n t n e g l i g e n t and d e f e n d a n t s R i n g s b y T r u c k
L i n e s and t h e S t a t e o f Montana t o be f r e e o f a n y n e g l i g e n c e .
P l a i n t i f f s a p p e a l a s t o R i n g s b y Truck L i n e s o n l y .
Walter and C l a i r e E s l i n g e r were k i l l e d when a t r u c k
b e l o n g i n g t o Ringsby Truck L i n e s c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e E s l i n g e r
automobile. The t r u c k was d r i v e n by an employee, Howard
Skiles. The a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d a t 1 2 : 1 5 p.m., January 18,
1 9 7 8 , on Highway 93 a t R a v a l l i , Montana. The roadway was
snow c o v e r e d and s l i c k ; t h e t e m p e r a t u r e was b e t w e e n 20 and
25 degrees Fahrenheit.
The c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d n e a r t h e T- j u n c t i o n formed by
U.S. Highway 93 and Montana Highway 200. Highway 93 is
s t r a i g h t and r e l a t i v e l y f l a t t h r o u g h R a v a l l i b u t c h a n g e s a s
t h e highway p r o c e e d s n o r t h up R a v a l l i H i l l . The B i s o n C a f e
i s l o c a t e d on Highway 9 3 , d i r e c t l y a d j a c e n t t o t h e a c c i d e n t
site. Several witnesses were in the cafe and testified
regarding the accident.
W a l t e r E s l i n g e r was d r i v i n g h i s 1967 C h e v r o l e t down
Ravalli H i l l in the southbound lane of U.S. Highway 93.
C l a i r e E s l i n g e r was h i s p a s s e n g e r . A t t h e same t i m e , Howard
S k i l e s was d r i v i n g a 1 9 7 3 Mack t r a i l e r - t r a c t o r combination
i n t h e n o r t h b o u n d l a n e o f Highway 93. A s t h e C h e v r o l e t came
down t h e h i l l and c r o s s e d t h e j u n c t i o n , snow-packed ruts a t
the i n t e r s e c t i o n caused the car to fishtail. The p a r t i e s
differ sharply from this point in their theories of the
subsequent events.
Appellants claimed Eslinger regained control;
however, the driver of the Ringsby truck abruptly locked his
brakes and lost control of his vehicle. The trailer jack-
knifed and the truck skidded across the centerline into the
southbound lane and the Eslinger vehicle. According to
appellants, the direct and proximate cause of the collision
and the wrongful deaths of the Eslingers was the negligence
of the truck driver in failing to (1) keep a proper lookout;
(2) maintain reasonable control of the truck; (3) yield one
half of the roadway; and (4) operate at a reasonable speed.
Respondent Ringsby claimed that Eslinger lost control
of his vehicle at the intersection and skidded head-on into
the truck's proper lane. An integral part of Ringsby's
theory was the emergency created for the Ringsby driver when
Eslinger 's vehicle began to fishtail. Ringsby claimed the
momentary application of the truck's brakes was an
appropriate response to a perilous situation. The emergency
instruction given was therefore proper.
Howard Skiles, the truck driver, did not appear at
trial. His testimony was entered by deposition.
Several witnesses testified that the Eslinger vehicle
was fishtailing prior to the accident. The truck driver's
testimony by deposition of his perceptions and actions is
relevant to the use of the sudden emergency doctrine.
Driver Skiles testified he was familiar with the road and
aware of the icy, unsanded conditions. He further testified:
"Q. Could you pinpoint for us just how far
away the vehicle was when you first saw it?
A. Well, no, I can't.
"Q. Could you estimate it perhaps in car
lengths? A. Not really. I seen him cominq
down ........................ v e r g o t t o t h e
t h e h i l l b e f o r e he e
'unction. I d i d n ' t p a y t h a t much a t t e n t i o n
i o him u n t i l h e got-within one h u n d r e d y a r d s
o f me. [Emphasis added.]
"Q. So was h e on t h e s t r a i g h t a w a y when you
f i r s t began t o p a y a t t e n t i o n t o him? A . Yes.
"Q. How l o n g i s your r i g ? Could you
estimate that? A. I t is approximately
sixty-eight f e e t overall.
"Q. Does that include both trailers? A.
Yes.
"Q. Could you d e s c r i b e t h e v e h i c l e t h a t you
saw coming i n t h e s o u t h b o u n d l a n e ? A. It
was a -- I t w a s n ' t no new c a r b u t i t w a s n ' t
no r e a l o l d one e i t h e r .
"Q. Was i t a l a r g e c a r o r a s m a l l c a r ? A.
It wasn't neither. I t was a b o u t a medium-
size car.
"Q. And t h e c o l o r ? A. Blue, I believe.
"Q. When you f i r s t p e r c e i v e d t h e c a r and
f i r s t n o t i c e d i t , i t was o n t h e s t r a i g h t a w a y ?
A. Yes.
"Q. Could you t h e n d e s c r i b e f o r u s w h a t
happened n e x t ? A. He j u s t -- when I f i r s t
r e a l l y n o t i c e d him, he was coming q u i t e
fairly fast.
"Q. Could you e s t i m a t e h i s s p e e d ? A . No, I
w o u l d n ' t e v e n t r y b e c a u s e h e was coming r i g h t
s t r a i g h t a t me b u t h e ' s coming f a s t and
t h a t ' s -- I ' m n o t h e r e t o e s t i m a t e s p e e d s
anyway.
"Q. Did you t e s t i f y what y o u r s p e e d was a t
t h i s t i m e ? A. Yes.
"Q. How f a s t was that again? A. About
twenty-f i v e .
"Q. Was t h e o t h e r c a r a t a c o m p a r a b l e r a t e
o f s p e e d would you s a y ? A . A l o t faster I
would s a y b u t how much f a s t e r I w o u l d n ' t
know.
"Q. So t h e c a r i s coming s t r a i g h t down t h e
s o u t h b o u n d l a n e t o w a r d s you and t h e n w h a t
happens? A. E e went a c r o s s t h e j u n c t i o n
t h e r e where t h i s compact snow and i c e i s
r u t t y , g o t r u t s i n i t k i n d o f , a n d when h e
g o t p a s t , when he c r o s s e d t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n ,
h e s t a r t e d t o go l i k e t h a t ( i n d i c a t i n g ) .
"Q. Is h e on t h e s t r a i g h t w a y a t t h i s t i m e ?
A. Yes . ' I
The v e h i c l e s s u b s e q u e n t l y c o l l i d e d a t t h e l e f t f r o n t
bumper of the truck and the l e f t f r o n t door of the car.
Several witnesses testified they heard two impacts up to
f i v e seconds a p a r t . The o n l y e v i d e n c e o f c o l l i s i o n d e b r i s
was found in the southbound (Eslinger's) lane, thus
s u p p o r t i n g t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e r e p o r t and t e s t i m o n y o f t h e
Montana Highway P a t r o l o f f i c e r t h a t t h e p o i n t o f i m p a c t was
i n t h e southbound l a n e . R i n g s b y c l a i m s t h a t t h e d e b r i s was
from the second collision and that the first collision
occurred in the northbound lane. It claims that since
i n v e s t i g a t o r s were d e l a y e d a p p r o x i m a t e l y o n e h o u r , traffic
in the northbound lane around the accident destroyed the
p h y s i c a l evidence of t h e f i r s t c o l l i s i o n .
Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d t o t h i s C o u r t f o r r e v i e w :
1. Whether t h e g i v i n g o f a s u d d e n emergency i n s t r u c -
t i o n was e r r o n e o u s u n d e r the facts in the instant case, or
whether such an instruction should be given under any
circumstances.
2. Whether t h e a l l e g e d p r i o r i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e m e n t
of the truck driver t a k e n by a highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r was
p r o p e r l y r e j e c t e d by t h e c o u r t .
The i s s u e o f t h e emergency i n s t r u c t i o n f i r s t c o n c e r n s
t h e s u d d e n emergency i n s t r u c t i o n and s e c o n d a r i l y t h e g i v i n g
of the instruction in conjunction with the statutory
i n s t r u c t i o n on y i e l d i n g o n e - h a l f of t h e roadway.
The g i v e n s u d d e n emergency i n s t r u c t i o n , Instruction
No. 1 8 , i s a s f o l l o w s :
"A s u d d e n emergency e x i s t s when t h e d r i v e r o f
a motor v e h i c l e i s s u d d e n l y p l a c e d i n a
p o s i t i o n of imminent p e r i l , g r e a t mental
stress, or danger, which situation has not
been brought about by his own negligence, - but
in which instant action is necessary to avoid
a threatened danger. But the driver must use
that care which the ordinary prudent person
w o u l d e x e r c i s e u n d e r l i k e or s i m i l a r
....................................
circumstances. One suddenly confronted with
a peril through no fault of his own, who in
attempting to escape does not choose the best
or safest way should not be held negligent
because of such choice, unless it was so
hazardous that an ordinary prudent person
would not have made [it] under similar
circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellants claim the District Court further erred by
giving the sudden emergency instruction together with the
following instruction on yielding one-half of the roadway.
Instruction No. 9 provided:
"Under the statutes of the State of Montana,
the operator of a motor vehicle is obligated
to yield one half of the roadway to oncoming
traffic. If the operator of a motor vehicle
fails to yield one-half of the roadway and
collides with the vehicle proceeding in the
opposite direction in its lane of traffic,
- the operator --- vehicle failinq to
then- of the
yield one half of the roadway is negligent."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Appellants contend the two instructions, not being
compatible, confused the jury and, thus, prevented a fair
trial. Presser v. Anderson (1965), 146 Mont. 396, 407 P.2d
$fi A41; Adami v. Murphy (1945). 118 Mont. 172, 164 P.2d 150.
Appellants further contend that the-
sudden emergency
instruction is an
...................... exceEtion to the g e n e r a l rule that
------------
violation of a safety statute is negligence per se. Lyndes
v. Scofield (1979), 180 Mont. 177, 589 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep.
185; Duchesneau v. Silver Bow County (1971), 158 Mont. 369,
492 P.2d 926. Appellants contend further that the sudden
emergency doctrine has a limited application. In the
instant case, the evidence did not present an "emergency"
situation as envisioned by the doctrine. The slippery
highway was foreseeable; therefore, the doctrine is
unavailable. Boge v. Jack Link Truck Line, Inc. (Iowa
Respondent Ringsby contends that a sudden emergency
instruction and a statutory violation instruction do not
necessarily conflict, Hood v. Williamson (1972), 7 Wash.App.
355, 499 P.2d 68, and NeSmith v. Bowden (1977), 17 Wash.App.
602, 563 P.2d 1322, and that their theory of the accident
(Eslinger crossed the centerline causing an emergency
situation) was supported by the evidence presented.
Therefore, respondent was entitled to present its theory to
the jury by proper instruction. Locker v. Sammons Trucking
Company (1974), 10 Wash.App. 899, 520 P.2d 939. The
appellants' theory of preexisting negligence by Skiles is
not sufficient for excluding a sudden emergency situation.
Barbieri v. Jennings (1976), 90 N.M. 83, 559 P.2d 1210. The
"emergency" situation was the fishtailing of appellants' car
and not the slippery condition of the road. Drivers need
not anticipate all events. Erickson v. Perrett (1976), 169
Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074. Respondent contends none of the
authority cited by appellants address the emergency of an
oncoming car in the wrong lane.
The doctrine of sudden emergency was first adopted in
Montana in the case of Peabody v. Northern Pac. Railway Co.
(1927), 80 Mont. 492, 497, 261 P. 261, 262:
"The rule as stated in the authorities
generally is that:
"'One who, in a sudden emergency, acts
according to his best judgment, or who,
because of want of time in which to form a
judgment omits to act in the most judicious
manner, is not chargeable with negligence.
Such . . .
act or omission . . may be .
called a mistake, but not carelessness.'
(Citations omitted.)"
The sudden emergency doctrine has been recently
criticized, and its application limited in a recent decision
of this Court. In Kudrna v. Comet Corp. (1977), 175 Mont.
29, 572 P.2d 183, we stated:
"While we do not reject the concept of sudden
emergency, we emphasize that it has limited
application in the law of negligence, and
trial courts should be very cautious in
instructing the jury on sudden emergency. In
Finley v. Wiley, 103 N.J.Super. 95, 246 A.2d
715 (1968), the court criticized the sudden
emergency rule:
"'Further we entertain grave doubt whether a
sudden emergency charge should ever be given
in an ordinary automobile a c c i d e n t case.
.....................
T h e r e i s a modern view that it is
----------_----------------------
_
argumentative, unnecessary, and confusing,
and should be eliminated . . .
I1 I
. . . defendant was faced with no more than
-------y--y---------~ - l e mfor which-
an ever da traffic r o b - he
should have been prepared. - ------------------y
The ordinar
----_--_--- o f n e g--g_----------w e r e a ~ ~ l i c a b land
rules li ence -------- e
---_-----------_-
afforded a s u f f i c i e n t g --g ---y w h i c h to
au e b
appraise his conduct.'
"Further, this Court in Erickson v. Perrett,
169 Mont. 167, 545 P.2d 1074, 33 St.Rep. 109
(1976) cited Prosser on Torts, 4th ed., p.
170, with approval as to the limited
application of the rule:
"'A further qualification [to the sudden
emergency ruie] which must be made is that
some "emergencies" must be anticipated, and
the actor must be prepared to meet them when
he engages- an activity in whrch they are
in-
likely to arise. Thus under present day
traffic conditions, any driver of an
automobile must be prepared for the sudden
appearance of obstacles in the highway .I ..
(Bracketed material added.)" 572 P.2d at
191. (Emphasis supplied.)
Professor Prosser's complete discussion of the
emergency doctrine defines an emergency as a "sudden or
unexpected event or combination of circumstances which calls
for immediate action." Prosser on Torts, 4th ed., at 169.
Other limitations not quoted in Kudrna, supra, are:
"There are, however, a number of limitations
which have hedged the 'emergency' rule. It
does not mean that any different standard i s
-
to- applied in the emergency. The conduct
be
required is still that of a reasonable man
under the circumstances, as they would appear
to one who was using proper --------- the
care, and
emergency is only- of the circumstances.
-
one
An objective standard must still be applied,
and the actor's own judgment or impulse is
still not the sole criterion. He may still
be found to be negligent if, notwithstandinq
----- m e r g---y..........................to be
the e e n c , h i s a c t s are found
unreasonable. - 'emergency doctrine' is
The-
applied only where the situation which arises
------------------ - -
is sudden and unexpected, and such- to
-- as-
deprive the actor of reasonable opportunity
for deliberation and considered decision.
--------
Furthermore, it obviously cannot serve to
excuse the actor when the emergency has been
created through his own negligence, since he
cannot be permitted to shield himself behind
a situation resulting from his own fault. It
is, however, not the conduct after the
emergency has arisen which is not excused,
but the prior negligence; and where the
question is one of the last clear chance, the
defendant may still not be liable." (Emphasis
supplied.) (Footnotes omitted.) Prosser,
supra, at 169.
Before an instruction on the doctrine of sudden
emergency is given, the evidence should be sufficient to
support a finding that: (1) the claimed emergency actually
or apparently existed; (2) the perilous situation was not
created or contributed to by the person confronted; (3)
alternative courses of action in meeting the emergency were
open to such person or there was an opportunity to take some
action to avert the threatened casualty; and (4) the action
or course taken was such as would or might have been taken
by a person of reasonable prudence in the same or similar
situation. Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 1 (1961).
The limited application of the sudden emergency
doctrine in automobile cases and the reasons therefor are
stated in Kudrna. In the instant case, assuming the
"emergency" relied upon by respondent that preceded the
accident was the fishtailing of the Eslinger vehicle, the
evidence cannot be said to preclude the concurrent
negligence of the truck driver Skiles, who testified, ". . .
I didn't pay that much attention to him until he got within
one hundred yards of me."
"This Court has recognized the doctrine of sudden
emergency, but a party asserting sudden emergency cannot
obtain the benefit of that rule where the emergency itself
has been created [or contributed to] by the actor's own
negligent or other tortious conduct." Kudrna, 572 P.2d at
189. (The bracketed language reflects the broader rule of
other jurisdictions which denotes consideration of
comparative negligence principles.)
Further, the doctrine's requirement that the actor be
deprived of "reasonable opportunity for deliberation," is
doubtful here. The driver of the truck did not "pay that
much attention to him [Eslinger] until he got within one
hundred yards." The road was snow-covered and slick.
Assuming, as respondent argues, that the collision occurred
in the northbound lane, its driver was not confronted with a
decision precipitated by an emergency. The time between his
recognition of the Eslinger vehicle and the collision
precluded a decision by him, and, therefore, the doctrine
cannot be applied.
The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to
Ringsby ( e ., adopting its theory of the case) refutes
Ringsby's claim of the propriety of the instruction. Under
the doctrine when an actor who, forced by exigencies, makes
less than the optimal decision, the trier of fact should not
necessarily find negligence but rather consider the
emergency and, accordingly, the reasonableness of the
actor's conduct.. As s t a t e d by t h i s Court, t h e emergency
d o c t r i n e is a r e i t e r a t i o n of the r e a s o n a b l e man s t a n d a r d .
However, if no alternatives were available to the truck
d r i v e r , t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , a g a i n , was n o t a p p r o p r i a t e . There
was no c l a i m h e r e o f a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s o f c o n d u c t f a c i n g
t h e t r u c k d r i v e r f o l l o w i n g h i s r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e emergency.
C o n s i d e r a t i o n b e i n g g i v e n t o a l l t h e f a c t s i n a l i g h t most
f a v o r a b l e t o r e s p o n d e n t , w e must a g r e e w i t h a p p e l l a n t s t h a t
t h e g i v i n g o f I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 8 was p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r .
The s u d d e n emergency d o c t r i n e a d m o n i t i o n c o n t a i n e d i n
Kudrna, supra, i s we11 t a k e n , and now, in view of this
jurisdiction's adoption of t h e d o c t r i n e of comparative
n e g l i g e n c e , w e would a t t h i s t i m e admonish t h e t r i a l c o u r t s
t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n n o t be g i v e n i n a n o r d i n a r y a u t o m o b i l e
accident case. It is unnecessary and confusing. The
ordinary rules of negligence are applicable and afford a
s u f f i c i e n t g a u g e by which t o a p p r a i s e c o n d u c t .
T h i s does n o t c r e a t e a d i f f e r e n t standard or diminish
t h e e x i s t i n g s t a n d a r d t o be a p p l i e d i n a n emergency. The
c o n d u c t r e q u i r e d i s s t i l l t h a t o f a r e a s o n a b l e man u n d e r t h e
c i r c u m s t a n c e s a s t h e y would a p p e a r t o o n e u s i n g p r o p e r c a r e .
The emergency i s o n l y o n e o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
Ringsby d e v o t e s a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of i t s argument
to support the proposition that an emergency instruction
does not inherently conflict with an instruction on
v i o l a t i o n of a s a f e t y s t a t u t e . Hood v . Williamson, supra;
NeSmith v . Bowden, supra. T h i s p r o p o s i t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by
Montana c a s e law a s w e l l :
"The D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n c o n c l u d i n g t h a t
violation of the statute constituted
n e g l i g e n c e a s a m a t t e r of l a w . I t is w e l l
e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t i n v o l u n t a r y v i o l a t i o n of a
s t a t u t e i n an emergency due t o c i r c u m s t a n c e s
beyond the actor's control does not
c o n s t i t u t e negligence per se. Duchesneau v .
Mack T r u c k , I n c . ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 1 5 8 Mont. 3 6 9 , 3 7 7 ,
492 P.2d 9 2 6 , 9 3 0 . " Lyndes v . S c o f i e l d ,
s u p r a , 589 P.2d a t 1 0 0 4 .
W h i l e t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f a n e m e r g e n c y and n e g l i g e n c e
per se instruction is not necessarily error, the
d e t e r m i n a t i v e i s s u e i n t h i s a p p e a l i s a somewhat d i f f e r e n t
legal issue; i .e., whether t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d j u s t i f i e d
a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n a s a m a t t e r o f law.
The appellants finally contend the trial court's
r e f u s a l t o a l l o w i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a s t a t e m e n t g i v e n by d r i v e r
S k i l e s t o t h e i n v e s t i g a t i n g highway p a t r o l o f f i c e r s h o r t l y
after the a c c i d e n t was prejudicial and reversible error.
The e v i d e n c e was o f f e r e d a s e x t r i n s i c e v i d e n c e o f a prior
inconsistent statement. At trial, t h e E s l i n g e r s planned t o
impeach S k i l e s ' c o n t e n t i o n , made i n h i s d e p o s e d t e s t i m o n y ,
that he had not lost control. ~n h i s testimony, skiles
said:
" I s t a r t e d t o p u l l t o t h e r i g h t and I h i t my
b r a k e s and I s e e n t h a t w a s n ' t t h e r i g h t t h i n g
t o d o s o I g o t r i g h t back o f f them and t h e
v e h i c l e s t a r t e d t o l o c k up."
The e x c l u d e d s t a t e m e n t made t o t h e p a t r o l o f f i c e r :
" I t h e n t a p p e d my b r a k e s and saw my v e h i c l e
was s t a r t i n g t o s k i d , s o I a c c e l e r a t e d i n a n
----- ---o r e g a i n c o n t r o l -m y v e h i c l e . "
a t t e m ~ tt of
(Emphasis s u p p l i e d . )
Although the officer's report was excluded, the
o f f i c e r was a l l o w e d t o t e s t i f y r e g a r d i n g h i s i n t e r v i e w w i t h
Skiles.
"Q. With r e s p e c t t o Howard S k i l e s , t h e
d r i v e r o f t h e R i n g s b y t r u c k , d i d you i n t e r -
v i e w him i m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t ? A .
A p p r o x i m a t e l y two h o u r s a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t .
"Q. T h i s was i n S t . Ignatius, was i t ? A.
Yes, sir.
"Q. He was t a k e n t h e r e , I b e l i e v e , f o r
m e d i c a l a t t e n t i o n , and you i n t e r v i e w e d him a t
t h a t t i m e ? A. Yes, I d i d .
"Q. Did h e t e l l you t h a t when t h e E s l i n g e r
c a r came o f f t h e h i l l i t f i s h t a i l e d , a n d t h a t
he h i t h i s b r a k e s ? A . Yes, h e d i d .
"Q. Did h e t e l l you t h a t t h e n t h e t r a i l e r o n
h i s t r u c k s t a r t e d t o come a r o u n d on him? A .
Yes, he d i d .
"Q. Did h e t e l l you t h a t h e l o s t c o n t r o l o f
h i s truck? A. Y e s . he did." ( E m ~ h a s i ssuw-
, & &
plied.)
The t e s t i m o n y o f t h e p a t r o l o f f i c e r p r o v i d e d s u b s t a n -
t i a l l y t h e same e v i d e n c e a s t h e e x c l u d e d s t a t e m e n t and t h e
exclusion of the exhibit was harmless error. Rule 61,
M.R.Civ.P. T h i s i s p r o b a b l y more t r u e i n t h i s c a u s e b e c a u s e
t h e d r i v e r was n o t p r e s e n t i n c o u r t and a l l t e s t i m o n y was by
deposition. Further, ". . . e r r o r c a n n o t be p r e d i c a t e d upon
t h e e x c l u s i o n o f e v i d e n c e a t one s t a g e o f a t r i a l , if the
same e v i d e n c e is a d m i t t e d thereafter." S t a t e v. American
Bank & T r u s t Co. ( 1 9 2 6 ) , 75 Mont. 369, 384, 243 P. 1093,
1098. See a l s o K r a f t v. P a t t y n ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 1 3 5 Mont. 5 7 2 , 342
P.2d 1 0 6 3 .
The judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t Court is r e v e r s e d , and
t h e c a u s e i s remanded f o r a new t r i a l .
Justice
W concur:
e
Chief J u s t i c e
L
'
Justices
Hon&rable J o h n M. McCarvel ,
~ i s y r i c t udge, s i t t i n g i n
J
p l a c e o f Mr. J u s t i c e F r a n k B .
Morrison, J r .
Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea c o n c u r r i n g :
I a g r e e t h a t t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n s h o u l d
n o t have been g i v e n , t h a t i t was p r e j u d i c i a l , and t h e r e f o r e
t h a t a new t r i a l s h o u l d be g r a n t e d . I f u r t h e r agree t h a t
it i s t i m e f o r t h e demise of t h e sudden-emergency i n s t r u c t i o n
i n any s i t u a t i o n . G e n e r a l i n s t r u c t i o n s on n e g l i g e n c e a r e
f u l l y c a p a b l e of p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y . I want t o
emphasize, however, a f a c t o r t h a t h a s n o t been mentioned
i n t h e m a j o r i t y opinion--the d e f e n d a n t a r g u e d t h e sudden
emergency t o t h e j u r y and t h e r e f o r e t h e d e f e n d a n t i s n o t now
i n a p o s i t i o n t o c o n t e n d t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was h a r m l e s s .
A t t h e p r e t r i a l hearing, t h e p l a i n t i f f s had no i d e a t h a t
t h e d e f e n d a n t would r e l y on a sudden emergency as a t l e a s t
one of t h e t h e o r i e s e x o n e r a t i n g i t from l i a b i l i t y . This
t h e o r y was f i r s t p r e s e n t e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t a t t h e end of
t h e c a s e d u r i n g t h e s e t t l e m e n t of i n s t r u c t i o n s . The i n s t r u c t i o n
was g i v e n o v e r t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' o b j e c t i o n .
Although it was n o t a r g u e d i n t h e b r i e f s , t h e d e f e n d a n t
t r u c k l i n e s a r g u e d a t t h e h e a r i n g of t h i s a p p e a l , t h a t , i n
any e v e n t , t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n was h a r m l e s s e r r o r .
T h i s argument w a s based on t h e u n d e r l y i n g c o n t e n t i o n t h a t e a c h
s i d e approached t h e c a s e knowing t h a t t h e c a s e would t u r n on
which o f t h e v e h i c l e s was on t h e wrong s i d e of t h e r o a d a t t h e
t i m e o f impact. I f t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' v e h i c l e w a s i n t h e northbound
l a n e o f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s t r u c k , t h e d e f e n d a n t t r u c k l i n e s would
prevail. But i f t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s t r u c k w a s i n t h e southbound
l a n e of t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' a t t h e t i m e of t h e i m p a c t , t h e
p l a i n t i f f s would p r e v a i l . For t h i s reason, t h e defendant
t r u c k l i n e s argued t h a t t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n was
h a r m l e s s e r r o r b e c a u s e t h e j u r y must have found t h a t t h e
p l a i n t i f f s ' v e h i c l e was i n t h e northbound l a n e o f t h e
defendant's t r u c k a t t h e time of impact.
But d u r i n g t h e f i n a l arguments t o t h e j u r y , d e f e n d a n t ' s
c o u n s e l d i d n o t downgrade t h e a p p l i c a t i o n and e f f e c t of t h e
sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n . R a t h e r , he emphasized t o
t h e j u r y t h a t i t would p r o b a b l y be a v i t a l a i d i n h e l p i n g
t h e jury reach a decision.
Counsel used t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n as f o l l o w s
i n h i s f i n a l argument:
". . . There h a s been no t e s t i m o n y by anyone
i n t h i s case t h a t t h a t truck w a s traveling
a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n a slow, c a r e f u l speed u n t i l
- sudden emergency.
a - going - - - -
I'm t o a s k t h a t you
go - - - - -- i n s t r u c t i o n on
- t o t h e j u r y and r e a d t h e
sudden emergency, b e c a u s e I ' m n o t g o i n g to t a l k
a b o u t it. You- - i t , - you a p p l y t h a t
- read and -
i n s t r-u c t i o n - -e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e . "
.
t o th --- (Emphas i s
added. )
Although d e f e n s e c o u n s e l d i d n o t a g a i n mention t h e
i n s t r u c t i o n , t h e e n t i r e c a s e based on t h e d e p o s i t i o n o f
t h e t r u c k d r i v e r r e a d i n t o e v i d e n c e , and i n p a r t r e a d a g a i n
t o t h e j u r y by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l i n f i n a l argument, was t h a t
t h e c o n d u c t o f t h e t r u c k d r i v e r s h o u l d be judged by t h e
f a c t t h a t he t o o k a c t i o n i n an emergency s i t u a t i o n . Obviously
t h e d e f e n s e wanted t h e j u r y t o judge t h e t r u c k d r i v e r ' s
c o n d u c t based f i r s t on t h e f a c t t h a t h e had responded t o a n
emergency s i t u a t i o n .
W e do n o t , of c o u r s e , know how t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s
verdict. But t h e j u r y c o u l d have d e c i d e d t h a t t h e t r u c k
w a s i n t h e wrong l a n e of t r a f f i c a t t h e t i m e o f i m p a c t ,
b u t a l s o t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d n o t be h e l d l i a b l e b e c a u s e
t h e t r u c k d r i v e r had responded t o an emergency s i t u a t i o n and
i n s o d o i n g he c o u l d n o t c o n t r o l t h e movement of h i s t r u c k
a f t e r he a p p l i e d h i s brakes. O r it i s p o s s i b l e t h a t a p a r t
o f t h e j u r y d e c i d e d t h e c a s e on t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s '
vehicle was in the wrong lane of traffic but that the
remainder of the jurors needed for a verdict, based their
decision on an emergency situation justifying the truck
driver being in the wrong lane of traffic at the time of
impact. They could have based their decision on the sudden
emergency instruction.
Under these circumstances, I cannot accept the defendant
truck line's argument that the instruction, if error, was
harmless.
Mr. J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d i s s e n t i n g :
I respectfully dissent.
The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n s e t s f o r t h t h e f u l l t e x t of I n s t r u c -
t i o n No. 1 8 , which i s t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n
i n t h i s case. I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s a
d u p l i c a t e of t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n g i v e n i n Dawe
v . D a l l e y ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 73, 504 P.2d 982. I n t h e Dawe
c a s e , t h e D a l l e y c a r had f o l l o w e d t h e Dawe v e h i c l e f o r
a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e - q u a r t e r s of a m i l e up t h e n o r t h s i d e of
Boulder H i l l on Highway 9 1 i n J e f f e r s o n County. The Dawe
c a r was o b s e r v e d t o have d i f f i c u l t y n e g o t i a t i n g t h e h i l l and
was f i s h t a i l i n g . When t h e c a r s t a r t e d down t h e s o u t h s i d e ,
t h e y were t r a v e l i n g no f a s t e r t h a n 1 5 m i l e s p e r h o u r , w i t h
D a l l e y t e s t i f y i n g he w a s t r y i n g t o keep 50-75 f e e t behind
t h e Dawe v e h i c l e . Upon r e a c h i n g a s h a r p c u r v e t h e Dawe
v e h i c l e went o u t of c o n t r o l w i t h f r o n t wheels c o l l i d i n g w i t h
a snowbank and t h e r e a r end s l i d i n g around. A t t h i s point
D a l l e y t r i e d t o t u r n t o t h e l e f t b u t was u n a b l e t o do s o
b e c a u s e of oncoming t r a f f i c . H e t h e n a p p l i e d b r a k e s and
s l i d i n t o t h e Dawe v e h i c l e . Based upon t h e s e f a c t s , t h i s
C o u r t i n a unanimous d e c i s i o n a g r e e d t h a t i t was p r o p e r t o
g i v e t h e sudden emergency i n s t r u c t i o n . The C o u r t s t a t e d :
"'We a r e a l s o of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e c o u r t
d i d n o t e r r i n i n s t r u c t i n g the jury with
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e emergency d o c t r i n e . An
i n s t r u c t i o n on t h i s t h e o r y s h o u l d always b e
g i v e n where i t i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e t h e o r y
of one of t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e a c t i o n and
where t h e e v i d e n c e s u b m i t t e d by s u c h p a r t y
would s u s t a i n a f i n d i n g t h a t he had been
c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a sudden p e r i l o r emer-
gency and a c t e d under i t s s t r e s s . ' " 1 6 1 Mont.
a t 76, 504 P.2d a t 984.
The C o u r t f u r t h e r q u o t e d from t h e Montana r u l e s s t a t e d
i n Peabody v . N o r t h e r n Pac. Ry. Co. ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 80 Mont. 492,
" ' I f t h e evidence i n t h i s case w e r e s u f f i c i e n t
t o warrant a reasonable conclusion t h a t a t
t h e time i n question t h e defendant . . .
was
c o n f r o n t e d w i t h a "sudden emergency," o r t h a t
" t h e r e was want of t i m e i n which t o form a
judgment", under t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a s t h e y
a p p e a r e d t o him, - c o u r t s h o u l d have g i v e n
the
- o f f e r e d i n s t r u c t i o n s . ' Emphasis s u p p l i e d . "
the
1 6 1 Mont. a t 76, 504 P.2d a t 984.
A t t h e time of t h e t r i a l of t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , the
h o l d i n g i n Dawe had n o t been m o d i f i e d o r o v e r t u r n e d . No
s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e i s made t o t h i s c a s e i n t h e m a j o r i t y
opinion.
The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n makes a n e x t e n s i v e r e f e r e n c e t o
t h e Kudrna c a s e . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e q u o t e d p o r t i o n s
of t h a t c a s e a r e e s s e n t i a l l y d i c t a . I n Kudrna t h i s C o u r t
found t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e of sudden emergency c o u l d n o t be
a p p l i e d b e c a u s e t h e t r u c k d r i v e r had c r e a t e d h i s own emergency
by h i s own n e g l i g e n t a c t s .
Following t h e q u o t a t i o n from Kudrna and P r o s s e r t h e
m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n r e f e r s t o t h e a n n o t a t i o n i n 80 ALR 2d 1
and p o i n t s o u t t h a t b e f o r e t h e i n s t r u c t i o n on t h e d o c t r i n e
of sudden emergency i s g i v e n , t h e e v i d e n c e s h o u l d be s u f f i c i e n t
t o s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g t h a t (1) t h e c l a i m e d emergency a c t u a l l y
o r apparently existed; ( 2 ) t h e a p p a r e n t s i t u a t i o n was n o t
c r e a t e d o r c o n t r i b u t e d t o by t h e p e r s o n c o n f r o n t e d ; (3)
a l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n i n meeting t h e emergency w e r e
open t o such p e r s o n o r t h e r e was a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o t a k e some
a c t i o n t o a v e r t the threatened casualty; ( 4 ) the action o r
c o u r s e t a k e n was s u c h a s would o r m i g h t have been t a k e n by a
p e r s o n of r e a s o n a b l e prudence i n t h e same o r s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n .
The m a j o r i t y t h e n s e e k s t o a p p l y t h e f a c t s t o t h e f o r e g o i n g
r u l e s and a r r i v e s a t a c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n was
improper.
W e r e s p e c t f u l l y s u b m i t t h a t t h e r e h a s been a f a i l u r e on
t h e p a r t of the majority t o accurately analyze t h e f a c t s i n
t h e p r e s e n t case. The e v i d e n c e on t h e p o i n t o f i m p a c t of
the vehicles i s i n d i r e c t conflict. The m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n
makes r e f e r e n c e t o t h e e v i d e n c e o f c o l l i s i o n d e b r i s i n t h e
southbound l a n e o f t r a f f i c and t h e t e s t i m o n y o f t h e highway
p a t r o l o f f i c e r t h a t t h e p o i n t of i m p a c t was i n t h e southbound
l a n e , t h a t b e i n g t h e l a n e of t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' car. That
e v i d e n c e i s c e r t a i n l y s i g n i f i c a n t and i s u n f a v o r a b l e t o t h e
defendant. However, i t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e r e i s
extensive evidence c o n t r a d i c t i n g t h e patrolman's conclusion
a s t o t h e p o i n t of i m p a c t . I n a s i m i l a r manner, t h e r e i s
e x t e n s i v e t e s t i m o n y which p o s i t i v e l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s '
car made two complete s p i n s on t h e i c y highway, f i s h t a i l e d
back and f o r t h , and s l i d sideways a c r o s s from i t s own l a n e
of t r a f f i c i n t o t h e l a n e of t r a f f i c of t h e northbound
t r u c k , c o l l i d i n g w i t h t h e t r u c k i n t h e northbound l a n e o f
traffic. The a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d i n t h e town of R a v a l l i i n a n
a r e a p o s t e d f o r 4 5 m i l e s p e r hour t r a v e l . The e v i d e n c e
i n d i c a t e s t h e t r u c k was d r i v i n g n o r t h a t 25-35 m i l e s p e r
hour and t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' c a r w a s d r i v i n g s o u t h down
R a v a l l i H i l l a t a speed of 35 m i l e s p e r hour o r p o s s i b l y
faster. T h a t e v i d e n c e shows t h a t t h e sudden emergency s o
f a r as t h e t r u c k d r i v e r w a s concerned was t h e s l i d i n g sideways
a c r o s s i n t o h i s t r a f f i c l a n e of t h e E s l i n g e r c a r .
Mark F i t c h , 4 0 y e a r s of a g e , w i t h 2 2 y e a r s of d r i v i n g
e x p e r i e n c e , was s e a t e d i n t h e Bison C a f e , which i s n e x t t o
t h e highway and a d j a c e n t t o t h e p o i n t of c o l l i s i o n . Key
p a r t s of M r . F i t c h ' s testimony a r e :
"A. W e l l , t h e c a r ( E s l i n g e r c a r ) was headed
s o u t h , corning o f f of R a v a l l i H i l l , and when
i t g o t c l o s e t o t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n of 2 0 0 a t
t h e f o o t of t h e h i l l , i t seemed t o s t a r t
f i s h t a i l i n g o u t of c o n t r o l and s t a r t e d two
c l o c k w i s e s p i n s s t i l l heading s o u t h .
"Q. How f a s t was t h e b l u e c a r ( E s l i n g e r c a r )
t r a v e l i n g a s i t approached t h e i n t e r s e c t i o n
heading toward Thompson F a l l s ?
"A. I would g u e s s between t h i r t y - thirty-
f i v e m i l e s a n hour.
"Q. You i n d i c a t e d t h a t i t s t a r t e d t o f i s h t a i l ;
is that right?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Can you t e l l t h e j u r y i n your own words
what your c o n c e p t i o n of a f i s h t a i l i n g maneuver
is?
"A. The back end t r y i n g t o p a s s t h e f r o n t end.
"Q. What d i d you do when you saw i t a t t e m p t i n g
to fishtail?
"A. Well, I watched i t go i n t o a c o u p l e of
c l o c k w i s e s p i n s , and t h e n I immediately looked
s o u t h , b e c a u s e m w i f e was supposed t o m e e t m e .
y
"Q. Why i s i t t h a t you looked s o u t h ?
"A. She d r i v e s a C h e v r o l e t C h e v e t t e , and I
was concerned s h e may be t h e n e x t c a r i n l i n e .
"Q. Based upon your twenty-two y e a r s of d r i v -
i n g e x p e r i e n c e , was t h e b l u e c a r i n c o n t r o l
a s i t proceeded from t h e Thompson F a l l s i n t e r -
section southerly?
"A. No.
"Q. A s you looked s o u t h e r l y towards t h e
d i r e c t i o n t o which you t h o u g h t your w i f e was
a p p r o a c h i n g , d i d you have t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o
see a n y o t h e r v e h i c l e ?
"A. Y e s , t h e r e was a t r u c k a p p r o a c h i n g headed
north .
"Q. Could you t e l l , based upon your o b s e r v a -
t i o n o f t h a t t r u c k a t t h a t p l a c e and t i m e , how
f a s t i t was t r a v e l i n g ?
"A. I would g u e s s a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h i r t y - thirty-
f i v e m i l e s a n hour.
"Q. A t t h e t i m e you saw t h e t r u c k , which l a n e
of t r a f f i c w a s i t i n , t h e r i g h t l a n e . Excuse
me, s t r i k e t h a t .
"Was i t i n t h e northbound l a n e o r t h e s o u t h -
bound l a n e ?
"A. I t was i n t h e northbound l a n e .
"Q. Had you d r i v e n t h a t p a r t i c u l a r roadway
before?
"A. Many t i m e s .
"Q. Were you f a m i l i a r w i t h where t h e snow
berms were on t h e s i d e and where t h e c e n t e r -
l i n e was u n d e r n e a t h t h e snowpack?
"A. Yes.
"Q. A s t h e t r u c k proceeded f u r t h e r n o r t h e r l y ,
d i d i t s t a y i n t h e northbound l a n e ?
"A. Yes, i t d i d .
"Q. M r . F i t c h , I ' l l a s k some more s p e c i f i c
q u e s t i o n s l a t e r , b u t w i l l you t e l l t h i s j u r y
i n your own words e x a c t l y what you saw a s t h e
t r u c k and t h e c a r approached e a c h o t h e r .
"A. J u s t a l i t t l e b i t s o u t h o f what u s e d t o
b e t h e Texaco s t a t i o n t h e r e t h e t r u c k w a s i n
t h e northbound l a n e , and t h e c a r seemed t o
be s t a r t i n g i n t o a n o t h e r s p i n and was s i t t i n g
crossways i n t h e northbound l a n e , a t which
time t h e truck contacted it a t about t h e
p a s s e n g e r o r t h e d r i v e r ' s d o o r , which would
be t h e l e f t s i d e , w i t h t h e l e f t f r o n t c o r n e r
of t h e v e h i c l e , t r u c k , and proceeded t o shove
i t back up t h e highway, I would g u e s s a hundred
- hundred and f i f t y f e e t . F i r s t c o n t a c t t h e
t r u c k immediately -- t h e t r a c t o r j a c k k n i f e d ,
made c o n t a c t a b o u t a hundred f e e t - a hundred
f i f t y f e e t up t h e r o a d , a t which time i t h i t
t h e r i g h t s i d e of t h e t r u c k , s t i l l h i t t i n g
t h e d r i v e r ' s s i d e of t h e c a r , shoving i t o f f
t o t h e w e s t of t h e highway, and t h e t r a i l e r
t h e n c o n t i n u e d t o s p i n around and s l i d e o f f
t o t h e w e s t s i d e of t h e highway.
"Q. M r . F i t c h , when t h e f i r s t c o n t a c t was
made between t h e c a r and t h e t r u c k , was t h e
t r u c k i n t h e northbound l a n e o r i n t h e s o u t h -
bound l a n e ?
"A. W a s i n t h e northbound l a n e .
"Q. When t h e c a r f i r s t made c o n t a c t w i t h t h e
t r u c k , was i t i n t h e northbound l a n e o r i n
t h e southbound l a n e ?
"A. Mostly i n t h e northbound l a n e .
"Q. Was t h e c a r a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t i n
t i m e w i t h i t s nose headed s o u t h , o r was i t
sideways?
"A. A l i t t l e sideways, s t i l l p r i m a r i l y headed
south.
"Q. Did you, from where you w e r e s e a t e d , h e a r
t h e s e v a r i o u s i m p a c t s t h a t took p l a c e ?
"A. Yes, I d i d .
"Q. Did you h e a r t h e f i r s t i m p a c t when you s a w
it take place?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Approximately how many s e c o n d s e l a p s e d
b e f o r e t h e second impact took p l a c e ?
"A. F i v e , t h r e e , f o u r , f i v e s e c o n d s , v e r y
s h o r t p e r i o d of t i m e .
"Q. Approximately f i v e seconds?
"A. Approximately.
"Q. Can you d e s c r i b e t o t h e j u r y what happened
t o t h e c a r a t t h e time of t h e f i r s t i m p a c t ?
"A. Y e s , i t was shoved back up t h e highway,
t h a t would be n o r t h , which i t went a l i t t l e
b i t t o t h e southbound l a n e , and on t h e second
i m p a c t t h e n i t took p l a c e i n t h e southbound
lane. "
V i r g i n i a B u t l e r , who had l i v e d i n t h e R a v a l l i a r e a f o r
3 7 y e a r s and been d r i v i n g a c a r f o r 20 y e a r s , a l s o t e s t i f i e d .
She a l s o was s e a t e d n e x t t o a window i n t h e Bison C a f e ,
d i r e c t l y o p p o s i t e t h e p o i n t of c o l l i s i o n . She t e s t i f i e d a t
l e n g t h a s t o h e r o b s e r v a t i o n s of b o t h v e h i c l e s . She confirmed
t h a t t h e E s l i n g e r c a r was g o i n g v i r t u a l l y sideways on t h e
highway. She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e c a r was t r a v e l i n g f a s t e r
than the truck. She f u r t h e r confirmed t h a t t h e t r u c k was i n
i t s c o r r e c t l a n e , t h a t b e i n g t h e northbound l a n e , and t h a t
j u s t p r i o r t o t h e i m p a c t , t h e c a r was i n t h e wrong l a n e ,
t h a t b e i n g t h e northbound l a n e a s w e l l . She a l s o confirmed
t h a t s h e h e a r d two l o u d n o i s e s , w i t h t h e second n o i s e b e i n g
s e v e r a l seconds a f t e r t h e f i r s t . She t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e
t r u c k ended up swerving around a f t e r t h e c o l l i s i o n and
i t s e l f heading s o u t h .
Howard S k i l e s , d r i v e r of t h e t r u c k t e s t i f i e d a s mentioned
i n the majority opinion. H e t e s t i f i e d t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of
b r a k e s on t h e t r u c k and t r a i l e r , which r e s u l t e d i n a s l i d i n g
o r l o c k i n g , a f t e r which he r e l e a s e d such b r a k e s . I t was
t h i s a p p l i c a t i o n of b r a k e s which t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s was
t h e a c t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e t r u c k d r i v e r which was j u s t i f i e d
b e c a u s e of t h e sudden emergency. In pertinent p a r t Skiles testified:
"A. I s t a r t e d t o p u l l t o t h e r i g h t and I
h i t m b r a k e s and I s e e n t h a t wasn' t t h e
y
r i g h t t h i n g t o do s o I g o t r i g h t back o f f
them and t h e v e h i c l e s t a r t e d t o l o c k up.
"Q. What happened when you h i t your b r a k e s ?
"A. I t s t a r t e d t o l o c k up.
"Q. And what o c c u r r e d when i t s t a r t e d t o
l o c k up?
"A. I t s t a r t e d t o s l i d e and I immediately
let off.
"Q. What d i r e c t i o n d i d i t s t a r t t o s l i d e ?
"A. J u s t down t h e s t r e e t .
"Q. Was i t g o i n g s t r a i g h t ?
"A. F a i r l y s t r a i g h t , yes.
"Q. I n what p o s i t i o n was t h e t r a i l e r a t t h i s
point?
"A. I t was behind m e .
"Q. Did t h e t r a i l e r s t a r t t o come forward?
"A. N o , I l e t o f f on t h e b r a k e s b e f o r e t h e y
had a chance. I j u s t b a r e l y tapped them.
"Q. You t a p p e d t h e b r a k e s , you f e l t t h e
v e h i c l e l o c k up -- I t h i n k t h a t ' s t h e t e r m
you used -- and s l i d e . You went i n t o a s k i d .
"A. Started to.
"Q. Then what happened?
"A. I l e t o f f t h e b r a k e s , looked back and he
s t a r t e d t o f i s h t a i l and he t u r n e d a b o u t h a l f
sideways and h e was coming r i g h t a t m e .
"Q. Where was your v e h i c l e a t t h i s time and
t h i s i s j u s t b e f o r e t h e impact?
"A. W e l l , t h e r e i s no way f o r m e t o r e a l l y --
The v e h i c l e i t s e l f , mine w a s -- I t was w e l l
o v e r i n m l a n e a t t h e time of impact.
y
"Q. Your v e h i c l e was i n t h e northbound l a n e
a t t h e t i m e of t h e impact?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Did i t e v e r s l i d e o v e r t o t h e southbound
lane?
"A. T h a t s t r e e t i s plowed r e a l wide r i g h t t h e r e .
T h a t must be o v e r s e v e n t y f e e t of s t r e e t r i g h t
t h e r e b u t i t was way o v e r on m s i d e .
y
"Q. Did you e v e r c r o s s t h e c e n t e r l i n e ?
"A. NO."
O f f i c e r Magone d i d t e s t i f y a s f o l l o w s w i t h r e g a r d t o
t h e p o i n t of impact:
"Q. Is t h e r e any q u e s t i o n i n your mind, o f f i c e r ,
a b o u t where t h e i m p a c t of t h i s a c c i d e n t o c c u r r e d ?
"A. NO, sir.
"Q. And i t o c c u r r e d , a s you s a i d , i n t h e s o u t h -
bound l a n e , c l o s e t o t h e w e s t e d g e , I t h i n k you
s a i d of t h e a s p h a l t ?
"A. I t i s d i f f i c u l t t o t e l l e x a c t l y where t h e
edge o f t h e l a n e w a s , b u t i t w a s on t h e w e s t
s i d e , y e s , i n t h e southbound l a n e ; k i n d of
h a r d t o t e l l r i g h t where t h e l a n e i s t h e r e due
t o t h e snow c o v e r , b u t from t h e c e n t e r l i n e
o v e r t o t h i s p o i n t we would p u t i t on t h e edge
of t h e lane."
Reviewing t h e e v i d e n c e i n the l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o
t h e d e f e n d a n t , a s r e q u i r e d , we would h o l d t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s
r e q u i r e d under t h e a n n o t a t i o n from 8 0 A R 2d. 1, c i t e d i n
L
t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n have been m e t :
1) The c l a i m e d emergency which a c t u a l l y e x i s t e d was
t h e s l i d i n g of t h e E s l i n g e r c a r sideways i n t o t h e t r u c k ' s
l a n e of t r a f f i c .
2) The p e r i l o u s s i t u a t i o n was n o t c r e a t e d by t h e
truck d r i v e r - t h e t r u c k d r i v e r t e s t i f i e d " I s e e n him coming
down t h e h i l l b e f o r e he e v e r g o t t o t h e j u n c t i o n . I didn' t
pay t h a t much a t t e n t i o n t o him u n t i l he g o t w i t h i n 1 0 0 y a r d s
o f me." The m a j o r i t y h a s s u g g e s t e d t h i s i s a n i n d i c a t i o n o f
negligence. T h a t c a n n o t be i m p l i e d where t h e e v i d e n c e shows
t h a t he was d r i v i n g a t 25-35 m i l e s p e r hour. Note t h e r e i s
no o t h e r e v i d e n c e showing n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e
truck d r i v e r with t h e exception of t h e reference t o t h e
p o i n t of c o l l i s i o n by t h e e v i d e n c e of t h e highway p a t r o l m a n .
3) A l t e r n a t i v e c o u r s e s of a c t i o n i n meeting t h e
emergency were open t o t h e t r u c k d r i v e r - c l e a r l y i t made
s e n s e f o r him t o t u r n r i g h t and a p p l y t h e b r a k e s a s he d i d .
4) The a c t i o n t a k e n w a s s u c h a s m i g h t have been t a k e n
by a p e r s o n of r e a s o n a b l e prudence i n t h e same o r s i m i l a r
situations - t h i s seems t o have been a n e n t i r e l y a p p r o p r i a t e
c o u r s e of a c t i o n t o be t a k e n by a r e a s o n a b l y p r u d e n t p e r s o n .
While t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e b r a k e s d i d c a u s e some l o c k i n g
and p o s s i b l y s l i d i n g , t h e immediate r e l e a s e of t h e b r a k e s
a l l o w e d t h e t r u c k and t r a i l e r s t o remain i n t h e p r o p e r l a n e .
Our c a s e i s d i r e c t l y comparable t o Hood v. Williamson
( 1 9 7 2 ) , 7 Wash. App. 355, 4 9 9 P.2d 68. I n t h e Hood case,
t h e r e was a head-on c o l l i s i o n where t h e o c c u p a n t s of t h e
v e h i c l e s were b o t h k i l l e d and t h e r e was c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e
c o n c e r n i n g t h e l a n e i n which t h e c o l l i s i o n o c c u r r e d . With
r e g a r d t o t h e emergency i n s t r u c t i o n s i m i l a r t o t h e i n s t r u c t i o n
here given, the c o u r t s t a t e d :
"An emergency i n s t r u c t i o n i s p r o p e r l y
a p p l i e d on b e h a l f of t h e d r i v e r o f a c a r
on i t s own s i d e of t h e r o a d , when c o n f r o n t -
e d w i t h a c a r on t h e wrong s i d e o f t h e
road. [ C i t a t i o n omitted. I There was s u b s t a n t i a l
e v i d e n c e t o j u s t i f y g i v i n g t h e emergency i n s t r u c -
t i o n on b e h a l f of b o t h p l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t . "
4 9 9 P.2d a t 7 2 .
I n t h e f a c t s i t u a t i o n of t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , t h e emergency
i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d be a p p l i c a b l e t o b o t h t h e p l a i n t i f f s ' and
d e f e n d a n t ' s s i d e of t h e c a s e . The p l a i n t i f f s c o u l d have
a r g u e d t h a t t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e b r a k e s , l o c k i n g of t h e
w h e e l s , and s l i d i n g of t h e t r u c k was a n emergency which
r e q u i r e d a r e s p o n s e on t h e p a r t of t h e E s l i n g e r s . On t h e
o t h e r hand, a s a r g u e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e sideways s l i d i n g
of t h e E s l i n g e r v e h i c l e i n t o t h e wrong t r a f f i c l a n e c l e a r l y
r e q u i r e d a n emergency r e s p o n s e by t h e t r u c k d r i v e r .
W e f i n d t h a t b o t h p l a i n t i f f s and d e f e n d a n t were r e p r e s e n t e d
by v e r y competent c o u n s e l , and p r e s e n t e d a l l of t h e e v i d e n c e
a v a i l a b l e i n b e h a l f of e a c h s i d e . There w e r e s t r i k i n g
c o n f l i c t s i n t h e evidence. A f t e r due c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t h e
j u r y found t h a t t h e n e g l i g e n c e of t h e E s l i n g e r s w a s 100% of
t h e c a u s e of t h e a c c i d e n t , and t h a t t h e r e was no n e g l i g e n c e
on t h e p a r t of t h e t r u c k d r i v e r . W would a f f i r m t h e judgment
e
of t h e lower c o u r t .
W e concur i n t h e above d i s s e n t :
Chief J u s t i c e
Eslinger v. Ringsby Truck Lines, Inc.
Court: Montana Supreme Court
Date filed: 1981-11-12
Citations: 636 P.2d 254, 195 Mont. 292
Copy CitationsCombined Opinion