IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-10-00344-CR
EX PARTE WILLIAM RENE DIAZ,
From the 272nd District Court
Brazos County, Texas
Trial Court No. 04-02588-CRF-272-A
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On August 30, 2004, William Rene Diaz pleaded guilty to the felony offense of
driving while intoxicated with a child passenger. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 49.045
(Vernon Supp. 2010). The trial court convicted appellant and assessed his punishment
at two years in a state jail facility and a $500 fine. The trial court suspended imposition
of the sentence and placed Diaz on community supervision for four years. The trial
court entered an order September 8, 2008, discharging Diaz from community
supervision. On June 21, 2010, Diaz filed an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus
under TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 11.072 (Vernon 2005). The trial court denied
Diaz’s Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus. We affirm.
We review the trial court's denial of habeas relief under an abuse of discretion
standard and will consider the facts in the light most favorable to the court's ruling. Ex
parte Wheeler, 203 S.W.3d 317, 324 (Tex.Crim.App.2006); Doyle v. State, 317 S.W.3d 471,
475 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d). We afford almost complete
deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts supported by the record,
especially when those factual findings rely upon an evaluation of credibility and
demeanor. Doyle v. State, 317 S.W.3d at 475. We apply the same deference to review the
trial court's application of law to fact questions, if the resolution of those determinations
rests upon an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Id. However, if the outcome of
those ultimate questions turns upon an application of legal standards, we review the
trial court's determination de novo. Id.
In his sole issue on appeal, Diaz argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by not evaluating his Writ of Habeas Corpus in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct.
1473 (2010). In Padilla, the Court stated that a defendant is entitled to effective
assistance of counsel before deciding whether to plead guilty. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130
S.Ct. at 1480-1; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 80 L.Ed.2d 674
(1984). The Court held that counsel must inform his client whether his plea carries a
risk of deportation. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. at 1486.
Diaz argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to inform him that he would no longer be eligible for Temporary
Protected Status as a result of his felony conviction. Diaz states that he would not have
entered a plea if he knew he would lose TPS status and face deportation.
Ex parte Diaz Page 2
In an affidavit, trial counsel stated that Diaz was incarcerated on the DWI charge
and also an I.N.S hold on an immigration matter. Trial counsel got the immigration
hold lifted, and Diaz was released on bond on the DWI charge. Trial counsel stated that
Diaz’s primary concern was that he not go back to jail, even as a condition of probation.
Diaz agreed to accept four years of community supervision with no jail time. Trial
counsel further stated, “I explained to him that there was a significant chance that he
could be deported as a result of his felony conviction.”
The record shows that at the hearing on Diaz’s guilty plea, the trial court
admonished Diaz that he could be deported as a result of his guilty plea. Diaz was
provided a certified translator at the plea hearing. The plea forms were also translated
into Spanish and reviewed with Diaz.
The trial court applied the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel set out
in Strickland v. Washington and concluded that Diaz had not met his burden to show that
he received ineffective assistance. The record shows that trial counsel informed Diaz he
could be deported as a result of his plea as required by Padilla. Although the trial court
does not cite Padilla, Diaz has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in
failing to evaluate his Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in light of Padilla. We
overrule Diaz’s sole issue on appeal.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying habeas relief.
AL SCOGGINS
Justice
Ex parte Diaz Page 3
Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Scoggins
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed February 9, 2011
Do not publish
[CR25]
Ex parte Diaz Page 4
Ex Parte William Rene Diaz
Combined Opinion