Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee
Kathleen M. Sweeney Steve Carter
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General
Christopher L. Lafuse
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
________________________________________________________________________
In the
Indiana Supreme Court
_________________________________
No. 49S02-0311-CR-587
Gregory Finger,
Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee (Plaintiff below).
_________________________________
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court, No. 49G01-0009-CF-165692
The Honorable Heather Welch, Judge Pro Tempore
_________________________________
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02-0106-
CR-389
_________________________________
November 26, 2003
Boehm, Justice.
This is an interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of a
motion to suppress evidence. Finger contends he was subjected to an
unlawful detention when an officer investigating his parked car retained
his driver’s license. The trial court ruled that Finger had not been
detained, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the investigating
officer’s retention of Finger’s driver’s license constituted detention. We
agree that retention of a driver’s license can constitute detention, but
find that the officer had reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative
stop under the facts of this case. We grant transfer and affirm the trial
court.
Factual and Procedural Background
At around 10:30 p.m on September 18, 2000, Officer Richard Young of
the Butler University Police Department received a police dispatch relaying
the report by a concerned citizen of a suspicious vehicle at the
intersection of 56th Street and Meridian Street in Indianapolis. Young
found a car with two occupants parked just west of the intersection and
partially in a driving lane of 56th street. After placing his university
police car behind the vehicle and activating his emergency lights, Young
approached the vehicle and found Gregory Finger sitting in the driver’s
seat and Michael Crosby in the passenger seat.
Young asked “what was happening” and whether Finger needed any
assistance. Finger responded that the car was out of fuel and that a
passerby would be returning soon with more gasoline. Young knew that a
filling station was around the corner, less than two blocks away, and
observed that the fuel gauge indicated approximately one eighth of a tank.
Young thought Finger seemed nervous, though a stranded motorist would be
expected to be relieved to receive the assistance of a police officer. As
Young carried on a general conversation with Finger and his passenger,
Finger’s explanation for his presence changed. Young then asked for and
received Finger’s and Crosby’s driver’s licenses and ran warrant and
license checks. Both came back negative. Young then continued to carry on
a conversation with Finger. As Young testified, Finger “[wasn’t] going
anywhere” if he was out of fuel. However, Young did not return the
driver’s licenses and never told Finger or Crosby that they either were or
were not free to leave. Young also testified that further conversation
with Finger produced inconsistencies in the information Finger was
providing, but he did not elaborate what these were on direct or cross-
examination. When Young asked about a knife on the back seat and
ammunition in the front seat of Finger’s vehicle, both in plain view,
Finger and Crosby responded that they did not know why these items were in
the car or to whom they belonged. Young testified that this explanation
made him suspicious, though at that point he did not know that any crime
had been committed.
Fifteen to twenty minutes after Young first encountered Finger, Young
heard a radio report of an armed robbery at a liquor store less than one
block from the car. At this point, Young asked the pair to exit the car
and read them Miranda rights. Next, based on safety concerns, he retrieved
the ammunition and knife from the car. In the meantime, Indianapolis
Police Department officers had been sent to the liquor store in response to
the robbery call and learned possible suspects were at 56th and Meridian
Street. When they arrived at Finger’s car, Young turned the situation over
to them. After a witness to the robbery identified Crosby as one of the
men in the store, Finger and Crosby were handcuffed and taken to the police
station.
Finger was eventually charged with the robbery of the liquor store.
He was alleged to be the driver of the car for Crosby and another man, both
of whom had entered the store. The State charged Finger with conspiracy to
commit robbery,[1] two counts of robbery,[2] and two counts of criminal
confinement,[3] all class B felonies.
Finger moved to suppress both the statements he made to IPD officers
at Police Headquarters and the knife and ammunition seized at the scene.[4]
Finger argued that Young’s initial encounter was unjustified as an
investigative stop under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution. He
claimed further that even if the initial encounter was not an investigative
stop, the continued interaction with Young rose to the level of a stop.
The trial court denied Finger’s motion to suppress, finding that Officer
Young’s initial approach to Finger’s vehicle and his interaction with
Finger until the point of the robbery call did not constitute an
investigative stop. The court reasoned that the encounter was consensual
because Officer Young was attempting to assist a possibly stranded vehicle.
The court found that Young did detain Finger after receiving the robbery
call. The court determined this detention to be lawful because, at that
time, Young knew of specific and articulable facts sufficient to give rise
to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court reasoned that
reasonable suspicion existed because Young smelled alcohol on Finger’s
breath, Young heard a radio report that a robbery had been committed at the
liquor store less than a block away from Finger’s parked car, and Young
found inconsistencies in information provided to Young by Finger and Crosby
as to what they were doing in the area. The trial court found that no
arrest had occurred before the IPD officers arrived at the scene. The
ruling was certified for interlocutory appeal and the Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that Young detained Finger when he retained Finger’s
driver’s license and that at that point Young did not have the necessary
reasonable suspicion to execute a lawful investigative stop.
I. Finger’s Fourth Amendment Claim
A. Young’s status as a state actor
We note initially that Young’s actions as a Butler University Police
Officer are subject to constitutional constraints. A private entity is
deemed a state actor when the state delegates to it a traditionally public
function. Wade v. Byles, 83 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1996). By statute the
state has conferred “general police powers” on Butler University Police
officers. Ind. Code §§ 20-12-3.5-1(1) and -2 (1998). This renders Young a
state actor subject to the Fourth Amendment restrictions on searches and
seizures. See Henderson v. Fisher, 631 F.2d 1115, 1119 (3d Cir. 1980)
(“[t]he delegation of police powers, a government function, to the campus
police buttresses the conclusion that the campus police act under color of
state authority.”).
B. Detention
The Fourth Amendment regulates nonconsensual encounters between
citizens and law enforcement officials and does not deal with situations in
which a person voluntarily interacts with a police officer. A full-blown
arrest or a detention that lasts for more than a short period of time must
be justified by probable cause. A brief investigative stop may be
justified by reasonable suspicion that the person detained is involved in
criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 31 (1968). The Fourth
Amendment claim turns on whether Young and Finger were initially involved
in a consensual encounter or were detained. At the point at which a
detention occurred, the issue is whether it was excessive in light of the
developments at that point.
Detention turns on an evaluation, under all the circumstances, of
whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and go
about his or her business. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628
(1991). Initially, Finger stated that he had run out of gas. If this were
true, it may have been enough to show that Young did not restrain Finger’s
liberty. If a person’s freedom to leave is restricted by something other
than police authority, it cannot be said that the police detained the
person. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); INS v. Delgado,
466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984). However, it appears that Finger’s car was in
fact not out of fuel, and Young observed that.
It is debatable whether Finger’s claim of lack of gasoline, which the
officer believed to be false, is sufficient to render his detention
voluntary. We find no relevant authority. The only factor Finger
identifies as restraining him after his initial exchange with Young was the
fact that Young obtained and then retained Finger’s driver’s license.
Young’s other actions, taken together, would not lead a reasonable person
to feel that he was not free to leave. Young parked behind Finger’s
vehicle, activated his emergency lights and proceeded to ask a few
questions, including whether Finger needed assistance. These are all
things a police officer would be expected to do upon finding a stranded
motorist and do not indicate to a reasonable motorist that the officer
intends to detain him. However, when Young returned to Finger’s car after
running license checks and did not return his identification, what arguably
began as a consensual encounter evolved into an investigative stop.
The Seventh Circuit has concluded that, “[o]fficers’ retaining airline
tickets and driver’s licenses has been a crucial factor in finding that a
seizure has occurred. Suspects deprived of their ticket and identification
are effectively deprived of the practical ability to terminate the
questioning and leave.” United States v. Borys, 766 F.2d 304, 310 (7th
Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit has specifically held that when an
officer retains an individual’s driver’s license, the individual has
effectively been detained. United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1359
(11th Cir. 1983). The court reasoned, “[w]ithout his driver’s license
Thompson was effectively immobilized. A reasonable person under these
circumstances would not consider himself free to leave. If Thompson had
tried to drive away, he could have been arrested for driving without a
license.” Id. Finger’s claim of lack of fuel adds a factor that arguably
renders his detention voluntary. However, we agree that like Thompson, a
reasonable person in Finger’s position would not feel free to leave after
Young retained his identification. At least theoretically, Finger could
have abandoned his car and walked away or recanted his story of lack of
fuel. Finger was therefore detained for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
C. Reasonable Suspicion
Although we agree with the Court of Appeals that Young’s retention of
the driver’s license converted a consensual encounter into an investigative
stop, we conclude that at that point Young had reasonable suspicion to
detain Finger for a brief investigative period, and therefore did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. The reasonable suspicion inquiry is highly
fact-sensitive and is reviewed under a sufficiency of the evidence
standard. Like any matter of sufficiency of the evidence, “[t]he record
must disclose substantial evidence of probative value that supports the
trial court's decision. We do not reweigh the evidence and we consider
conflicting evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling.” Goodner
v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638, 641 (Ind. 1999) (citations omitted). Here, Young
observed inconsistencies in Finger’s responses, nervousness, and improbable
explanations. The trial court finding here was that there was no
detention, so we have no trial court finding as to reasonable suspicion.
However, the result the trial court reached is proper even though detention
occurred before the radio report of the robbery. We do not agree with the
dissent that the officer’s reasonable suspicion relies on facts occurring
after the detention.
Reasonable suspicion to justify an investigative stop must be based on
specific and articulable facts known to the officer at the time of the stop
that lead the officer to believe that “criminal activity may be afoot.”
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Reasonable suspicion requires more than mere
hunches or unparticularized suspicions. Id. at 27. An officer must be
able to point to specific facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. In this case, at the time he detained Finger, Young
testified that he relied on the following facts: (1) Finger’s car was
reported as a “suspicious”; (2) although Finger claimed the car was out of
fuel, and someone had gone for gasoline, a gas station was around the
corner and the fuel gauge indicated that there was one eighth of a tank of
fuel remaining in the car; (3) Finger told other inconsistent stories
during his conversation with Young; (4) there was a folded pocketknife in
the car; and (5) Finger and his passenger were “acting nervous.”
The first of these, being based solely on an anonymous tip, is of
little value. A report that describes a suspicious car, but gives no
further information, is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.
United States v. Packer, 15 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 1994). In Packer,
three Milwaukee police officers responded to a call regarding a suspicious
car with fogged up windows parked along a street in the early hours of the
morning. Id. at 655. In finding reasonable suspicion lacking, the court
explained, “the record does not suggest any specific irregularities in the
car, other than the windows being all fogged up with the four individuals
sitting inside.” Id. at 658. The court also pointed out that the phone
call reporting the suspicious car did not provide enough information to
raise reasonable suspicion because the caller did not indicate knowledge of
any criminal activity. Id. at 659. The court concluded, “[i]n order to
protect the constitutionally guaranteed rights of us all, the minimum
threshold of ‘specific and articulable facts’ sufficient to give rise to
reasonable suspicion must be higher, albeit marginally, than those
presented here.” Id.
Young, like the officers in Packer, could not rely solely on the
report by a concerned citizen of a “suspicious car.” And taken
individually, any one of the remaining facts might not be enough to give
rise to reasonable suspicion. However, a set of individually innocent
facts, when observed in conjunction, can be sufficient to create reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277-
78 (2002). We think this is the case here.
First, Young pointed out the inconsistencies in Finger and his
companion’s responses to his questions. Specifically, Finger first claimed
his vehicle was out of fuel, but Young found the fuel gauge registering no
shortage. Second, the explanations that Finger and his passenger provided
for their presence in the street were inconsistent. Deceptive responses may
contribute to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See United States
v. Lebrun, 261 F.3d 731, 733 (8th Cir. 2001). Some courts have found
nervousness on the part of the occupants is a factor leading an officer to
form reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See, e.g., United States
v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995). However, we place little
weight on that fact alone. As the Tenth Circuit explained, “nervousness is
of limited significance when determining reasonable suspicion . . . it is
common for most people ‘to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted by
a law enforcement officer’ whether or not the person is currently engaged
in criminal activity.” United States v. Salzano, 158 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir.
1998) (quoting United States v. Ward, 106 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir. 1997).
Here, however, we have more than mere nervousness. The occupants of the
car offered an implausible explanation for their presence and were
deceptive with Officer Young. In conjunction with their “nervous”
behavior, these facts generated reasonable suspicion that something was
afoot. Subsequent report of a robbery in the immediate vicinity justified
brief detention for further investigation.
Finally, Finger points out that Young’s detention lasted approximately
20 minutes before the robbery call, and argues therefore that the stop was
too long to be justified under the facts known to Young. We agree that “an
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,” Florida v. Royer, 460
U.S. 491, 500 (1983), but find that the detention in this case was
reasonable. During this investigative stop, Young questioned Finger and
observed his responses. These responses did not dispel Young’s suspicion.
To the contrary, they justifiably compounded his concern. Within a few
minutes, given all of these factors, it is arguable that probable cause for
an arrest existed even before IPD officers arrived. In any event,
identification of Crosby by a witness established probable cause.
II. Finger’s Indiana Constitutional Claim
In addition to claiming a violation of his rights under the United
States Constitution, Finger also asserts violation of Article I, Section 11
of the Indiana Constitution. Under this section, the State is required to
show that, in the totality of the circumstances, the intrusion was
reasonable. Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 337 (Ind. 1999) (citing
Brown v. State, 653 N.E.2d 77 (Ind. 1999)). Under this analysis, the State
must show that the facts at the time, along with the reasonable inferences
arising from those facts, would justify a prudent person in believing that
a crime has been or is about to be committed. Id. (citing Taylor v. State,
639 N.E.2d 1052, 1054 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)). In this case, the factors
leading to reasonable suspicion, discussed earlier, also satisfy the
requirements of the Indiana Constitution because they could lead an
ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity was afoot.
For these reasons this Court finds that Young detained Finger at the
time he retained his driver’s license. Furthermore, we find that based on
the facts known to him at the time, Young had reasonable suspicion to
believe that Finger might be involved in criminal activity. Therefore,
Young was justified in briefly detaining Finger for further investigation.
When the report of the robbery was received, additional inquiry was
justified. The arrival of IPD police and subsequent identification of
Crosby by a witness constituted probable cause to arrest the pair.
Conclusion
We grant transfer and affirm the decision of the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, and SULLIVAN JJ., concur.
RUCKER, J., dissents with separate opinion.
Rucker, Justice, dissenting.
I agree with the majority that when Officer Young retained Finger’s
driver’s license, what began as a consensual encounter evolved into an
investigatory stop. However, I do not agree that at that point Officer
Young had reasonable suspicion to detain Finger. Therefore I dissent.
The sequence of events in this case is important for a proper
evaluation of whether Officer Young had reasonable suspicion to detain
Finger. The majority contends that at the point Finger was detained,
Officer Young knew the following: (1) Finger’s car was reported as
“suspicious”; (2) although Finger claimed the car was out of fuel, and
someone had gone for gasoline, a gas station was around the corner and the
fuel gauge indicated that there was one eighth of a tank of fuel remaining
in the car; (3) Finger told other inconsistent stories during his
conversation with Young; (4) there was a folded pocketknife in the car; and
(5) Finger and his passenger were “acting nervous”;
The majority correctly points out that item one is of little value.
“A report that describes a suspicious car, but gives no further information
is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion.” Slip op. at 9. As for the
remaining items the record shows that at the point Officer Young retained
Finger’s driver’s license, he was aware only of items two and four: Finger
was not actually out of gas, and a folded pocketknife was in the back seat
of the car. Officer Young testified as follows:
Q. And why were you dispatched to the corner near the area of
56th and Meridian?
A. I was advised by our control operator that a concerned
citizen had called in on a suspicious vehicle with two subjects
sitting inside the vehicle at this corner of 56th and Meridian.
Q. What did you find when you responded?
A. On the – I believe it was the southeast corner of this
intersection I found a large older model vehicle sitting on the
south curb east of Meridian Street with two black male
occupants.
Q. Okay . . . what did you do when you got there?
A. I activated my emergency equipment – being that this is at
an intersection and approached the vehicle to ascertain if I
could offer any assistance.
Q. All right – who – did you speak with[,] anybody?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Who did you speak with?
A. I believe a Mr. Finger was sitting in the driver’s position
and I believe I spoke with him first.
Q. Okay. What did he tell you?
A. I believe my question to him was something to the effect of
– you know – what – what was the situation – what was happening.
He advised that the vehicle was out of gas. And that someone
was going to retrieve gas for him.
Q. All right, did he tell you who?
A. He just [said] a passerby.
Q. Okay. What did you do at that point?
A. I obtained identification, ran wanted checks, license checks
– just as a standard procedure that we do.
Q. All right. Did anything come back when you did?
A. I – I don’t believe there was any wanted information. And I
don’t recall the – the license status. I would have to check my
notes.
Q. Okay. So what did you do after you ran their checks to see
if there were any warrants out for them?
A. I returned to the vehicle to speak further with them, ask if
– if there was anything I could help them with – where they were
going – where they were coming from – just general conversation.
R. at 6-7. It was at this point Officer Young testified, “The conversation
that I recall . . . somewhat devi[ated] from what they had originally
stated. The stories they were giving weren’t quite adding up. I don’t – I
do not recall the exact conversation that was – ensued.” Id. at 9. The
record then shows that two more Butler University Police Officers arrived
on the scene, followed shortly by officers of the Indianapolis Police
Department. By then, the officers had overheard a call of a robbery about
a block away. Because of the alleged inconsistency in the stories and the
report of the robbery, the officers decided to detain Finger and his
passenger. The following testimony by Officer Young is instructive:
Q. Okay, do you recall whether IPD arrived before you decided
that you wanted to detain these persons because of the robbery
or after?
A. It was within a close proximity of time. I’m – I believe it
was – I believe we detained them before they arrived.
Q. Okay. . .
A. But it was within a close proximity of time.
Q. Is there any other reason that you decided to detain these
persons besides the fact that their stories were inconsistent
and the proximity and the closeness of the call?
A. Well, they weren’t going anywhere. They stated they were
out of gas.
Id. at 11.
Contrary to the majority’s recitation of facts, Officer Young’s
testimony makes clear that Finger telling inconsistent stories and Finger
and his passenger “acting nervous” occurred after Finger had been deprived
of his driver’s license, and thus after he had already been detained for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. That leaves only two facts known to
Officer Young at the time Finger was detained that could support the notion
that the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe criminal activity was
afoot: (1) Finger lied about being out of gas, and (2) Young observed a
folded pocketknife in the back seat of the car. Nothing in this record
suggests that the pocketknife was contraband or that it had been used in
the commission of a crime. As for Finger’s lack of truthfulness, although
a deceptive response may contribute to reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, see United States v. Burton, 288 F.3d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 2002), it
is not enough standing alone. Because no reasonable suspicion existed in
this case, Officer Young’s investigatory stop was illegal. Accordingly,
the decision of the trial court denying Finger’s motion to suppress
evidence seized as a result of the stop should be reversed.
-----------------------
[1] Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-2, 35-42-5-1 (1998).
[2] I.C. § 35-42-5-1.
[3] I.C. § 35-42-3-3.
[4] Finger challenges the admissibility of his statements to IPD officers,
claiming the statements were involuntary by reason of his intoxication.
The trial court found otherwise based on testimony of the investigating
officers. Finger points to no specific evidence on this point. His
general claim that he was intoxicated is insufficient to overcome the trial
court’s finding on this factual issue.