Foster Apiaries, Inc. v. Hubbard Apiaries, Inc.

No. 80-399
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
1981

FOSTER APIARIES, INC. a Montana Corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs .
HUBBARD APIARIES, INC., a Michigan Corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Tenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Fergus.
Honorable LeRoy McKinnon, Judge presiding.
Counsel of Record:
For Appellant:
Parrish, Knopp & O'Hare, Lewistown, Montana
Robert Knopp argued, Lewistown, Montana
Fdr Respondentt
K. Robert Foster argued, Lewistown, Montana

Submitted: June 16, 1981
Decided : JUL 2 1905
Filed: [JILZ-
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
the Court.

D e f e n d a n t Hubbard A p i a r i e s , I n c . , a p p e a l s from d e n i a l

of i t s m o t i o n s t o v a c a t e and d i s m i s s a d e f a u l t j u d g m e n t o f
$ 1 1 , 9 6 8 e n t e r e d J u n e 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 , by t h e F e r g u s County D i s t r i c t

Court.

Appellant Hubbard is a Michigan corporation which

p r o c e s s e s honey p r o d u c t s . Respondent F o s t e r A p i a r i e s , I n c . ,

i s a Montana c o r p o r a t i o n w h i c h p r o d u c e s h o n e y . I n November

1978 F o s t e r s h i p p e d beeswax t o Hubbard for processing. A

dispute over the accounting arose between the parties.

F o s t e r f i l e d a c o m p l a i n t i n F e r g u s County D i s t r i c t C o u r t on

F e b r u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , which was s e r v e d March 9 , 1 9 7 9 . On March

15 the president of Hubbard Apiaries sent the following

l e t t e r t o F o s t e r ' s a t t o r n e y , Robert Foster:

"Dear Mr. F o s t e r :

"Enclosed p l e a s e f i n d p h o t o c o p i e s of i n v o i c e s
f o r which we s e n t c h e c k s .

"We were n o t a w a r e t h e r e was a p r o b l e m .
F o s t e r s e n t i n cappings-slum. W e rendered
and r e p o r t e d . What more c a n w e do o r s a y !

"Yours s i n c e r e l y ,
" / s / R . L . Hubbard"

Hubbard did not retain local counsel or further

communicate w i t h Foster's counsel. Default judgment was

e n t e r e d on J u n e 2 0 , 1979. A l t h o u g h n o t i c e o f d e f a u l t was

n o t s e n t t o Hubbard, t h e company had actual notice of the

d e f a u l t judgment a g a i n s t i t on S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 . Hubbard

then contacted counsel in Michigan who secured Montana

counsel. On behalf of Hubbard A p i a r i e s , counsel filed a

m o t i o n t o v a c a t e and d i s m i s s on F e b r u a r y 1 3 , 1 9 8 0 , c l a i m i n g

lack of j u r i s d i c t i o n . When t h a t m o t i o n was d e n i e d on J u n e

11, 1 9 8 0 , Hubbard renewed t h e m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s and v a c a t e
on J u n e 1 7 , 1 9 8 0 , on t h e g r o u n d s o f m i s t a k e , ina-dvertence,

s u r p r i s e o r e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t and o f f e r e d a n answer t o t h e

complaint. The m o t i o n was deemed d e n i e d by f a i l u r e o f the

court to r u l e on t h e motion. N o t i c e of a p p e a l was f i l e d

August 21, 1980.

We find the following issues fundamental to this

appeal :

1. Was H u b b a r d ' s a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t t i m e l y f i l e d

u n d e r R u l e 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P.?

2. Did the District Court err when it denied

Hubbard's June 17, 1980, motion to vacate the default

judgment on g r o u n d s o f mistake, inadvertence, surprise or

excusable neglect?

3. Did Foster comply with the Rule 55(a),

M.R.Civ.P., requirement of showing by "affidavit or

otherwise?"

4. Was H u b b a r d ' s l e t t e r t o respondent's counsel an

appearance r e q u i r i n g a three-day n o t i c e of e n t r y of d e f a u l t ?

5. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court abuse its discretion i n

not appointing a representative for Hubbard under Rule

5 5 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P.?

Accompanying a m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s , respondent Foster

a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t h a s no j u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r H u b b a r d ' s

a p p e a l because it is u n t i m e l y . As the facts reflect, the

c o u r t denied Hubbard's f i r s t m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s on J u n e 11.

N o t i c e o f a p p e a l was n o t f i l e d u n t i l A u g u s t 2 1 , seventy-one

days l a t e r . This, Foster argues, i s beyond t h e t h i r t y - d a y
time limit mandated by Rule 5, M.R.App.Civ.P. The time

l i m i t s for filing an appeal are jurisdictional and

exclusive. An a p p e l l a n t h a s a d u t y t o p e r f e c t i t s a p p e a l i n
the manner and time provided in Rule 5. Absent this

compliance, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hea-r t h e

appeal. P r i c e v . Zunchich ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 612 P.2d

1 2 9 6 , 37 S t . R e p . 1058.

Hubbard responds that Foster's argument belies the

f a c t t h a t t h e M i c h i g a n c o r p o r a t i o n was a p p e a r i n g s p e c i a l l y ,

c h a l l e n g i n g o n l y t h e c o u r t 1s j u r i s d i c t i o n . The n e c e s s i t y o f

presenting jurisdictional questions to the court and

obtaining a ruling, separate from other viable issues,

results i n two m o t i o n s and two h e a r i n g s , b o t h o f which may

provide appealable decisions. Hubbard concludes that it

would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e q u i r e t h e d e f a u l t e d d e f e n d a n t t o

appeal the jurisdictional decision prior to judgment on

other motions.

I n our view n e i t h e r p a r t y is c o m p l e t e l y c o r r e c t . The

a p p e a l of t h e d e n i a l of Hubbard1s f i r s t motion t o d i s m i s s is

untimely. However, t h e s e c o n d d e n i a l i s t i m e l y and p r o p e r l y

before this Court for consideration. This conclusion is
b a s e d on t h e p r e m i s e t h a t we h a v e h e r e two s e p a r a t e f i n a l

orders, each c o n t r o l l e d s e p a r a t e l y by t h e p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s

and e a c h s i n g u l a r l y a p p e a l a b l e .

A s Chief J u s t i c e Haswell s t a t e d i n S h i e l d s v. Pirkle

Refrigerated Freight Lines (1979), - Mont . , 591 P.2d

1 1 2 0 , 1 1 2 5 , 36 S t . R e p . 472, 478, there i s no q u e s t i o n t h a t

an order refusing to vacate a default judgment is
immediately appealable. T h i s b e i n g t h e c a s e Hubbard s h o u l d

have appealed p r o m p t l y when t h e D i s t r i c t Court denied its

m o t i o n t o d i s m i s s on j u r i s d i c t i o n a l grounds. I t should be

noted that Hubbard moved to vacate for lack of personal

j u r i s d i c t i o n , which c a n be waived i f n o t a p p e a l e d p r o p e r l y ,
a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from s u b j e c t m a t t e r j u r i s d i c t i o n , which may

be r a i s e d a t any t i m e .

Hubbard's r i g h t t o appeal t h e d e n i a l of its February

14, 1 9 8 0 , m o t i o n was e x t i n g u i s h e d when i t f a i l e d t o a p p e a l

w i t h i n t h e time l i m i t s o f R u l e 5 , M.R.App.Civ.P. Hubbard i s

not persuasive regarding i t s i s s u e of s p e c i a l appearance.

The company has not shown that its special appearance

somehow engaged a new s e t o f p r o c e d u r a l r u l e s .

W a l s o d i r e c t Hubbard's
e attention t o the f a c t that

there is no longer any distinction between a general or

s p e c i a l appearance i n Montana. With t h e a d o p t i o n o f Rule

12, M.R.Civ.P., we abolished the difference between the

traditional classifications of general and special

appearances. The j u r i s d i c t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e i s p r e s e r v e d by

including it in a defendant's initial response to the

plaintiff's claim. Once a p a r t y h a s r a i s e d the jurisdic-

tional issue in its pleading, the claim is not lost or

waived solely because of the response. Knoepke v.

S o u t h w e s t e r n R a i l w a y Co. (1980), Mont. , 620 P . 2 d

1 1 8 5 , 37 S t . R e p . 1910. S e e a l s o Dragor S h i p p i n g C o r p o r a t i o n

v. Union Tank Car Company (9th Cir. 1 9 6 7 ) , 378 F . 2 d 241;

Orange T h e a t r e C o r p . v . R a y h e r s t z Amusement C o r p . (3rd Cir.

1 9 4 4 ) , 139 F.2d 871; 2 M o o r e ' s F e d e r a l P r a c t i c e Yl12.12.
A

An immediate appeal of the court's denial of the

first motion would not have exposed appellant to the

jurisdiction of the District Court. By filing a second

motion to vacate on other, nonjurisdictional grounds,

Hubbard a c c e p t e d t h e d e n i a l and a d m i t t e d t h e a u t h o r i t y and

j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t o v e r t h e company and t h e c a s e .

R e g a r d i n g t h e d e n i a l o f H u b b a r d ' s J u n e 17 m o t i o n , we
find that the notice of appeal was timely filed.

Disregarding the improper deviations from the procedures

o u t l i n e d i n R u l e s 6 0 ( b ) and 5 9 ( d ) , M.R.Civ.P., we f i n d t h a t

the motion would be deemed denied on August 10, 1980,

f i f t e e n days a f t e r hearing. Appellant f i l e d its n o t i c e of

a p p e a l on A u g u s t 2 1 , 1980, w e l l w i t h i n t h e t h i r t y - d a y time

limit. Therefore, t h i s Court has t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o review

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s a c t i o n on t h e s e c o n d m o t i o n .

Although w e have t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear Hubbard's

c l a i m s of error regarding i t s second motion t o v a c a t e , the

D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d e n i a l was n o t e r r o r b e c a u s e t h e m o t i o n was

untimely f i l e d with t h e D i s t r i c t Court.

R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., provides in part:

"The m o t i o n s h a l l be made w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e
t i m e , and f o r r e a s o n s ( I ) , ( 2 ) , and ( 3 ) when
a defendant has been p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d ,
whether i n l i e u of p u b l i c a t i o n o r n o t , n o t
more t h a n 60 d a y s a f t e r t h e j u d g m e n t , o r d e r
o r p r o c e e d i n g was e n t e r e d o r t a k e n , o r , i n a
c a s e where n o t i c e o f e n t r y o f judgment i s
r e q u i r e d by R u l e 7 7 ( d ) , n o t more t h a n 60 d a y s
after service of notice of entry of
j udgment " .
The r e c o r d d i s c l o s e s t h a t Hubbard had actual notice

no l a t e r t h a n September 20, 1979. One h u n d r e d and f o r t y -

seven days later Hubbard moved t o dismiss under Rule 60.

This Court has consistently and s t r i c t l y enforced the

sixty-day limitation. See Strnod v. Abadie (1962), 141

Mont. 224, 376 P.2d 730.

I n t h e c a s e a t hand, Hubbard simply s t a t e d t h a t it

d i d n o t know t h a t f u r t h e r a c t i o n was r e q u i r e d o f i t by way

of an appearance. This does not constitute excusable

neglect, e s p e c i a l l y when a p p e l l a n t ' s representative is t h e
p r e s i d e n t o f a l a r g e c o r p o r a t i o n d o i n g b u s i n e s s on a m u l t i -

s t a t e basis. I n Morris v. F r a n k T r a n s p o r t a t i o n Co. (1979),
- Mont . , 6 0 1 P.2d 6 9 8 , 36 S t . R e p . 1 8 7 5 , we s t a t e d :

"A f a i l u r e t o a p p e a r d u e t o f o r g e t f u l n e s s and
t h e p r e s s o f o t h e r , more i m p o r t a n t b u s i n e s s
is not s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h excusable
neglect. D u d l e y v . S t i l e s ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 2 Mont.
566, 386 P.2d 3 4 2 , 343. Even t h e m o s t
l i b e r a l approach t o t h i s problem cannot s a v e
appellants1 case. . . . A l i b e r a l court
c a n n o t f i n d e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t where a
d e f e n d a n t h a s w i l l i n g l y slumbered on h i s
r i g h t s and i g n o r e d t h e j u d i c i a l m a c h i n e r y
e s t a b l i s h e d by l a w . ' " 601 P.2d a t 699.

It is o u r view that here again, as in its tardy

appeal to this Court, appellant slept on its rights and

thereby extinguished them. Hubbard admitted to having

a c t u a l n o t i c e o f t h e d e f a u l t on S e p t e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 7 9 . I f we

a r e t o s t r i c t l y apply t h e language of R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , Hubbard

had u n t i l November 1 9 , 1 9 7 9 , t o move t h e c o u r t t o v a c a t e t h e

judgment. I t is s i m p l y n o t r e a s o n a b l e f o r a p a r t y t o wait

u n t i l F e b r u a r y 14 t o r a i s e an i s s u e of e r r o r i n r e g a r d t o a

default judgment. Hubbard1s incalcitrance cannot be

condoned by a l l o w i n g i t t o now c o m p l a i n o f i m p r o p r i e t y .

Since we have no jurisdiction to hear Hubbard's

a p p e a l of t h e f i r s t d e n i a l of i t s motion t o v a c a t e , Rule 5,

M.R.App.Civ.P., and since the second motion was untimely

f i l e d with the D i s t r i c t Court, R u l e 6 0 ( b ) , M.R.Civ.P., we
w i l l n o t consider Hubbard's o t h e r i s s u e s . T h e r e c o u l d be no

prejudicial error i n t h e d e n i a l of Hubbard's second motion

to vacate, since the motion should have been denied as

untimely. No c a u s e s h a l l be r e v e r s e d upon a p p e a l by r e a s o n

o r e r r o r c o m m i t t e d by t h e t r i a l c o u r t a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t

where t h e r e c o r d shows t h a t t h e same r e s u l t would h a v e b e e n

attained had the trial court not committed the error or

errors. R u l e 1 4 , M.R.App.Civ.P. S e e a l s o G a l i g e r v . Hansen

(1957), 1 3 3 Mont. 34, 319 P.2d 1051. Only substantial
p r e j u d i c e t o t h e r i g h t s of Hubbard would w a r r a n t r e v e r s a l .
N such p r e j u d i c e o c c u r r e d because of t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r s of
o

the t r i a l court.
Af f irmed.

W concur:
e