Fottler v. United States

                              PUBLISH

                   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 1/18/96
                           TENTH CIRCUIT


FRED L. FOTTLER,
     Plaintiff - Appellant,                 No. 95-2083
     v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; GARY
L. AINSWORTH, Special Agent,
ATF; PAUL HEH, Sargeant, APD;
FRED MOORE, Special Agent,
DEA; DAVID BOHN also known as
Peter Adang; JAMES TIERNEY,
AUSA, individually and in
their official capacities,
     Defendants - Appellees.


          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
                  (D.C. No. CIV 94-1011 LH/LFG)



Submitted on the briefs:

Fred Fottler, pro se, Boron, California, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

                     _________________________

Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, McKAY and HENRY , Circuit Judges.



McKAY, Circuit Judge.

                      ________________________




     After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record,

this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would

not materially assist the determination of this appeal.   See Fed.
R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9.   The case is therefore

ordered submitted without oral argument.



    Plaintiff Fred Fottler, a federal prisoner, appeals the

dismissal of his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and various other statutes.   Mr. Fottler proceeds pro se

and in forma pauperis.   He alleged in his complaint that the

means used to arrest and convict him were unconstitutional.     The

magistrate judge recommended dismissing the case as frivolous
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) because of the Supreme Court’s holding

in Heck v. Humphrey, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994).    Heck establishes
that a plaintiff may not use a § 1983 action to challenge the

constitutionality of his conviction if that conviction has not

been reversed or otherwise set aside.    Id. at 2372.   The

magistrate judge reasoned that Heck controls, because “Plaintiff

has not successfully set aside, or challenged his federal
conviction . . . .”   R. Vol. I, pt. 2, at 4.


    Mr. Fottler moved for a thirty-day extension of time to file

objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations.    R. Vol.

I., pt. 3.   The magistrate judge granted Mr. Fottler’s motion.

R. Vol. I, pt. 7.   Mr. Fottler then requested, in a document
styled “Objections To Denied Motions”, that the court dismiss his

action without prejudice, if the court were indeed inclined to

dismiss.   R. Vol. I, pt. 11.   Otherwise, Mr. Fottler did not file

any objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations.     The

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district court adopted the magistrate judge’s analysis and

recommended disposition and dismissed Mr. Fottler’s complaint

with prejudice.



    Failure of a plaintiff to object to a magistrate judge’s

recommendations results in a waiver of appellate review.     Moore

v. United States, 950 F. 2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).     This

remains true for pro se litigants if the plaintiff was properly

informed of the consequences of his failure to object.     Id.    We
may make an exception to this rule, however, where the interests

of justice so require.   Id.   Here, Mr. Fottler was properly
notified in the magistrate judge’s recommendations of the

consequences of failing to object.   R. Vol. I, pt. 2, at 1 n.1.

Mr. Fottler did not object to the dismissal of his action
pursuant to § 1915(d).   Thus, he has waived appellate review of

this issue.   The interests of justice do not require us to make
an exception in this case.


    Mr. Fottler did object, however, to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation that the action be dismissed with prejudice.

Construing a pro se litigant’s pleadings liberally, we find that

Mr. Fottler’s motion entitled “Objections to Denied Motions”

properly raised an objection to the magistrate judge’s

recommendation that the action be dismissed with prejudice.       We

conclude that the district court erred when it adopted this

recommendation.

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    When a § 1983 claim is dismissed under Heck, the dismissal
should be without prejudice.     See, e.g., Perez v. Sifel, 57 F. 3d

503, 505 (7th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Trimble v. City of Santa

Rosa, 49 F. 3d 583, 585 (9th cir. 1995); Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.

3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995).     If Mr. Fottler is later successful in

overturning his conviction, he should be allowed to bring his

§ 1983 action at that time.    Thus, his case should be dismissed

without prejudice.


    We AFFIRM the district court but REMAND with directions to

MODIFY the judgment to reflect that Mr. Fottler’s claim is
dismissed without prejudice.




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