F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
JAN 6 2000
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
BILLY RAY FOX,
Petitioner - Appellant,
vs. Nos. 98-6343, 98-6359
RON WARD, Warden, Oklahoma
State Penitentiary,
Respondent - Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. CIV-95-705-T)
Don J. Gutteridge, Jr., Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioner - Appellant.
Sandra D. Howard, Assistant Attorney General (W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney
General, on the brief) Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for
Respondent-Appellee.
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Background
In the early morning hours of July 3, 1985, three employees of the Wynn’s
IGA in Edmond, Oklahoma, were murdered during a robbery planned and
executed by Petitioner-Appellant, Billy Ray Fox (“Mr. Fox”) and co-defendant
Mark Andrew Fowler (“Mr. Fowler”). They were arrested on July 4, 1985. Both
admitted to involvement in the robbery, but each accused the other of committing
the murders. Following a jointly held jury trial in the Oklahoma County District
Court, both were convicted of three counts of first degree felony murder. Okla
Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 701.7(B). Both were thereafter sentenced to death. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed both Mr. Fox’s murder
convictions and death sentence. See Fox v. State, 779 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1989). Mr. Fox’s application for post-conviction relief was denied by the
OCCA in 1994. See Fox v. Oklahoma, 880 P.2d 383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994).
On June 16, 1995, Mr. Fox filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district
court for the Western District of Oklahoma pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
asserting fifteen grounds for relief from his state convictions and sentences. On
July 6, 1998, the district court denied Mr. Fox’s habeas petition but granted a
certificate of probable cause for all issues in this appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253
(pre-AEDPA); Foster v. Ward, 182 F.3d 1177, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999).
Petitioner asserts the following twelve grounds for relief: (1) the trial court
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refused to sever Mr. Fox and Mr. Fowler’s trial, resulting in the violation of Mr.
Fox’s right to due process; (2) petitioner’s trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment; (3) the trial court admitted
misleading testimony of three state expert witnesses, violating due process; (4)
the trial court admitted Mr. Fox’s pretrial statements to the police in violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (5) the “especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel” aggravating circumstance was applied in Mr. Fox’s case in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; (6) during his closing argument, the
prosecutor violated Mr. Fox’s constitutional rights by instructing the jury to
ignore mitigating evidence, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (7) the trial
court erroneously failed to instruct the jury that it had the option of returning a
life sentence even if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors; (8)
the trial court erroneously restricted Mr. Fox’s cross-examination of one of the
government’s expert witnesses, resulting in a violation of the Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation; (9) the trial court and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals applied and interpreted the “avoid arrest or prosecution” aggravating
circumstance in an unconstitutionally vague and overbroad manner in violation of
the Eighth Amendment; (10) the “continuing threat” aggravating circumstance as
applied in Mr. Fox’s case violates the Eighth Amendment; (11) the trial court
failed to instruct the jury that mitigating factors need not be found unanimously,
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thus violating the Eighth Amendment; (12) the state and federal district courts
denied Mr. Fox an evidentiary hearing on his claim that the jury was permitted to
consider misleading evidence, and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
violating his constitutional right to due process. Our jurisdiction arises under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Discussion
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) does not
apply to this appeal, because Mr. Fox filed his habeas petition on June 16, 1995,
before the law’s enactment. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-323
(1997). Therefore, we refer to pre-AEDPA law for guidance as to the appropriate
standards of review. Our review is limited insofar as we can grant relief only if
state court error “deprived [petitioner] of fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States.” See Brown v. Shanks, 185 F.3d 1122, 1124
(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Jackson v. Shanks, 143 F.3d 1313, 1317 (10th Cir.
1998)). We review legal issues de novo, “affording deference to the state court’s
construction of state law.” Id. We review the federal district court’s factual
findings for clear error, while presuming that the findings of fact made by the
state court are correct unless they are not fairly supported by the record. See id.;
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (pre-amendment).
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I. Erroneous Failure to Sever
Mr. Fox asserts that the trial court erroneously joined his trial with co-
defendant Mr. Fowler’s, resulting in unconstitutionally unfair proceedings. As
this court articulated in Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610 (10th Cir. 1998),
“whether the trial court erred in denying severance is generally a question of state
law that is not cognizable on federal habeas appeal. . .a criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to severance unless there is a strong showing of prejudice
caused by the joint trial.” Id. at 619; see also, Arbuckle v. Dorsey, No. 98-2262
1999 WL 672274, *3 (10th Cir. Aug. 30, 1999). Mr. Fox argues, citing Zafiro v.
United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993), that two specific trial rights were
compromised by the trial court’s denial of severance. He first claims that his
constitutional right of Confrontation was violated by virtue of the limitation on
his cross-examination of a witness regarding his co-defendant’s redacted
confession. Secondly, Mr. Fox argues that it amounts to constitutional error that
he was required to share peremptory strikes with his co-defendant. Mr. Fox
concludes that as a result of these errors, the jury was left with the misimpression
that he actually committed the murders rather than his co-defendant, Mr. Fowler.
a. Bruton violation
Mr. Fox contends that he was deprived of his rights guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause when the trial court refused to permit Mr. Fox’s attorney to
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elicit additional portions of Mr. Fowler’s confession. The statement, admitted
through the testimony of the interviewing detective, essentially established that
co-defendant Fowler was present at the Wynn’s IGA on the night of the murder,
watching for people entering and leaving. Mr. Fox’s counsel sought to establish
that Mr. Fowler was in the storeroom at the time of the murders. However, the
trial judge sustained Mr. Fowler’s objection to this cross-examination on the
grounds that it would open the door for the prosecutor to elicit the full admission
of Mr. Fowler, which included the statement that he saw Mr. Fox committing the
murders in the back storeroom. Mr. Fox asserts on appeal that this limitation on
cross-examination constitutes a Bruton violation.
Mr. Fox misconstrues Bruton. Mr. Fox is neither explicitly nor implicitly
implicated by the admitted portion of Mr. Fowler’s confession - the hallmark of a
Bruton violation. See Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 201-02 (1987) (“In
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), we held that a defendant is
deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying co-
defendant’s confession naming him as a participant in the crime is introduced at
their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only
against the co-defendant.”). Thus, Bruton is not implicated by the trial court’s
restriction on Mr. Fox’s cross-examination of the detective. On the contrary, as
we discuss below, the trial court’s restriction of Mr. Fox’s cross-examination was
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integral to the court’s compliance with the mandates of Bruton. Moreover, to
permit Mr. Fox to elicit the additional portions of the Fowler admission while
omitting Mr. Fowler’s statement that he witnessed Mr. Fox killing the victims
would have been tantamount to permitting a deliberate act of deception, totally
recasting the nature of the admission. A trial court may not sit idly on the
sidelines and permit counsel to deliberately distort the evidence or mislead the
jury. Admission of a redacted version of a defendant’s post-arrest statement is
impermissible if it unfairly distorts the original, or excludes substantially
exculpatory information. See United States v. Mussaleen, 35 F.3d 692, 696 (2d
Cir. 1994); United States v. Zamudio, No. 96-2182, 1998 WL 166600 (10th Cir.
1998); United States v. Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505, 522 (8th Cir. 1982)
Mr. Fox’s objection is more properly characterized as a challenge to an
evidentiary ruling by the trial court. This court held in Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d
1333 (10th Cir. 1998), that “[h]abeas relief is not available on this ground unless
the petitioner can show his whole trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the
limitation of the cross-examination.” 135 F.3d at 1342. Mr. Fox has not satisfied
this standard. Mr. Fox was not prejudiced in any way by the trial court’s
limitation on his cross-examination of the detective. Moreover, there was ample
evidence before the jury, based on testimony of the state’s forensic experts, that
Mr. Fowler was in the storeroom at the time of the murders. Whatever
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“exculpatory” benefit Mr. Fox sought to elicit from Mr. Fowler’s admission was
provided by this forensic evidence. Additionally, it bears noting that neither Mr.
Fowler’s admission nor the forensic evidence exculpated Mr. Fox, but rather
merely inculpated Mr. Fowler. Despite Mr. Fox’s assertions to the contrary, in
view of the evidence presented at trial, these are not equivalent. Establishing that
Mr. Fowler was present at the site of the murders does not render Mr. Fox’s
participation in the murders impossible or even unlikely. There was ample
evidence to suggest that Mr. Fox and Mr. Fowler were both involved in the actual
murders. In sum, Mr. Fox has failed to demonstrate any prejudice by the trial
court’s limit on his cross-examination of the detective who interviewed Mr.
Fowler. Thus, Mr. Fox’s Confrontation Clause argument fails.
b. Sharing Peremptory Strikes
Mr. Fox next argues that he was unconstitutionally prejudiced because he
was required to share peremptory challenges with his co-defendant. Mr. Fox
claims that because their defenses were inconsistent, he was entitled to his own
nine peremptory challenges, rather than having to share nine with his co-
defendant. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22 § 655 (1981).
Mr. Fox has not challenged the impartiality of the jury. Thus, he is
objecting only to the number of peremptory challenges. This is a question of state
law, not of constitutional dimension. See Cummings, 161 F.3d at 619 (citing Ross
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v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988)). We may not review this claim as a result.
Id.
Moreover, to the extent that Mr. Fox implies that severance was warranted
because his defense was mutually antagonistic with that of his co-defendant, his
argument is unpersuasive. “Mutually antagonistic defenses are not prejudicial per
se.” Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 538. In order to prevail on such a theory for severance,
the defendant must show real prejudice, rather than merely note that each
defendant is trying to exculpate himself while inculpating the other. See United
States v. Dirden, 38 F.3d 1131, 1140-41 (10th Cir. 1994); Arbuckle, at *3; United
States v. Briseno-Mendez, Nos. 96-2218; 96-2145, 96-2172 WL 440279, **4
(10th Cir. July 17, 1998). Such actual prejudice is shown if the defenses are truly
mutually exclusive, such that “the jury could not believe the core of one defense
without discounting entirely the core of the other.” Dirden, 38 F.3d at 1141. Mr.
Fox has not shown this type of prejudice in either the guilt phase or the
sentencing phase of trial.
c. Severance at Guilt Phase
Mr. Fox argues that he was prejudiced during the guilt phase of his trial,
because his defense was mutually antagonistic with that of his co-defendant.
Namely, each defendant admitted to involvement in the felony, but tried to
exculpate himself by inculpating the other in the actual commission of the
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murders. Mr. Fox overlooks the fact that during the guilt phase of the instant
case, the relative culpability of the defendants was irrelevant, given that they were
charged with first degree felony murder, which only requires that a murder result
during the commission of a robbery with a dangerous weapon. Okla. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21 § 701.7 (B). The evidence at trial amply established both Mr. Fox and Mr.
Fowler’s participation in the underlying robbery. Thus, Mr. Fox has not
sufficiently demonstrated that he was prejudiced during the guilt phase by joinder
with Mr. Fowler.
d. Severance at the Penalty Phase
Mr. Fox argues that the prejudice he suffered from the denial of severance
was especially acute in the penalty phase of his trial. Beyond his above claims of
Confrontation clause and peremptory challenge violations, he does not develop or
support his argument beyond simply claiming that “who actually committed the
murders would have made a substantial difference to the jury when they
considered punishment.” The failure to develop this aspect of his legal argument,
supported by relevant authority, effects a forfeiture of the claim. See United
States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1115 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995). Mr. Fox does not
challenge the constitutionality of the Oklahoma statute requiring the same jury to
sit for both guilt and penalty phases. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 701.10. Nor
does he discuss (with reference to the relevant facts and authority) why it was
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impossible for the jury to believe the core of Mr. Fowler’s defense without
discounting entirely the core of his own. Dirden, 28 F.3d at 1141.
The relevance of who specifically committed the murders in the penalty
phase is not automatically apparent, given that Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
797 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987), require only that the
petitioner “himself kill[ed the victim], attempt[ed] to kill [the victim], or
intend[ed] that a killing [of the victim] take place or that lethal force will be
employed.” Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797. (Emphasis added). Moreover, “major
participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to
human life is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement.” Tison,
481 U.S. at 158. Ample evidence, including Mr. Fox’s own confession,
demonstrated that Mr. Fox intended that lethal force might be employed. Mr. Fox
acquired firearms in preparation for the robbery of the Wynn’s IGA, immediately
prior to the murders, and admitted the killing to his roommate.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Fox next claims that he was deprived of effective assistance of trial
counsel. Specifically, he argues that trial counsel was deficient because he (i)
implicated Mr. Fox during voir dire in such a way as to unfairly poison the jury
against him; and (ii) failed to sufficiently inculpate the co-defendant, in order to
exculpate Mr. Fox. Ineffective assistance claims are mixed questions of law and
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fact reviewed by this court de novo. See Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1096
(10th Cir. 1998).
a. Ineffective Assistance during Voir Dire
Mr. Fox relies upon the following incidents to support his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel during voir dire. Trial counsel asked several
times whether the venire could be open minded about the imposition of life
imprisonment rather than the death penalty, should his client be convicted. One
member of the venire 1 formed an opinion as to Mr. Fox’s guilt based on the voir
dire. This person was subsequently dismissed for cause. Moreover, the trial court
expressed the opinion that Mr. Fox’s counsel had gone too far in this line of
questioning, to the detriment of his client.
To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Mr. Fox must
demonstrate that (i) counsel’s performance was objectively deficient and (ii)
counsel’s deficiency prejudiced the defense, depriving petitioner of a fair trial
with a reliable result. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
To demonstrate constitutional deficiency, Mr. Fox must show that counsel’s
performance was completely unreasonable, not simply wrong. See Hoxsie v.
Kerby , 108 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 1997). Similarly, to show unconstitutional
prejudice, Mr. Fox must demonstrate that but for counsel’s errors, there is a
1
In his brief, Mr. Fox refers improperly to this individual as a “juror.”
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reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been
different. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. Mr. Fox bears a heavy burden in that
he must overcome the presumption that his counsel’s actions were sound trial
strategy, in the context of his case. See id. at 689. Moreover, counsel’s actions
during voir dire are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. See Nguyen v.
Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1349 (10th Cir. 1997).
Mr. Fox cannot overcome this burden. Like the counsel in Nguyen, Mr.
Fox’s attorney chose, as a strategic matter, to focus on whether potential jurors
could give his client a fair trial. Id. Mr. Fox’s attorney commented to this effect,
in response to the judge’s disapproval of his line of questioning:
First of all, Your Honor, it is over our objection that we
have the same jury determine guilt or innocence and
punishment. We believe that even if we get past guilt or
innocence we have to have some idea as to how these
people will behave, if you will, on punishment. We have
to ask certain questions so that we exercise our peremptory
challenges and whether they could consider life
imprisonment...
Tr. 340-341. Thus it is clear that Mr. Fox’s counsel, properly recognizing that
Oklahoma law requires the same jury to sit for both guilt and penalty phases of a
trial for first degree murder, Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21 § 701.10, chose to focus on
whether the jurors could be fair during the sentencing phase. This was neither
unreasonable nor prejudicial, Nguyen, 131 F.3d at 1349, especially in view of the
evidence that counsel undoubtedly was aware would later be admitted. It was an
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entirely understandable strategic decision. We reject Mr. Fox’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on questions posed during voir dire.
b. Counsel’s Failure to Inculpate Co-Defendant
Mr. Fox next argues that counsel was ineffective in that he failed to
inculpate the co-defendant, on the theory that had he done so, it would have
proven that Mr. Fox “did not kill, attempt to kill or intend to kill any of the
victims” Aplt. Br. at 16. Citing Enmund, Mr. Fox implies that had his counsel
demonstrated that it was Mr. Fowler who committed the actual murders, Mr. Fox
would have been exonerated from the first degree felony murder charge. In this
vein, Mr. Fox argues counsel was ineffective for not refuting the state’s blood
spatter expert, who testified that two people were involved in the murders; for not
making an opening statement; for failing to rebut Mr. Fowler’s comments
inculpating Mr. Fox during the guilt phase closing argument; and for failing to
inculpate Mr. Fowler during the penalty phase closing argument.
An ineffective assistance claim may be resolved on either performance or
prejudice grounds alone. See Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1457 (10th Cir.
1995). This is true in the instant case regarding Mr. Fox’s arguments about
counsel’s failure to inculpate Mr. Fowler in the guilt phase of trial. Because Mr.
Fox was charged with first degree felony murder, he would not have been
exculpated by inculpating defendant Mr. Fowler in the murders themselves, since
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Mr. Fox concedes that he participated in the underlying robbery. Okla Stat. Ann.
tit. 21 § 701.7(B). Moreover, the state’s blood spatter expert was cross-examined
by Mr. Fowler’s counsel, who elicited the expert’s concession that it was
possible, albeit improbable, that one person committed the murders. Thus, Mr.
Fox has not demonstrated any prejudice resulting from his counsel’s failure to
orally contest the expert’s conclusion that two people committed the murders.
Additionally, Mr. Fox has not shown that his counsel was constitutionally
deficient. That is, he has not overcome the presumption of trial strategy
regarding his counsel’s waiver of opening statement in the guilt phase, the failure
to rebut Mr. Fowler’s closing argument inculpating Mr. Fox in the guilt phase,
and the failure to inculpate Mr. Fowler in the penalty phase. For counsel’s actions
to rise to the level of constitutional ineffectiveness, his strategic decisions must
have been “‘completely unreasonable, not merely wrong, so that [they] bear no
relationship to a possible defense strategy.’” Hatch, 58 F.3d at 1459 (quoting
United States v. Ortiz Oliveras, 717 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1983)).
While opening and closing statements are not to be lightly waived in a
capital case, it is well-settled that the decision to waive an opening or closing
statement is a commonly adopted strategy, and without more, does not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Nguyen, 131 F.3d at 1350; see also United
States v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Miller, 907
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F.2d 994, 1000 (10th Cir. 1990). The record indicates Mr. Fox’s counsel chose to
waive closing argument during the guilt phase as a strategic matter as well. Mr.
Fox’s counsel initially believed that waiving closing argument in the guilt phase
would preclude the State from presenting rebuttal argument aimed at Mr. Fox.
When the judge made it clear that this was not an accurate understanding of the
trial procedures, Mr. Fox’s counsel stated that he nevertheless thought that if he
made a closing argument rebutting Mr. Fowler’s arguments inculpating Mr. Fox,
he would waive his objections to those arguments on Eighth Amendment grounds.
Finally, Mr. Fox’s counsel’s failure to argue that Mr. Fox was innocent during the
penalty phase was a reasonable strategy, especially in light of the overwhelming
evidence militating in favor of Mr. Fox’s guilt. Instead, Mr. Fox’s counsel
understandably shifted the focus from Mr. Fox’s innocence (or Mr. Fowler’s
guilt) to the humanity of his client. It was a reasonable strategy to do so, both to
maintain credibility with the jury, and to try to emphasize the mitigating factors
presented. Thus, following Hatch, we find that counsel’s decisions amounted to a
reasonable trial strategy, and as such, do not rise to the level of unconstitutional
deficiency.
III. Admission of Misleading Testimony
Mr. Fox next claims that the state court permitted the jury to consider
misleading evidence, thus violating his right to due process. Specifically, he
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alleges that the trial court impermissibly admitted the testimony of the state’s
forensic experts on blood, blood spatter, and hair evidence. Additionally, he
asserts that the trial court impermissibly admitted forensic evidence regarding an
article of clothing discovered with blood on it.
Mr. Fox’s claims are properly characterized as a due process challenge to
the state evidentiary rulings. On habeas review, we will not disturb the state
court’s evidentiary rulings unless the appellant demonstrates that the court’s error
was “so grossly prejudicial that it fatally infected the trial and denied the
fundamental fairness that is the essence of due process.” Williamson v. Ward, 110
F.3d 1508, 1522 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Fox has not demonstrated any error in the
admission of this evidence, much less that the admission of the above evidence
rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Mr. Fox simply disagrees with the
testimony.
As for the testimony of the various forensic experts, they were all
adequately qualified to testify, See Saathoff v. Hesse, No. 95-1130, 1995 WL
749722, at **2 (10th Cir. Dec. 19, 1995), and were subject to rigorous cross-
examination. Weaknesses in the testimony of each of the state’s forensic experts
were sufficiently pursued and developed on cross-examination. First, the state’s
forensic blood expert witness admitted on cross-examination that the blood tests
performed were presumptive and not conclusive. That is, he openly stated that he
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was unable to determine conclusively whether the stains were of animal or human
origin. Next, the “blood spatter” expert who recreated the murder scene for the
jury admitted on cross-examination that his account was not the only possible
description. Rather, he conceded that it was possible, though not plausible, that
one person could have committed the homicides. Moreover, this forensic expert
stated clearly that he relied on data produced from the aforementioned
“presumptive” blood testing, the validity of which was discussed and tested at
length. Finally, the state forensic hair expert’s opinions were thoroughly tested
on cross-examination, and a defense expert with a differing view was presented
during the trial to rebut her claims. The state’s hair expert candidly admitted that
she was rushed in completing her testing. The credibility of these witnesses was a
question exclusively for the jury.
Furthermore, the admission of evidence regarding blood found on an article
of clothing, a white polo shirt, was not error and in any event, did not render the
entire trial fundamentally unfair. The record reflects that the evidence bearing on
what Mr. Fox wore the night of the murder was conflicting; the shirt was
discovered behind the front seat of the vehicle driven by Mr. Fox the night of the
murders. It was certainly relevant for the State to introduce evidence from
forensic experts that there was blood on the shirt, most likely wiped off from the
knife used in the murder. It seems that Mr. Fox is actually objecting to the weight
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accorded to the evidence admitted by the state trial court; this is not of
constitutional dimension, and fails to satisfy our standard of review of state
evidentiary rulings on habeas.
IV. Admission of Pre-trial Statements to Police
Next, Mr. Fox claims that the trial court failed to suppress pre-trial
custodial statements to the police in violation of his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. After his arrest, and while in custody, two police officers
approached Mr. Fox in the absence of his attorney, removed him from his cell,
and gave him their business cards. The officers were aware that Mr. Fox had
elected to remain silent, and that he had requested his attorney be present during
any interrogation. The record reflects that as the officers were leaving, Mr. Fox
indicated to them that he wanted to talk to them. The officers advised Mr. Fox of
his right to counsel, and asked him if he wanted to waive it. Mr. Fox responded
that while he preferred his counsel be present, he was nevertheless willing to talk
with them 2. The statements taken during this interrogation were not admitted at
trial. However, evidence was recovered as a result of information thus gathered.
Mr. Fox argues that the officers’ actions constitute interrogation in violation of
2
Mr. Fox stated: “My case is not getting any better. It is getting worse, I
mean. I would like it if the lawyer was on his way. While I am talking to you
now, I mean, I don’t mind him not being here, you know, but I am ready to talk to
you all now.” State’s exhibit 108(A) at 2 (admitted only for purposes of in camera
hearing).
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his Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Moreover, Mr. Fox
asserts, citing Minnick v. Mississippi, that he was legally incapable of waiving
his right to counsel, once invoked, without his counsel present.
We find his claims unpersuasive. The officers’ initial conduct did not
constitute “interrogation” under controlling standards. Under Rhode Island v.
Innis, interrogation extends only to words or actions that the officers should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 446 U.S. 291,
301 (1980); see also United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir.
1997). In the instant case, the officers merely introduced themselves to Mr. Fox
and left him their business cards. The fact that Mr. Fox was in custody does not
automatically render this exchange an interrogation. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 299.
Such interaction between Mr. Fox and the police constituted conduct “normally
attendant to arrest and custody,” and was not the “functional equivalent” of
interrogation. See id. at 301. Thus, we agree with the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals in its conclusion that the officers’ actions were not evocative
within the meaning of Innis. See Fox v. State, 779 P.2d 562, 569 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1989).
It is certainly true that once an individual has expressed his desire only to
deal with police through counsel, all interrogation absent counsel will be deemed
involuntary. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981); United States
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v. Giles, 967 F.2d 382, 385 (10th Cir. 1992). However, if the individual
voluntarily initiates further communication with law enforcement officials, he can
effectively waive his previously invoked right to counsel. See Oregon v.
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983); Cooks v. Ward, 165 F.3d 1283, 1288
(10th Cir. 1998). In the instant case, the facts presented at trial make it clear that
Mr. Fox reinitiated contact with the officers as they were leaving. Reviewing his
waiver de novo, Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985), we agree with the
district court’s finding that Mr. Fox’s waiver was voluntary. The evidence
demonstrates that Mr. Fox’s waiver “was a product of free and deliberate
choice...and was made in full awareness of the nature of the right being waived
and the consequences of waiving.” Cooks, 165 F.3d at 1288. Like the defendant
in Cooks, Mr. Fox was fully appraised of his rights, he had previously exercised
his right to remain silent absent his counsel (demonstrating his understanding of
the right), and there is no evidence of coercion or compulsion on the part of the
officers. Id.
Mr. Fox argues that it is legally impossible for an individual to waive his
right to counsel, once invoked, absent counsel’s presence. This badly
misconstrues Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990). Minnick stands for
the proposition that once counsel is requested, interrogation must cease, and law
enforcement officials may not reinitiate interrogation without counsel present,
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regardless of whether the accused has conferred with his attorney. See id. at 153.
Minnick does not bear on the instant situation, namely, where the accused
voluntarily reinitiates contact with law enforcement officials. Because Mr. Fox
voluntarily reinitiated contact with law enforcement officials, and validly waived
his right to counsel, his instant claim does not warrant relief.
V. “Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel” Aggravator
Mr. Fox argues next that the jury instruction given by the state trial court
regarding the “heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator is unconstitutional.
Moreover, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s
finding of the above aggravator.
This identical challenge has been considered and rejected by this court on
several occasions, see Cooks, 165 F.3d at 1289-90; see also Hatch, 58 F.3d at
1468-69; Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 792-93 (10th Cir. 1998), and binds
this panel in the instant case. See Cooks, 165 F.3d at 1289 (citing United States
v. Foster, 104 F.3d 1228, 1229 (10th Cir. 1997).
Next we consider whether given the evidence presented, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. See LaFevers v. Gibson,
182 F.3d 705, 723 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979)). This is a question of law which we review de novo. See, e.g., Romero
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v. Tansy, 46 F.3d 1024, 1032 (10th Cir. 1995).
John Barrier’s murder was “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.” It was
marked by torture and serious physical abuse, evidenced by proof of conscious
physical suffering. Sufficient evidence was presented to support this conclusion.
The State’s forensic expert testified that Mr. Barrier had defensive wounds on his
hands, consistent with those one suffers in a fight for his life. Tr. 1677.
Additionally, the detective who interviewed co-defendant Mr. Fowler testified
that Mr. Fowler heard Mr. Barrier cry out and beg for his life. Tr. 1877. This is
strong evidence of conscious physical suffering. Thus, Mr. Fox’s claim for relief
on this ground fails.
VI. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Mr. Fox next argues that he was subjected to unconstitutional prosecutorial
misconduct. Specifically, he takes issue with the prosecutor’s comments in two
ways. First, he objects to the prosecutor’s comments regarding the weight that
should be accorded to the mitigating evidence presented. Second, he objects to
the prosecutor’s comments regarding the procedural and discretionary hurdles that
are required before seeking the death penalty. Finally, Mr. Fox argues that he is
entitled to a rehearing because the state and district courts applied the incorrect
standard in reviewing his claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Prosecutorial misconduct claims present mixed issues of law and fact and
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are reviewed by this court de novo. See Fero v. Kerby, 39 F.3d 1462, 1473 (10th
Cir. 1994). Mr. Fox will be entitled to habeas relief only if he can establish that
the prosecutor’s misconduct or improper remarks infected the trial to such an
extent that it resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. See Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 (1974).
The prosecutor in the instant case made several comments that Mr. Fox
regards as tantamount to instructing the jury that it should ignore mitigating
evidence. Namely, the prosecutor said:
I tell you today that what these two were prior to 1985 is irrelevant.
Tr. 2345.
Why these defendants are what they are may be a good field of
research, but it’s no mitigation or justification for what they did. It
doesn’t change them back and it doesn’t mitigate what they did. Tr.
2348.
Is it adequate punishment just to lock them up on a clean bed with
clean clothes and three meals a day? Is that adequate punishment
for taking three lives? Tr. 2358.
Mr. Fox argues that these comments violate the dictates of Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393 (1987), which reversed a death sentence because the advisory jury
was instructed not to consider, and the sentencing judge refused to consider,
evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances.
The facts of Mr. Fox’s case are distinguishable. Only the court instructs
the jury. The prosecutor merely argues to the jury. In this case, the prosecutor’s
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comments bore on the weight to be accorded to the mitigating evidence. The
comments did not contradict the court’s instructions and did not preclude the jury
from considering this evidence. The court is permitted to shape and structure the
jury’s consideration of mitigating evidence, provided that it does not preclude the
jury from giving effect to the mitigating evidence. See Buchanan v. Angelone,
118 S.Ct. 757, 761 (1998). In the instant case, the prosecutor merely commented
on the weight that should be accorded to the mitigating factors. He did not
suggest that the jury was not permitted to consider the factors. It is well-settled
that the prosecutor may comment on “information about the defendant, his
character, and the circumstances of his offense made known to the jury
throughout the bifurcated trial.” Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1239 (10th
Cir. 1986). The trial court clearly instructed the jury that “the determination of
what are mitigating circumstances is for you as jurors to resolve under the facts
and circumstances of this case.” O.R. at 202. Also, after listing thirty factors that
Mr. Fox offered in mitigation, the trial court further instructed the jury that
“whether these circumstances existed, and whether these circumstances are
mitigating, must be decided by you.” O.R. at 204. The prosecutor’s remarks did
not constitute misconduct that prejudiced Mr. Fox so as to deny him a fair trial
consistent with due process.
Mr. Fox further claims that the following comments made by the prosecutor
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diminished the jury’s sense of responsibility in violation of the rule set forth in
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985):
I had to make the decision to seek the death penalty.
Before I could do that, the Edmond police department and
the Oklahoma City police department had to bring the
evidence to me upon which I could justify such a decision.
And all of you, you, the jury and my staff and the police
departments and their experts did what we did because it’s
our responsibility and duty.
Tr. at 2350. Mr. Fox misconstrues Caldwell. In that case, the court held that the
prosecutor could not suggest to the jury that it was not the final arbiter of the
defendant’s fate, given that there was an appeals process in which their
determination was reviewable. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-329. In this case,
the prosecutor told the jury that he did not undertake the decision to seek the
death penalty lightly, and pointed to the different elements that went into making
his decision. This is a permissible line of commentary. See Moore v. Gibson,
1999 WL 765893, *19-20 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that it was not a violation of
Caldwell for the prosecutor to note “a number of things have to happen” before a
death sentence is sought); see also Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1343 (10th
Cir. 1998) (prosecutor’s suggestion that he personally approved of death penalty
and statements that “many hurdles had to be jumped before a capital murder trial
could ever occur” were insufficient to suggest that anyone other than the jury had
the burden to make ultimate sentencing decision). Thus, we reject Mr. Fox’s
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claims based on a Caldwell violation.
The district court reviewed the merits of Mr. Fox’s claim of prosecutorial
misconduct, and properly applied the Donnelly standard in reaching its
determination. Mr. Fox is not entitled to re-sentencing on these grounds.
VII. Jury Instructions Regarding Option of Life Sentence
Mr. Fox next argues that he is entitled to relief because the jury instructions
given did not explicitly inform the jury that they were not required to give a
sentence of death, even if they made a determination that the aggravating factors
outweighed the mitigating factors. Mr. Fox properly recognizes that we have
rejected this very claim in Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 789-91 (10th Cir.
1998). He urges that we nevertheless depart from our earlier holding given that
the court there failed to consider the relevance of Oklahoma’s revision of its
uniform jury instructions in 1994, to include the instruction he sought at trial.
This argument is likewise unavailing; the court squarely passed on this contention
in Bryson v. Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1207 (10th Cir. 1999). In Bryson, we held that
while the revised jury instruction clearly sets forth the settled law, the failure to
give such an instruction is not constitutional error. Id. As stated previously, this
resolution binds this panel in the instant case.
VIII. Restriction of Cross-Examination
Mr. Fox argues that he is entitled to relief because the state trial court
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unconstitutionally restricted his cross-examination of the state’s forensic expert
regarding hair evidence. Mr. Fox sought to elicit from her, in cross-examination
that there was a delay in her analysis due to her large caseload. The court
sustained the state’s objection to this question, and held that while the inquiry
was relevant, any probative value was outweighed by the prejudice that the
defendant would suffer by implying that there was an unusually high rate of crime
in the county where the murders took place.
As stated previously, Mr. Fox faces a demanding burden in raising a
challenge to the trial court’s evidentiary ruling on habeas review. That is, relief
is not available on this ground unless Mr. Fox shows that the entire proceeding
was rendered fundamentally unfair by the trial court’s limit on cross-examination.
See Sellers, 135 F.3d at 1342. The inquiry focuses on the materiality of the
excluded evidence to the presentation of Mr. Fox’s defense, and ultimately turns
on whether or not the trial court deprived Mr. Fox of an opportunity for effective
cross examination. Id.
Mr. Fox has not satisfied this burden. We are not persuaded that the entire
trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the trial court’s restriction on Mr.
Fox’s cross-examination. Mr. Fox’s counsel was permitted to elicit that the
state’s forensic expert had been under pressure to complete her analysis, and as
such, her work was hurried. Additionally, the state’s expert was thoroughly
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cross-examined concerning her conclusions. Moreover, Mr. Fox’s co-defendant
presented his own expert testimony directly challenging the state expert’s
opinions. In light of the foregoing, prohibiting Mr. Fox’s inquiry into the delay in
the forensic expert’s analysis did not have the effect of rendering the entire
proceeding fundamentally unfair. Thus, Mr. Fox’s claim for relief on this ground
fails.
IX. “Avoid Arrest or Prosecution” Aggravator
Mr. Fox next seeks relief on the grounds that the state trial court applied
the “avoid arrest or prosecution” aggravating circumstance in an
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad manner. However, the arguments Mr.
Fox advances in support of this proposition are more accurately characterized as a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of this
aggravating circumstance. That is, Mr. Fox merely argues that there is nothing in
the record to support this aggravating circumstance.
To support the finding of this aggravating circumstance, the focus is on
the defendant’s intent, whether proved by the defendant’s own statement or
through circumstantial evidence. See Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 923 (10th Cir.
1999). In the instant case, there was ample evidence from which a rational fact
finder could conclude that the aggravating circumstance was present. Neither Mr.
Fox nor Mr. Fowler attempted to conceal their identities. Mr. Fox had worked at
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the Wynn’s IGA previously, and it is thus reasonable to infer that he knew one or
more of the victims and that they could have identified him. Moreover, as the
federal district court observed, Mr. Fox and Mr. Fowler committed these crimes
in the early morning hours, when it was unlikely that other customers would be
present. The robbery was planned for a time when there would be a minimal
number of employees present. All of the foregoing is persuasive circumstantial
evidence supporting a finding of the aggravating circumstance in question. Mr.
Fox’s claim for relief on this ground fails.
X. “Continuing Threat” Aggravator
Mr. Fox next argues that the “continuing threat” aggravating circumstance,
as used in Oklahoma is constitutionally deficient, insofar as it would apply to
every defendant convicted of murder. Mr. Fox properly recognizes that this court
has upheld the constitutionality of this aggravating factor in Nguyen v. Reynolds,
131 F.3d 1340, 1353 (10th Cir. 1997). He nevertheless asks that we revisit the
issue and grant relief. Even if we were so inclined, we are unable to do so, given
that the determination of the Nguyen panel binds this panel.
XI. Jury Instruction Regarding Unanimity Requirement for Mitigating Factors
Determination
Mr. Fox next argues that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jurors that
they need not be unanimous in their findings of mitigating evidence was error of
constitutional magnitude warranting relief on habeas. This court has squarely
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addressed and rejected this claim in LaFevers v. Gibson, 182 F.3d 705 (10th Cir.
1999), in which we held that “a trial court need not, however, expressly instruct a
capital sentencing jury that unanimity is not required before each juror can
consider a particular mitigating circumstance.” Id. at 719. This resolution is
binding on this panel.
XII. Evidentiary Hearing
Finally, Mr. Fox claims that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
develop his claims that the jury was permitted to consider misleading evidence
and ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish entitlement to an evidentiary
hearing under pre-AEDPA standards, Mr. Fox must “make allegations which, if
proved, would entitle him to relief.” See Stouffer v. Reynolds, 168 F.3d 1155,
1168 (10th Cir. 1999). If Mr. Fox has made these requisite allegations, he is
entitled to a hearing only if there is a factual dispute, and he did not receive a full
and fair evidentiary hearing in a state court. See Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d
1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 1998). Following our own independent review, we agree
with the district court that the issues here raised by Mr. Fox were properly
resolved on the basis of the record and the law, and as such, an evidentiary
hearing is not required. See Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 832 (10th Cir. 1998).
AFFIRMED.
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