—In an action to partition real property, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Berler, J.), dated December 5, 1997, as granted the defendant’s cross motion which was to modify the report of the Referee to the extent of directing reimbursement of the defendant for one-half of all payments made for mortgage, taxes, and insurance on the subject property from September 1975 to the date of sale from the plaintiff’s share of the proceeds of the sale.
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
As conceded by the parties, the parties’ judgment of divorce converted their ownership of the marital home from that as
Contrary to the plaintiffs contentions, reimbursement should not have been denied based on either an “ouster” pursuant to an order dated September 16, 1975, or based on the defendant’s exclusive use and occupancy of the property. A tenant in common “has the right to take and occupy the whole of the premises and preserve them from waste and injury, so long as he does not interfere with the right of a cotenant to also occupy the premises” (Oliva v Oliva, supra, at 612; see also, Graciler v Johnstone, 144 AD2d 436). Thus, the mere fact that a tenant enjoys exclusive use of a property held in common, without more, does not either preclude reimbursement from a cotenant of expenditures concerning the property (see, e.g., Goldberg v Goldberg, supra; Phelan v Phelan, 148 AD2d 433; Worthing v Cossar, supra; Doyle v Hamm, supra) or constitute an “ouster” of a cotenant (see, Graciler v Johnstone, supra; Oliva v Oliva, supra). Here, the plaintiff does not, and cannot, dispute the finding that the defendant never acted in any manner to prevent her use and enjoyment of the property.
Further, the court’s order dated September 16, 1975, did not constitute an “ouster” of the plaintiff (compare, Borock v Fray, 220 AD2d 637; Oliva v Oliva, 136 AD2d 611, supra). Significantly, the plaintiff did not testify or even allege that she was in any way precluded from the former marital home based on the order. Rather, it appears from the record that she was free to come and go as she pleased and that her absence was wholly voluntary. Further, the right to exclusive use of the home was only temporarily transferred to the defendant in order to preserve the property after it was discovered that the plaintiff