FUENTES-CAMPOS

Interim Decision #3318

In re Samuel FUENTES-CAMPOS, Applicant

Decided May 14, 1997

U.S. Department of Justice
Executive Office for Immigration Review
Board of Immigration Appeals

An applicant for admission in exclusion proceedings who is inadmissible on the basis of a
controlled substance offense is statutorily eligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under section
212(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), as amended by
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 440(d), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1277.

FOR APPLICANT: James Todd Bennett, Esquire

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: John W. Seaman, Jr.,
Assistant District Counsel

BEFORE: Board En Banc: SCHMIDT, Chairman; DUNNE, Vice Chairman; VACCA,
HEILMAN, HOLMES, HURWITZ, VILLAGELIU, FILPPU, COLE, ROSENBERG,
MATHON, and GUENDELSBERGER, Board Members.

SCHMIDT, Chairman:

The issue in this case is whether an applicant for admission who is
excludable on the basis of a controlled substance offense is eligible for a
waiver of inadmissibility under section 212(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994), as amended by section 440(d) of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1277 (enacted Apr. 24, 1996) (“AEDPA”). The
Immigration Judge determined that the applicant was statutorily ineligible
for relief under section 212(c) of the Act. The applicant has appealed from
that decision. The appeal will be sustained, and the record will be remanded
for further proceedings.

I. SUMMARY OF FACTS
The applicant is a native and citizen of Mexico who became a lawful per-
manent resident of the United States on February 2, 1988. On March 25,
1995, he was detained by the Immigration and Naturalization Service as he
attempted to enter the United States at Nogales, Arizona. Thereafter, on or
about November 6, 1995, he pled guilty to possession of marijuana with

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intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)
(1994).
The Service subsequently initiated exclusion proceedings. At a hearing on
July 5, 1996, the applicant acknowledged being excludable as a controlled
substance trafficker and an alien convicted of a controlled substance viola-
tion. He also sought to apply for a section 212(c) waiver. However, in a writ-
ten decision dated August 5, 1996, the Immigration Judge granted the
Service’s motion to pretermit the section 212(c) application.

II. ISSUE ON APPEAL
Is an applicant for admission in exclusion proceedings, who is inadmissi-
ble on the basis of a controlled substance offense, statutorily ineligible for
relief under section 212(c) of the Act as “an alien who is deportable by reason
of having committed any criminal offense covered in section
241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to the
date of their commission, otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i)”?

III. THE AEDPA AMENDMENT TO SECTION 212(c)
Prior to the enactment of section 440(d) of the AEDPA, section 212(c) of
the Act read as follows:
Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily proceeded abroad vol-
untarily and not under an order of deportation, and who are returning to a lawful
unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of
the Attorney General without regard to the provisions of subsection (a) (other than para-
graphs (3) and (9)(C)). Nothing contained in this subsection shall limit the authority of the
Attorney General to exercise the discretion vested in him under section 211(b). The first
sentence of this subsection shall not apply to an alien who has been convicted of one or
more aggravated felonies and has served for such felony or felonies a term of imprisonment
of at least 5 years. (Emphasis added).

The AEDPA was signed on April 24, 1996, more than 2 months prior to
the applicant’s exclusion hearing. Congress subsequently made a technical
correction to section 440(d) of the AEDPA in section 306(d) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C
of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612 (enacted Sept. 30,
1996) (“IIRIRA”). As corrected, section 440(d) of the AEDPA changed the
last sentence of section 212(c) of the Act to provide as follows:
This subsection shall not apply to an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed
any criminal offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense
covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to
the date of their commission, otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i). (Emphasis
added.)

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IV. SECTION 212(c) ELIGIBILITY
A. Principles of Statutory Construction
The object of statutory construction is to determine the congressional
intent with respect to the legislation enacted. Matter of W-F-, 21 I&N Dec.
503 (BIA 1996). Where the language of the statute is clear, the inquiry is
ended. The unambiguously expressed intent of Congress must be given
effect. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
The paramount index of congressional intent is the plain meaning of the
words used in the statute taken as a whole. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 431 (1987); Matter of Grinberg, 20 I&N Dec. 911, 912 (BIA 1994). Pre-
sumably, the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the
words used. INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 189 (1984); Matter of W-F-,
supra; Matter of Barrett, 20 I&N Dec. 171, 174 (1990). In ascertaining the
plain meaning of a provision, we construe the language in harmony with the
wording and design of the statute as a whole. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988); Matter of W-F-, supra.
We find that the plain language of the amendment to section 212(c), as
construed within the context of the well-established statutory distinctions
between deportation and exclusion, provides that the bar to eligibility for
relief applies only to specified criminal aliens who are in deportation
proceedings.

B. “Who is deportable” Language of Section 440(d)
1. Distinctions Between Exclusion and Deportation
At the time the AEDPA was enacted, the distinctions between exclusion
and deportation had long been recognized in immigration law. Leng May Ma
v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 187 (1958). The meaning of each term is well
defined, and the significant differences between them are clear. See Landon
v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 25-26 (1982) (noting the differences in the pur-
poses and procedures in exclusion and deportation proceedings). For exam-
ple, the admissibility of aliens seeking to enter the United States is
determined in an exclusion hearing, while aliens already physically in this
country are subject to deportation proceedings. Id. The grounds of inadmissi-
bility and deportability are set forth in separate statutory provisions. Leng
May Ma v. Barber, supra. In addition, the rights available to persons in exclu-
sion proceedings are significantly different from those provided in deporta-
tion proceedings. Landon v. Plasencia, supra. Congress, which had created
these important distinctions between exclusion and deportation proceedings,
was obviously aware of them when it enacted the AEDPA.
Prior to its amendment, section 212(c) of the Act barred from eligibility
those aliens who “had been convicted” of certain offenses. This inclusive

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language covered both aliens in exclusion proceedings and those in deporta-
tion proceedings. By enacting section 440(d) of the AEDPA, Congress omit-
ted the inclusive language of section 212(c), which made a waiver
unavailable to certain criminal aliens regardless of whether they were in
exclusion or deportation proceedings. Congress replaced that language with
a more limited provision making relief unavailable to any alien “who is
deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in
[specified grounds of deportability].” (Emphasis added.)
Clearly, aliens in exclusion proceedings seeking admission to the United
States are not “deportable.” The Supreme Court has recognized the long-
standing principle of the immigration laws that aliens seeking admission are
subject to exclusion proceedings and are to be distinguished from
“deportable” aliens, who are only subject to deportation proceedings. See,
e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, supra; Leng May Ma v. Barber, supra. As the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated, the term
“deportable” is a “word of art [that] does not cover excludable aliens.” Yuen
Sang Low v. Attorney General of United States, 479 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973).
The phrase “is deportable” also has a long administrative history of being
understood to apply only in deportation proceedings. See Matter of Ching, 12
I&N Dec. 710, 712 (BIA 1968) (discussing the phrase “is deportable” in rela-
tion to eligibility for suspension of deportation); Matter of T-, 5 I&N Dec.
459 (BIA 1953) (relating to eligibility for voluntary departure); see also Mat-
ter of Melo, 21 I&N Dec. 883, 885 n.2 (BIA 1997) (regarding the phrase “is
deportable” in the bond context).
The Immigration Judge concluded that Congress’ use of the words “who
is deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in
[certain sections]” indicates its intent to include within the bar to eligibility
any alien who has committed a described criminal offense. However, such a
conclusion is unwarranted in light of the explicit statutory reference to an
alien “who is deportable.” In this regard, it would have been possible for
Congress to have clearly barred aliens in exclusion proceedings from relief
under section 212(c) either by (1) referencing excludability and
deportability, as was done in other AEDPA amendments; or (2) by applying
the bar to an alien “who has been convicted of [a designated offense],” as was
done in the language of section 212(c) that was replaced. Section 440(d) of
the AEDPA makes no reference to findings of excludability or inadmissibil-
ity, despite the fact that the section 212(c) waiver was enacted to address the
problem of inadmissible aliens.
We find it significant that while section 440(d) of the AEDPA makes no
mention of excludable or inadmissible aliens, another section of the same
statute is explicit in its inclusion of them. Section 421(a) of the AEDPA, 110
Stat. at 1270, denies asylum to an alien “if the Attorney General determines
that the alien is excludable under subclause (I), (II), or (III) of section

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212(a)(3)(B)(i) or deportable under section 241(a)(4)(B).” (Emphasis
added.) In enacting the AEDPA, Congress obviously knew how to make spe-
cific references to excludable or inadmissible aliens when it sought to pre-
clude them from relief. We conclude that the clause “who is deportable” in
section 440(d) of the AEDPA refers only to aliens in deportation
proceedings.
2. “Deportation” of Excludable Aliens
The Service also argues that the clause “who is deportable” was simply
intended to denote someone subject to removal from the country. According
to the Service, excluded aliens are actually “deported” when they are
removed from the United States. In support of this contention, the Service
cites the new section 237 of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227), enti-
tled “Immediate Deportation of Aliens Excluded from Admission or
Entering in Violation of Law,” and 8 C.F.R Part 237, entitled “Deportation of
Excluded Alien,” as well as circuit court and Board case law.
We find that argument unpersuasive. Section 440(d) rewrote the bar to
section 212(c) relief to apply to:
any alien who is deportable by reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in
section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by section
241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to the date of their
commission, otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i).

The Service impliedly argues that when Congress used the term
“deportable,” it actually meant “deportable, or excludable and therefore
deportable.” Additionally, under the logic of the Service’s argument, when
Congress said in section 440(d) “deportable by reason of having committed
any criminal offense covered in [the cited provisions of section 241(a)(2)],” it
must have meant:
any alien who is excludable and/or deportable by reason of having committed any criminal
offense covered in section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by sec-
tion 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are, without regard to the date of
their commission, otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(i).

The Service is asking the Board to read into section 440(d) language that
was not included, i.e., to add the words “excludable and/or” to the amend-
ment. The language of the amendment is clear and unambiguous on its
face—it precludes relief for designated aliens in deportation proceedings.
Finally, we find no support in the cases on which the Service relies for its
assertion that the word “deportable” is not a term of art, limited to use in
deportation proceedings, but includes excludable aliens as well. In these
cases, as the Service itself indicates, the courts and the Board consistently
combined the words “excluded and deported,” never using the term
“deported” alone to refer to excluded aliens. In any case, this use of the
deportation terminology has been refuted by the courts. See Leng May Ma v.

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Barber, supra, at 187; Yuen Sang Low v. Attorney General of United States,
supra, at 823.
3. Legislative History
Because the words of section 440(d) of the AEDPA are clear, we are pre-
cluded from referring to the statute’s legislative history to support a contrary
construction of the law. Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254
(1992). However, we note that the legislative history does not yield any clear
evidence of congressional intent regarding the amendment to section 212(c).
Section 440(d) of the AEDPA was part of a more comprehensive package
of amendments aimed at enhancing “the ability of the United States to deport
criminal aliens.” See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 518, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925. For example, section 440(c)
requires the Attorney General to take them into custody immediately upon
completion of their criminal sentences and to deport them as expeditiously as
possible; section 440(d) makes them ineligible for section 212(c) waivers;
and section 440(a) eliminates judicial review of their final orders of deporta-
tion. Taken together, these amendments established an interrelated statutory
structure designed to expedite removal of certain targeted categories of crim-
inal aliens.
However, there is nothing in the legislative history of the AEDPA discuss-
ing whether any of these provisions should apply to aliens in exclusion pro-
ceedings as well as to those in deportation proceedings. The provisions were
not the subject of a committee report in either house of Congress, nor were
they the subject of extensive debate on the floor of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. In the Senate, Senator Abraham spoke of the need to
remove criminal aliens, but did not specifically address the issue of
excludable aliens. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7822-23 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
Senator Kennedy criticized the provision. He added, “The provision in the
pending bill would do nothing to enhance our ability to exclude suspected
terrorists. It would impede current efforts to remove dangerous criminal
aliens.” See 141 Cong. Rec. S7851-52 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
We cannot find this debate determinative of the question whether section
440(d) of the AEDPA extends to aliens in exclusion proceedings. Similarly,
we note that this issue was not discussed in the conference committee report
on the AEDPA. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 518, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
Accordingly, in regard to the specific question before us, the legislative his-
tory of the AEDPA provides little guidance.
The congressional concern over criminal aliens is, nevertheless, quite
apparent in the legislative history of AEDPA. In this respect, it may well be
that the failure to bar relief for excludable criminal aliens is simply a legisla-
tive oversight. We, however, lack the authority to rewrite the otherwise plain
language of the statute simply because Congress may have been incomplete
in achieving its goal.

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C. Does the clear language of section 440(d) produce an absurd or
unconstitutional result?
The Service advances a second argument for holding section 440(d) of the
AEDPA to apply in exclusion proceedings or deportation proceedings. This
argument is not about the “plain meaning” of the amendment, but rather
about the effect of applying this plain meaning in cases such as the one before
us. To permit the applicant to apply for a section 212(c) waiver, the Service
contends, would reduce the amendment to a legislative absurdity, one that
violates the constitutional mandate of equal protection. We disagree.
1. Absurdity
The Immigration Judge noted that it would be absurd to interpret section
440(d) of the AEDPA as barring deportable aliens from applying for a sec-
tion 212(c) waiver, but to allow excludable aliens in virtually identical cir-
cumstances to be eligible for that relief. Implicitly invoking what is known as
the “absurdity principle,” the Immigration Judge elected to choose another
construction of the amendment, one that fits with what Congress “must have”
intended when it enacted the provision.
The Supreme Court has recognized and applied the absurdity principle
when confronted with a situation where the literal meaning of the statute pro-
duces a result that appears totally illogical or unreasonable. In so doing, the
Court goes past the plain language of the statute to find a construction that
seems to comport with congressional intent. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry
Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510 (1989) (stating, “No matter how plain the
text [of the evidentiary rule] may be, we cannot accept an interpretation that
would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an adversary’s testi-
mony that it grants to a civil defendant,” and therefore construing the eviden-
tiary rule in question to apply only in criminal cases).
Some applications of the absurdity principle appear to provoke little con-
troversy. In United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1869), for exam-
ple, the Court was faced with a Federal statute that prohibited any
interference with the Postal Service. Despite the lack of any exceptions in the
statute, the Court held that it did not apply to a State official who arrested a
Federal postal carrier wanted for murder.
Other, more recent applications of this principle, however, have been
challenged by members of the Court. For example, in Public Citizen v.
United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989), the Court con-
cluded that regardless of the terms of the statute, Congress did not intend the
Federal Advisory Committee Act to apply to the Department’s use of the
American Bar Association to evaluate judicial candidates. Concurring in the
result but dissenting from the Court’s reliance on the absurdity principle, Jus-
tice Kennedy asserted that even if a particular application of the clear terms
of a statute might be unconstitutional, that fact, in and of itself, does not

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render a straightforward application of the language absurd, thereby allowing
the Court to conclude that the statute does not apply. Id. at 472.
Whatever the scope of the absurdity principle, we conclude that it cannot
be found dispositive of the case before us. In enacting section 440 of the
AEDPA, Congress intended to create a series of provisions that would pro-
mote the swift removal of designated categories of criminal aliens from the
United States. However, leaving a narrow category of such aliens an opportu-
nity to apply for relief could only be said to achieve an incomplete result, not
an absurd one.
Identifying a shortcoming in section 440(d)—some but not all of the crim-
inal alien population will be denied the opportunity to apply for a section
212(c) waiver—is significantly different from concluding that the provision
is so illogical that Congress “must have” intended something else. We are
therefore not at liberty to rewrite the statute on the basis that it leads to an
absurd result. See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493
U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (“Our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon it.”).
In any event, we would not find it absurd to require an alien who has commit-
ted a serious criminal offense to leave the United States as a condition of
seeking relief under section 212(c) from outside the border.
2. Unconstitutionality
Both the Service and the Immigration Judge found that the inquiry did not
stop with the clarity of the language in section 440(d). Rather, they concluded
that if the amendment meant what it seemed to say—aliens in exclusion pro-
ceedings could apply for a section 212(c) waiver, but similarly situated aliens
in deportation proceedings could not—the result would violate the constitu-
tional principle of equal protection. Therefore, they construed the statute to
avoid this perceived infirmity. Under their construction of the AEDPA, if one
group of aliens was to be denied relief, so would the other.
We recognize the canon of statutory interpretation stating that construc-
tions of doubtful constitutional validity should be avoided where possible.
See United States v. Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 199 (1957); United States ex
rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 407 (1909).
However, inasmuch as we find no ambiguity in section 440(d), we find it
unnecessary to resort to this canon.
Faced with an unambiguous statutory mandate, our task is simple: we
must apply the statute as written to the cases that come before us. It is well
settled that we lack jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of the Act and
the regulations we administer. Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA 1992).
Therefore, even if we were to perceive a constitutional infirmity in the unam-
biguous statute before us, we would be without authority to remedy it. See,
e.g., Matter of Lazarte, 21 I&N Dec. 214 (BIA 1996) (Schmidt, Chairman,
concurring) (stating that the Board cannot engage in equal protection analy-
sis where the statute is clear and there consequently is nothing to “interpret”).

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We also find that this situation is significantly different from that which
prompted the Second Circuit’s equal protection decision in Francis v. INS,
532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). In Francis, the court noted that the text of sec-
tion 212(c) limited availability of the waiver to aliens who had left the United
States and were seeking reentry (in other words, aliens in exclusion proceed-
ings). Nevertheless, this Board had permitted some aliens in deportation pro-
ceedings to apply—aliens who were also applying for adjustment of status as
a relief from deportation, and aliens who had departed and returned to the
United States after committing the act that rendered them deportable. Our
decisions, however, did not permit aliens in deportation proceedings to apply
if they had not left and returned after committing the deportable act. See Mat-
ter of Arias-Uribe, 13 I&N Dec. 696 (BIA 1971).
In Francis, the Second Circuit stated that it recognized Congress’ power
to create different standards of admission and deportation for different
groups of aliens. However, it concluded that the Board violated the constitu-
tional requirement of equal protection when it permitted one alien in deporta-
tion proceedings to apply for a waiver but denied permission to another alien
in deportation proceedings, based solely on the fact that one had departed
and returned prior to the deportation proceedings while the other had not. In
Matter of Silva, 16 I&N Dec. 26 (BIA 1976), following the Service’s deci-
sion to apply the Francis decision nationwide, this Board also found it appro-
priate to permit otherwise eligible aliens in deportation proceedings to apply
for the waiver, regardless of whether they had made a departure. This
Board’s pre-Silva statutory analysis had been upheld by the Ninth Circuit.
See Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972). In Tapia-Acuna v.
INS, 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981), however, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
constitutional position enunciated in Francis.
The situation before us is different from that in Francis. It does not involve
an arguable extension by us of the statutory scope of the waiver. Instead, we
are applying the literal language of section 212(c) of the Act as it has been
amended by Congress in section 440(d) of the AEDPA, which includes an
express preclusion of relief to certain aliens in deportation proceedings. The
Immigration Judge and the Service seemingly start with the premise that the
administrative case law which led up to the Francis decision would apply to
an alien in deportation proceedings who “is deportable by reason of having
committed [any of the designated criminal offenses].” However, we have
not so held. Therefore, the constitutional issue raised by Tapia-Acuna and
Francis is not present in this case.
Moreover, we note in any event that the law presently gives the Attorney
General discretionary authority to achieve uniform treatment for aliens who
were in exclusion or deportation proceedings prior to April 1, 1997. See
IIRIRA §§ 309(c)(1), (3), 110 Stat. at 3009-625, 3009-626; 62 Fed. Reg.
10,312, 10,371 (1997) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. § 240.16) (interim, effective
Apr. 1, 1997). And, this is now a closed group of aliens, as any applicant for

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admission to the United States after April, 1, 1997, is subject to the newly
enacted provisions of the IIRIRA.

IV. CONCLUSION
The applicant remains eligible for a waiver under section 212(c) of the Act
under the plain meaning of the amendment by section 440(d) of the AEDPA.
Accordingly, the record will be remanded to permit the Immigration Judge to
consider the applicant’s previously submitted section 212(c) application.
ORDER: The appeal is sustained. The record is remanded to the
Immigration Judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and
for the entry of a new decision.

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