Gachot v. State of Louisiana

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 01-30843

MICHAEL J. GACHOT,

Petitioner - Appellee,

VERSUS

RICHARD STALDER,

Respondent;

STATE OF LOUISIANA and KELLY WARD, WARDEN,

Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana

July 15, 2002
Before SMITH, BENAVIDES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges
ROBERT M. PARKER, Circuit Judge

The State of Louisiana (hereinafter, “the State”) appeals from

the district court’s grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus

on the voluntariness of a juvenile’s confession under police

interrogation. We reverse.

I. Background.

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 On September 6, 1991, Appellee Michael Gachot (hereinafter,

“Gachot”), then 15 years old, shot and killed his father and then

his mother. The father had a history of openly suspecting that

Gachot was homosexual and publicly used demeaning language and

epithets toward him; he threatened that if he found out that Gachot

was homosexual, he would kill him. The parents were actively

discussing a divorce and it appears that neither wanted to take

custody of Gachot. The parents were both employed by Angola

Penitentiary, and the family lived on the grounds. They had a

second home off of the prison grounds, however, which is where the

shooting took place.

The parents had been arguing on that day about the divorce and

Gachot’s father threatened to kill Gachot and his mother. During

the heated argument, Gachot took his father’s pistol and shot him,

then shot his mother, killing them both. He claims that he “lost

awareness of his actions” until after the shooting.

Gachot then called his 23 year-old half-brother, Clay, who had

been a booking deputy in the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff’s

Department(Avoyelles Parish is where the shooting, interrogation,

and trial took place). Gachot told Clay that his father had shot

his mother and then had tried to shoot him but that the father was

killed in a struggle for the gun.

Clay arranged for friends, who were active deputies, to

assist. One of them went to secure the Gachots’ home. Gachot had

gone to his grandparents’ home, while officers and the coroner

2
conducted an investigation. That revealed evidence inconsistent

with Gachot’s story. The law enforcement agents asked Gachot to

the Sheriff’s office for a statement. Gachot did so, with his

grandmother’s permission, given the understanding that his older

half-brother, Clay, would be present. He had taken a tranquilizer,

Butisol, given to him by his grandmother.

Gachot went to the Sheriff’s office at about 11:30 p.m. and

remained there for about four hours. During that time, with Clay

present, Gachot gave three different statements. He and Clay had

been advised of Gachot’s Miranda rights prior to each of the three

statements and he agreed that he understood them. Initially, he

repeated his earlier story in a statement given between 12:19 and

12:51. He was then advised by the law enforcement officers and the

coroner that it was better to come across with a true statement,

and that the coroner would have to give testimony at trial to

discredit Gachot or “tear him apart.” He gave a sample of blood.

His second statement occurred between 2:14 and 2:25 a.m. and did

not result in a confession. He was then directly confronted by a

detective who abruptly told Gachot that his statement did not match

the physical evidence, upsetting Gachot. The detective left the

room and other officers attempted to calm Gachot down. He was

again advised to tell the truth. In his third statement, between

3:05 and 3:24 a.m., he confessed to the shootings.

Gachot was indicted on September 25, 1991, for two counts of

first degree murder. The District Attorney reduced these charges

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to two counts of second degree murder on January 6, 1992, the date

of trial. Before trial, Gachot moved to suppress his inculpatory

statements, which was denied. He re-urged the motion on the date

of trial. Gachot was found guilty of manslaughter on count one

(the death of his father) and guilty as charged on count two (his

mother). Gachot filed a motion for post-conviction judgment of

acquittal, which included as a basis for relief the inadmissibility

of his confession. The motion was denied and Gachot was sentenced

to one to 21 years in prison on the first count and life

imprisonment without parole on the second count, to be served

consecutively.

His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The Louisiana

Supreme Court denied his application for writs and his request for

reconsideration of the application. He petitioned for a writ of

habeas corpus on six grounds in the Louisiana district court, court

of appeals, and Louisiana Supreme Court, all of which were denied.

Gachot then applied to the U.S. District Court for the Western

District of Louisiana on July 2, 1999, for a writ of habeas corpus

on six grounds. The magistrate judge to whom the case was referred

recommended that Gachot’s conviction and sentence be reversed and

vacated on grounds three and five. Ground three reads:

The trial court denied the defendant his right against
self-incrimination by allowing his statement to the
police, by not allowing him a meaningful consultation
with an interested adult, other than his brother who
obviously could not meaningfully consult with the best
interest of Michael Gachot in mind.

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 The district judge concurred with and adopted the magistrate

judge’s recommendation as to ground three but did not accept his

recommendation as to ground five. On June 13, 2001, the district

judge granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and ordered

Gachot’s discharge unless he was returned to the Twelfth Judicial

District Court for the Parish of Avoyelles for re-arraignment

within 60 days, execution of which was stayed pending the instant

appeal.

The State of Louisiana appeals on the basis that Gachot’s

confession was free and voluntary and that the federal district

court failed to give due deference to the state court under the

federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, et seq., as

modified by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act

(“AEDPA”).

II. Standard of Review.

A. Habeas review under the AEDPA.

To prevail on a federal habeas application, a petitioner must

make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional

right, a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable

jurists could debate whether. . . the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were

adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Moore v.

Johnson, 225 F.3d 495, 500 (5th Cir. 2000), quoting Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483 (2000).

5
 In assessing whether a petitioner has demonstrated a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the

deference scheme laid out in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) applies. See

Moore, 225 F.3d at 501.

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of
a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that
was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim--
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Under that scheme, pure questions of law and

mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(1) and

questions of fact are reviewed under § 2254(d)(2). See 225 F.3d at

501. The objective standard of Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362

(2000) is used in these analyses.

As a result, we must defer to the state court unless its
decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is contrary to
clearly established Federal law "if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court
decides a case differently than [the] Court has on a set
of materially indistinguishable facts." Williams v.
Taylor, [529 U.S. 362, 412-13] (2000). Under §§
2254(d)(1)’s "unreasonable application" language, a writ
may issue "if the state court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from [the] Court’s decisions
but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of
the prisoner’s case." Williams, [529 U.S. at 413].
Factual findings are presumed to be correct, see §

6
 2254(e)(1), and we will give deference to the state
court’s decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding." Id. §§ 2254
(d)(2).

Moore, 225 F.3d at 501 (citing Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 484-84

(5th Cir. 2000)).

B. Juvenile confession/waiver of rights.

“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

[prohibits] states from securing criminal convictions through the

use of involuntary confessions resulting from coercive police

conduct.” Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir.

1992)(citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)). “In

addition to the due process prohibition against the use of coerced

confessions, the now-familiar procedural safeguards established in

[Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] also protect an accused’s

Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during

custodial interrogation.” Id. “[W]hile the ultimate issue of

voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent factual

determination, subsidiary factual questions . . . are entitled to

the § 2254(d) presumption.”1 Id. at 1204 (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

The “totality of the circumstances” approach established by

Miranda, for reviewing a waiver of Fifth Amendment rights by

1
Although Self v. Collins is a 1992, pre-AEDPA case, the AEDPA
only strengthens the stricture imposing a strong requirement of
deference for a state court’s findings of fact.

7
adults, is adequate for the determination of whether there is a

valid waiver by a juvenile of his rights to remain silent and to

have the assistance of counsel. See United States v. Saucedo-

Velasquez, 843 F.2d 832, 835 (5th Cir. 1988)(citing Fare v. Michael

C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)). The Michael C. “totality of the

circumstances” standard is the “clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” governing

this circumstance.

Under this approach, the circumstances to be considered

include “evaluation of the juvenile’s age, experience, education,

background, and intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity

to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth

Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.”

Michael C., 442 U.S. at 725; Saucedo-Velasquez, 843 F.2d at 835.

III. Analysis.

At the time that Gachot was interrogated, the Louisiana

Supreme Court required that a juvenile in custody be given the

opportunity to consult with an interested adult before

interrogation. See State v. Dino, 359 So.2d 586 (La. 1978). That

court later overruled Dino and affirmed the “totality of the

circumstances” rule in Louisiana following an examination of Fare

v. Michael C., supra, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962), and

the premises upon which Dino was decided. See State v. Fernandez,

8
712 So.2d 485, 490 (La. 1998).2 Therefore, under the Louisiana

Supreme Court’s jurisprudence at the time of Gachot’s trial in

1992, the Dino standard applied. Although Dino placed emphasis on

whether the interrogated juvenile had had the opportunity to

consult with an interested adult, however, the Louisiana Supreme

Court did not ignore a “totality of the circumstances” approach.

In fact, that court reviewed the “totality” factors in Dino, see

359 So.2d at 591, in addition to whether the juvenile had been

afforded the opportunity to consult with an interested adult.

Therefore, although the Michael C. standard as enunciated by the

U.S. Supreme Court in 1979 was not explicitly adopted by Louisiana

jurisprudence until Fernandez in 1998, the Dino standard in place

at the time of Gachot’s interrogation in 1991 and trial in 1992 may

be fairly understood as recognizing the same principles as in

Michael C.

Even if the Dino standard were read to obviate other

“totality” factors in favor of whether the juvenile was afforded

access to an interested adult, our review of this case indicates

that the Louisiana trial court did not unreasonably ignore a

“totality of the circumstances” analysis.

2
The State of Louisiana takes exception, here, with the wording
of Gauchot’s issue to the extent that it seems to evoke the earlier
Dino standard. Regardless, the preamble to the “interested adult”
language in Gachot’s issue, “[t]he trial court denied the defendant
his right against self-incrimination by allowing his statement to
the police,” sufficiently invoked a waiver of rights issue for the
magistrate judge and the district judge to consider.

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 The state court, when evaluating the admissibility of Gachot’s

confession, considered his age, experience, education, background,

and intelligence to determine whether he had had adequate access to

the counsel of his half-brother, Clay, in the role of an interested

adult. The court noted that the interrogation was “conducted in a

very, very non-oppressive manner” and that Gachot had been

explained his Miranda Fifth Amendment rights at each turn.

Although the state court did appear to place more emphasis on

whether Gachot had been allowed access to an interested adult,

which it found that he had, we cannot see that the court

unreasonably ignored the total framework in which the interrogation

occurred.

Two U.S. Supreme Court cases guide us in making this

“totality” assessment. In Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948), the

U.S. Supreme Court held that a 15-year old who had been arrested at

midnight and subjected to continuous interrogation by a rotation of

several police officers, without counsel or friend, until he

confessed to participating in a robbery and shooting, had been

subjected to a violation of due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Id. at 599-601. There, the youth had been taken from

his home, held incommunicado, and subjected to continuous

interrogation until the early morning hours when he confessed after

having been shown the alleged confessions of two other boys

involved in the robbery. He was not informed of his right to

10
counsel but was presented with a prepared confession that started

off with a statement that he could make the statement or not at his

decision, that it could be used against him at trial, and that he

was under no duress. It went on with the pre-printed question-and-

answer, “[d]o you still desire to make this statement and tell the

truth after having had the above clause read to you? A. Yes.” He

then signed the statement. Id. at 598.

The boy’s mother was denied access to him. When she brought

fresh clothing for him, she found that his old clothes had been

torn and bloodied. An attorney hired to represent him was denied

access to him, although a newspaper photographer was allowed access

to take his picture immediately after the 15 year-old signed the

confession. He was held for three days before being taken before

a magistrate. In court, he appeared bruised and skinned. Id. at

597-98. The Court reviewed the boy’s age, experience, the

conditions of his interrogation and methods of the interrogating

officers, and held that, “[i]f the undisputed evidence suggests

that force or coercion was used to exact the confession, we will

not permit the judgment of conviction to stand, even though without

the confession there might have been sufficient evidence for

submission to the jury.” Id. at 599.

On the other hand, in Michael C., the U.S. Supreme Court found

that, given the totality of the circumstances, a 16 1/2 year old

juvenile voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment

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rights under an interrogation in a murder case. There were nothing

to indicate that he was unable to understand the nature of his

actions; he had considerable experience with the police, having a

record of several arrests. There was no indication that he was of

insufficient intelligence to understand the rights he was waiving,

or the consequences of that waiver. Further, he was not worn down

by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning by

trickery or deceit. Michael C., 442 U.S. at 726-27. He had had

his Miranda rights explained to him and answered that he understood

them. He had wanted his probation officer present, but agreed to

answer questions without an attorney present when the police

declined to bring his probation officer to the interrogation. Id.

at 700-11.

The instant case is dissimilar in many ways from each of the

situations just described, but is substantially closer to the

latter. Unlike Haley, Gachot was not arrested and pulled from his

home, without counsel, in the middle of the night. He agreed to go

to the Sheriff’s office to answer questions after having consulted

with his grandmother and with the knowledge that Clay would be

present. Clay in fact was present throughout the interrogation.

Gachot was not subjected to physical abuse nor was he subjected to

relentless, continuing questioning by callous police officers for

over five hours. Instead, he was questioned three times, ranging

from 11 minutes to 32 minutes, over about a three-hour period. His

12
questioning was described as “non-oppressive” and “with kid

gloves.” To the extent that he was confronted, it was with

inconsistencies between his story and the physical evidence at the

scene, not with spurious untruths. His interrogators advised him

repeatedly of his full Miranda rights, including his right to

counsel, unlike the officers in Haley.

Although Gachot did not have a considerable police record as

did the defendant in Michael C., he had been exposed to law

enforcement personnel and procedures for years. His parents were

employed by Angola Penitentiary, and they lived on the grounds.

His half-brother, Clay, had been employed by the Sheriff’s

department. He was not “worn down” any more than the Michael C.

defendant was during questioning. Although Gachot had taken a

Butisol given by his grandmother, there is no evidence that it

affected his intelligence, understanding, or judgment in deciding

to make his statements. Gachot clearly understood his actions and

the consequences of them and understood his rights, which had been

equally communicated to Clay. Finally, if Clay had harbored ill

will toward Gachot after the shootings, there is no manifestation

of it in the evidence, which suggests that he fulfilled the role of

“interested adult.”

Under these circumstances, the decision of the Louisiana state

court did not “result[] in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established

13
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because that is the case,

the federal court must defer to the findings of the state court and

may not issue a writ of habeas corpus. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-

13.

IV. Conclusion.

For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the district

court in this case is REVERSED and the conditional writ of habeas

corpus is hereby REVOKED.

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