In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Knipel, J.), dated August 2, 2006, which denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
The defendant met his prima facie burden of establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955 [1992]). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.
While the affidavit and medical report of the plaintiff’s examining orthopedist noted limitations in the plaintiffs range of motion of her cervical spine, the plaintiff failed to provide any admissible medical proof that was contemporaneous with the subject accident which showed range of motion limitations in her spine (see Felix v New York City Tr. Auth., 32 AD3d 527 [2006]; Ramirez v Parache, 31 AD3d 415 [2006]; Bell v Rameau, 29 AD3d 839 [2006]; Ranzie v Abdul-Massih, 28 AD3d 447 [2006]; Li v Woo Sung Yun, 27 AD3d 624 [2006]). The magnetic
The plaintiff failed to proffer competent medical evidence that she was unable to perform substantially all of her daily activities for not less than 90 of the first 180 days subsequent to the accident (see Sainte-Aime v Ho, supra). Mastro, J.P., Ritter, Skelos, Carni, and McCarthy, JJ., concur.