PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 7/17/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
CINDY S. GARDNER, by and through
her guardian, Michael S. Gardner,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CHRYSLER CORPORATION, a
Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee,
No. 95-3255
and
KEIPER RECARO, INC., also known as
ATWOOD AUTOMOTIVE, INC., a
Michigan corporation; BERTRAND
FAURE, INC.; and BERTRAND
FAURE, LTD., a Canadian corporation,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 91-CV-1496)
Chan P. Townsley (Christopher P. Christian with him on the briefs), Hutton & Hutton,
Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Thomas O. Baker (Patricia A. Rosa, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, L.L.C., Kansas City,
MO; James R. Jarrow, Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, L.L.C., Overland Park, KS; and
Larry A. Withers, Kahrs, Nelson, Fanning, Hite & Kellogg, Wichita, KS, with him on the
brief), Baker Sterchi Cowden & Rice, L.L.C., Kansas City, MO, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, and PORFILIO and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PORFILIO, Circuit Judge.
Cindy Gardner suffered an acute frontotemporal intracranial hemorrhage resulting
in permanent brain damage which has confined her to a wheelchair after an automobile
accident. In this action, she contends defendant Chrysler Corporation defectively
designed the pedestal-mounted, high-backed front seat upon which she was seated
because it failed to provide essential protection for her in a modest rear-end collision. In
fact, Ms. Gardner was trajectiled into the third rear passenger seat. It is controversial
whether this occurred at the moment of the collision or when the vehicle swerved into a
ditch and flipped over before righting itself. Nonetheless, her seat back broke, and there
was no seat belt fastened over her to counter the trajectory. Despite her effort to
establish the seat back failed when the intermediate plate rivet, the mechanism limiting its
forward and backward movement, sheared under the load forces, a jury determined
Chrysler was not liable under either a theory of strict liability or negligence. Ms.
Gardner now attacks that verdict claiming it is the product of the trial court’s creation of a
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judicial exception to Kansas law prohibiting the introduction of the nonuse of seat belt
evidence to establish fault and abnegation of its gatekeeper role in the trial process.
Having reviewed the record and Kansas law, however, we find no support for these
contentions. We therefore affirm.
On December 3, 1989, Ms. Gardner was a front seat passenger in a 1988 Dodge
Caravan (the Minivan); her sister, Terri Garrison, at the wheel; and Terri’s five-year-old
daughter, Kimberly, in Ms. Gardner’s lap. Two other children were seated on the rear
seats. At the time of the collision, no one in the Minivan was wearing a seat belt. As Ms.
Garrison turned onto a county road, a 1988 Toyota Celica rear-ended the Minivan,
causing it to yaw or rotate around before skidding sideways into a ditch and tripping or
turning over, hitting the side of the ditch, and righting itself. Ms. Gardner was found
seriously injured in the third rear seat, while the others, scattered between the seats and
one partway out a rear window, sustained only minor injuries.
At trial, Ms. Gardner’s accident reconstruction focused on the initial impact in
which, she maintained, the recliner mechanism attaching the seat back to the seat’s lower
cushion failed, causing the seat back to collapse rearward and projectile her into the
Minivan’s third rear seat. At some point in that trajectory, Ms. Gardner hit her head,
causing a subdural hematoma, a localized bleed into her brain which has permanently
incapacitated her. Ms. Gardner alleged the rivet attaching the recliner mechanism to the
seat back was too small to resist a moving force in the foreseeable event of a rear-end
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collision in which the seat back is designed as the passenger’s primary protection.
Although this seat back complied with Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 207
(FMVSS 207), the applicable performance standard issued by the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA), she contended the standard represented
only a minimum requirement for the loads seat backs must withstand and consequently
did not relieve Chrysler of its liability for the defective seat design. In the ensuing battle
of the experts, Ms. Gardner’s witness, Dr. Kenneth Salczalski, a consulting engineer,
described his effort beginning in 1989 to change the federal seat back standard, increasing
substantially the amount of weight a seat back would have to resist. In effect, his theory
was predicated on producing a seat back that was almost rigid in order to provide what he
opined was the appropriate protection to its occupant. Under this theory, Dr. Salczalski
testified that in rear collisions, data suggested seat belts reduced harm by only about ten
percent.
Chrysler’s theory of defense discounted the first impact when the Toyota collided
with the Minivan at a “closing velocity” calculated at about 20-25 mph, which it
considered insufficient to overload the seat back. Instead, its experts opined in the second
and third impacts, as the Minivan pirouetted, hitting the ditch initially and turning on its
side in a clockwise rotation, Ms. Gardner was thrown forward perhaps hitting the
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windshield or headliner1 before the seat back failed, jettisoning her into the rear seat. In
that third impact, Chrysler claimed the 190-pound force of Ms. Gardner’s and Kimberly’s
hitting the seat back without any other counter restraint caused the seat back to yield or
fail.
Key to this theory was Chrysler’s contention the seat back was designed to yield or
absorb energy when impacted. Chrysler maintained that design contemplated utilization
of the seat belt which, it asserted, was integral to the seat design. Thus, Chrysler insisted
the seat back design not only exceeded the FMVSS 207 requirement but also best
protected its occupant when used in conjunction with the seat belt to yield and absorb the
passenger’s load force.
Ms. Gardner now complains when Chrysler injected the seat belt issue into
evidence, it tainted her trial, permitting the jury to equate her nonuse with fault and to
divest Chrysler of responsibility for the defective seat back. She alleges her effort to
immunize the trial from this infection, a motion in limine prohibiting Chrysler from any
reference to seat belts during the presentation of evidence, was denied in contravention of
Pretrial, Chrysler moved to dismiss this action claiming its defense was debilitated
1
by the spoilation of the front end of the Minivan. Although the trial court denied the
motion, it permitted Chrysler to tell the jury that because, through neither party’s fault, the
Minivan’s front end was sold for salvage, it was not available for inspection.
Consequently, Chrysler maintained it was unable to verify its theory Ms. Gardner hit the
windshield or headliner by producing tissue fragments or blood samples.
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Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c). That error, she insists, was not cured by the court’s limiting
Instruction No. 16 and now requires a new trial.
I. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c)
Under this Kansas statute:
Evidence of failure of any person to use a safety belt shall not be admissible
in any action for the purpose of determining any aspect of comparative
negligence or mitigation of damages.
To date, the only Kansas case addressing Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c) is Watkins v.
Hartsock, 245 Kan. 756, 783 P.2d 1293 (1989), in which the Kansas Supreme Court
traced the development of the laws requiring the use of seat belts and child safety
restraining systems in Kansas. Although the Kansas legislature enacted a statutory
requirement that manufacturers equip passenger cars with seat belts as early as 1965, the
use of seat belts was not mandatory, especially because older cars would not be so
equipped. With no statutory duty to use a seat belt, Kansas courts refused to shift fault to
the non-wearer for fear that an insurer might try to evade coverage under a policy or to
prevent actual wrongdoers from avoiding liability. See, e.g., Hampton v. State Highway
Comm’n, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P.2d 236 (1972) (no duty to use a seat belt under the
common law standard of due care or to mitigate damages). Nevertheless, as the Kansas
courts infiltrated this principle with more complex analyses of duty under the common
law, “the legislature modified the seat belt law to clarify its intent.” Watkins, 783 P.2d at
1298; see also Rollins v. Kansas Dept. of Transp., 238 Kan. 453, 711 P.2d 1330 (1985).
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The result was Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c), prohibiting evidence of nonuse of safety belts
“in any action for the purpose of determining any aspect of comparative negligence
or mitigation of damages.” (emphasis added). The Child Passenger Safety Act was
similarly amended in 1989 to prohibit evidence of the failure to secure a child in a child
safety seat “for the purpose of determining any aspect of comparative negligence or
mitigation of damages.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-1345(a). The Watkins court concluded the
legislature thus evidenced an intent to modify the common law in this amendment
rejecting defendant’s effort to introduce “general principles of tort law” into the analysis.
For purposes of establishing fault or mitigating damages, then, evidence of nonuse of seat
belts is inadmissible “in any action” in Kansas.
Ms. Gardner propounds “in any action” includes a products liability action in
which a manufacturer may be found strictly liable by virtue of placing a defective product
into the marketplace. Indeed, her counsel crafted the lawsuit as a crashworthiness case,
alleging the vehicle’s design failed to protect its occupants from “enhanced” injuries
during a second collision when the occupant continues to move inside or is ejected from
the vehicle. Given Kansas law imposing a strict duty on manufacturers to design
reasonably safe products for ordinary or anticipated use, Prince v. Leesona Corp., Inc.,
720 F.2d 1166, 1171 n.9 (10th Cir. 1983); Lindquist v. Ayerst Lab., Inc., 227 Kan. 308,
607 P.2d 1339, 1349 (1980), Ms. Gardner contends it is irrelevant whether the Minivan
was even equipped with a seat belt. The only issue for the jury is whether the product, the
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seat back, is defective. Permitting the jury to consider whether she wore her seat belt, she
contends, amounted to asking it to judge whether she was at fault and contributorily
negligent. The camel thus in the tent, her trial became a foregone conclusion, she plaints.
The district court disagreed with this argument and denied Ms. Gardner’s motion
in limine. After a hearing, it concluded Watkins would not preclude the introduction of
nonuse evidence in a crashworthiness case,2 believing the jury is
entitled to consider all of the evidence and whether this vehicle’s design
was insufficiently crashworthy, including the effect of proper use of seat
belts, and thus the company is at liberty to address it to explain it as it
pertains to the whole of things in the design of the ... seat assembly and in
its intent or effort to demonstrate that their structure or design is not
unreasonably dangerous or defective.
The district court announced it would tell the jury the Minivan was equipped with a seat
belt which Ms. Gardner was not wearing; her nonuse did not constitute fault; but was
2
Indeed, in Watkins v. Hartsock, 245 Kan. 756, 783 P.2d 1293 (1989), after a
foray into the issue of misuse of safety restraints, the court inserted the observation:
In an automobile product liability action, the manufacturer is allowed to introduce
into evidence the nonuse or misuse of its product by the user for the purpose of (1)
comparing negligence and (2) defending the design of the vehicle when
crashworthiness is asserted as a theory of liability. In either situation, the failure
to use seat belts is treated no differently than the failure to properly use safety
devices. For purposes of comparing negligence in product liability cases, evidence
of a plaintiff’s nonuse or misuse of an available safety restraint is a factual issue to
be submitted to a jury.
Id. at 1299 (citing Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987)).
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admissible to disprove her contention the seat assembly was defective. Instruction No.
16, which embodied this conclusion, read:
You may consider the fact that the Chrysler minivan was equipped with a
seat belt restraint system for the sole purpose of determining whether the
overall design of the seat assembly was defective and unreasonably
dangerous. However, you may not consider Cindy Gardner’s nonuse of
seatbelts in determining whether she was negligent or otherwise at fault for
her own injuries.
Before we tackle the legal question presented, whether Kansas law permits
evidence of nonuse of a seat belt for the purpose of establishing a defect, it is helpful to
set the context in which the record discloses this issue arose. During the voir dire of the
jury, the court set out each party’s theory of the case, telling the jury of Chrysler’s
position:
[T]he seat assembly includes the engagement and the use of a seat belt
that’s intended, of course, for the purpose of restraint and for the safety of
any occupant, and they claim and will show from their evidence that when
it’s in place and used ... its seat assembly is just not defective, nor is it
negligent in its design .... I say that to you cautiously because the evidence
of the absence of a seat belt is not shown here, nor argued here to say that
this young lady herself was at fault and negligent or bears responsibility, but
rather that it’s offered here by the defense to show that with its placement in
the design of the whole of things ... this product is just not defective ....
Ms. Gardner asserts she was thus forced to address the seat belt issue although the
rejection of her motion in limine certainly prepared her to counter the defense. Moreover,
contrary to her representation she did not open the door to Chrysler’s defense, in a
February 27, 1995 hearing addressing her motion to compel Chrysler to respond to
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interrogatories about rear end crash tests, plaintiff’s counsel impressed upon the court the
essentiality of this evidence:
[O]ur case is not based on simply the recliner mechanism because we allege
that the seat as a complete unit is the occupant restraint device for a rear
impact, and, therefore, the seat is important, the environment of the seat,
which is the minivan ....
Later, counsel represented, “we contend that the entire occupant restraint system in these
seats is defective. It’s a design defect.” Counsel had posited this case on a theory of
crashworthiness, citing Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968),
and claiming the Minivan’s seat design, “the environment of the seat,” is defective.
Although Ms. Gardner consistently argued “the primary occupant restraint system in a
rear impact crash is the seat back,” a primary component is still only one component of
the restraint system and does not subsume or exclude other design elements’ secondary or
conjunctive features. Surely, it strains credulity to argue the seat environment does not
include a seat belt, the essential safety mechanism consumers fought years to have
automobile manufacturers install in their vehicles as protection in front and rear end
crashes. Consequently, when the court concluded, in denying the motion in limine, that
the seat belt has bearing on whether “the seat assembly itself -- the whole thing -- is
unreasonably dangerous,” the court’s predicate was plaintiff’s crashworthiness theory.3
3
We would note Ms. Gardner has argued the court erred in rejecting her evidence
of the percentage of Kansas drivers who do not use seat belts in order to establish a
foreseeable use of driving a vehicle is without “the optional seat belt restraint.” She
(continued...)
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Moreover, Chrysler vigorously contested the court’s “splitting the baby,”
permitting it to argue the nonuse of the seat belt for the purpose of disproving the
Minivan’s seat design defect but not to prove fault in causing plaintiff’s enhanced
injuries. Chrysler insisted Kansas law allowed the introduction of seat belt evidence for
the purpose of comparing the parties’ negligence when the crashworthiness of the vehicle
is alleged. The trial court disagreed, adamant that the jury would hear all of the evidence
plaintiff would offer to prove the seat design was defective and permit Chrysler to
introduce seat belt evidence to prove the design is not unreasonably dangerous or
defective.
In so ruling under Ms. Gardner’s theory of the case, the legal question remains:
does this resolution comply with Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c)?4 Ms. Gardner contends it
does not, urging a reading which essentially eliminates the clause following “in any
3
(...continued)
sought to characterize the “alternate design of optimum safety features,” that is, driving
with the seat belt fastened ,as not within “the ranges of driving conditions and
circumstances that could reasonably [sic] anticipated by the designers and engineers of
the car.” (quoting Culpepper v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 109 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115,
33 Cal. App. 3d 510, 517-18 (1973). Nevertheless, the trial court properly excluded this
evidence on the basis of relevance, recognizing the likelihood of its raising questions of
avoidable consequences and other negligence questions which lurked within the
“foreseeable use” message.
4
On appeal, Chrysler contends Ms. Gardner has lost this issue because of her
failure to object under 10th Cir. R. 28.2(c). However, Ms. Gardner easily overcomes this
argument having adequately presented the matter to the trial court before trial and
received a definitive ruling. Pandit v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 82 F.3d 376,
380 (10th Cir. 1996).
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action,” to bar nonuse of seat belt evidence in all actions for all purposes. This
interpretation misstates legislative intent and the plain meaning of the statute.
We begin our plenary review with certain elemental rules of statutory construction.
Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the meaning of the statute from its very language,
and if it is straightforward, we simply enforce it according to its terms. Its words then
bear “their ordinary meaning and the statute is not to be read so as to add or subtract from
[that] which is stated....” R.D. Anderson Const. Co., Inc. v. Kansas Dept. of Human
Resources, 7 Kan. App. 2d 453, 643 P.2d 1142, 1146 (1982) (citations omitted). We
presume no terms are surplusage. Felten Truck Line, Inc. v. State Bd. of Tax Appeals,
183 Kan. 287, 327 P.2d 836 (1958).
When we apply these rules to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c), its language conveys
the legislature’s intent to bar admission of evidence of nonuse of a safety belt in any
action where the purpose of its introduction is to establish comparative negligence or to
mitigate damages. If introduced for another purpose, to defend allegations of a defect or
to establish its presence in the vehicle, § 8-2504(c) does not apply.
This reading not only comports with the plain meaning of the statute but also
reflects the interpretive tenet expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the legislature’s
defining the reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not included.
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1488 (1995); Degollado v.
Gallegos, ___P.2d ___, 1996 WL 28728 (Kan. 1996); State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 911
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P.2d 792, 797 (1996). That the legislature specifically stated those two instances in
which evidence is inadmissible permits the inference other uses are permissible.
Furthermore, by Kansas law, statutes in derogation of the common law “shall be liberally
construed to promote their object.” Kan Stat. Ann. § 77-109. Thus, read within the
whole of Article 25, which addresses seat belts, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c), reflects the
legislature’s intent to make their use mandatory but to minimize any penalty for nonuse,5
and to isolate their nonuse from any connotation of fault. To read the statute more
broadly defeats that legislative intent.
Watkins is not to the contrary nor is its dicta, supra note 2, to be disregarded
because it cites Michigan common law. Watkins gave effect to the statute’s reach but
recognized the common law domain left untouched by the legislature in the realm of
comparative and contributory negligence. 783 P.2d at 1299. Although plaintiff offers
Fudge v. City of Kansas, 239 Kan. 369, 720 P.2d 1093 (1986); Rollins, 711 P.2d at 1332-
33 (in Kansas, because no duty to wear seat belt, no fault attributable to nonuse);
Ratterree v. Bartlett, 238 Kan. 11, 707 P.2d 1063, 1069 (1985) (nonuse of seat belt is not
evidence of negligence for purposes of contributory negligence or in mitigation of
damages); and Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66, 626 P.2d 1198 (1981) (improper to
use seat belt evidence to reduce liability and fault), to buttress her interpretation, none is a
5
The failure to use a seat belt does not constitute a separate offense “in the absence
of another violation of law,” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2503(e), and carries a fine of “not more
than $10 including court costs.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(a)(2).
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products liability case, and each, if decided after the statute was enacted, comports with
our take of the statute.
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c) is not simply a rule of evidence, which we could then
ignore under our diversity jurisdiction, but represents the substantive law of Kansas, one
“concerned with the channeling of behavior outside the courtroom, and where as in this
case the behavior in question is regulated by state law rather than by federal law, state law
should govern even if the case happens to be in federal court.” Barron v. Ford Motor
Co. of Canada Ltd, 965 F.2d 195, 199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1001 (1992);
Moe v. Avions, 727 F.2d 917, 930 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 853 (1984).
Consequently, although deemed relevant to permit Chrysler to defend its design of the
seat back, it is not dispositive of a design defect. A jury could factor the seat belt
evidence into its resolution of the issue of whether Chrysler reasonably designed a seat.
Although Ms. Gardner is probably correct in suggesting the average juror may not be
able to divest the presence of a seat belt with the moral implication it ought to be worn,
we must follow the law and not human nature. Indeed, it is the fact that Chrysler
designed an occupant restraint system that included the seat belt which we cannot
foreclose Chrysler from establishing in this case. Because Instruction No. 16 set forth
that fact, and we must presume jurors followed the court’s instructions, U.S. Industries,
Inc. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1257 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Weber v.
Continental Cas. Co., 379 F.2d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 1967 ), we hold the trial court
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properly admitted evidence of plaintiff’s nonuse of the seat belt and appropriately limited
its use to disprove a defect.
II. Exclusion of Plaintiff’s Witness
Ms. Gardner claims error sufficient to have altered the result of the verdict when
the trial court excluded Paul Sheridan’s testimony. Introduction of his testimony would
have permitted the jury to assess Chrysler’s credibility on the question, whether it really
designed its front pedestal seat to collapse in a controlled manner. Ms. Gardner contends,
this so-called controlled yield theory was not disclosed during discovery and prejudiced
her preparation for trial. Because Mr. Sheridan was competent to provide relevant
evidence which might have swayed the jury, she seeks a retrial.
Again, it is helpful to set the context in which this issue arose. In her trial brief,
plaintiff represented Mr. Sheridan, though not involved with minivans until after this
accident, was named to head up a Minivan Safety Leadership Team (MSLT) in 1993.
After watching the television show, 60 Minutes, which featured an investigative report on
the potential for minivan seat back failures, Mr. Sheridan obtained a tape of the show and
exhibited it to MSLT. In the aftermath of that viewing, Mr. Sheridan had conversations
with various Chrysler employees, including the attorney monitoring Chrysler’s
interactions with the NHTSA, and raised his concerns about the safety of seat backs.
Although under a Michigan court order prohibiting him from revealing any trade secrets
and other proprietary information, Mr. Sheridan was designated to testify as a fact witness
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to impeach Chrysler’s controlled yield design concept. Chrysler objected to the testimony
on the basis of competency, relevancy, and prejudice.
After a hearing, the trial court found Mr. Sheridan “wholly unqualified” to testify
on seat back failure within the time frame of 1989, FMVSS 207, or anything related to
controlled yield. The court concluded Mr. Sheridan had no personal knowledge of seat
back design or performance albeit his role on the MSLT, a committee the court
characterized was known more for its brainstorming than engineering activities. In a
second deposition ordered after the parties first presented this issue, Mr. Sheridan
specifically responded he had not reviewed any seat assembly information from 1985
through 1988 and disclaimed calling controlled yield a myth, handing off the issue to the
engineering department because the MSLT was concerned with marketing. Thus, not
only was Mr. Sheridan not privy to any questions about seat design during the relevant
time period, but also he had no competence, notwithstanding his work in truck operations
and exterior mirrors. Finally, the court noted the 60 Minutes feature instigating these
concerns involved Chrysler’s competitors’ vehicles but no Chrysler minivan products.
The court’s ruling is not an abuse of discretion tethered as it is to Fed. R. Evid. 402
and 701. Proffered as a fact witness, Mr. Sheridan could not offer any relevant evidence
tending to prove any fact at issue in this case: he had no knowledge of the recliner
mechanism; had never witnessed a rear end crash test; and while stating “controlled
yield” wasn’t part of any design criteria, wouldn’t elaborate. If offered as an opinion
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witness under Fed. R. Evid. 701, his testimony is similarly disadvantaged: his testimony is
“limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception
of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue.” Fed. R. Evid. 701 (emphasis added).
Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 906 F.2d 1399, 1407 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
981 (1990), is not to the contrary. In that case, we held the district court, the same trial
judge who tried this case, abused his discretion in excluding one of defendant’s experts
from testifying, holding that discretion restricted “viable and relevant theories offered by
a party.” Id. at 1409. The error, we stated, stemmed from the court’s fashioning the
central issue of the case to be whether endotoxins caused the injury, eliminating the
possibility of intervening causes. However, the expert in Graham, an ophthalmologist,
had examined the child at the request of the treating pediatrician and diagnosed an eye
problem. That personal involvement and direct knowledge were relevant to defendant’s
alternative theory that the DPT vaccination did not cause the injury, but the child suffered
a stroke prior to receiving the vaccine. Advised by that holding, the trial court here
properly framed plaintiff’s theory of the case and concluded Mr. Sheridan was
incompetent to address any element relevant to her claim.
Having reviewed both of Mr. Sheridan’s depositions, we agree, finding his
testimony anecdotal, tangential, and equivocal. Although Chrysler argued prejudice as
grounds for exclusion, Sheridan, a whistle blower claiming he was fired for speaking out,
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Chrysler had ample notice of Sheridan’s testimony to anticipate cross-examination and
objections. Our concern is bounded by relevancy. The court properly exercised its
discretion in excluding it.6
III. Discovery Disputes
Throughout, this case has been pocked by rancorous disputes over discovery:
allegations of withholding depositions, failures to respond to interrogatories, and
unanswered requests for production, each prompting motions to compel, requests for
sanctions, and hearings. Ms. Gardner contends although each noncompliance generated a
motion to compel, the trial court failed to resolve the disputes, abnegating its gatekeeper
duties in overseeing the case. The court neither balanced the interests when supposed
trade secret issues arose nor appreciated the obvious prejudice to plaintiff caused by its
inaction. This failure to control discovery, Ms. Gardner contends, hamstrung her effort to
prepare for trial on such issues as occupant kinematics, the mechanisms of injury, and
seat design. Ms. Gardner urges the cumulative effect of the court’s failure to facilitate the
discovery process was an abuse of discretion.
6
Plaintiff overstates the trial court’s reference to Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), attempting to convert its passing mention of
the case into the mistaken basis of excluding Sheridan’s testimony because he didn’t
qualify as an expert witness. There was never a suggestion by the court that Mr. Sheridan
was testifying as an expert or the subject of his testimony was scientific knowledge.
Taken in context, the trial court’s reference to Daubert was more generic, alluding to the
Court’s discussion of the trial judge’s responsibility to ferret out relevancy and assure a
reliable basis for any testimony.
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Although there were other hearings addressing Ms. Gardner’s motions to compel,
we believe the February 27, 1995 proceeding in which the court entertained arguments on
her motion to compel responses to interrogatories and requests for production
paradigmatizes the trial court’s task. At the outset of the hearing, the court lamented
plaintiff’s inundating it with “a mass of material” from which the court could glean no
particularized basis for resolving the dispute. Although plaintiff acknowledged she had
received over 15,000 pages of documents from Chrysler, she complained Chrysler merely
handed over volumes of documents without any direction, knowing it would be
impossible for her to extract the information requested. Despite her requests for test
results from rear end crashes, plaintiff protested Chrysler produced only crash test results
for front end crashes, claiming it had discarded rear end crash test information in the
normal course of its document destruction. Plaintiff insisted all minivan testing was
important regardless of when the tests were run, what seat types were involved, and
whether the same minivan was used. Chrysler defended its document production not only
by stating it had handed over volumes of information but also that plaintiff’s discovery
should be limited to the uniquely designed seat and recliner mechanism involved in this
model Minivan. Chrysler addressed the list of tests plaintiff requested, noting in each
instance how each test did not apply to the facts of this case.
With each example of a discovery problem, the trial court implored Ms. Gardner to
indicate where in the mass of interrogatories, the specified material appeared. For each
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request, plaintiff blamed Chrysler for stonewalling. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the
hearing, plaintiff offered to devise more specific interrogatories, pare down her concerns,
and provide copies to Chrysler and the court of the precise discovery sought.
Consequently, when plaintiff now characterizes the resolution of that hearing as a denial
of her motion to compel, amounting to an abuse of discretion, we are dumbfounded.
Clearly, plaintiff led the court to believe she would endeavor to resolve this discovery
dispute before asking the court again to intervene.
The record discloses another example of the trial court’s effort to control the flow
of discovery materials. During trial, the court advised counsel that as it approached the
issue of Ms. Gardner’s evidence of other incidents of seat back failure, the parties should
get together and select a few of the forty examples Chrysler had produced. Again Ms.
Gardner agreed to pare down the list to accommodate the court’s request.7 Clearly, the
trial court was exercising its gatekeeper function to anticipate potential ramifications of
this evidence and control its impact. Given the array of accident possibilities sought, the
court was justified in thwarting any effort that might lead to confusing this trial with the
presentation of vast amounts of evidence involving different seat backs, vehicles, and
7
Indeed, in this Circuit, evidence of similar accidents involving the same product is
admissible to establish “notice, the existence of a defect, or to refute testimony given by a
defense witness that a given product was designed without safety hazards.” Robinson v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1089 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted).
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accident scenarios. Again, Ms. Gardner’s complaint the trial judge abandoned its
gatekeeper role is unfounded in the record.
Thus, our review of the trial court’s management of the discovery process in
general leaves no doubt it properly supervised the plethora of discovery requested and
produced. We will not equate the court’s gatekeeper role to that of a micro-manager. If a
party is disadvantaged or dissatisfied with discovery responses, it is the party’s
responsibility to particularize the basis of the request so that the court can properly
evaluate the arguments and exercise its discretion. Here, plaintiff neither assisted the
court in this process nor objected to the court’s accepting her assurances the matters
would be resolved by counsel.
The entire record similarly dispels our concern raised by Ms. Gardner’s contention
Chrysler sandbagged the presentation of her case by waiting until trial began to drop its
“controlled yield” product defense, causing surprise and obvious prejudice. In an effort
to cushion that blow, Ms. Gardner moved to reopen discovery on an expedited basis to
depose some of Chrysler’s witnesses, arguing to the trial court that Chrysler’s opening
argument the seat design was intended to yield rearward in a controlled fashion was
contrary to all of its discovery production. Emphasizing that every mention of a
controlled yield design postdated the Minivan involved in this accident, Ms. Gardner
represented she worried about introducing evidence of remedial conduct by otherwise
arguing Chrysler’s 1988 model seat collapsed and wasn’t designed to yield.
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On June 23, 1995, during trial, the court denied the motion based on Chrysler’s
response to its question whether it had ever taken the position the Minivan seat “in 1987
would not collapse, nor are they intended to collapse in any way?” Chrysler responded it
had consistently maintained the seat “did not collapse in this impact.... Never taken the
position that this seat would not collapse.” In the process of clarifying that answer,
Chrysler asserted the seat is intended to yield or, in the court’s words “does not stand
rigid in the face of a rear-end impact.”
We are satisfied the purported sandbagging was more a semantic shift and not a
substantive alteration of defense tactics. Although several of Chrysler’s witnesses
expressed unfamiliarity with the appellation, their testimony evinced a grasp of the
concept of a seat designed to protect its occupant by absorbing the energy from kinetic
load forces against it. Much of the pretrial discovery involved exploring the witnesses’
views on whether a rigid seat back or a more flexible seat back provided greater
protection, causing the witness to express an opinion on a seat designed to collapse in
some sort of controlled fashion versus one that would be so rigid as to virtually slingshot
the occupant in the event of a rear impact. Even Dr. Salczalski, plaintiff’s expert who
testified he had never seen any design criteria for controlled yield, conceded there are two
schools of thought on seat backs: those described as stronger and less yielding versus
those that are weaker and more yielding. His recommendation to the NHTSA, he agreed,
would make seat backs virtually rigid, built to resist approximately 50,000 inch pounds in
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contrast to FMVSS 207 which requires 3,300 inch pounds of resistance. Consequently,
we are satisfied that the concepts of “controlled yield,” designed to yield, energy
absorbing, whatever the designation, were reflected in the pretrial discovery and did not
surprise plaintiff at trial simply because the theory acquired a new label. The district
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reopen discovery.
In a Parthian shot, Chrysler asks we strike references to materials which were not
incorporated in the district court record although plaintiff included them in her brief and
appendix. Our disposition is not based on those materials as the district court had no
opportunity to review them.
In sum, we hold the trial court properly interpreted Kan. Stat. Ann. § 8-2504(c) to
admit evidence of the presence of a seat belt in the design of the passenger restraint
system and did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and discovery rulings. We
therefore AFFIRM.
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