delivered tbe following opinion:
This is a bill in equity filed by a widow and ber children as complainants, alleging themselves to be citizens and residents of Porto Rico, against the respondent who, they allege, is a subject of the Emperor of Germany, although a resident of Porto Rico.
They set up in their bill a peculiar state of affairs intended
The issue we are called upon to settle is raised by respondent’s plea to the jurisdiction, — he alleging that he is not a subject of the Emperor of Germany, but in truth and in fact is a citizen of and resident in Porto Rico, and that therefore, as the jurisdiction is based entirely upon the alleged diversity of citizenship of the parties, not this court, but the proper insular court should entertain the cause. This plea was duly traversed, and a trial was had before the court on the issue thus raised, by which the following facts were developed.
The respondent, Guillermo Riefkohl, was born in 1862 at Maunabo, on this island. His father was a German who had lived many years in Porto Rico before that time, and continued for many years thereafter, until his death, to so reside therein. His mother was a subject of the King of Denmark, and a native of Saint Thomas or some other Danish West India island, bxit had also, for several years previous to 1862, resided here in Porto Rico, and is still living here. It was also shown that respondent’s father never changed his citizenship, but remained a German subject up to the time of his death, which occurred previous to American occupation of Porto Rico, and that during
This state of facts, of course, raises the question as to whether respondent is now a Porto Rican or a subject of the Emperor of Germany, and, of course, it turns upon the facts as stated, and the laws of Spain regarding citizenship. The Civil Code of Spain of 1899, which we are informed is, as to citizenship, the s<ime as the previous Codes, is as follows:
“Art. 17. The following are Spaniards: (1) Persons bom in Spanish territory; (2) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain; (3) foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers; (4) those who, without said papers, may have acquired a residence in any town in the monarchy.
“Art. 18. Children, while they remain under the parental authority, have the nationality of their parents.
Page 425“In. order that those born of foreign parents in Spanish territory may enjoy the benefits granted them by No. 1 of art. 17, it shall be an indispensable requisite that the parents declare in the manner and before the officials specified in art. 19, that they choose in the name of their children the Spanish nationality, renouncing all others.
“Art. 19. The children of foreigners, born in Spanish possessions, must state within the year following their majority or emancipation, whether they desire to enjoy the citizenship of Spaniards, granted them by art. 17.”
“Art. 25. In order that foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers, or acquired a residence in any town in the monarchy may enjoy Spanish nationality, they must previously renounce their former nationality, swear to the Constitution of the monarchy, and record themselves as. Spaniards in the civil registry.”
It will be seen that art. 18 aforesaid provides that it shall be an indispensable requisite that the parents declare in the manner and before the officials specified in art. 19 that they choose in the name, of the child the Spanish nationality, renouncing all others. Now we cannot imagine how this boy could have appeared registered in the Spanish consulate in Germany, unless his parents had in fact complied with this requisite of the law for him, and we think that this finding also disposes of the requisites set forth in art. 25, supra. It is also stated that art. 1, subsee. 4 of the Spanish Constitution, defining who are Spaniards, says: “4. Those who, without such (naturalization) papers, may have acquired a residence in any town within the Spanish territory.”
Counsel for complainants has filed a painstaking brief, in
Here is a case where a man, who is now forty-eight years of age, was born in Porto Pico, and who, although he spent twelve years in Germany learning the language of his father, has never claimed German citizenship, but has always denied it, and in addition has asserted first his Spanish nationality and later his Porto Pican citizenship, and when testifying on this issue asserted his hope of soon becoming a citizen of the United States. He has held office in the island under both governments, all his interests are here, and he asserts he has no intention of removing elsewhere. Under such facts and circumstances it does seem to us, under the rule laid down by all the authorities, and particularly by the broad principle laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Boyd v. Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135, 36 L. ed. 103, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 375, that all doubts, if there are any, which we deny, should be resolved in favor of his claim. Of course it is well established that the jurisdiction of this court is special and limited, and that doubts ought not to be resolved in its favor, especially on a question of citizenship, but we do not think there is any doubt here, as we hold that respondent’s parents, under the Spanish Code, properly registered him as a Spanish subject. The statement of counsel for complainants that respondent first denied his German citizenship in Germany, in 1882, to avoid military service, and that he is