General Agriculture Corporation v. Moore

No. 12843

I N THE SUPREME C U T O THE STATE O M N A A
OR F F OTN

1975

GENERAL AGRICULTURE CORPORATION,

P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

PAUL J. MOORE and LUELLA MAY MOORE,
husband and w i f e , e t a l . ,

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Twelfth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable B. W. Thomas, Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant :

J a r d i n e , Stephenson, Blewett and Weaver, Great F a l l s ,
Montana, K. Dale Schwanke argued, Great F a l l s , Montana
W. G. G i l b e r t , J r . , D i l l o n , Montana

For Respondents:

Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg and Matteucci, Great F a l l s ,
Montana, Ray F. Koby argued, Great F a l l s , Montana
Morrison, E t t i e n and Barron, Havre, Montana
J. Chan E t t i e n argued, Havre, Montana
Hauge, Hauge, Ober and Spangelo, Havre, Montana
Ronald Smith, Havre, Montana
Weber, Bosch, Kuhr, Dugdale and Warner, Havre, Montana
Burns, Solem and MacKenzie, Chinook, Montana

For Amicus Curiae:

A l l e n B. C h r o n i s t e r , Helena, Montana
Kendrick Smith argued, B u t t e , Montana
James T. H a r r i s o n , Jr. argued, Helena, Montana

Submitted: February 10, 1975

Decided :APR 3 (I 19~5
Filed: 8 dJ
Hon. Arthur Martin, D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e
James T. Harrison, d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court:

The circumstances l e a d i n g t o t h i s a p p e a l a r e b r i e f . On
November 30, 1972, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d i t s p e t i t i o n seeking t o
a p p r o p r i a t e s u r p l u s w a t e r s from an a d j u d i c a t e d stream under
p r o v i s i o n s of s e c t i o n 89-829, R.C.M. 1947. While t h e a c t i o n
was pending t h e l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Chapter 452, Laws of 1973,
If
denominated a s t h e " ~ o n t a n aWater U s e Act. The new Act, codi-
f i e d a s s e c t i o n s 89-865 e t s e q . , R.C.M. 1947, s u b s t i t u t e d a
new procedure f o r t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of water r i g h t s , e f f e c t i v e
J u l y 1, 1973. The former Act, i n c l u d i n g t h e s e c t i o n under which
p l a i n t i f f i n s t i t u t e d i t s a c t i o n , was r e p e a l e d .
A f t e r t h e e f f e c t i v e d a t e of t h e new Act, p l a i n t i f f , w i t h o u t
changing c h a r a c t e r of r e l i e f sought, f i l e d an amended complaint. On
motion of defendants (a group of a p p r o p r i a t o r s o r c l a i m a n t s who
have o r appear t o have, r i g h t s i n t h e source of supply of w a t e r
r i g h t s sought by p l a i n t i f f , Cow Creek), t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t dismissed
t h e amended complaint on t h e ground p l a i n t i f f ' s a c t i o n was a b a t e d
by t h e r e p e a l of s e c t i o n 89-829. The p r o p r i e t y of t h e d i s m i s s a l on
t h a t ground i s t h e primary i s s u e on t h i s appeal.
A u t h o r i t y f o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s d i s m i s s a l i s d e r i v e d from
s e c t i o n 43-512, R..C.M. 1947, which p r o v i d e s :
11
Any s t a t u t e may be r e p e a l e d a t any time, except
when i t i s o t h e r w i s e provided t h e r e i n . Persons
a c t i n g under any s t a t u t e a r e deemed t o have a c t e d
i n contemplation o f t h i s power o f r e p e a l . I 1
S e c t i o n 43-512 i s an e x t e n s i o n of common law s t a t e d i n
73 Am J u r 2d, S t a t u t e s , !j 389:
"* * 9; i f a s t a t u t e i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y r e p e a l e d w i t h o u t
a s a v i n g c l a u s e i n f a v o r of pending s u i t s , a l l pending
proceedings thereunder a r e terminated. ** Moreover,
i n t h e absence of any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s a v i n g c l a u s e , a
judgment rendered by v i r t u e of t h e terms of a s t a t u t e
which i s r e p e a l e d i s v o i d , although t h e proceedings may
have been commenced b e f o r e t h e r e p e a l . 11
See a l s o : Anno. 77 A.L.R. 1338, 1345
This rule applies especially to remedial statutes such as
section 89-829, R.C.M. 1947. 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, $ 11;
Lemon v. Los Angeles Terminal Ry. Co., 38 C.A.2d 659, 102
P.2d 387, 393; Continental Oil Co. v. Mont. C. Co., 63 Mont.
223, 230, 207 P. 116.
Initially on appeal, arguments presented in behalf of
appellant were directed toward showing that the Water Use Act
contained provisions which saved the proceeding from the annihi-
lating effect of section 43-512, W.C.M. 1947. Subsequently,
supplemental briefs were submitted which placed emphasis on
constitutional considerations rather than legislative intent.
We agree that constitutional provisions are controlling in disposi-
tion of this appeal.
A,rticle 111, Sec. 15, of the 1889 Montana Constitution,
provided :
h he use of all water now appropriated, or that may
hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, distri-
bution, or other beneficial use, and the right of way
over the lands of others, for all ditches, drains,
flumes, canals, and aqueducts, necessarily used in
connection therewith, as well as the sites for
reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing the
same, shall be held to be a public use.* f: *"
In 1972, Montana adopted a new donstitution which became
effective on July 1, 1973, Subdivisions (2) and (3) of Section
3, A.rticle IX of the 1972 Constitution are substantially the same
as Article 111, Sec. 15, of the 1889 Constitution, but two provi-
sions of significance to this case, subdivisions ( ) and ( )
1 4,
were added in Section 3, Article IX of the 1972 Constitution.
Subdivision (1) provides :
"All existing; rights to the use of any waters for
any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized
and confirmed." (Emphasis supplied).
Subdivision ( ) provides :
4
h he legislature shall provide for the administration,
control and regulation of water rights and shall estab-
lish a system of centralized records, in addition to the
present system of local records.11
 Section 6 of the Transition Schedule of the 1972 Constitution
contains this provision:
f1
General transition

"2
( ) The validity of all public and private bonds, debts,
and contracts, and of all suits, actions and rights of
action, shall continue as if no change had taken place. 1 1
This paragraph will hereafter be referred to herein as the "transi-
tion clause".
16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law $48, states:
"Jt Jc * it is within the power of those who adopt a

constitution to make some of its provisions self-
executing. * * *
II
A provision is self-executing when it can be given
effect without the aid of legislation and there is
nothing to indicate that legislation is contemplated
in order to render it operative * *.
"The fact that a right granted by a constitutional
provision may be better or further protected by
supplementary legislation does not of itself prevent
the provision in question from being self-executing;
nor does the self-executing character of a constitu-
tional provision necessarily preclude legislation
for the better protection of the right secured, or
legislation in furtherance of the purposes, or of
the enforcement, of the provision.
See also: State ex rel. Stafford v. Fox-Great Falls Theatre
Corp. , 114 Mont.
This Court in State v. Aitchison, 96 Mont. 335, 341, 30 P.2d
805, in discussing the constitutional provision relative to public
use of water, said:
11
The effect of this constitutional provision in
declaring certain uses to be public, and the declara-
tion of this court that the provision is self-executing,
have the effect of foreclosing a11 inquiry into the
question whether or not the enumerated uses are public,
both by the legislature and the judiciary.I t
We construe Article IX, Section 3 (1) of the 1972 Constitution
as not only reaffirming the public policy of the 1889 Constitution
but also as recognizing and confirming all rights acquired under
that Constitution and the implementing statutes enacted thereunder.
Construed in this context, Article IX, Section 3, with the exception
of subdivision ( ) is self-executing.
4,
As urged by respondents, legislation may be enacted in contem-
plation of constitutional provisions to become effective at a later
date. State ex rel. Woodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont. 141, 520 P.2d 776,
31 St.Rep. 138. Proceeding from this premise respondents argue
the repeal of section 89-829, R.C.M. 1947, took effect before the
effective date of the 1972 Constitution with the result that
appellant had no existing right that could be recognized and con-
firmed. The routing of the repealing provision of the Act through
section 43-512, R.C.M. 1947, has the effect of giving these statu-
tory provisions priority over the 1972 Constitution. The statu-
tory repealing provision and section 43-512, operating together,
say that appellant has lost its right to proceed under section
89-829, R.C.M. 1947. On the other hand, Article IX and the
transition clause of the 1972 Constitution express an intent to
the contrary.
The supremacy of constitutional mandates is too well estab-
lished to require citation. This principle is summarized in 16
Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, 5 56:
It
A written constitution is not only the direct
and basic expression of the sovereign will, it
is also the absolute rule of action and decision
for all departments and offices of government
with respect to all matters covered by it, and
must control as it is written until it is changed
by the authority which established it. No function
of government can be discharged in disregard of or
in opposition to the fundamental law. The state
constitution is the mandate of a sovenzign people to
its servants and representatives. No one of them has
a right to ignore or disregard its mandates, and the
legislature, the executive officers, and the judi-
ciary cannot lawfully act beyond its limitations. 11
Montana is in accord. 0'~annonv. Gustafson, 130 Mont. 402,
303 P.2d 938; State ex rel. Nagle v Stafford, 97 Mont. 275, 34
.
P.2d 372; State ex rel. DuFresne v. Leslie, 100 Mont. 449, 50

Against this background we turn to the question of whether
appellant has an existing right within the meaning of the key words
of Article IX, Section 3 1 ,
() 1972 Constitution -- "All existing
rights to the use of any waters * * *. " We construe these words
in the light of the established principles of construction as stated
in 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law, 5 19:
 II
The words of a c o n s t i t u t i o n may n o t be ignored a s
meaningless * 5;. I f t h e language used i s c l e a r and
unambiguous i t s meaning and i n t e n t a r e t o be a s c e r t a i n e d
from t h e i n s t r u m e n t i t s e l f by c o n s t r u i n g t h e language
a s i t i s w r i t t e n . Unless t h e c o n t e n t s u g g e s t s o t h e r w i s e ,

Corp.,
meaning. +
words a r e t o be given t h e i r n a t u r a l obvious o r o r d i n a r y
** There i s no o c c a s i o n f o r c o n s t r u c t i o n
where t h e language i s p l a i n and d e f i n i t e . 11
See a l s o : S t a t e ex r e l . S t a f f o r d v. Fox-Great F a l l s T h e a t r e
114 Mont. 52, 132 P.2d 689; R i d e r v. Cooney, 94 Mont. 295,

The word " r i g h t s " i s l i m i t e d o n l y by t h e word " e x i s t i n g " .
Outside t h i s l i m i t a t i o n i t extends t o "All", a word t h a t needs no
definition. W a g r e e w i t h amicus c u r i a e t h a t p r i o r i t y i n appro-
e
p r i a t i o n of w a t e r i s a v a l u a b l e r i g h t and q u o t e w i t h a p p r o v a l
from t h e c i t e d Utah c a s e , Whitmore v. Murray C i t y , 107 Utah 445,

"* * Although i t i s t r u e t h a t p l a i n t i f f does n o t
and cannot have a r i g h t t o t h e u s e of t h e w a t e r u n t i l
he h a s completed h i s works and p u t i t t o a b e n e f i c i a l
u s e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e r i g h t t o proceed and a c q u i r e
t h i s r i g h t by complying w i t h t h e s t a t u t o r y requirements
i s a v a l u a b l e r i g h t and i t s v a l u e o f t e n depends upon i t s
priority. ***
II
Property r i g h t s i n water c o n s i s t not alone i n
t h e amount of t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n , b u t , a l s o , i n t h e
p r i o r i t y of t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n . It o f t e n happens t h a t
t h e c h i e f v a l u e of an a p p r o p r i a t i o n c o n s i s t s i n i t s
p r i o r i t y over o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t i o n s i n t h e same n a t u r a l
stream. Hence, t o d e p r i v e a person of h i s p r i o r i t y i s
t o d e p r i v e him of a most v a l u a b l e p r o p e r t y r i g h t . * * *"
The word " e x i s t i n g " i s t o be examined i n t h e c o n t e x t of t h e
law under which a p p e l l a n t commenced i t s a c t i o n . Rider v. Cooney,
supra. A p p e l l a n t ' s p r i o r i t y came i n t o e x i s t e n c e on November 30,
1972. Respondents1 e f f o r t s h e r e i n t o remove whatever p r i o r i t y
a p p e l l a n t might have gained by commencing i t s a p p r o p r i a t i o n i s
a r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h a t r i g h t .
The words "to" and "use" a r e t o be examined i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n -
s h i p t o t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y d e c l a r e d p o l i c y of "public use" and
a l s o i n t h e c o n t e x t of s e c t i o n 89-829, R.C.M. 1947. The f i l i n g
of a p e t i t i o n under s e c t i o n 89-829 i s t h e f i r s t s t e p l e a d i n g t o
11
use", i t b e i n g an i n t e g r a l p a r t of p u t t i n g w a t e r t o p u b l i c and
 11 I1
b e n e f i c i a l use. Limiting use" t o p e r f e c t e d o r a c t u a l use"
would n u l l i f y t h e e x i s t i n g r i g h t of p r i o r i t y c r e a t e d by t h e f i l i n g .
When t h e i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s e words i s c o n s i d e r e d
t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e body of t h e law t o which t h e y r e l a t e , they
r e t a i n t h e i r n a t u r a l meaning. When s o r e a d , a p p e l l a n t had " e x i s t i n g
r i g h t s " when t h e 1972 C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h e Montana Water Use Act
went i n t o e f f e c t .
Other r u l e s governing c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n f o r t i f y t h e
meaning we have given t o A r t i c l e I X , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .
16 C.J.S. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Law $ 5 14 t o 1 6 , s t a t e :
11
In construing a constitution, i t s e s s e n t i a l character
must always be k e p t i n mind. ** J" It i s t o be regarded
a s fundamental law t o which a l l o t h e r laws must y i e l d ,
and should be i n t e r p r e t e d i n such a manner a s t o c a r r y
o u t t h e broad g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of government s t a t e d
therein * * *.
11
A c o n s t i t u t i o n , o r p r o v i s i o n t h e r e o f , should r e c e i v e a
r e a s o n a b l e and p r a c t i c a l i n t e r n r e t a t i o n i n accord w i t h
common sense. Confusion, ambiguity o r c o n t r a d i c t i o n
should b e avoided i f p o s s i b l e . Of two a l t e r n a t i v e con-
s t r u c t i o n s , t h a t which g i v e s r i s e t o fewer o r l e s s com-
p l i c a t e d q u e s t i o n s should be favored, *** *
I1
The prime e f f o r t o r fundamental purpose i n c o n s t r u i n g a
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n , , i s t o a s c e r t a i n and g i v e
e f f e c t t o t h e i n t e n t of t h e framers and of t h e people
who adopted i t . The c o u r t , t h e r e f o r e should c o n s t a n t l y
keep i n mind t h e o b j e c t sought t o be accomplished *** and
proper r e g a r d should b e given t o t h e evil:, i f any,
sought t o be prevented o r remedied,J<;k J".
The c o n s t r u c t i o n w e have given t o A r t i c l e I X , S e c t i o n 3 ( 1 ) ,
1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , would e n t i t l e a p p e l l a n t t o proceed i n
t h e absence of t h e t r a n s i t i o n c l a u s e . The t r a n s i t i o n c l a u s e f u r -
I1
n i s h e s t h e f i n a l touch. It affirms the r i g h t s recognized and
confirmed" by A r t i c l e I X .
I n view of t h e d i s p o s i t i o n h e r e i n made i t i s n o t n e c e s s a r y t o
c o n s i d e r t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t so e x t e n s i v e l y d i s c u s s e d by counsel.
W e n o t e , however, t h a t t h e Water Use Act d i s c l o s e s a l e g i s l a t i v e

construction consistent with t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provision. Legis-
l a t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s , though n o t con-
c l u s i v e , i s e n t i t l e d t o g r e a t weight. Johnson v. C i t y of Great
F a l l s , 38 Mont. 369, 99 P. 1059; S t a t e v. Toomey, 135 Mont. 35,

Judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d .

D i s t r i c t Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief
J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.

W Concur:
e

Justices.

Chief J u s t i c e James T . Harrison and J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly
took no p a r t i n t h i s o p i n i o n , deeming themselves d i s q u a l i f i e d .