G.G. Ex Rel. Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-2056

G. G., by his next friend and mother, Deirdre Grimm,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

GLOUCESTER COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

Defendant - Appellee.

------------------------

JUDY CHIASSON, Ph. D., School Administrator California;
DAVID VANNASDALL, School Administrator California; DIANA K.
BRUCE, School Administrator District of Columbia; DENISE
PALAZZO, School Administrator Florida; JEREMY MAJESKI,
School Administrator Illinois; THOMAS A ABERLI, School
Administrator Kentucky; ROBERT BOURGEOIS, School
Administrator Massachusetts; MARY DORAN, School
Administrator Minnesota; VALERIA SILVA, School Administrator
Minnesota; RUDY RUDOLPH, School Administrator Oregon; JOHN
O'REILLY, School Administrator New York; LISA LOVE, School
Administrator Washington; DYLAN PAULY, School Administrator
Wisconsin; SHERIE HOHS, School Administrator Wisconsin; THE
NATIONAL WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; LEGAL MOMENTUM; THE ASSOCIATION
OF TITLE IV ADMINISTRATORS; EQUAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES; GENDER
JUSTICE; THE WOMEN'S LAW PROJECT; LEGAL VOICE; LEGAL AID
SOCIETY - EMPLOYMENT LAW CENTER; SOUTHWEST WOMEN'S LAW
CENTER; CALIFORNIA WOMEN'S LAW CENTER; THE WORLD
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH; PEDIATRIC
ENDOCRINE SOCIETY; CHILD AND ADOLESCENT GENDER CENTER CLINIC
AT UCSF BENIOFF CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL; CENTER FOR TRANSYOUTH
HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENT AT CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL LOS ANGELES;
GENDER & SEX DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AT ANN & ROBERT H. LURIE
CHILDREN'S HOSPITAL OF CHICAGO; FAN FREE CLINIC; WHITMAN-
WALKER CLINIC, INC., d/b/a Whitman-Walker Health; GLMA:
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS ADVANCING LGBT EQUALITY; TRANSGENDER
LAW & POLICY INSTITUTE; GENDER BENDERS; GAY, LESBIAN &
STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK; GAY-STRAIGHT ALLIANCE NETWORK;
INSIDEOUT; EVIE PRIESTMAN; ROSMY; TIME OUT YOUTH; WE ARE
FAMILY; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; MICHELLE FORCIER, M.D.;
NORMAN SPACK, M.D.,

Amici Supporting Appellant,

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; PAUL R. LEPAGE, In his official
capacity as Governor State of Maine; STATE OF ARIZONA; THE
FAMILY FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA; STATE OF MISSISSIPPI; JOHN
WALSH; STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA; LORRAINE WALSH; PATRICK L.
MCCRORY, In his official capacity as Governor State of North
Carolina; MARK FRECHETTE; JUDITH REISMAN, Ph.D.; JON LYNSKY;
LIBERTY CENTER FOR CHILD PROTECTION; BRADLY FRIEDLIN; LISA
TERRY; LEE TERRY; DONALD CAULDER; WENDY CAULDER; KIM WARD;
ALICE MAY; JIM RUTAN; ISSAC RUTAN; DORETHA GUJU; DOCTOR
RODNEY AUTRY; PASTOR JAMES LARSEN; DAVID THORNTON; KATHY
THORNTON; JOSHUA CUBA; CLAUDIA CLIFTON; ILONA GAMBILL; TIM
BYRD; EAGLE FORUM EDUCATION AND LEGAL DEFENSE FUND,

Amici Supporting Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (4:15-cv-00054-RGD-DEM)

Argued: January 27, 2016 Decided: April 19, 2016

Before NIEMEYER and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published
opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge
Davis joined. Senior Judge Davis wrote a separate concurring
opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote a separate opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part.

ARGUED: Joshua A. Block, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for Appellant. David Patrick
Corrigan, HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Rebecca K. Glenberg, Gail

2
Deady, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF VIRGINIA FOUNDATION,
INC., Richmond, Virginia; Leslie Cooper, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, New York, New York, for Appellant.
Jeremy D. Capps, M. Scott Fisher, Jr., HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN
& WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. Cynthia Cook
Robertson, Washington, D.C., Narumi Ito, Amy L. Pierce, Los
Angeles, California, Alexander P. Hardiman, Shawn P. Thomas, New
York, New York, Richard M. Segal, Nathaniel R. Smith, PILLSBURY
WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP, San Diego, California; Tara L.
Borelli, Atlanta, Georgia, Kyle A. Palazzolo, LAMBDA LEGAL
DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC., Chicago, Illinois; Alison
Pennington, TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, Oakland, California, for
Amici School Administrators Judy Chiasson, David Vannasdall,
Diana K. Bruce, Denise Palazzo, Jeremy Majeski, Thomas A.
Aberli, Robert Bourgeois, Mary Doran, Valeria Silva, Rudy
Rudolph, John O’Reilly, Lisa Love, Dylan Pauly, and Sherie Hohs.
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Sexuality and Gender Law Clinic, COLUMBIA
LAW SCHOOL, New York, New York; Erin E. Buzuvis, WESTERN NEW
ENGLAND UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, Springfield, Massachusetts,
for Amici The National Women’s Law Center, Legal Momentum, The
Association of Title IX Administrators, Equal Rights Advocates,
Gender Justice, The Women’s Law Project, Legal Voice, Legal Aid
Society-Employment Law Center, Southwest Women’s Law Center, and
California Women’s Law Center. Jennifer Levi, GAY & LESBIAN
ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, Boston, Massachusetts; Thomas M.
Hefferon, Washington, D.C., Mary K. Dulka, New York, New York,
Christine Dieter, Jaime A. Santos, GOODWIN PROCTER LLP, Boston,
Massachusetts; Shannon Minter, Asaf Orr, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
LESBIAN RIGHTS, San Francisco, California, for Amici The World
Professional Association for Transgender Health, Pediatric
Endocrine Society, Child and Adolescent Gender Center Clinic at
UCSF Benioff Children’s Hospital, Center for Transyouth Health
and Development at Children’s Hospital Los Angeles, Gender & Sex
Development Program at Ann & Robert H. Lurie Children's Hospital
of Chicago, Fan Free Clinic, Whitman-Walker Clinic, Inc., GLMA:
Health Professionals Advancing LGBT Equality, Transgender Law &
Policy Institute, Michelle Forcier, M.D. and Norman Spack, M.D.
David Dinielli, Rick Mula, SOUTHERN POVERTY LAW CENTER,
Montgomery, Alabama, for Amici Gender Benders, Gay, Lesbian &
Straight Education Network, Gay-Straight Alliance Network,
iNSIDEoUT, Evie Priestman, ROSMY, Time Out Youth, and We Are
Family. James Cole, Jr., General Counsel, Francisco Lopez,
Vanessa Santos, Michelle Tucker, Attorneys, Office of the
General Counsel, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Washington, D.C.; Gregory B. Friel, Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Diana K. Flynn, Sharon M. McGowan, Christine A. Monta,
Attorneys, Civil Rights Division, Appellate Section, UNITED

3
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
United States of America. Alan Wilson, Attorney General, Robert
D. Cook, Solicitor General, James Emory Smith, Jr., Deputy
Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, Columbia, South Carolina, for Amicus State of South
Carolina; Mark Brnovich, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF ARIZONA, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amicus State
of Arizona; Jim Hood, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI, Jackson, Mississippi, for Amicus State
of Mississippi; Patrick Morrisey, Attorney General, OFFICE OF
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Amicus State of West Virginia; Amicus Paul R.
LePage, Governor, State of Maine, Augusta, Maine; Robert C.
Stephens, Jr., Jonathan R. Harris, COUNSEL FOR THE GOVERNOR OF
NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Amicus Patrick L.
Mccrory, Governor of North Carolina. Mary E. McAlister,
Lynchburg, Virginia, Mathew D. Staver, Anita L. Staver, Horatio
G. Mihet, LIBERTY COUNSEL, Orlando, Florida, for Amici Liberty
Center for Child Protection and Judith Reisman, PhD. Jeremy D.
Tedesco, Scottsdale, Arizona, Jordan Lorence, Washington, D.C.,
David A. Cortman, J. Matthew Sharp, Rory T. Gray, ALLIANCE
DEFENDING FREEDOM, Lawrenceville, Georgia, for Amici The Family
Foundation of Virginia, John Walsh, Lorraine Walsh, Mark
Frechette, Jon Lynsky, Bradly Friedlin, Lisa Terry, Lee Terry,
Donald Caulder, Wendy Caulder, Kim Ward, Alice May, Jim Rutan,
Issac Rutan, Doretha Guju, Rodney Autry, James Larsen, David
Thornton, Kathy Thornton, Joshua Cuba, Claudia Clifton, Ilona
Gambill, and Tim Byrd. Lawrence J. Joseph, Washington, D.C.,
for Amicus Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund.

4
FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

G.G., a transgender boy, seeks to use the boys’ restrooms

at his high school. After G.G. began to use the boys’ restrooms

with the approval of the school administration, the local school

board passed a policy banning G.G. from the boys’ restroom.

G.G. alleges that the school board impermissibly discriminated

against him in violation of Title IX and the Equal Protection

Clause of the Constitution. The district court dismissed G.G.’s

Title IX claim and denied his request for a preliminary

injunction. This appeal followed. Because we conclude the

district court did not accord appropriate deference to the

relevant Department of Education regulations, we reverse its

dismissal of G.G.’s Title IX claim. Because we conclude that

the district court used the wrong evidentiary standard in

assessing G.G.’s motion for a preliminary injunction, we vacate

its denial and remand for consideration under the correct

standard. We therefore reverse in part, vacate in part, and

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

At the heart of this appeal is whether Title IX requires

schools to provide transgender students access to restrooms

congruent with their gender identity. Title IX provides: “[n]o

5
person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to

discrimination under any education program or activity receiving

Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The

Department of Education’s (the Department) regulations

implementing Title IX permit the provision of “separate toilet,

locker room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such

facilities provided for students of one sex shall be comparable

to such facilities for students of the other sex.” 34 C.F.R. §

106.33. In an opinion letter dated January 7, 2015, the

Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) interpreted how this

regulation should apply to transgender individuals: “When a

school elects to separate or treat students differently on the

basis of sex . . . a school generally must treat transgender

students consistent with their gender identity.” J.A. 55.

Because this case comes to us after dismissal pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the facts below are

generally as stated in G.G.’s complaint.

G.G. is a transgender boy now in his junior year at

Gloucester High School. G.G.’s birth-assigned sex, or so-called

“biological sex,” is female, but G.G.’s gender identity is male.

G.G. has been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, a medical

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condition characterized by clinically significant distress

caused by an incongruence between a person’s gender identity and

the person’s birth-assigned sex. Since the end of his freshman

year, G.G. has undergone hormone therapy and has legally changed

his name to G., a traditionally male name. G.G. lives all

aspects of his life as a boy. G.G. has not, however, had sex

reassignment surgery. 1

Before beginning his sophomore year, G.G. and his mother

told school officials that G.G. was a transgender boy. The

officials were supportive and took steps to ensure that he would

be treated as a boy by teachers and staff. Later, at G.G.’s

request, school officials allowed G.G. to use the boys’

restroom. 2 G.G. used this restroom without incident for about

seven weeks. G.G.’s use of the boys’ restroom, however, excited

the interest of others in the community, some of whom contacted

1 The World Professional Association for Transgender Health
(WPATH) has established Standards of Care for individuals with
gender dysphoria. J.A. 37. These Standards of Care are
accepted as authoritative by organizations such as the American
Medical Association and the American Psychological Association.
Id. The WPATH Standards of Care do not permit sex reassignment
surgery for persons who are under the legal age of majority.
J.A. 38.

2 G.G. does not participate in the school’s physical
education programs. He does not seek here, and never has sought,
use of the boys’ locker room. Only restroom use is at issue in
this case.

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the Gloucester County School Board (the Board) seeking to bar

G.G. from continuing to use the boys’ restroom.

Board Member Carla B. Hook (Hook) added an item to the

agenda for the November 11, 2014 board meeting titled

“Discussion of Use of Restrooms/Locker Room Facilities.” J.A.

15. Hook proposed the following resolution (hereinafter the

“transgender restroom policy” or “the policy”):

Whereas the GCPS [i.e., Gloucester County
Public Schools] recognizes that some
students question their gender identities,
and

Whereas the GCPS encourages such students to
seek support, advice, and guidance from
parents, professionals and other trusted
adults, and

Whereas the GCPS seeks to provide a safe
learning environment for all students and to
protect the privacy of all students,
therefore

It shall be the practice of the GCPS to
provide male and female restroom and locker
room facilities in its schools, and the use
of said facilities shall be limited to the
corresponding biological genders, and
students with gender identity issues shall
be provided an alternative appropriate
private facility.

J.A. 15-16; 58.

At the November 11, 2014 meeting twenty-seven people spoke

during the Citizens’ Comment Period, a majority of whom

supported Hook’s proposed resolution. Many of the speakers

displayed hostility to G.G., including by referring pointedly to

8
him as a “young lady.” J.A. 16. Others claimed that permitting

G.G. to use the boys’ restroom would violate the privacy of

other students and would lead to sexual assault in restrooms.

One commenter suggested that if the proposed policy were not

adopted, non-transgender boys would come to school wearing

dresses in order to gain access to the girls’ restrooms. G.G.

and his parents spoke against the proposed policy. Ultimately,

the Board postponed a vote on the policy until its next meeting

on December 9, 2014.

At the December 9 meeting, approximately thirty-seven

people spoke during the Citizens’ Comment Period. Again, most

of those who spoke were in favor of the proposed resolution.

Some speakers threatened to vote the Board members out of office

if the Board members voted against the proposed policy.

Speakers again referred to G.G. as a “girl” or “young lady.”

J.A. 18. One speaker called G.G. a “freak” and compared him to

a person who thinks he is a “dog” and wants to urinate on fire

hydrants. Id. Following this second comment period, the Board

voted 6-1 to adopt the proposed policy, thereby barring G.G.

from using the boys’ restroom at school.

G.G. alleges that he cannot use the girls’ restroom because

women and girls in those facilities “react[] negatively because

they perceive[] G.G. to be a boy.” Id. Further, using the

girls’ restroom would “cause severe psychological distress” to

9
G.G. and would be incompatible with his treatment for gender

dysphoria. J.A. 19. As a corollary to the policy, the Board

announced a series of updates to the school’s restrooms to

improve general privacy for all students, including adding or

expanding partitions between urinals in male restrooms, adding

privacy strips to the doors of stalls in all restrooms, and

constructing single-stall unisex restrooms available to all

students. G.G. alleges that he cannot use these new unisex

restrooms because they “make him feel even more stigmatized . .

. . Being required to use the separate restrooms sets him apart

from his peers, and serves as a daily reminder that the school

views him as ‘different.’” Id. G.G. further alleges that,

because of this stigma and exclusion, his social transition is

undermined and he experiences “severe and persistent emotional

and social harms.” Id. G.G. avoids using the restroom while at

school and has, as a result of this avoidance, developed

multiple urinary tract infections.

G.G. sued the Board on June 11, 2015. G.G. seeks an

injunction allowing him to use the boys’ restroom and brings

underlying claims that the Board impermissibly discriminated

against him in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments

Act of 1972 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

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On July 27, 2015, the district court held a hearing on G.G.’s

motion for a preliminary injunction and on the Board’s motion to

dismiss G.G.’s lawsuit. At the hearing, the district court

orally dismissed G.G.’s Title IX claim and denied his request

for a preliminary injunction, but withheld ruling on the motion

to dismiss G.G.’s equal protection claim. The district court

followed its ruling from the bench with a written order dated

September 4, 2015 denying the injunction and a second written

order dated September 17, 2015 dismissing G.G.’s Title IX claim

and expanding on its rationale for denying the injunction.

In its September 17, 2015 order, the district court

reasoned that Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of

sex and not on the basis of other concepts such as gender,

gender identity, or sexual orientation. The district court

observed that the regulations implementing Title IX specifically

allow schools to provide separate restrooms on the basis of sex.

The district court concluded that G.G.’s sex was female and that

requiring him to use the female restroom facilities did not

impermissibly discriminate against him on the basis of sex in

violation of Title IX. With respect to G.G.’s request for an

injunction, the district court found that G.G. had not made the

required showing that the balance of equities was in his favor.

The district court found that requiring G.G. to use the unisex

restrooms during the pendency of this lawsuit was not unduly

11
burdensome and would result in less hardship than requiring

other students made uncomfortable by G.G.’s presence in the

boys’ restroom to themselves use the unisex restrooms.

This appeal followed. G.G. asks us to reverse the district

court’s dismissal of his Title IX claim, grant the injunction he

seeks, and, because of comments made by the district judge

during the motion hearing, to assign the case to a different

district judge on remand. The Board, on the other hand, asks us

to affirm the district court’s rulings and also asks us to

dismiss G.G.’s equal protection claim—on which the district

court has yet to rule—as without merit. The United States, as

it did below, has filed an amicus brief supporting G.G.’s Title

IX claim in order to defend the government’s interpretation of

Title IX as requiring schools to provide transgender students

access to restrooms congruent with their gender identity.

II.

We turn first to the district court’s dismissal of G.G.’s

Title IX claim. 3 We review de novo the district court’s grant of

3We decline the Board’s invitation to preemptively dismiss
G.G.’s equal protection claim before it has been fully
considered by the district court. “[W]e are a court of review,
not of first view.” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct.
1326, 1335 (2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We
will not proceed to the merits of G.G.’s equal protection claim
(Continued)

12
a motion to dismiss. Cruz v. Maypa, 773 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir.

2014). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations and quotations

omitted).

As noted earlier, Title IX provides: “[n]o person . . .

shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in,

be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination

under any education program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). To allege a

violation of Title IX, G.G. must allege (1) that he was excluded

from participation in an education program because of his sex;

(2) that the educational institution was receiving federal

financial assistance at the time of his exclusion; and (3) that

the improper discrimination caused G.G. harm. 4 See Preston v.

on appeal without the benefit of the district court’s prior
consideration.

4The Board suggests that a restroom may not be educational
in nature and thus is not an educational program covered by
Title IX. Appellee’s Br. 35 (quoting Johnston v. Univ. of
Pittsburgh, 97 F. Supp. 3d 657, 682 (W.D. Pa. 2015)). The
Department’s regulation pertaining to “Education programs or
activities” provides:

Except as provided in this subpart, in
providing any aid, benefit, or service to a
(Continued)

13
Virginia ex rel. New River Cmty. Coll., 31 F.3d 203, 206 (4th

Cir. 1994) (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 680

(1979)). We look to case law interpreting Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in evaluating a claim

brought under Title IX. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d

686, 695 (4th Cir. 2007).

Not all distinctions on the basis of sex are impermissible

under Title IX. For example, Title IX permits the provision of

student, a recipient shall not, on the basis
of sex:

(1) Treat one person differently from
another in determining whether such person
satisfies any requirement or condition for
the provision of such aid, benefit, or
service;

(2) Provide different aid, benefits, or
services or provide aid, benefits, or
services in a different manner;

(3) Deny any person any such aid, benefit,
or service;

. . .

(7) Otherwise limit any person in the
enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity.

34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b). We have little difficulty concluding
that access to a restroom at a school, under this regulation,
can be considered either an “aid, benefit, or service” or a
“right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity,” which, when
offered by a recipient institution, falls within the meaning of
“educational program” as used in Title IX and defined by the
Department’s implementing regulations.

14
separate living facilities on the basis of sex: “nothing

contained [in Title IX] shall be construed to prohibit any

educational institution receiving funds under this Act, from

maintaining separate living facilities for the different sexes.”

20 U.S.C. § 1686. The Department’s regulations implementing

Title IX permit the provision of “separate toilet, locker room,

and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such facilities

provided for students of one sex shall be comparable to such

facilities provided for students of the other sex.” 34 C.F.R.

§ 106.33. The Department recently delineated how this

regulation should be applied to transgender individuals. In an

opinion letter dated January 7, 2015, the Department’s Office

for Civil Rights (OCR) wrote: “When a school elects to separate

or treat students differently on the basis of sex . . . a school

generally must treat transgender students consistent with their

gender identity.” 5 J.A. 55.

5 The opinion letter cites to OCR’s December 2014 “Questions
and Answers on Title IX and Single-Sex Elementary and Secondary
Classes and Extracurricular Activities.” This document, denoted
a “significant guidance document” per Office of Management and
Budget regulations, states: “All students, including transgender
students and students who do not conform to sex stereotypes, are
protected from sex-based discrimination under Title IX. Under
Title IX, a recipient generally must treat transgender students
consistent with their gender identity in all aspects of the
planning, implementation, enrollment, operation, and evaluation
of single-sex classes.” Office of Civil Rights, Dept. of Educ.,
Questions and Answers on Title IX and Single-Sex Elementary and
Secondary Classes and Extracurricular Activities 25 (2014)
(Continued)

15
A.

G.G., and the United States as amicus curiae, ask us to

give the Department’s interpretation of its own regulation

controlling weight pursuant to Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452

(1997). Auer requires that an agency’s interpretation of its

own ambiguous regulation be given controlling weight unless the

interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation or statute. Id. at 461. Agency interpretations need

not be well-settled or long-standing to be entitled to

deference. They must, however, “reflect the agency’s fair and

considered judgment on the matter in question.” Id. at 462. An

interpretation may not be the result of the agency’s fair and

considered judgment, and will not be accorded Auer deference,

when the interpretation conflicts with a prior interpretation,

when it appears that the interpretation is no more than a

available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs
/faqs-title-ix-single-sex-201412.pdf.

The dissent suggests that we ignore the part of OCR’s
opinion letter in which the agency “also encourages schools to
offer the use of gender-neutral, individual-user facilities to
any student who does not want to use shared sex-segregated
facilities,” as the Board did here. Post at 66. However,
because G.G. does want to use shared sex-segregated facilities,
the agency’s suggestion regarding students who do not want to
use such shared sex-segregated facilities is immaterial to the
resolution of G.G.’s claim. Nothing in today’s opinion
restricts any school’s ability to provide individual-user
facilities.

16
convenient litigating position, or when the interpretation is a

post hoc rationalization. Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham

Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166 (2012) (citations omitted).

The district court declined to afford deference to the

Department’s interpretation of 34 C.F.R. § 106.33. The district

court found the regulation to be unambiguous because “[i]t

clearly allows the School Board to limit bathroom access ‘on the

basis of sex,’ including birth or biological sex.” G.G. v.

Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., No. 4:15cv54, 2015 WL 5560190, at *8

(E.D. Va. Sept. 17, 2015). The district court also found,

alternatively, that the interpretation advanced by the

Department was clearly erroneous and inconsistent with the

regulation. The district court reasoned that, because “on the

basis of sex” means, at most, on the basis of sex and gender

together, it cannot mean on the basis of gender alone. Id.

The United States contends that the regulation clarifies

statutory ambiguity by making clear that schools may provide

separate restrooms for boys and girls “without running afoul of

Title IX.” Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae 24-25

(hereinafter “U.S. Br.”). However, the Department also

considers § 106.33 itself to be ambiguous as to transgender

students because “the regulation is silent on what the phrases

‘students of one sex’ and ‘students of the other sex’ mean in

the context of transgender students.” Id. at 25. The United

17
States contends that the interpretation contained in OCR’s

January 7, 2015 letter resolves the ambiguity in § 106.33 as

that regulation applies to transgender individuals.

We will not accord an agency’s interpretation of an

unambiguous regulation Auer deference. Thus, our analysis

begins with a determination of whether 34 C.F.R. § 106.33

contains an ambiguity. Section 106.33 permits schools to

provide “separate toilet, locker room, and shower facilities on

the basis of sex, but such facilities provided for students of

one sex shall be comparable to such facilities provided for

students of the other sex.” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.

“[D]etermining whether a regulation or statute is ambiguous

presents a legal question, which we determine de novo.”

Humanoids Grp. v. Rogan, 375 F.3d 301, 306 (4th Cir. 2004). We

determine ambiguity by analyzing the language under the three-

part framework set forth in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S.

337 (1997). The plainness or ambiguity of language is

determined by reference to (1) the language itself, (2) the

specific context in which that language is used, and (3) the

broader context of the statute or regulation as a whole. Id. at

341.

18
First, we have little difficulty concluding that the

language itself—“of one sex” and “of the other sex”—refers to

male and female students. Second, in the specific context of

§ 106.33, the plain meaning of the regulatory language is best

stated by the United States: “the mere act of providing separate

restroom facilities for males and females does not violate Title

IX . . . .” U.S. Br. 22 n.8. Third, the language “of one sex”

and “of the other sex” appears repeatedly in the broader context

of 34 C.F.R. § 106 Subpart D, titled “Discrimination on the

Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Prohibited.” 6

This repeated formulation indicates two sexes (“one sex” and

“the other sex”), and the only reasonable reading of the

language used throughout the relevant regulatory section is that

it references male and female. Read plainly then, § 106.33

permits schools to provide separate toilet, locker room, and

shower facilities for its male and female students. By

6For example, § 106.32(b)(2) provides that “[h]ousing
provided . . . to students of one sex, when compared to that
provided to students of the other sex, shall be as a whole:
proportionate in quantity . . . and [c]omparable in quality and
cost to the student”; § 106.37(a)(3) provides that an
institution generally cannot “[a]pply any rule . . . concerning
eligibility [for financial assistance] which treats persons of
one sex differently from persons of the other sex with regard to
marital or parental status”; and § 106.41(b) provides that
“where [an institution] operates or sponsors a team in a
particular sport for members of one sex but operates or sponsors
no such team for members of the other sex . . . members of the
excluded sex must be allowed to try-out for the team offered . .
. .”

19
implication, the regulation also permits schools to exclude

males from the female facilities and vice-versa.

Our inquiry is not ended, however, by this straightforward

conclusion. Although the regulation may refer unambiguously to

males and females, it is silent as to how a school should

determine whether a transgender individual is a male or female

for the purpose of access to sex-segregated restrooms. We

conclude that the regulation is susceptible to more than one

plausible reading because it permits both the Board’s reading—

determining maleness or femaleness with reference exclusively to

genitalia—and the Department’s interpretation—determining

maleness or femaleness with reference to gender identity. Cf.

Dickenson-Russell Coal Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 747 F.3d 251, 258

(4th Cir. 2014) (refusing to afford Auer deference where the

language of the regulation at issue was “not susceptible to more

than one plausible reading” (citation and quotation marks

omitted)). It is not clear to us how the regulation would apply

in a number of situations—even under the Board’s own “biological

gender” formulation. For example, which restroom would a

transgender individual who had undergone sex-reassignment

surgery use? What about an intersex individual? What about an

individual born with X-X-Y sex chromosomes? What about an

individual who lost external genitalia in an accident? The

Department’s interpretation resolves ambiguity by providing that

20
in the case of a transgender individual using a sex-segregated

facility, the individual’s sex as male or female is to be

generally determined by reference to the student’s gender

identity.

Because we conclude that the regulation is ambiguous as

applied to transgender individuals, the Department’s

interpretation is entitled to Auer deference unless the Board

demonstrates that the interpretation is plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation or statute. Auer, 519 U.S. at

461. “Our review of the agency’s interpretation in this context

is therefore highly deferential.” Dickenson-Russell Coal, 747

F.3d at 257 (citation and quotation marks omitted). “It is well

established that an agency’s interpretation need not be the only

possible reading of a regulation—or even the best one—to

prevail.” Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1337

(2013). An agency’s view need only be reasonable to warrant

deference. Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 702

(1991) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the [agency’s] interpretation

need not be the best or most natural one by grammatical or other

standards. Rather, the [agency’s] view need be only reasonable

to warrant deference.”).

21
Title IX regulations were promulgated by the Department of

Health, Education, and Welfare in 1975 and were adopted

unchanged by the Department in 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 30802, 30955

(May 9, 1980). Two dictionaries from the drafting era inform

our analysis of how the term “sex” was understood at that time.

The first defines “sex” as “the character of being either male

or female” or “the sum of those anatomical and physiological

differences with reference to which the male and female are

distinguished . . . .” American College Dictionary 1109 (1970).

The second defines “sex” as:

the sum of the morphological, physiological,
and behavioral peculiarities of living
beings that subserves biparental
reproduction with its concomitant genetic
segregation and recombination which underlie
most evolutionary change, that in its
typical dichotomous occurrence is usu[ally]
genetically controlled and associated with
special sex chromosomes, and that is
typically manifested as maleness and
femaleness . . . .

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2081 (1971).

Although these definitions suggest that the word “sex” was

understood at the time the regulation was adopted to connote

male and female and that maleness and femaleness were determined

primarily by reference to the factors the district court termed

“biological sex,” namely reproductive organs, the definitions

also suggest that a hard-and-fast binary division on the basis

of reproductive organs—although useful in most cases—was not

22
universally descriptive. 7 The dictionaries, therefore, used

qualifiers such as reference to the “sum of” various factors,

“typical dichotomous occurrence,” and “typically manifested as

maleness and femaleness.” Section 106.33 assumes a student

population composed of individuals of what has traditionally

been understood as the usual “dichotomous occurrence” of male

and female where the various indicators of sex all point in the

same direction. It sheds little light on how exactly to

determine the “character of being either male or female” where

those indicators diverge. We conclude that the Department’s

interpretation of how § 106.33 and its underlying assumptions

should apply to transgender individuals is not plainly erroneous

or inconsistent with the text of the regulation. The regulation

is silent as to which restroom transgender individuals are to

use when a school elects to provide sex-segregated restrooms,

and the Department’s interpretation, although perhaps not the

intuitive one, is permitted by the varying physical,

psychological, and social aspects—or, in the words of an older

7
Modern definitions of “sex” also implicitly recognize the
limitations of a nonmalleable, binary conception of sex. For
example, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “sex” as “[t]he sum of
the peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a
male from a female organism; gender.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1583 (10th ed. 2014). The American Heritage Dictionary includes
in the definition of “sex” “[o]ne’s identity as either female or
male.” American Heritage Dictionary 1605 (5th ed. 2011).

23
dictionary, “the morphological, physiological, and behavioral

peculiarities”—included in the term “sex.”

Finally, we consider whether the Department’s

interpretation of § 106.33 is the result of the agency’s fair

and considered judgment. Even a valid interpretation will not

be accorded Auer deference where it conflicts with a prior

interpretation, where it appears that the interpretation is no

more than a convenient litigating position, or where the

interpretation is a post hoc rationalization. Christopher, 132

S. Ct. at 2166 (citations omitted).

Although the Department’s interpretation is novel because

there was no interpretation as to how § 106.33 applied to

transgender individuals before January 2015, “novelty alone is

no reason to refuse deference” and does not render the current

interpretation inconsistent with prior agency practice. See

Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2263

(2011). As the United States explains, the issue in this case

“did not arise until recently,” see id., because schools have

only recently begun citing § 106.33 as justification for

enacting new policies restricting transgender students’ access

to restroom facilities. The Department contends that “[i]t is

to those ‘newfound’ policies that [the Department’s]

24
interpretation of the regulation responds.” U.S. Br. 29. We

see no reason to doubt this explanation. See Talk Am., Inc.,

131 S. Ct. at 2264.

Nor is the interpretation merely a convenient litigating

position. The Department has consistently enforced this

position since 2014. See J.A. 55 n.5 & n.6 (providing examples

of OCR enforcement actions to secure transgender students access

to restrooms congruent with their gender identities). Finally,

this interpretation cannot properly be considered a post hoc

rationalization because it is in line with the existing

guidances and regulations of a number of federal agencies—all of

which provide that transgender individuals should be permitted

access to the restroom that corresponds with their gender

identities. 8 U.S. Br. 17 n.5 & n.6 (citing publications by the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission, the Department of Housing and

8 We disagree with the dissent’s suggestion that the result
we reach today renders the enforcement of separate restroom
facilities impossible because it “would require schools to
assume gender identity based on appearances, social
expectations, or explicit declarations of identity.” Post at
65. Accepting the Board’s position would equally require the
school to assume “biological sex” based on “appearances, social
expectations, or explicit declarations of [biological sex].”
Certainly, no one is suggesting mandatory verification of the
“correct” genitalia before admittance to a restroom. The
Department’s vision of sex-segregated restrooms which takes
account of gender identity presents no greater “impossibility of
enforcement” problem than does the Board’s “biological gender”
vision of sex-segregated restrooms.

25
Urban Development, and the Office of Personnel Management).

None of the Christopher grounds for withholding Auer deference

are present in this case.

We conclude that the Department’s interpretation of its own

regulation, § 106.33, as it relates to restroom access by

transgender individuals, is entitled to Auer deference and is to

be accorded controlling weight in this case. 9 We reverse the

district court’s contrary conclusion and its resultant dismissal

of G.G.’s Title IX claim.

In many respects, we are in agreement with the dissent. We

agree that “sex” should be construed uniformly throughout Title

IX and its implementing regulations. We agree that it has

indeed been commonplace and widely accepted to separate public

9 The Board urges us to reach a contrary conclusion
regarding the validity of the Department’s interpretation,
citing Johnston v. Univ. of Pittsburgh of Com. Sys. of Higher
Educ., 97 F. Supp. 657 (W.D. Pa. 2015). Although we recognize
that the Johnston court confronted a case similar in most
material facts to the one before us, that court did not consider
the Department’s interpretation of § 106.33. Because the
Johnston court did not grapple with the questions of
administrative law implicated here, we find the Title IX
analysis in Johnston to be unpersuasive.

26
restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of

sex. We agree that “an individual has a legitimate and

important interest in bodily privacy such that his or her nude

or partially nude body, genitalia, and other private parts” are

not involuntarily exposed. 10 Post at 56. It is not apparent to

us, however, that the truth of these propositions undermines the

conclusion we reach regarding the level of deference due to the

Department’s interpretation of its own regulations.

The Supreme Court commands the use of particular analytical

frameworks when courts review the actions of the executive

agencies. G.G. claims that he is entitled to use the boys’

restroom pursuant to the Department’s interpretation of its

regulations implementing Title IX. We have carefully followed

the Supreme Court’s guidance in Chevron, Auer, and Christopher

and have determined that the interpretation contained in the OCR

letter is to be accorded controlling weight. In a case such as

10
We doubt that G.G.’s use of the communal restroom of his
choice threatens the type of constitutional abuses present in
the cases cited by the dissent. For example, G.G.’s use—or for
that matter any individual’s appropriate use—of a restroom will
not involve the type of intrusion present in Brannum v. Overton
Cty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 494 (6th Cir. 2008) (involving the
videotaping of students dressing and undressing in school locker
rooms), Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 604
(6th Cir. 2005) (involving the indiscriminate strip searching of
twenty male and five female students), or Supelveda v. Ramirez,
967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) (involving a male parole
officer forcibly entering a bathroom stall with a female parolee
to supervise the provision of a urine sample).

27
this, where there is no constitutional challenge to the

regulation or agency interpretation, the weighing of privacy

interests or safety concerns 11—fundamentally questions of policy—

is a task committed to the agency, not to the courts.

The Supreme Court’s admonition in Chevron points to the

balance courts must strike:

Judges are not experts in the field, and are
not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases,
reconcile competing political interests, but
not on the basis of the judges' personal
policy preferences. In contrast, an agency
to which Congress has delegated policy-
making responsibilities may, within the
limits of that delegation, properly rely
upon the incumbent administration's views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While
agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political
branch of the Government to make such policy
choices—resolving the competing interests

11 The dissent accepts the Board’s invocation of amorphous
safety concerns as a reason for refusing deference to the
Department’s interpretation. We note that the record is devoid
of any evidence tending to show that G.G.’s use of the boys’
restroom creates a safety issue. We also note that the Board
has been, perhaps deliberately, vague as to the nature of the
safety concerns it has—whether it fears that it cannot ensure
G.G.’s safety while in the restroom or whether it fears G.G.
himself is a threat to the safety of others in the restroom. We
are unconvinced of the existence of danger caused by “sexual
responses prompted by students’ exposure to the private body
parts of students of the other biological sex.” Post at 58.
The same safety concern would seem to require segregated
restrooms for gay boys and girls who would, under the dissent’s
formulation, present a safety risk because of the “sexual
responses prompted” by their exposure to the private body parts
of other students of the same sex in sex-segregated restrooms.

28
which Congress itself either inadvertently
did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the
administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities.

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 865-66 (1984). Not only may a subsequent administration

choose to implement a different policy, but Congress may also,

of course, revise Title IX explicitly to prohibit or authorize

the course charted here by the Department regarding the use of

restrooms by transgender students. To the extent the dissent

critiques the result we reach today on policy grounds, we reply

that, our Auer analysis complete, we leave policy formulation to

the political branches.

III.

G.G. also asks us to reverse the district court’s denial of

the preliminary injunction he sought which would have allowed

him to use the boys’ restroom during the pendency of this

lawsuit. “To win such a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must

demonstrate that (1) they are likely to succeed on the merits;

(2) they will likely suffer irreparable harm absent an

injunction; (3) the balance of hardships weighs in their favor;

and (4) the injunction is in the public interest.” League of

Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th

29
Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). We review a district court’s

denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Id.

at 235. “A district court has abused its discretion if its

decision is guided by erroneous legal principles or rests upon a

clearly erroneous factual finding.” Morris v. Wachovia Sec.,

Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotations

omitted). “We do not ask whether we would have come to the same

conclusion as the district court if we were examining the matter

de novo.” Id. (citation omitted). Instead, “we reverse for

abuse of discretion if we form a definite and firm conviction

that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the

conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.”

Id. (citations and quotations omitted).

The district court analyzed G.G.’s request only with

reference to the third factor—the balance of hardships—and found

that the balance of hardships did not weigh in G.G.’s favor.

G.G. submitted two declarations in support of his complaint, one

from G.G. himself and one from a medical expert, Dr. Randi

Ettner, to explain what harms G.G. will suffer as a result of

his exclusion from the boys’ restroom. The district court

refused to consider this evidence because it was “replete with

inadmissible evidence including thoughts of others, hearsay, and

suppositions.” G.G., 2015 WL 5560190, at *11.

30
The district court misstated the evidentiary standard

governing preliminary injunction hearings. The district court

stated: “The complaint is no longer the deciding factor,

admissible evidence is the deciding factor. Evidence therefore

must conform to the rules of evidence.” Id. at *9. Preliminary

injunctions, however, are governed by less strict rules of

evidence:

The purpose of a preliminary injunction is
merely to preserve the relative positions of
the parties until a trial on the merits can
be held. Given this limited purpose, and
given the haste that is often necessary if
those positions are to be preserved, a
preliminary injunction is customarily
granted on the basis of procedures that are
less formal and evidence that is less
complete than in a trial on the merits.

Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981); see also

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 350 n.1 (1976) (taking as true

the “well-pleaded allegations of respondents’ complaint and

uncontroverted affidavits filed in support of the motion for a

preliminary injunction”); compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (requiring

affidavits supporting summary judgment to be “made on personal

knowledge, [and to] set out facts that would be admissible in

evidence), with Fed R. Civ. P. 65 (providing no such requirement

in the preliminary injunction context). Thus, although

admissible evidence may be more persuasive than inadmissible

evidence in the preliminary injunction context, it was error for

31
the district court to summarily reject G.G.’s proffered evidence

because it may have been inadmissible at a subsequent trial.

Additionally, the district court completely excluded some

of G.G.’s proffered evidence on hearsay grounds. The seven of

our sister circuits to have considered the admissibility of

hearsay in preliminary injunction proceedings have decided that

the nature of evidence as hearsay goes to “weight, not

preclusion” and have permitted district courts to “rely on

hearsay evidence for the limited purpose of determining whether

to award a preliminary injunction.” Mullins v. City of New

York, 626 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Kos Pharm., Inc.

v. Andrx Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 718 (3d Cir. 2004); Ty, Inc. v.

GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997); Levi

Strauss & Co. v. Sunrise Int’l Trading, Inc., 51 F.3d 982, 985

(11th Cir. 1995) (“At the preliminary injunction stage, a

district court may rely on affidavits and hearsay materials

which would not be admissible evidence for a permanent

injunction, if the evidence is appropriate given the character

and objectives of the injunctive proceeding.” (citation and

internal quotations omitted)); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v.

FDIC, 992 F.2d 545, 551 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[A]t the preliminary

injunction stage, the procedures in the district court are less

formal, and the district court may rely on otherwise

inadmissible evidence, including hearsay evidence.”); Asseo v.

32
Pan Am. Grain Co., Inc., 805 F.2d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 1986); Flynt

Distrib. Co., Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir.

1984). We see no reason for a different rule to govern in this

Circuit. Because preliminary injunction proceedings are

informal ones designed to prevent irreparable harm before a

later trial governed by the full rigor of usual evidentiary

standards, district courts may look to, and indeed in

appropriate circumstances rely on, hearsay or other inadmissible

evidence when deciding whether a preliminary injunction is

warranted.

Because the district court evaluated G.G.’s proffered

evidence against a stricter evidentiary standard than is

warranted by the nature and purpose of preliminary injunction

proceedings to prevent irreparable harm before a full trial on

the merits, the district court was “guided by erroneous legal

principles.” We therefore conclude that the district court

abused its discretion when it denied G.G.’s request for a

preliminary injunction without considering G.G.’s proffered

evidence. We vacate the district court’s denial of G.G.’s

motion for a preliminary injunction and remand the case to the

district court for consideration of G.G.’s evidence in light of

the evidentiary standards set forth herein.

33
IV.

Finally, G.G. requests that we reassign this case to a

different district judge on remand. G.G. does not explicitly

claim that the district judge is biased. Absent such a claim,

reassignment is only appropriate in “unusual circumstances where

both for the judge’s sake and the appearance of justice an

assignment to a different judge is salutary and in the public

interest, especially as it minimizes even a suspicion of

partiality.” United States v. Guglielmi, 929 F.2d 1001, 1007

(4th Cir. 1991) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

In determining whether such circumstances exist, a court should

consider: (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be

expected upon remand to have substantial difficulty in putting

out of his or her mind previously expressed views or findings

determined to be erroneous or based on evidence that must be

rejected, (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the

appearance of justice, and (3) whether reassignment would entail

waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in

preserving the appearance of fairness. Id. (citation omitted).

G.G. argues that both the first and second Guglielmi

factors are satisfied. He contends that the district court has

pre-existing views which it would be unwilling to put aside in

the face of contrary evidence about medical science generally

and about “gender and sexuality in particular.” Appellant’s Br.

34
53. For example, the court accepted the Board’s “mating”

concern by noting:

There are only two instincts—two.
Everything else is acquired—everything.
That is, the brain only has two instincts.
One is called self-preservation, and the
other is procreation. And procreation is
the highest instinct in individuals who are
in the latter part of their teen-age years.
All of that is accepted by all medical
science, as far as I can determine in
reading information.

J.A. 85-86.

The district court also expressed skepticism that medical

science supported the proposition that one could develop a

urinary tract infection from withholding urine for too long.

J.A. 111-12. The district court characterized gender dysphoria

as a “mental disorder” and resisted several attempts by counsel

for G.G. to clarify that it only becomes a disorder when left

untreated. See J.A. 88-91; 101-02. The district court also

seemed to reject G.G.’s representation of what it meant to be

transgender, repeatedly noting that G.G. “wants” to be a boy and

not a girl, but that “he is biologically a female.” J.A. 103-

04; see also J.A. 104 (“It’s his mind. It’s not physical that

causes that, it’s what he believes.”). The district court’s

memorandum opinion, however, included none of the extraneous

remarks or suppositions that marred the hearing.

35
Reassignment is an unusual step at this early stage of

litigation. Although the district court did express opinions

about medical facts and skepticism of G.G.’s claims, the record

does not clearly indicate that the district judge would refuse

to consider and credit sound contrary evidence. Further,

although the district court has a distinct way of proceeding in

court, the hearing record and the district court’s written order

in the case do not raise in our minds a question about the

fundamental fairness of the proceedings, however idiosyncratic.

The conduct of the district judge does not at this point satisfy

the Guglielmi standard. We deny G.G.’s request for reassignment

to a different district judge on remand.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district

court is

REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

36
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring:

I concur in Judge Floyd’s fine opinion. I write

separately, however, to note that while I am happy to join in

the remand of this matter to the district court so that it may

consider G.G.’s evidence under proper legal standards in the

first instance, this Court would be on sound ground in granting

the requested preliminary injunction on the undisputed facts in

the record.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, G.G. must

demonstrate that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits, (2)

he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an

injunction, (3) the balance of hardships tips in his favor, and

(4) the requested injunction is in the public interest. Pashby

v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing Winter v.

Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The record

before us establishes that G.G. has done so.

G.G. alleges that by singling him out for different

treatment because he is transgender, the Board’s restroom policy

discriminates against him “on the basis of sex” in violation of

Title IX. In light of the weight of circuit authority

concluding that discrimination against transgender individuals

constitutes discrimination “on the basis of sex” in the context

37
of analogous statutes and our holding here that the Department’s

interpretation of 34 C.F.R. § 106.33 is to be given controlling

weight, G.G. has surely demonstrated a likelihood of success on

the merits of his Title IX claim. See Price Waterhouse v.

Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989); see also Glenn v. Brumby,

663 F.3d 1312, 1316–19 (11th Cir. 2011); Smith v. City of Salem,

378 F.3d 566, 573–75 (6th Cir. 2004); Rosa v. Park W. Bank &

Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215–16 (1st Cir. 2000); Schwenk v.

Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2000).

In support of his claim of irreparable harm, G.G. submitted

an affidavit to the district court describing the psychological

distress he experiences when he is forced to use the single-

stall restrooms or the restroom in the nurse’s office. See J.A.

32–33. His affidavit also indicates that he has “repeatedly

developed painful urinary tract infections” as a result of

holding his urine in order to avoid using the restroom at

school. Id.

An expert declaration by Dr. Randi Ettner, a psychologist

specializing in working with children and adolescents with

gender dysphoria, provides further support for G.G.’s claim of

irreparable harm. In her affidavit, Dr. Ettner indicates that

treating a transgender boy as male in some situations but not in

others is “inconsistent with evidence-based medical practice and

38
detrimental to the health and well-being of the child” and

explains why access to a restroom appropriate to one’s gender

identity is important for transgender youth. J.A. 39. With

respect to G.G. in particular, Dr. Ettner states that in her

professional opinion, the Board’s restroom policy “is currently

causing emotional distress to an extremely vulnerable youth and

placing G.G. at risk for accruing lifelong psychological harm.”

J.A. 41. In particular, Dr. Ettner opines that

[a]s a result of the School Board’s restroom policy, .
. . G.G. is put in the humiliating position of having
to use a separate facility, thereby accentuating his
‘otherness,’ undermining his identity formation, and
impeding his medically necessary social transition
process. The shame of being singled out and
stigmatized in his daily life every time he needs to
use the restroom is a devastating blow to G.G. and
places him at extreme risk for immediate and long-term
psychological harm.

J.A. 42.

The Board offers nothing to contradict any of the

assertions concerning irreparable harm in G.G.’s or Dr. Ettner’s

affidavits. Instead, its arguments focus on what is purportedly

lacking from G.G.’s presentation in support of his claim of

irreparable harm, such as “evidence that [his feelings of

dysphoria, anxiety, and distress] would be lessened by using the

boy[s’] restroom,” evidence from his treating psychologist,

medical evidence, and an opinion from Dr. Ettner

“differentiating between the distress that G.G. may suffer by

39
not using the boy[s’] bathroom during the course of this

litigation and the distress that he has apparently been living

with since age 12.” Br. Appellee 42–43. As to the alleged

deficiency concerning Dr. Ettner’s opinion, the Board’s argument

is belied by Dr. Ettner’s affidavit itself, which, as quoted

above, provides her opinion about the psychological harm that

G.G. is experiencing “[a]s a result of the School Board’s

restroom policy.” J.A. 42. With respect to the other purported

inadequacies, the absence of such evidence does nothing to

undermine the uncontroverted statements concerning the daily

psychological harm G.G. experiences as a result of the Board’s

policy or Dr. Ettner’s unchallenged opinion concerning the

significant long-term consequences of that harm. Moreover, the

Board offers no argument to counter G.G.’s averment that he has

repeatedly contracted a urinary tract infection as a result of

holding his urine to avoid using the restroom at school.

The uncontroverted facts before the district court

demonstrate that as a result of the Board’s restroom policy,

G.G. experiences daily psychological harm that puts him at risk

for long-term psychological harm, and his avoidance of the

restroom as a result of the Board’s policy puts him at risk for

developing a urinary tract infection as he has repeatedly in the

past. G.G. has thus demonstrated that he will suffer

irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

40
C.

Turning to the balance of the hardships, G.G. has shown

that he will suffer irreparable harm without the requested

injunction. On the other end of the scale, the Board contends

that other students’ constitutional right to privacy will be

imperiled by G.G.’s presence in the boys’ restroom.

As the majority opinion points out, G.G.’s use of the

restroom does not implicate the unconstitutional actions

involved in the cases cited by the dissent. Moreover, students’

unintentional exposure of their genitals to others using the

restroom has already been largely, if not entirely, remedied by

the alterations to the school’s restrooms already undertaken by

the Board. To the extent that a student simply objects to using

the restroom in the presence of a transgender student even where

there is no possibility that either student’s genitals will be

exposed, all students have access to the single-stall restrooms.

For other students, using the single-stall restrooms carries no

stigma whatsoever, whereas for G.G., using those same restrooms

is tantamount to humiliation and a continuing mark of difference

among his fellow students. The minimal or non-existent hardship

to other students of using the single-stall restrooms if they

object to G.G.’s presence in the communal restroom thus does not

tip the scale in the Board’s favor. The balance of hardships

weighs heavily toward G.G.

41
D.

Finally, consideration of the public interest in granting

or denying the preliminary injunction favors G.G. Having

concluded that G.G. has demonstrated a likelihood of success on

the merits of his Title IX claim, denying the requested

injunction would permit the Board to continue violating G.G.’s

rights under Title IX for the pendency of this case. Enforcing

G.G.’s right to be free from discrimination on the basis of sex

in an educational institution is plainly in the public interest.

Cf. Giovani Carandola, Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 507, 521 (4th

Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (observing that upholding

constitutional rights is in the public interest).

The Board contends that the public interest lies in

allowing this issue to be determined by the legislature, citing

pending legislation before Congress addressing the issue before

the Court. But, as discussed above, the weight of authority

establishes that discrimination based on transgender status is

already prohibited by the language of federal civil rights

statutes, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The existence of

proposed legislation that, if passed, would address the question

before us does not justify forcing G.G. to suffer irreparable

harm when he has demonstrated that he is likely to succeed on

the merits of his claims under current federal law.

42
II.

Based on the evidence presented to the district court, G.G.

has satisfied all four prongs of the preliminary injunction

inquiry. When the record before us supports entry of a

preliminary injunction—as it amply does here—we have not

hesitated to act to prevent irreparable injury to a litigant

before us. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North

Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 248 (4th Cir. 2014) (expressly observing

that appellate courts have the power to vacate a denial of a

preliminary injunction and direct entry of an injunction);

Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery Cty. Pub. Schs., 197

F.3d 123, 134 (4th Cir. 1999) (directing entry of injunction

“because the record clearly establishes the plaintiff’s right to

an injunction and [an evidentiary] hearing would not have

altered the result”).

Nevertheless, it is right and proper that we defer to the

district court in this instance. It is to be hoped that the

district court will turn its attention to this matter with the

urgency the case poses. Under the circumstances here, the

appropriateness and necessity of such prompt action is plain.

By the time the district court issues its decision, G.G. will

have suffered the psychological harm the injunction sought to

prevent for an entire school year.

43
With these additional observations, I concur fully in Judge
Floyd’s thoughtful and thorough opinion for the panel.

44
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part:

I concur in Part IV of the court’s opinion. With respect

to whether G.G. stated a claim under Title IX and whether the

district court abused its discretion in denying G.G’s motion for

a preliminary injunction, I would affirm the ruling of the

district court dismissing G.G.’s Title IX claim and denying his

motion for a preliminary injunction. I therefore dissent from

the majority’s decision on those issues.

G.G., a transgender boy who is 16, challenges as

discriminatory, under the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX

of the Education Amendments of 1972, his high school’s policy

for assigning students to restrooms and locker rooms based on

biological sex. The school’s policy provides: (1) that the

girls’ restrooms and locker rooms are designated for use by

students who are biologically female; (2) that the boys’

restrooms and locker rooms are designated for use by students

who are biologically male; and (3) that all students, regardless

of their sex, are authorized to use the school’s three single-

stall unisex restrooms, which the school created to accommodate

transgender students. Under this policy, G.G., who is

biologically female but who identifies as male, is authorized to

use the girls’ restrooms and locker rooms and the unisex

restrooms. He contends, however, that the policy discriminates

45
against him because it denies him, as one who identifies as

male, the use of the boys’ restrooms, and he seeks an injunction

compelling the high school to allow him to use the boys’

restrooms.

The district court dismissed G.G.’s Title IX claim,

explaining that the school complied with Title IX and its

regulations, which permit schools to provide separate living

facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities “on

the basis of sex,” so long as the facilities are “comparable.”

20 U.S.C. § 1686; 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.32(b), 106.33.

Strikingly, the majority now reverses the district court’s

ruling, without any supporting case law, and concludes that when

Title IX and its regulations provide for separate living

facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities on

the basis of sex, the statute’s and regulations’ use of the term

“sex” means a person’s gender identity, not the person’s

biological status as male or female. To accomplish its goal,

the majority relies entirely on a 2015 letter sent by the

Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights to G.G., in

which the Office for Civil Rights stated, “When a school elects

to separate or treat students differently on the basis of sex

[when providing restrooms, locker rooms, shower facilities,

housing, athletic teams, and single-sex classes], a school

generally must treat transgender students consistent with their

46
gender identity.” (Emphasis added). Accepting that new

definition of the statutory term “sex,” the majority’s opinion,

for the first time ever, holds that a public high school may not

provide separate restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of

biological sex. Rather, it must now allow a biological male

student who identifies as female to use the girls’ restrooms and

locker rooms and, likewise, must allow a biological female

student who identifies as male to use the boys’ restrooms and

locker rooms. This holding completely tramples on all

universally accepted protections of privacy and safety that are

based on the anatomical differences between the sexes. And,

unwittingly, it also tramples on the very concerns expressed by

G.G., who said that he should not be forced to go to the girls’

restrooms because of the “severe psychological distress” it

would inflict on him and because female students had “reacted

negatively” to his presence in girls’ restrooms. Surely

biological males who identify as females would encounter similar

reactions in the girls’ restroom, just as students physically

exposed to students of the opposite biological sex would be

likely to experience psychological distress. As a result,

schools would no longer be able to protect physiological privacy

as between students of the opposite biological sex.

This unprecedented holding overrules custom, culture, and

the very demands inherent in human nature for privacy and

47
safety, which the separation of such facilities is designed to

protect. More particularly, it also misconstrues the clear

language of Title IX and its regulations. And finally, it

reaches an unworkable and illogical result.

The recent Office for Civil Rights letter, moreover, which

is not law but which is the only authority on which the majority

relies, states more than the majority acknowledges. In the

sentence following the sentence on which the majority relies,

the letter states that, to accommodate transgender students,

schools are encouraged “to offer the use of gender-neutral,

individual-user facilities to any student who does not want to

use shared sex-segregated facilities [as permitted by Title IX’s

regulations].” This appears to approve the course that G.G.’s

school followed when it created unisex restrooms in addition to

the boys’ and girls’ restrooms it already had.

Title IX and its implementing regulations are not

ambiguous. In recognition of physiological privacy and safety

concerns, they allow schools to provide “separate living

facilities for the different sexes,” 20 U.S.C. § 1686, provided

that the facilities are “proportionate” and “comparable,” 34

C.F.R. § 106.32(b), and to provide “separate toilet, locker

room, and shower facilities on the basis of sex,” again provided

that the facilities are “comparable,” 34 C.F.R. § 106.33.

Because the school’s policy that G.G. challenges in this action

48
comports with Title IX and its regulations, I would affirm the

district court’s dismissal of G.G.’s Title IX claim.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. G.G. is a 16 year-

old who attends Gloucester High School in Gloucester County,

Virginia. He is biologically female, but “did not feel like a

girl” from an early age. Still, he enrolled at Gloucester High

School for his freshman year as a female.

During his freshman year, however, G.G. told his parents

that he considered himself to be transgender, and shortly

thereafter, at his request, he began therapy with a

psychologist, who diagnosed him with gender dysphoria, a

condition of distress brought about by the incongruence of one’s

biological sex and gender identity.

In August 2014, before beginning his sophomore year, G.G.

and his mother met with the principal and guidance counselor at

Gloucester High School to discuss his need, as part of his

treatment, to socially transition at school. The school

accommodated all of his requests. Officials changed school

records to reflect G.G.’s new male name; the guidance counselor

supported G.G.’s sending an email to teachers explaining that he

was to be addressed using his new name and to be referred to

using male pronouns; G.G. was permitted to fulfill his physical

49
education requirement through a home-bound program, as he

preferred not to use the school’s locker rooms; and the school

allowed G.G. to use a restroom in the nurse’s office “because

[he] was unsure how other students would react to [his]

transition.” G.G. was grateful for the school’s “welcoming

environment.” As he stated, “no teachers, administrators, or

staff at Gloucester High School expressed any resistance to

calling [him] by [his] legal name or referring to [him] using

male pronouns.” And he was “pleased to discover that [his]

teachers and the vast majority of [his] peers respected the fact

that [he is] a boy.”

As the school year began, however, G.G. found it

“stigmatizing” to continue using the nurse’s restroom, and he

requested to use the boys’ restrooms. The principal also

accommodated this request. But the very next day, the School

Board began receiving “numerous complaints from parents and

students about [G.G.’s] use of the boys’ restrooms.” The School

Board thus faced a dilemma. It recognized G.G.’s feelings, as

he expressed them, that “[u]sing the girls’ restroom[s] [was]

not possible” because of the “severe psychological distress” it

would inflict on him and because female students had previously

“reacted negatively” to his presence in the girls’ restrooms.

It now also had to recognize that boys had similar feelings

caused by G.G.’s use of the boys’ restrooms, although G.G.

50
stated that he continued using the boys’ restrooms for some

seven weeks without personally receiving complaints from fellow

students.

The Gloucester County School Board considered the problem

and, after two public meetings, adopted a compromise policy, as

follows:

Whereas the GCPS recognizes that some students
question their gender identities, and

Whereas the GCPS encourages such students to seek
support, advice, and guidance from parents,
professionals and other trusted adults, and

Whereas the GCPS seeks to provide a safe learning
environment for all students and to protect the
privacy of all students, therefore

It shall be the practice of the GCPS to provide male
and female restroom and locker room facilities in its
schools, and the use of said facilities shall be
limited to the corresponding biological genders, and
students with gender identity issues shall be provided
an alternative appropriate private facility.

Gloucester High School promptly implemented the policy and

created three single-stall unisex restrooms for use by all

students, regardless of their biological sex or gender identity.

In December 2014, G.G. sought an opinion letter about his

situation from the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for

Civil Rights, and on January 15, 2015, the Office responded,

stating, as relevant here:

The Department’s Title IX regulations permit schools
to provide sex-segregated restrooms, locker rooms,
shower facilities, housing, athletic teams, and
single-sex classes under certain circumstances. When

51
a school elects to separate or treat students
differently on the basis of sex in those situations, a
school generally must treat transgender students
consistent with their gender identity. [The Office
for Civil Rights] also encourages schools to offer the
use of gender-neutral, individual-user facilities to
any student who does not want to use shared sex-
segregated facilities.

G.G. commenced this action in June 2015, alleging that the

Gloucester County School Board’s policy was discriminatory, in

violation of the U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause and

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681

et seq. He sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and

damages. With his complaint, G.G. also filed a motion for a

preliminary injunction “requiring the School Board to allow

[him] to use the boys’ restrooms at school.”

The district court dismissed G.G.’s Title IX claim because

Title IX’s implementing regulations permit schools to provide

separate restrooms “on the basis of sex.” The court also denied

G.G.’s motion for a preliminary injunction. As to the Equal

Protection claim, the court has not yet ruled on whether G.G.

failed to state a claim, but, at the hearing on the motion for a

preliminary injunction, it indicated that it “will hear

evidence” and “get a date set” for trial to better assess the

claim.

From the district court’s order denying G.G.’s motion for a

preliminary injunction, G.G. filed this appeal, in which he also

52
challenges the district court’s Title IX ruling as inextricably

intertwined with the district court’s denial of the motion for a

preliminary injunction.

G.G. recognizes that persons who are born biologically

female “typically” identify psychologically as female, and

likewise, that persons who are born biologically male

“typically” identify as male. Because G.G. was born

biologically female but identifies as male, he characterizes

himself as a transgender male. He contends that because he is

transgender, the School Board singled him out for “different and

unequal treatment,” “discriminat[ing] against him based on sex

[by denying him use of the boys’ restrooms], in violation of

Title IX.” He argues, “discrimination against transgender

people is necessarily discrimination based on sex because it is

impossible to treat people differently based on their

transgender status without taking their sex into account.” He

concludes that the School Board’s policy addressing restrooms

and locker rooms thus illegally fails to include transgender

persons on the basis of their gender identity. In particular,

he concludes that he is “prevent[ed] . . . from using the same

restrooms as other students and relegat[ed] . . . to separate,

single-stall facilities.”

53
As noted, the School Board’s policy designates the use of

restrooms and locker rooms based on the student’s biological sex

-- biological females are assigned to the girls’ restrooms and

unisex restrooms; biological males are assigned to the boys’

restrooms and unisex restrooms. G.G. is thus assigned to the

girls’ restrooms and the unisex restrooms, but is denied the use

of the boys’ restrooms. He asserts, however, that because

neither he nor the girls would accept his use of the girls’

restroom, he is relegated to the unisex restrooms, which is

stigmatizing.

The School Board contends that it is treating all students

the same way, as it explains:

The School Board’s policy does not discriminate
against any class of students. Instead, the policy
was developed to treat all students and situations the
same. To respect the safety and privacy of all
students, the School Board has had a long-standing
practice of limiting the use of restroom and locker
room facilities to the corresponding biological sex of
the students. The School Board also provides three
single-stall bathrooms for any student to use
regardless of his or her biological sex. Under the
School Board’s restroom policy, G.G. is being treated
like every other student in the Gloucester Schools.
All students have two choices. Every student can use
a restroom associated with their anatomical sex,
whether they are boys or girls. If students choose
not to use the restroom associated with their
anatomical sex, the students can use a private,
single-stall restroom. No student is permitted to use
the restroom of the opposite sex. As a result, all
students, including female to male transgender and
male to female transgender students, are treated the
same.

54
While G.G. has pending a claim under the Equal Protection

Clause (on which the district court has not yet ruled), only his

preliminary injunction challenge and Title IX claim are before

us at this time.

Title IX provides:

No person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . .

20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis added). The Act, however,

provides, “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in

this chapter, nothing contained herein shall be construed to

prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this

Act, from maintaining separate living facilities for the

different sexes.” Id. § 1686 (emphasis added); see also 34

C.F.R. § 106.32(b) (permitting schools to provide “separate

housing on the basis of sex” as long as the housing is

“proportionate” and “comparable” (emphasis added)). Similarly,

implementing Regulation 106.33 provides for particular separate

facilities, as follows:

A recipient may provide separate toilet, locker room,
and shower facilities on the basis of sex, but such
facilities provided for students of one sex shall be
comparable to such facilities provided for students of
the other sex.

34 C.F.R. § 106.33 (emphasis added). Thus, although Title IX

and its regulations provide generally that a school receiving

55
federal funds may not discriminate on the basis of sex, they

also specify that a school does not violate the Act by

providing, on the basis of sex, separate living facilities,

restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities.

While G.G. only challenges the definition and application

of the term “sex” with respect to separate restrooms, acceptance

of his argument would necessarily change the definition of “sex”

for purposes of assigning separate living facilities, locker

rooms, and shower facilities as well. All are based on “sex,” a

term that must be construed uniformly throughout Title IX and

its implementing regulations. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S.

478, 484 (1990) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory construction

[is] that identical words used in different parts of the same

act are intended to have the same meaning” (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted)); In re Total Realty Mgmt., LLC,

706 F.3d 245, 251 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Canons of construction . . .

require that, to the extent possible, identical terms or phrases

used in different parts of the same statute be interpreted as

having the same meaning. This presumption of consistent

usage . . . ensure[s] that the statutory scheme is coherent and

consistent” (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted)); see also Kentuckians for Commonwealth

Inc. v. Riverburgh, 317 F.3d 425, 440 (4th Cir. 2003)

(“[B]ecause a regulation must be consistent with the statute it

56
implements, any interpretation of a regulation naturally must

accord with the statute as well” (quoting John F. Manning,

Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency

Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 627 n.78

(1996))).

Across societies and throughout history, it has been

commonplace and universally accepted to separate public

restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities on the basis of

biological sex in order to address privacy and safety concerns

arising from the biological differences between males and

females. An individual has a legitimate and important interest

in bodily privacy such that his or her nude or partially nude

body, genitalia, and other private parts are not exposed to

persons of the opposite biological sex. Indeed, courts have

consistently recognized that the need for such privacy is

inherent in the nature and dignity of humankind. See, e.g., Doe

v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2011)

(recognizing that an individual has “a constitutionally

protected privacy interest in his or her partially clothed body”

and that this “reasonable expectation of privacy” exists

“particularly while in the presence of members of the opposite

sex”); Brannum v. Overton Cnty. Sch. Bd., 516 F.3d 489, 494 (6th

Cir. 2008) (explaining that “the constitutional right to privacy

. . . includes the right to shield one’s body from exposure to

57
viewing by the opposite sex”); Beard v. Whitmore Lake Sch.

Dist., 402 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Students of course

have a significant privacy interest in their unclothed bodies”);

Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992)

(explaining that “[t]he right to bodily privacy is fundamental”

and that “common sense, decency, and [state] regulations”

require recognizing it in a parolee’s right not to be observed

by an officer of the opposite sex while producing a urine

sample); Lee v. Downs, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 1989)

(recognizing that, even though inmates in prison “surrender many

rights of privacy,” their “special sense of privacy in their

genitals” should not be violated through exposure unless

“reasonably necessary” and explaining that the “involuntary

exposure of [genitals] in the presence of people of the other

sex may be especially demeaning and humiliating”).

Moreover, we have explained that separating restrooms based

on “acknowledged differences” between the biological sexes

serves to protect this important privacy interest. See Faulkner

v. Jones, 10 F.3d 226, 232 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting “society’s

undisputed approval of separate public rest rooms for men and

women based on privacy concerns”). Indeed, the Supreme Court

recognized, when ordering an all-male Virginia college to admit

female students, that such a remedy “would undoubtedly require

alterations necessary to afford members of each sex privacy from

58
the other sex.” United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550

n.19 (1996). Such privacy was and remains necessary because of

the inherent “[p]hysical differences between men and women,”

which, as the Supreme Court explained, are “enduring” and render

“the two sexes . . . not fungible,” id. at 533 (distinguishing

sex from race and national origin), not because of “one’s sense

of oneself as belonging to a particular gender,” as G.G. and the

government as amicus contend.

Thus, Title IX’s allowance for the separation, based on

sex, of living facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and shower

facilities rests on the universally accepted concern for bodily

privacy that is founded on the biological differences between

the sexes. This privacy concern is also linked to safety

concerns that could arise from sexual responses prompted by

students’ exposure to the private body parts of students of the

other biological sex. Indeed, the School Board cited these very

reasons for its adoption of the policy, explaining that it

separates restrooms and locker rooms to promote the privacy and

safety of minor children, pursuant to its “responsibility to its

students to ensure their privacy while engaging in personal

bathroom functions, disrobing, dressing, and showering outside

of the presence of members of the opposite sex. [That the

school has this responsibility] is particularly true in an

59
environment where children are still developing, both

emotionally and physically.”

The need to protect privacy and safety between the sexes

based on physical exposure would not be present in the same

quality and degree if the term “sex” were to encompass only a

person’s gender identity. Indeed, separation on this basis

would function nonsensically. A biological male identifying as

female could hardly live in a girls’ dorm or shower in a girls’

shower without invading physiological privacy needs, and the

same would hold true for a biological female identifying as male

in a boys’ dorm or shower. G.G.’s answer, of course, is that he

is not challenging the separation, on the basis of sex, of

living facilities, locker rooms, and shower facilities, but only

of restrooms, where the risks to privacy and safety are far

reduced. This effort to limit the scope of the issue apparently

sways the majority, as it cabins its entire discussion to

“restroom access by transgender individuals.” Ante at 26. But

this effort to restrict the effect of G.G.’s argument hardly

matters when the term “sex” would have to be applied uniformly

throughout the statute and regulations, as noted above and,

indeed, as agreed to by the majority. See ante at 26.

The realities underpinning Title IX’s recognition of

separate living facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and shower

facilities are reflected in the plain language of the statute

60
and regulations, which is not ambiguous. The text of Title IX

and its regulations allowing for separation of each facility “on

the basis of sex” employs the term “sex” as was generally

understood at the time of enactment. See Thomas Jefferson Univ.

v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (explaining that courts

should not defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own

regulation if an “alternative reading is compelled by the

regulation’s plain language or by other indications of the

Secretary’s intent at the time of the regulation’s promulgation”

(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted)); see also Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)

(discussing dictionary definitions of the regulation’s “critical

phrase” to help determine whether the agency’s interpretation

was “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Title IX was

enacted in 1972 and the regulations were promulgated in 1975 and

readopted in 1980, and during that time period, virtually every

dictionary definition of “sex” referred to the physiological

distinctions between males and females, particularly with

respect to their reproductive functions. See, e.g., The Random

House College Dictionary 1206 (rev. ed. 1980) (“either the male

or female division of a species, esp. as differentiated with

reference to the reproductive functions”); Webster’s New

Collegiate Dictionary 1054 (1979) (“the sum of the structural,

61
functional, and behavioral characteristics of living beings that

subserve reproduction by two interacting parents and that

distinguish males and females”); American Heritage Dictionary

1187 (1976) (“The property or quality by which organisms are

classified according to their reproductive functions”);

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2081 (1971) (“the

sum of the morphological, physiological, and behavioral

peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental

reproduction with its concomitant genetic segregation and

recombination which underlie most evolutionary change . . .”);

The American College Dictionary 1109 (1970) (“the sum of the

anatomical and physiological differences with reference to which

the male and the female are distinguished . . . ”). Indeed,

although the contemporaneous meaning controls our analysis, it

is notable that, even today, the term “sex” continues to be

defined based on the physiological distinctions between males

and females. See, e.g., Webster’s New World College Dictionary

1331 (5th ed. 2014) (“either of the two divisions, male or

female, into which persons, animals, or plants are divided, with

reference to their reproductive functions”); The American

Heritage Dictionary 1605 (5th ed. 2011) (“Either of the two

divisions, designated female and male, by which most organisms

are classified on the basis of their reproductive organs and

functions”); Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1140 (11th

62
ed. 2011) (“either of the two major forms of individuals that

occur in many species and that are distinguished respectively as

female or male esp. on the basis of their reproductive organs

and structures”). Any new definition of sex that excludes

reference to physiological differences, as the majority now

attempts to introduce, is simply an unsupported reach to

rationalize a desired outcome.

Thus, when the School Board assigned restrooms and locker

rooms on the basis of biological sex, it was clearly complying

precisely with the unambiguous language of Title IX and its

regulations.

Despite the fact that the majority offers no case to

support the definition of “sex” as advanced by G.G. and

supported by the government as amicus, the majority nonetheless

accepts that the meaning of the term “sex” in Title IX and its

regulations refers to a person’s “gender identity” simply to

accommodate G.G.’s wish to use the boys’ restrooms. But, it is

not immediately apparent whether G.G., the government, and the

majority contend that the term “sex” as used in Title IX and its

regulations refers (1) to both biological sex and gender

identity; (2) to either biological sex or gender identity; or

(3) to only “gender identity.” In his brief, G.G. seems to take

the position that the term “sex” at least includes a reference

to gender identity. This is the position taken in his complaint

63
when he alleges, “Under Title IX, discrimination ‘on the basis

of sex’ encompasses both discrimination based on biological

differences between men and women and discrimination based on

gender nonconformity.” The government seems to be taking the

same position, contending that the term “sex” “encompasses both

sex -- that is, the biological differences between men and women

-- and gender [identity].” (Emphasis in original). The

majority, however, seems to suggest that the term “sex” refers

only to gender identity, as it relies solely on the statement in

the Office for Civil Rights’ letter of January 7, 2015, which

said, “When a school elects to separate or treat students

differently on the basis of sex [for the purpose of providing

restrooms, locker rooms, and other facilities], a school

generally must treat transgender students consistent with their

gender identity.” (Emphasis added). But, regardless of where

G.G., the government, and the majority purport to stand on this

question, the clear effect of their new definition of sex not

only tramples the relevant statutory and regulatory language and

disregards the privacy concerns animating that text, it is also

illogical and unworkable.

If the term “sex” as used in the statute and regulations

refers to both biological sex and gender identity, then, while

the School Board’s policy is in compliance with respect to most

students, whose biological sex aligns with their gender

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identity, for students whose biological sex and gender identity

do not align, no restroom or locker room separation could ever

be accomplished consistent with the regulation because a

transgender student’s use of a boys’ or girls’ restroom or

locker room could not satisfy the conjunctive criteria. Given

that G.G. and the government do not challenge schools’ ability

to separate restrooms and locker rooms for male and female

students, surely they cannot be advocating an interpretation

that places schools in an impossible position. Moreover, such

an interpretation would deny G.G. the right to use either the

boys’ or girls’ restrooms, a position that G.G. does not

advocate.

If the position of G.G., the government, and the majority

is that the term “sex” means either biological sex or gender

identity, then the School Board’s policy is in compliance

because it segregates the facilities on the basis of biological

sex, a satisfactory component of the disjunctive.

Therefore, when asserting that G.G. must be allowed to use

the boys’ restrooms and locker rooms as consistent with his

gender identity, G.G., the government, and the majority must be

arguing that “sex” as used in Title IX and its regulations means

only gender identity. But this construction would, in the end,

mean that a school could never meaningfully provide separate

restrooms and locker rooms on the basis of sex. Biological

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males and females whose gender identity aligned would be

required to use the same restrooms and locker rooms as persons

of the opposite biological sex whose gender identity did not

align. With such mixed use of separate facilities, no purpose

would be gained by designating a separate use “on the basis of

sex,” and privacy concerns would be left unaddressed.

Moreover, enforcement of any separation would be virtually

impossible. Basing restroom access on gender identity would

require schools to assume gender identity based on appearances,

social expectations, or explicit declarations of identity, which

the government concedes would render Title IX and its

regulations nonsensical:

Certainly a school that has created separate restrooms
for boys and girls could not decide that only students
who dress, speak, and act sufficiently masculine count
as boys entitled to use the boys’ restroom, or that
only students who wear dresses, have long hair, and
act sufficiently feminine may use the girls’ restroom.

Yet, by interpreting Title IX and the regulations as “requiring

schools to treat students consistent with their gender

identity,” and by disallowing schools from treating students

based on their biological sex, the government’s position would

have precisely the effect the government finds to be at odds

with common sense.

Finally, in arguing that he should not be assigned to the

girls’ restrooms, G.G. states that “it makes no sense to place a

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transgender boy in the girls’ restroom in the name of protecting

student privacy” because “girls objected to his presence in the

girls’ restrooms because they perceived him as male.” But the

same argument applies to his use of the boys’ restrooms, where

boys felt uncomfortable because they perceived him as female.

In any scenario based on gender identity, moreover, there would

be no accommodation for the recognized need for physiological

privacy.

In short, it is impossible to determine how G.G., the

government, and the majority would apply the provisions of Title

IX and the implementing regulations that allow for the

separation of living facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and

shower facilities “on the basis of sex” if “sex” means gender

identity.

The Office for Civil Rights letter, on which the majority

exclusively relies, hardly provides an answer. In one sentence

it states that schools “generally must treat transgender

students consistent with their gender identity,” whatever that

means, and in the next sentence, it encourages schools to

provide “gender-neutral, individual-user facilities to any

student who does not want to use shared sex-segregated

facilities.” While the first sentence might be impossible to

enforce without destroying all privacy-serving separation, the

second sentence encourages schools, such as Gloucester High

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School, to provide unisex single-stall restrooms for any

students who are uncomfortable with sex-separated facilities, as

the school in fact provided.

As it stands, Title IX and its implementing regulations

authorize schools to separate, on the basis of sex, living

facilities, restrooms, locker rooms, and shower facilities,

which must allow for separation on the basis of biological sex.

Gloucester High School thus clearly complied with the statute

and regulations. But, as it did so, it was nonetheless

sensitive to G.G.’s gender transition, accommodating virtually

every wish that he had. Indeed, he initially requested and was

granted the use of the nurse’s restroom. And, after both girls

and boys objected to his using the girls’ and boys’ restrooms,

the school provided individual unisex restrooms, as encouraged

by the letter from the Office for Civil Rights. Thus, while

Gloucester High School made a good-faith effort to accommodate

G.G. and help him in his transition, balancing its concern for

him with its responsibilities to all students, it still acted

legally in maintaining a policy that provided all students with

physiological privacy and safety in restrooms and locker rooms.

Because the Gloucester County School Board did not violate

Title IX and Regulation 106.33 in adopting the policy for

separate restrooms and locker rooms, I would affirm the district

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court’s decision dismissing G.G.’s Title IX claim and therefore

dissent.

I also dissent from the majority’s decision to vacate the

district court’s denial of G.G.’s motion for a preliminary

injunction. As the Supreme Court has consistently explained,

“[a] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy” that

“may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is

entitled to such relief,” and “‘[i]n exercising their sound

discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for

the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy.’”

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22-24 (2008)

(quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312

(1982)). Given the facts that the district court fully and

fairly summarized in its opinion, including the hardships

expressed both by G.G. and by other students, I cannot conclude

that we can “form a definite and firm conviction that the court

below committed a clear error of judgment,” Morris v. Wachovia

Sec., Inc., 448 F.3d 268, 277 (4th Cir. 2006) (quotation marks

and citation omitted), particularly when we are only now

expressing as binding law an evidentiary standard that the

majority asserts the district court violated.

As noted, however, I concur in Part IV of the court’s

opinion.