United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1642
KELLY A. GILLEN,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
FALLON AMBULANCE SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Reginald C. Lindsay, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Lawrence P. Cohen, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Saris,* District Judge.
William J. McLeod, with whom McLeod & Associates was on
brief, for appellant.
Wilfred J. Benoit, Jr., with whom Wilfred J. Benoit, Jr.,
P.C., Heidi Goldstein Shepherd, and Goodwin Procter LLP were on
brief, for appellee.
March 19, 2002
____________
*Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-appellant Kelly A.
Gillen, a genetic amputee with only one completely functioning
arm, sued defendant-appellee Fallon Ambulance Service, Inc.
(FAS) for refusing to hire her as an emergency medical
technician (EMT). The court below granted summary judgment,
reasoning that the appellant did not have a disability within
the meaning of the relevant statutes, and that, in all events,
she could not have performed the essential functions of the job.
Gillen's appeal raises nuanced questions under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. After
pondering these questions, we vacate the judgment and remand for
further proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
Consistent with the conventional summary judgment
praxis, we recount the facts in the light most hospitable to the
appellant's theory of the case, consistent with record support.
C.K. Smith & Co. v. Motiva Enters., 269 F.3d 70, 72 (1st Cir.
2001).
The appellant was born with a deformed left arm — the
limb ends a few inches below the elbow — but her courage and
perseverance are not open to question. Although she eschews the
use of a prosthesis, she performed impeccably in a myriad of
jobs (e.g., sales clerk in a department store, laboratory
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assistant) during her high school and college years. Aspiring
to become a physician, she decided, as an interim step after
obtaining a bachelor's degree, to seek employment as an EMT.
This was easier said than done. The duties of an EMT
involve substantial physical prowess. An EMT usually works as
part of a two-person team. The team typically responds to a
call for assistance, assesses the patient's condition on the
scene, administers basic medical care, and then transports the
patient to an appropriate health care facility. The transport
is customarily effected by placing the patient on a stretcher or
stair chair, which then must be lifted and carried to an
ambulance, sometimes down several flights of stairs. The EMTs
then load the patient into the ambulance, drive to the health
care facility, and unload. Given the rigors of this work, it is
unsurprising that the Massachusetts Department of Public Health
(MDPH) requires that an EMT "[b]e free of any physical or mental
impairment or disease which could reasonably be expected to
impair [her abilities], or which could reasonably be expected to
jeopardize the health and safety of the patient." Mass. Regs.
Code tit. 105, § 170.910(A)(3).
Once she set her sights on obtaining employment as an
EMT, the appellant enrolled in a preparatory course. After
logging 110 hours of course work (including both academic and
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clinical components), she took and passed the state
certification examination — an examination composed of both
written and practical portions. Id. § 170.910(A)(5). She
received her certificate in the fall of 1997.
In search of work, the appellant contacted FAS on
December 7, 1997. She filled out an application form that
included questions about her physical condition and required her
to authorize the release of medical and workers' compensation
records.1 Tim Royer, an FAS hierarch, interviewed her a few
weeks later. She filled out more forms.
Paul Fallon, FAS's vice-president of operations,
conducted a second interview on January 2, 1998. He queried the
appellant about the origins of her deformity, expressed
skepticism about her ability to perform certain physical tasks
(especially lifting), and voiced concern about possible
liability should the appellant prove unable to hoist patients
properly. Despite these reservations, Fallon offered her
1
These materials were used by FAS, at the time, to screen
out prospective employees who might be susceptible to injury on
the job. FAS has now removed all questions about physical
deformities and workers' compensation from its standard
application form.
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employment as an EMT, conditional upon passing a physical
examination administered by the Milton Hospital.2
Milton Hospital has had a longstanding relationship
with FAS, serving as the principal provider of employment-
related health care to FAS's work force. As part of this
relationship, the hospital, through its occupational health
clinic, was in the process of helping FAS establish a compendium
of the physical attributes required for doing EMT work. This
list, intended for use as a baseline by physicians who examined
candidates for vacant EMT positions, included the following
"essential job functions:"
C Lifting with two hands individually
up to 70 pounds for a total height of
6 inches from knuckle height
occasionally. Lifting with one hand
individually up to 20 pounds from a
height of 0 inches to 48 inches
frequently.
C With a partner lifting a stretcher
with a client on it weighing from 75
pounds to 300 pounds from a height of
6 inches to 40 inches occasionally.
In another part of this same document, the catalogue of "minimal
job requirements" included two-handed lifting of 70 pounds from
2 Fallon also offered the appellant the less taxing position
of chair car driver. The appellant declined, declaring that she
was interested only in an EMT position.
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0-4 times a day,3 a one-handed lift of 20 pounds 0-40 times a
day, and lifting (with a partner) 75-300 pounds 0-40 times a
day.
On January 8, 1998, the appellant repaired to Milton
Hospital for her medical examination. The examiner, Dr. Asif
Qazi, did not have the list of essential job functions with him
at the time, but he knew that the EMT position involved heavy
lifting and lifting in difficult positions. He worried that the
appellant might not be able to perform the lifting functions
effectively. He therefore decided that a further review of her
strength and ability to lift were in order before he could give
her a clean bill of health. In Dr. Qazi's view, the results of
this later testing would not only document the appellant's raw
strength but also shed light upon her lifting mechanics (e.g.,
her ability to keep a patient properly balanced aboard a
stretcher).4
Dr. Qazi informed the appellant of his conclusion, and
she immediately called an FAS official, Christine Hamilton, to
3
Fallon testified without contradiction that "0-4 times a
day" was an error, and that the requirement instead should read
"0-40 times a day."
4
The paperwork that Dr. Qazi completed roughly tracked this
conclusion. In his report, the physician placed a checkmark
next to "[n]o medical contraindication to performing this job,
with the following recommended accommodations or job training,"
and then added: "To be determined by strength test."
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make arrangements for the strength test. Later that day,
however, Dr. Qazi discussed the situation with his immediate
superior, Dr. Thomas Winters. Dr. Winters, who had vast
expertise in both emergency medicine and occupational health
matters, served as the medical director of Milton Hospital's
occupational health clinic. After Dr. Qazi described the
appellant as a genetic amputee whose left arm was missing below
the elbow, Dr. Winters replied that, in his opinion, she could
not perform the essential functions of the EMT position (and,
thus, could not pass the preemployment examination).
Dr. Winters premised his opinion in part on a fear that
the appellant could not serve as an EMT without jeopardizing
patients and coworkers. He explained that, based on his
experience, one of the most important duties of an EMT was to
stabilize a patient after an accident, and, given the
appellant's impairment, she would be unable (even with a
partner) effectively to perform the difficult balancing required
when transporting patients from tight spaces or difficult-to-
reach sites. Moreover, Dr. Winters did not believe that the
appellant's grasping technique, as described to him by Dr. Qazi,
could work in lifting a stretcher (with a partner) when the
patient weighed over 150 pounds. Given these problems, Dr.
Winters considered further testing of the appellant's strength
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or lifting mechanics unnecessary and, with Dr. Qazi's
acquiescence, determined that the appellant had failed the
preemployment examination.
Dr. Winters called Fallon and informed him of this
determination. He also compiled a report. Like Dr. Qazi, see
supra note 4, he placed a checkmark in the box next to "[n]o
medical contraindication to performing this job, with the
following recommended accommodations or job training," but
underneath he wrote, "can perform all essential job functions of
EMT except: — 2 handed lift independent or with partner."
On January 14, 1998, Fallon told the appellant that Dr.
Winters had reviewed her file and refused to pass her because
she could not perform two-handed lifting. The appellant
expressed dismay that a doctor who had never seen her could
determine that she was unable to do the lifting necessary for
the EMT position, and soon filed a charge of disability
discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination (MCAD). FAS answered the MCAD complaint and
identified the appellant's inability to perform two-handed lifts
as "the sole reason" why she was not hired. FAS further alleged
that it had relied on the advice of Milton Hospital in
determining that the appellant was unable to perform an
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essential job function (and, thus, in rejecting the appellant's
application).
On April 13, 1998, FAS's attorney wrote to the
appellant's counsel stating that FAS still would be willing to
hire the appellant if she could demonstrate how, with or without
reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential job
function of two-handed lifting. In that letter, FAS made clear
that it regarded the appellant as "otherwise qualified for the
job." The appellant did not respond to this offer.
In the meantime, the appellant applied for an EMT
position with American Medical Response (AMR). AMR agreed to
hire her on the condition that she pass a strength test. One
portion of this test required that the appellant lift ninety
pounds to knuckle height with her one functioning arm. At
first, the appellant could not satisfy this requirement. She
began a weightlifting regimen and, a few weeks later, passed the
strength test. AMR hired her as a part-time EMT in April 1998.
Three months later, the appellant accepted a full-time EMT
position with Boston Emergency Medical Services (BEMS). She has
performed that job successfully without any special
accommodations.
On May 29, 1998, the appellant forsook the MCAD and
brought suit in the United States District Court for the
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District of Massachusetts. She alleged, inter alia, violations
of the ADA and its state counterpart, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B,
§ 4. At the close of discovery, FAS moved for summary judgment.
The appellant resisted the motion. The district court referred
the matter to a magistrate judge. After expressing doubt about
whether lifting could be considered a "major life activity," the
magistrate judge concluded that the appellant was not
substantially limited in this activity because she could lift at
least forty to fifty pounds at the time that she applied for
work with FAS (and, moreover, she had stated in her deposition
that she could do whatever she desired without an accommodation
of any kind). Finding the appellant not disabled, the
magistrate judge recommended the entry of summary judgment in
FAS's favor. The appellant objected to the recommendation.
The district court overruled the objection and granted
FAS's motion for brevis disposition. The court accepted the
reasoning set forth in the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation, and added a further ground: that the appellant
was not qualified for the position when she applied to FAS
because she was unable to lift sufficient weight to enable her
to perform essential job functions. This timely appeal
followed.
II. DISCUSSION
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As we approach the merits of this appeal, we are
mindful that summary judgment is appropriate only when "the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our review of a district court's grant
of summary judgment is plenary. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co. v.
Lapalme, 258 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2001).
We are mindful, too, that the ADA was designed to
eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). To that end, it prohibits any covered
employer — and FAS is within that category, see id. § 12111(5)
— from discriminating against a qualified individual because of
that individual's disability. This prohibition extends to a
wide variety of employment-related matters, including
recruitment and hiring. Id. § 12112(a).
To evaluate the merits of a failure-to-hire claim
brought under the ADA, an inquiring court must ask three
questions: (1) Did the disappointed applicant have a
disability? (2) Was the applicant an otherwise qualified
individual? (3) Did the employer discriminate against the
applicant on the basis of that disability? See Laurin v.
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Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1998). A negative
answer to any of these queries dooms the applicant's quest.
In this case, the district court — for simplicity's
sake, we use that term institutionally and do not distinguish
hereafter between the district judge and the magistrate judge —
concluded that the appellant could not survive the first two
inquiries because she was neither disabled within the purview of
the ADA nor qualified for the EMT position. We examine this
bipartite conclusion.5 At FAS's behest, we also examine whether
the appellant has made out a genuine issue of material fact as
to discrimination.
A
The word "disability" is a term of art in the ADA
context. The statute offers three alternative definitions: a
person is considered disabled if she suffers from "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her]
5Although we write in terms of the ADA, our comments apply
with equal force to the appellant's claim under its state-law
counterpart, Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 151B, § 4. That statute
tracks the ADA in virtually all respects. Whitney v. Greenberg,
Rosenblatt, Kull & Bitsoli, P.C., 258 F.3d 30, 32 n.1 (1st Cir.
2001). The lone exception is that the use of mitigating
measures must be taken into account when determining the extent
of an individual's disability under the ADA, Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), whereas the
disability must be considered in its natural state under
Massachusetts law, Dahill v. Police Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d
956, 963 (Mass. 2001). Inasmuch as the appellant does not use
a prosthetic device, this difference is irrelevant here.
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major life activities," 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A); is stigmatized
by "a record of such an impairment," id. § 12102(2)(B); or is
"regarded as having such an impairment," id. § 12102(2)(C).
Although Congress did not explicitly delegate authority to
refine the meaning of these statutory terms to any particular
administrative agency, see Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 122 S.
Ct. 681, 689 (2002); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471, 479 (1999), the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) seized the initiative and promulgated regulations aimed
at clarifying the statutory terminology, see 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(g)-(l) (1991).
Two pertinent EEOC regulations advance our analysis.
First, the EEOC has defined "major life activities" to include
"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." Id. § 1630.2(i). In an interpretive guidance
accompanying the regulations, the EEOC noted that this list is
not all-encompassing and emphasized that point by adding
sitting, standing, reaching, and lifting to the roster of likely
major life activities. Id. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.2(i).
Second, the EEOC has defined the term "substantially
limits" in this context as:
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(i) Unable to perform a major life activity
that the average person in the general
population can perform; or
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an
individual can perform a particular major
life activity as compared to the condition,
manner, or duration under which the average
person in the general population can perform
that same major life activity.
Id. § 1630.2(j)(1). The EEOC has gone a step further and
recommended that a court, in applying this standard, consider
the nature and severity of the impairment, its expected
duration, and its permanent or long-term impact. Id. §
1630.2(j)(2). Against this backdrop, we turn to the question
of whether the appellant, contrary to the district court's
intuition, has succeeded in making out a genuine issue as to
what is clearly a material fact: whether she suffers from a
disability. To mount this inquiry, we first must determine
whether lifting is a major life activity. The "touchstone for
determining an activity's inclusion under the statutory rubric
is its significance." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638
(1998) (citing Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 940 (1st Cir.
1997)). The term "major life activities," as used in the ADA,
"refers to those activities that are of central importance to
daily life." Toyota, 122 S. Ct. at 691. Whether lifting pen to
paper or glass to mouth, lifting is an integral part of everyday
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life and seems to fit comfortably within the parameters set by
the Court. We conclude, therefore, that the EEOC appropriately
interpreted the statute, see 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §
1630.2(i), and that lifting is a major life activity.
The next question is whether the appellant is
substantially limited in this major life activity. The ADA
"addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not
utter inabilities." Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. Thus, when an
impairment results in significant limitations, that impairment
is substantially limiting even if the limitations are not
insurmountable. See id.; see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488
(explaining that "individuals who use prosthetic limbs or
wheelchairs may be mobile and capable of functioning in society
but still be disabled because of a substantial limitation on
their ability to walk or run"). The focus is not on whether the
individual has the courage to participate in the major life
activity despite her impairment, but, rather, on whether she
faces significant obstacles when she does so. The EEOC's
emphasis on "condition, manner, or duration" in contrasting how
a disabled person performs an activity and how a member of the
general public performs that same activity dovetails with this
formulation.
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In concluding that the appellant had no substantial
limitation on her ability to lift, the district court relied
upon two items. The first of these was the appellant's
optimistic self-assessment of her capabilities. This
consideration deserves little weight. Although the appellant
took an upbeat view of her prowess (when FAS's counsel asked,
during her deposition, if there was anything that she would like
to do that she had not been able to do because of her missing
hand, she replied "no"), that was more a testament to her
determination than to her condition. She did not dwell on the
restrictions on lifting that she had to overcome in order to
achieve her objectives — and those restrictions comprise the
focal point of this prong of the ADA inquiry. The key question
is not whether a handicapped person accomplishes her goals, but
whether she encounters significant handicap-related obstacles in
doing so. For summary judgment purposes, we must resolve this
question in the appellant's favor.
The second consideration credited by the district court
was the appellant's demonstrated ability to lift forty to fifty
pounds. In attaching significance to this factor, the court
relied on case law holding that restrictions on heavy lifting
are not indicative of a disability. E.g., Snow v. Ridgeview
Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1207 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that a
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restriction on lifting more than twenty-five pounds is
insufficient to constitute a disability within the meaning of
the ADA); Ray v. Glidden Co., 85 F.3d 227, 229 (5th Cir. 1996)
(theorizing that the "inability to perform heavy lifting does
not render a person substantially limited" in the major life
activity of lifting).
As a comparison between the impairments alleged in
those cases and the appellant's impairment illustrates, that
reliance is mislaid. The cases holding that an inability to
lift heavy objects does not constitute a substantial limitation
on a person's overall ability to lift rely implicitly in some
instances, e.g., Snow, 128 F.3d at 1207, and explicitly in
others, e.g., Williams v. Channel Master Satellite Sys., Inc.,
101 F.3d 346, 349 (4th Cir. 1996) (per curiam), on the rationale
that a capacity to perform heavy lifting is not a trait shared
by the majority of the population. That reasoning is
understandable: strength varies widely throughout the
population, and if a restriction on heavy lifting were
considered a substantial limitation on a major life activity,
then the ranks of the disabled would swell to include infants,
the elderly, the weak, and the out-of-shape. Congress obviously
did not mean to extend the protections of the ADA to every
physical impairment that precluded the performance of some
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particularly difficult manual task. See Toyota, 122 S. Ct. at
691.
Although these cases seem to be correctly decided, they
are inapposite here. A missing hand is a more profound
impairment than a simple inability to lift objects over a
certain weight. Such an impairment poses a type of restriction
on lifting not shared by a significant portion of the populace.
While most people can use two hands to pick up a plate or carry
groceries (or even do both at the same time), a one-handed
individual must develop an array of techniques to overcome her
innate limitation. Even if she is able to lift more poundage
than many two-handed individuals, the manner in which she lifts
and the conditions under which she can lift will be
significantly restricted because she only has one available
limb. In this sense, at least, the appellant's lack of a hand
will substantially limit her ability to lift notwithstanding her
extraordinary efforts to compensate for her impairment.
FAS counters with the argument that the appellant
failed to provide sufficient proof that her impairment
substantially limited her ability to lift (i.e., she did not
offer evidence elucidating the exact nature of her inability to
lift) and, therefore, failed to create a genuine issue as to
whether she is substantially limited in this major life
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activity. In mounting this argument, it relies upon the Supreme
Court's decision in Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555 (1999), a case in which the Court held that a monocular
individual must prove his disability "by offering evidence that
the extent of the limitation in terms of [his] own experience .
. . is substantial." Id. at 567.
This argument misconstrues the holding in Albertson's.
Central to Justice Souter's analysis was the nature of a
monocular impairment. Even though a monocular individual has
only one eye with which to see, the Court explained that the
individual's body often will adjust its vision to account for
this impairment. Id. at 566-67. Just as artificial mitigating
measures must be factored into the disability calculus, Sutton,
527 U.S. at 482, so too adjustments undertaken within the body's
own systems must be taken into account. Albertson's, 527 U.S.
at 565-66. For present purposes, the key is that the
Albertson's Court did not, as a matter of law, dismiss
monocularity as a disability. Rather, the Court held that a
monocular individual, like any other ADA plaintiff, must proffer
evidence demonstrating the extent of the limitation on the
designated major life activity (there, the ability to see). Id.
at 567. The Court emphasized that this burden is modest and
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indicated that, as a general rule, monocular individuals will
satisfy the ADA's criteria for disability. Id.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Toyota is along
the same lines. There, the Court held that a plaintiff
afflicted with carpal tunnel syndrome cannot rely upon that
diagnosis alone to prove a disability under the ADA. Toyota,
122 S. Ct. at 692. The Court reminded us that:
An individualized assessment of the
effect of an impairment is particularly
necessary when the impairment is one whose
symptoms vary widely from person to person.
. . . Given the[] large potential
differences in the severity and duration of
the effects of carpal tunnel syndrome, an
individual's carpal tunnel syndrome
diagnosis, on its own, does not indicate
whether the individual has a disability
within the meaning of the ADA.
Id. (citations omitted). Since the plaintiff's particular form
of carpal tunnel syndrome permitted her to engage in a wide
range of manual tasks, the Court was unwilling to find that her
impairment could be considered disabling as a matter of law.
Id. at 694.
When all is said and done, however, these decisions do
not alter the usual standard that obtains on summary judgment in
ADA cases: "[A] plaintiff must proffer evidence from which a
reasonable inference can be drawn that [a major life] activity
is substantially or materially limited." Snow, 128 F.3d at
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1207. The evidence needed to establish the limiting qualities
of a particular impairment almost always will be unique to that
impairment and to the individual involved. See Sutton, 527 U.S.
at 483. Still, that evidence need not necessarily be composed
of excruciating details as to how the plaintiff's capabilities
have been affected by the impairment. See Albertson's, 527 U.S.
at 566 (observing that "some impairments may invariably cause a
substantial limitation of a major life activity"). We would not
demand, for example, that a paraplegic expound on the many
scenarios in which she is unable to walk. Indeed, adopting such
a rule would place deserving ADA plaintiffs in an unenviable
"catch-22:" in order to demonstrate that she is disabled, the
plaintiff also would have to demonstrate why she is unqualified
to do the job to which she aspires. See David Olsky, Note, Let
Them Eat Cake: Diabetes and the Americans with Disabilities Act
After Sutton, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1829, 1832 (2000).
We need not probe this point too deeply, for the record
shows that, at the most general level of diagnosis, the
appellant is a genetic amputee. To supplement this diagnosis,
she has supplied specific information about the nature of her
impairment — her arm is missing a few inches below the elbow —
and she has confirmed that she does not use a prosthesis or
other correcting device. The record also contains some evidence
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about the extent of her limitations in grasping things; the
appellant revealed during the preemployment physical that she
uses the remnant of her left arm only to pin and hook objects.
Taking this information in the light most favorable to the
appellant, we think that it suffices to support a finding that
she is significantly restricted in the activity of lifting. No
more is exigible at the summary judgment stage.6
B
The ADA's employment discrimination prohibitions apply
only to those who are qualified to perform particular jobs. See
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In this context, Congress defined a
"qualified individual with a disability" as "an individual with
a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). The
employee or applicant bears the burden of showing that she meets
this standard. See EEOC v. Amego, 110 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir.
1997); see also Laurin, 150 F.3d at 61 (explaining that an ADA
plaintiff must present some evidence to rebut the employer's
conclusion that a particular function is essential for a
6
Inasmuch as a genuine issue of material fact exists as to
whether the appellant is disabled, we need not discuss whether
the record, viewed in her favor, supports a finding that she was
"regarded as" disabled by FAS.
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particular job). Moreover, if (and to the extent that)
essential job functions implicate the safety of others, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that she can perform those functions
in a manner that will not endanger others. Amego, 110 F.3d at
144.
The EEOC has promulgated regulations that elaborate on
this subject. The regulations explain that a qualified
individual "satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education
and other job-related requirements of the employment position
such individual holds or desires, and . . . with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of
such position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The regulations
describe "essential job functions" somewhat tautologically as
"fundamental job duties," exclusive of "the marginal functions
of the position." Id. § 1630.2(n)(1).
In deciding whether a specific job function is
essential or marginal, courts must pay heed "to the employer's
judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an
employer has prepared a written description before advertising
or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall
be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job."
42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The EEOC's regulations add that
"[e]vidence of whether a particular function is essential
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includes, but is not limited to," an employer's determination of
what is an essential function of the job. 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(n)(3) (emphasis supplied). They also recommend
considering evidence of the amount of time spent performing the
particular function, the consequences of not requiring the
applicant to perform the function, and the past and current work
experience of incumbents in the job (or in similar positions
elsewhere). Id. The purpose of these provisions is not to
enable courts to second-guess legitimate business judgments,
but, rather, to ensure that an employer's asserted requirements
are solidly anchored in the realities of the workplace, not
constructed out of whole cloth. See id. pt. 1630, App. §
1630.2(n).
Following the statutory and regulatory mosaic, we have
made clear that the employer's good-faith view of what a job
entails, though important, is not dispositive. See Ward v.
Mass. Health Research Inst., 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 2000)
(noting that an employer's view of job requirements generally
should be given "substantial weight," but that it is "only one
factor" in the mix); see also Amego, 110 F.3d at 147 (explaining
that "the employer's judgment is entitled to some weight"). In
the final analysis, the complex question of what constitutes an
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essential job function involves fact-sensitive considerations
and must be determined on a case-by-case basis.
This body of law serves as the backdrop for a
discussion of the second issue in this case. In moving for
summary judgment, FAS argued that the appellant could not
perform a duty that it purportedly required of all EMTs:
lifting seventy pounds. The district court agreed.
Consequently, the court held, as an alternate ground for summary
judgment, that the appellant was not qualified to perform the
job of an EMT when she applied to FAS. Appellate review of this
holding involves a bifurcated inquiry. First, we ask whether
the plaintiff could have performed the essential functions of
the particular job; and, if not, whether some reasonable
accommodation would have enabled her to perform those functions.
Ward, 209 F.3d at 33.
To prove its point, FAS's memorandum in support of
summary judgment cited a portion of the appellant's deposition
testimony. There, she described the weightlifting regimen that
she undertook after she failed AMR's strength test, stating that
she had begun with forty- and fifty-pound weights — which she
could easily lift — and worked her way up to ninety pounds.
Those statements led to the following exchange (which FAS deems
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conclusive proof of the appellant's inability to perform an
essential job function):
Q. At what point in terms of the amount of
time you spent working on improving your
strength did you get to the point where you
could lift 60 pounds?
A. I don't know.
Q. Was it more than two weeks?
A. I honestly don't know, I don't remember.
Q. Could it have been as much as a month?
A. To get past 60 pounds?
Q. Yes.
A. I doubt it. I think it got — it was
about a month for me to be able to lift the
required amount to pass the exam.
Q. And you don't — you can't currently
recall what point in that exercise strength-
building process you reached the ability to
lift any particular level weight.
A. No.
The appellant objected to the summary judgment motion.
Along with her opposition, she filed an affidavit in which she
swore that, when she sought employment with FAS, she was able to
do all the lifting that the EMT position legitimately required.
To bolster this statement, she pointed to her performance in
practical exercises conducted during the EMT certification
classes (where, with a partner, she consistently lifted
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classmates of an average weight of 160 pounds on a weighted
stretcher). She explained the seeming inconsistency between
this statement and her deposition testimony on the basis that
the latter related to incremental weight training, not to
practical, in-the-field experience. She concluded that she
could have passed the FAS strength test had it been administered
to her as originally scheduled by Dr. Qazi.
The district court accepted FAS's appraisal, noting
that "[i]t appears from the [appellant's] deposition, that at
the time that she applied for the EMT position with [FAS], she
was unable to lift 60 pounds."7 The court gave short shrift to
the affidavit because a party "may not create a triable issue
simply by filing an affidavit that contradicts an admission in
an earlier deposition."
For purposes of summary judgment, we find the district
court's interpretation of the facts too constricted. Although
it is true that a party opposing summary judgment cannot create
a genuine issue of material fact by the simple expedient of
filing an affidavit that contradicts clear answers to
unambiguous questions in an earlier deposition, Colantuoni v.
7
The perceived inability to lift sixty pounds, if documented
in the record, would mean, of course, that the appellant lacked
the ability to lift the seventy-pound minimum allegedly required
by FAS.
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Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc., 44 F.3d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1994),
the deposition testimony here was neither clear nor unambiguous.
The appellant testified that she did not know whether she could
lift a particular weight on a particular date, but that it did
not take her long to reach ninety pounds. Thus, the deposition
testimony is, at best, inconclusive as to whether she could have
lifted any given weight lower than ninety pounds at some earlier
time (say, when she applied for an EMT position with FAS). A
subsequent affidavit that merely explains, or amplifies upon,
opaque testimony given in a previous deposition is entitled to
consideration in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.
Shepherd v. Slater Steels Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1007 (7th Cir.
1999); see also Herring v. Can. Life Assur. Co., 207 F.3d 1026,
1030-31 (8th Cir. 2000). Thus, the district court erred in
disregarding the appellant's affidavit.
We note, too, that other competent evidence in the
record suggests that, when she sought employment at FAS, the
appellant was qualified to do the necessary lifting. Several
months before she applied (i.e., during her certification
classes), she demonstrated her ability, with a partner, to lift
and carry adults on weighted stretchers. Several months after
she applied (i.e., during her tenure at AMR and, later, at
BMES), she demonstrated her ability to perform the full range of
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an EMT's duties, lifting included. This temporal bracketing
constitutes fairly strong circumstantial evidence which, when
combined with the other evidence of record, suffices to raise a
reasonable inference that the appellant was qualified to fill
FAS's vacant EMT position.8
In all events, the district court should not have
attached decretory significance to the specific weight that the
appellant might (or might not) have been able to lift at the
time that she applied. As said, a court should give
consideration to what an employer deems essential, but also
should take care to ensure that such functions are essential in
fact. Here, the record reveals a genuine issue as to whether
FAS, at the time it rejected the appellant's employment
application, required all its EMTs to be able to lift seventy
pounds. We explain briefly.
The record reflects that when the appellant submitted
to the preemployment examination, FAS did not routinely screen
prospective employees to confirm their ability to lift. Indeed,
Fallon admitted in his deposition that the lifting requirement
was only in its nascent stage, and that the appellant probably
8
This inference is not undercut by the appellant's failure
initially to pass the AMR lifting test. After all, AMR insisted
that its EMTs lift a greater weight — ninety pounds — than FAS
purportedly required, and the appellant met this higher standard
after a brief regimen of weight training.
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would have been the first to be required to pass such a test.
This dovetails with Dr. Qazi's deposition testimony to the
effect that he had tested the ability to lift only on rare
occasions in connection with his work for FAS, and that he was
not aware of any firm lifting requirement at the time that he
examined the appellant. The evidence, then, does not support
the conclusion that, as a matter of law, lifting seventy pounds
constituted an essential function of the EMT position.
FAS presents a variation on this theme, asserting that
it required its EMTs to perform two-handed lifting, and that
having two hands is a sine qua non of the EMT position. To
buttress this assertion, FAS cites the list of essential job
functions that it was preparing in conjunction with Milton
Hospital. The list, not yet in final form when the appellant
applied, stated that the EMT position involved "[l]ifting with
two hands individually up to 70 pounds for a total height of 6
inches from knuckle height occasionally." FAS told the MCAD
that the appellant's inability to perform two-handed lifting was
"the sole reason" that it refused to hire her.
Although the question is not free from doubt — after
all, it is certainly reasonable for an employer to be concerned
about whether a one-handed EMT could fulfill her
responsibilities in a field involving the health and safety of
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others — FAS's "essential function" argument does not entitle it
to summary judgment on the record as it stands. If two hands
were essential, then it logically would follow that an
individual with only one hand — like the appellant — could never
satisfy that requirement (and, therefore, could not qualify for
the position). But FAS's actions belie such a conclusion.
After all, FAS made a conditional offer of employment to the
appellant, whom it knew to have only one hand, and requested
that she submit to a preemployment examination. In and of
itself, that request attests to FAS's belief, at the relevant
time, that a one-handed individual might be able to perform the
essential functions of the EMT position. If two-handed lifting
could only be done by a two-handed person, then the
preemployment examination would have been at best an empty
exercise, and at worst a cynical charade.
Other evidence also undermines the argument that two-
handed lifting is an essential job function. For one thing, the
MDPH certified the appellant to work as an EMT despite the fact
that she had only one hand. For another thing, the "essential
job function" list was merely a work in progress at the critical
time. Third, Fallon testified that the list had been drafted on
the basis of observations made by a member of the Milton
Hospital team concerning how EMTs picked up stretchers while
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working at FAS. Thus, the list reported on a historical fact —
how EMT work traditionally has been performed — which, while
relevant, did not conclusively prove that two hands were
required to perform this task. Further, the appellant's
deposition testimony and affidavit regarding her own experiences
tend to prove that two hands are not essential for this purpose.
To cinch matters, when Fallon was asked whether two-handed
lifting necessarily meant lifting with two hands, he replied:
"No, it does not."
We add a caveat. Our rejection of FAS's position does
not mean that the "essential function" inquiry is never amenable
to summary judgment. When an employer proves that it has gone
through a deliberative process or has mustered evidence of
judgments of public health officials, that evidence may undercut
any argument that the employer based its decision on the
plaintiff's proficiency in a marginal function of the job. Cf.
Amego, 110 F.3d at 146-47 & n.11. But the line between an
essential function that seems at first blush to be self-evident
and a marginal function is sometimes blurred. That is the case
here. Taking the full panoply of proof into account and
indulging all reasonable inferences in the appellant's favor, a
rational factfinder could conclude that the appellant was
qualified for the EMT position at the time that she sought
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employment with FAS.9 See, e.g., Holiday v. City of Chattanooga,
206 F.3d 637, 644-45 (6th Cir. 2000) (reversing an entry of
summary judgment in analogous circumstances).
C
FAS urges us to hold that the appellant has not adduced
sufficient evidence to support an inference that it
discriminated against her on the basis of her disability.
Inasmuch as we may affirm the entry of summary judgment on any
independent ground made manifest by the record, Houlton
Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st
Cir. 1999), we consider this exhortation.
FAS's argument brings into focus a fine line that
separates permissible and impermissible decisionmaking under the
ADA. The ADA prohibits employment decisions based on
stereotypes about a disability, but it does not prohibit
decisionmaking based on the actual attributes of a disability.
Pesterfield v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 443 (6th Cir.
1991); Anderson v. Univ. of Wis., 841 F.2d 737, 740 (7th Cir.
1988).10 Thus, an employer may base a decision on an employee's
9
Whether FAS might reasonably have believed that the
appellant, if hired, would have posed a threat to patients or
coworkers is a different question. We return to that question
in due course. See infra Part II(C).
10
Although both of these cases were decided under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), their holdings
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actual limitations, even if those limitations result from a
disability. Matthews v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 128 F.3d 1194,
1196 (7th Cir. 1997). By the same token, an employer may refuse
to hire a prospective employee because she is unable to do the
job, even though a handicap lies at the root of that inability.
Of course, an employer cannot insulate itself from
liability under the ADA merely by asserting its belief th a t a
prospective employee's known disability will limit her ability
to perform a particular job to such an extent as to disqualify
her from employment. Even if the employer's belief is honestly
held, on particular facts a jury still might conclude that it
rested on an unfounded stereotype (and, therefore, constituted
discrimination). See Zapata-Matos v. Reckitt & Colman, Inc.,
277 F.3d 40, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002). To avoid liability in this
sort of situation, the evidence must show that the employer
understood the nature, extent, and implications of the
prospective employee's particular impairment, and that the
employment decision reflected that understanding. See Holiday,
206 F.3d at 643. Only by insisting on that level of proof can
courts effectuate one of the primary goals of the ADA: "to
prohibit employers from making adverse employment decisions
are fully transferable to cases arising under the ADA. See
Phelps v. Optima Health, Inc., 251 F.3d 21, 23 n.2 (1st Cir.
2001).
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based on stereotypes and generalizations associated with the
individual's disability rather than on the individual's actual
characteristics." EEOC v. Prevo's Family Market, Inc., 135 F.3d
1089, 1097 (6th Cir. 1998).
The trick, then, is to distinguish between unfounded
stereotypes, on the one hand, and frank assessments of the
actual consequences of a disability, on the other hand. That
inquiry is fact-dependent. For example, in a situation in which
an employer fails to hire an applicant and attributes that
failure to the limitations imposed by the applicant's known
disability, the employer must show that it made due inquiry into
the applicant's impairment, sufficient to inform itself of those
limitations, and that the results of that individualized inquiry
furnished a reasonable foundation for the employer's belief that
the applicant was unqualified. See Holiday, 206 F.3d at 643.
If the employer's assumptions about an applicant's disability
are unreasonable, or are not based upon a good-faith assessment
of that individual's capabilities and ultimately prove to be
groundless, its refusal to hire will engender liability under
the ADA. See Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807-08 (6th
Cir. 1998).
Here, FAS claims that the evidence shows conclusively
that it reached its decision not to hire the appellant on the
-36-
basis of her real capabilities (or lack thereof), not on an
illegal stereotype. The critical question, then, is whether the
adverse employment action — the refusal to hire — resulted from
an informed and considered decision, based on appropriate
criteria. Because this case was decided on summary judgment,
that question mutates into a question of whether the record
reveals a genuine issue of material fact as to why FAS rejected
the appellant's application for the EMT position.
To answer that question, we reassemble the familiar
framework first erected in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973). See Higgins v. New Balance Athletic
Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999) (approving use of
McDonnell Douglas framework in connection with ADA claims of
disability discrimination). Under that framework, the plaintiff
first must establish a prima facie case by "prov[ing] by a
[preponderance] of the evidence that she applied for an
available position for which she was qualified, but was rejected
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination." Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 253 (1981). This showing is easily made and, once
achieved, triggers a presumption of discrimination. At that
point, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
-37-
action. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07
(1993). This is a burden of production, not a burden of
persuasion, and satisfying it "serves simultaneously to meet the
plaintiff's prima facie case by presenting a legitimate reason
for the action and to frame the factual issue with sufficient
clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-
56.
Once the employer has produced such an explanation and
the plaintiff has questioned it (as, say, pretextual or
irrelevant), the initial presumption evaporates. Mesnick v.
Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 823 (1st Cir. 1991). The trier of
fact then focuses on the main event: deciding whether the
evidence adduced is sufficient to sustain a finding of
discriminatory intent on the part of the defendant. See Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000).
The ultimate question is not the veracity of the defendant's
explanation — proof of falsity, in and of itself, does not
compel a finding of discriminatory intent, see St. Mary's
Honor's Ctr., 509 U.S. at 511 — but, rather, whether the
plaintiff's evidence suffices to demonstrate the defendant's
-38-
animus.11 Zapata-Matos, 277 F.3d at 45; accord Abramian v.
President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 731 N.E.2d 1075, 1085
(Mass. 2000) (establishing same principle under counterpart
Massachusetts statute).
In the case at hand, the appellant presented evidence
that she is disabled; that she applied and was qualified for the
EMT position; that she was rejected despite her qualifications;
and that FAS thereafter continued to hire EMTs. This was enough
to satisfy the prima facie case requirement. See Gadson v.
Concord Hosp., 966 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
FAS responded by providing an explanation for its refusal to
hire — the appellant's limited capabilities — that was
sufficient on its face to dispel the presumption created by the
prima facie case. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55.
With the presumption of discrimination gone, we
scrutinize the facts, indulging all reasonable inferences in the
appellant's favor, and ask whether the evidence conclusively
demonstrates that FAS acted on the basis of an objectively
reasonable assessment of the appellant's capabilities and not on
11
We do not mean to suggest, however, that a factfinder may
not infer discriminatory intent from the defendant's proffer of
a pretextual explanation. The opposite is true. Reeves, 530
U.S. at 147.
-39-
the basis of an unfounded stereotype about the nature of her
impairment. We do not think that it does.
In the first place, FAS continually asserted its
position that a one-handed woman could not be an EMT without
hurting herself or others, yet never fully tested the
appellant's lifting capabilities. FAS persisted in this course
of conduct even after the appellant alerted Hamilton to the fact
that the strength test recommended by Dr. Qazi had not been
performed and complained that Dr. Winters had never examined
her. Given this state of affairs, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that such an examination was vital to an understanding
of how (and to what extent) the appellant might be able to
balance stretchers, carry patients down stairs, and otherwise
perform the requisite duties of an EMT. By the same token, a
factfinder could conclude that, absent such testing, FAS based
its decision on a stereotype about one-handed persons.
In the second place, the record shows that the
appellant ultimately succeeded in performing all the duties of
an EMT with two other employers (and, thus, overcame obstacles
that FAS had thought insurmountable). This evidence, coupled
with the appellant's successful completion of the "practical"
portion of the EMT certification examination, could support an
inference that she was able to perform those duties at the time
-40-
FAS rejected her application. See, e.g., Holiday, 206 F.3d at
644-45; Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 766 (6th Cir.
1997). Thus, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that FAS's
negative assumptions not only were based on an unfounded
stereotype about the appellant's impairment but also were
inaccurate.
In an effort to blunt the force of these facts, FAS
argues that it was entitled to rely on the advice it received
from Dr. Winters. It notes that the ADA specifically permits a
prospective employer to commission a preemployment physical
examination once a conditional offer of employment has been
made, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(3), and asseverates that its
good-faith reliance on the results of such an examination should
put to rest any legitimate question about its intentions.
The case law does not support so mechanistic a view.
To be sure, obtaining a physician's detailed assessment and then
acting in accordance with it can be persuasive evidence that an
employer has based its decision on an individualized inquiry
into the applicant's capabilities. See, e.g., Pesterfield, 941
F.2d at 443-44; Bento v. I.T.O. Corp., 599 F. Supp. 731, 744-45
(D.R.I. 1984). But a physician's endorsement does not provide
complete insulation. An employer cannot evade its obligations
under the ADA by contracting out personnel functions to third
-41-
parties — and this prohibition extends to an employer's attempt
to use a preemployment examination as conclusive proof of an
applicant's physical capabilities. Holiday, 206 F.3d at 645;
cf. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(1) (prohibiting disability
discrimination in preemployment physical examinations); 29
C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2) (same).
The short of it is that a medical opinion is often
cogent evidence of nondiscriminatory intent — in some instances,
it may even be enough to justify summary judgment, see, e.g.,
Crocker v. Runyon, 207 F.3d 314, 319 (6th Cir. 2000) — but the
mere obtaining of such an opinion does not automatically absolve
the employer from liability under the ADA. Cf. Bragdon, 524
U.S. at 650 (emphasizing that "courts should assess the
objective reasonableness of the views of health care
professionals without deferring to their individual judgments").
Thus, an employer cannot slavishly defer to a physician's
opinion without first pausing to assess the objective
reasonableness of the physician's conclusions. See Holiday, 206
F.3d at 645 (explaining that "[c]ourts need not defer to an
individual doctor's opinion that is neither based on the
individualized inquiry mandated by the ADA nor supported by
objective scientific and medical evidence").
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Holiday has especial pertinence to the present appeal.
In that case, an HIV-positive individual applied for a position
as a police officer, and subsequently passed both the written
and physical tests necessary to join the force. Id. at 640.
Then, in the course of a preemployment examination, conducted by
a physician specializing in occupational health matters, he
revealed his HIV status. The physician eschewed any
individualized testing of the effect of that impairment but told
the employer that Holiday, due to his HIV-positive status, would
be unable to withstand the rigors of police work. Id. at 641.
After the employer rejected Holiday's bid for employment, he was
hired as a police officer by a different agency. Id. at 644.
The district court granted summary judgment for the
employer, but the court of appeals reversed. It held that the
employer did not have an unconditional right to rely on the
physician's "unsubstantiated and cursory medical opinion" to
settle the question of Holiday's actual qualifications. Id. at
645. The court regarded the absence of any scientific support
for the doctor's opinion as implicating the reasonableness of
the employer's reliance on it. Id. at 647. The court concluded
that "Holiday was entitled to be evaluated based on his actual
abilities and the relevant medical evidence, and to be protected
-43-
from discrimination founded on fear, ignorance or
misconceptions." Id. at 648.
The parallels between Holiday and the case at bar are
easily drawn. In both instances, the applicant had taken
courses and passed tests adumbrating a general fitness for the
position sought. In both, the employer reached its assessment
of the applicant's capabilities on the basis of a preemployment
examination. In both, the physician neglected fully to examine
the applicant or to conduct an individualized examination of the
effects of a known disability — and the employer knew as much.
In both, the physician offered his opinion without citing
objective evidence to show how the disability would affect the
particular applicant's fitness to perform work. And in both,
the applicant obtained a similar position a short time later and
served creditably in it, thus casting doubt on the
reasonableness of the physician's assessment.
We find the reasoning of the Holiday court persuasive,
especially given the striking similarities between that case and
this. We conclude that the appellant adduced sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
FAS refused to hire her as an EMT without any objective medical
evidence that she was physically incapable of performing the
essential functions of the position, acting instead on the basis
-44-
of its (and its lead physician's) stereotyping of one-handed
persons. We rest this conclusion, in part, on the view that a
reasonable factfinder could determine that Dr. Winters's opinion
was unsupported. After all, Dr. Winters made no inquiry into
the appellant's actual ability to lift (and, indeed, prevented
Dr. Qazi from performing such an evaluation). Moreover, in
light of the fact that the appellant soon found employment as an
EMT elsewhere and performed all the duties of the position
without incident, a reasonable factfinder could infer that Dr.
Winters's opinion was based on an unfounded assumption. We
therefore hold that the Winters opinion does not provide
sufficient certainty to warrant summary judgment in favor of
FAS.12
For these reasons, we deem the record inconclusive on
this prong of the ADA inquiry. A trial must be held to decide
whether FAS acted on an illegal stereotype as opposed to an
adequate assessment of the appellant's capabilities. As part
and parcel of this decision, the factfinder will need to assess,
12
This conclusion is bolstered to some degree by other
evidence in the record from which a reasonable factfinder might
find that FAS's proffered rationale was pretextual. Fallon
asked questions during the employment interview about the nature
of the appellant's disability that may well have offended the
statutory prohibition. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(2). FAS's use
of an employment application that asked for an enumeration of
physical defects and a workers' compensation history, see supra
note 1, is equally troubling.
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inter alia, the factual foundation of Dr. Winters's opinion, and
whether or not FAS acted in an objectively reasonable way in
relying on that opinion. While an employer need not be
unfailingly correct in its assumptions, its subjective beliefs
about an applicant's limitations must have a sufficient factual
foundation to make them objectively reasonable. See Cook v.
State of R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10
F.3d 17, 26-27 (1st Cir. 1993).
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. Because genuine issues of
material fact persist on at least three salient questions —
whether the appellant's impairment was disabling, whether she
was qualified for the position at the time that she applied, and
whether FAS discriminated against her on the basis of an illegal
stereotype — the district court erred when it granted FAS's
motion for summary judgment. We therefore vacate the judgment
and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
In so doing, we intimate no view as to how these questions
should be answered or as to the ultimate outcome of the
underlying litigation.
Vacated and remanded. Costs shall be taxed in favor of the
appellant.
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