Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Torraca, J.), entered February 6, 1990 in Sullivan County, which granted plaintiffs motion for, inter alia, a protective order.
In 1966, plaintiff and defendant executed a separation
At issue is whether Supreme Court properly denied disclosure of plaintiffs income tax returns and information contained therein for the years involved. We affirm.
Defendant failed to make the requisite showing that the returns were relevant to any defense he might assert for his asserted breach of the separation agreement (see, Matthews Indus. Piping Co. v Mobil Oil Corp., 114 AD2d 772; O’Grady v Burr, 2 AD2d 712, 713). Defendant requested plaintiffs tax information because he believed plaintiff deducted the expenses she had incurred for their son’s care (those same expenses for which she seeks reimbursement from defendant). Whether these payments were in fact deducted, however, is irrelevant to defendant’s liability, which hinges on whether he breached the parties’ agreement.
Generally, damages are computed as of the time the contract is breached (Rodriguez & Co. v Moore-McCormack Lines, 32 NY2d 425, 429; Orange & Rockland Utils. v New England Petroleum Corp., 60 AD2d 233, 235). Any subsequent collateral recovery supplied by a source other than the transgressor does not alter the amount of the breaching party’s obligation (36 NY Jur 2d, Damages, § 128, at 220). Thus, any tax deductions accruing to plaintiff would not reduce defendant’s liability (cf., Randall v Loftsgaarden, 478 US 647, 660).
Order affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Levine and Mercure, JJ., concur.