United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1891
No. 99-1892
ROBERT K. GRAY,
Plaintiff, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC. and SUSAN TRENTO,
Defendants, Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Steven J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Stahl and Lynch,
Circuit Judges.
James E. Higgins with whom Elizabeth A. Bailey and Sheehan
Phinney Bass & Green, P.A. were on consolidated brief for
plaintiff.
John C. Lankenau with whom Robert D. Balin, Jeffrey H. Blum,
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, William L. Chapman, James P. Basset
and Orr & Reno, P.A. were on consolidated brief for defendants.
August 2, 2000
BOUDIN, Circuit Judge. Robert K. Gray was for many
years active in Republican politics and a leading figure in
public relations in Washington, D.C. He served in the
Eisenhower administration in various roles (e.g., Secretary to
the Cabinet), worked in the 1980 Reagan-Bush presidential
campaign and served between 1961 and 1981 as the head of the
Washington office of, and eventually as vice chairman of, Hill
and Knowlton, a major public relations and lobbying firm. He
founded his own firm in 1981, sold it to Hill and Knowlton in
1986, and served for a period as a member of the board of
directors and chairman of a division of the latter.
In July 1992, St. Martin's Press, Inc., published a
book by Susan Trento, entitled The Power House: Robert Keith
Gray and the Selling of Access and Influence in Washington.
Focusing on Gray's career, the book sought to show the influence
of powerful and well-connected lobbyists on the federal
government. In June 1995, Gray brought suit both against St.
Martin's Press and Trento in the federal district court in New
Hampshire, claiming that eight separate statements made in the
-2-
book were defamatory. The eight statements are set forth in an
appendix to this opinion.
After two years of discovery, St. Martin's Press moved
for summary judgment. On March 5, 1998, the district court
granted partial summary judgment to St. Martin's Press, ruling
that three of the eight statements--(designated (b), (f), and
(h))--were non-actionable statements of opinion. More discovery
was conducted and both defendants filed a second summary
judgment motion. On May 19, 1999, the district court ruled that
Gray was a "limited purpose public figure," requiring Gray to
show "actual malice" in order to prevail. The district court
granted summary judgment for defendants as to one statement
(statement (c)), finding that there was no basis for the jury to
find actual malice.
The trial on the remaining four statements began on
June 7, 1999. On June 22, 1999, the jury returned special
verdicts in favor of St. Martin's and Trento. As to each of the
four remaining statements in issue ((a), (d), (e), and (g)), the
jury found that Gray had not proved that the defendants had
published to third parties statements that were false and
defamatory as to Gray; separately, the jury found that Gray
failed to prove actual malice by either defendant as to any of
the four statements.
-3-
Gray has now appealed. In this court he contests the
dismissal before trial of four of the statements, a discovery
ruling upholding a claim of privilege asserted by Trento that
pertains to one of the statements considered by the jury, and
the denial before trial of a motion by Gray to amend his
complaint to add twenty additional statements to the eight
already charged. We consider the issues in this order, applying
the standard of review pertinent to the issue in question.
Under state law, defendants in this case would be
liable for damages for libel if, as a result of the failure to
exercise reasonable care, they published false and defamatory
facts about the plaintiff to a third party, assuming that no
valid privilege applies. 1 Independent Mechanical Contractors,
Inc. v. Gordon T. Burke & Sons, Inc., 138 N.H. 110, 118 (N.H.
1993); The Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 229 Va. 1, 8, 15 (1985),
cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985). See generally Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 558 (1977). However, the Supreme Court has
read the First Amendment, made binding on the states through the
Fourteenth, to impose additional limitations in defamation
1The district court initially applied New Hampshire law in
ruling on the defendants' motions for summary judgment, but just
before trial was persuaded that Virginia law applies to this
case. The parties to this appeal do not contend that any issue
on this appeal turns on differences between New Hampshire and
Virginia law.
-4-
cases, whether or not they are also part of state law. Two of
these limitations are significant in this case--one dealing with
scienter and the other with opinion.
Pertinently, the Court has held that a "public figure"
may recover only if the false and defamatory statement was made
with "actual malice," meaning (in the Supreme Court's non-
literal usage) either that defendant knew that the statement was
false or showed a "reckless disregard" as to its truth or
falsity. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80
(1964); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335-
37 (1974). A "public figure" may be one of such fame as to be
so in all contexts (e.g., the President) or a "limited-purpose
public figure" as to a particular episode or subject; in the
latter case, only the statements about the person in that
context require a showing of actual malice. Gertz, 418 U.S. at
351-52; Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 67 & n.7
(1st Cir. 1998).
The Court has also held that only statements that
present or imply the existence of facts that can be proven true
or false are actionable under state defamation law. Milkovich
v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1990). But to say "I
think" is not enough to turn fact into opinion, Milkovich, 497
U.S. at 18-19, where what is supposedly "thought" is, or
-5-
implies, a proposition of fact, id.; Levinsky's v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 127 (1st Cir. 1997). Rather, the
cases are likely to protect a statement as "opinion" where it
involves expressions of personal judgment, especially as the
judgments become more vague and subjective in character. See
Levinsky's, 127 F.3d at 130 (store was "trashy"). As Chief
Judge Posner put the matter in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.,
8 F.3d 1222, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993):
[I]f it is plain that the speaker is
expressing a subjective view, an
interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or
surmise, rather than claiming to be in
possession of objectively verifiable facts,
the statement is not actionable.
On this appeal, Gray first questions the district
court's March 5, 1998, ruling that statements (b), (f), and (h)
are not actionable because they are not factual statements
capable of being proven false. The determination was made on
summary judgment and in any event the courts treat the issue of
labeling a statement as verifiable fact or as opinion as one
ordinarily decided by judges as a matter of law. Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510-11
(1984). Thus from either vantage, our review is de novo. As it
happens, we agree with the district court's reasoning as well as
its result and so treat this issue briefly.
-6-
Statement (b) is the view, attributed to an unnamed
Gray and Company senior executive, that Gray's "closeness to the
President [Reagan] and others was often faked. 'He completely
faked his closeness with a number of senior administration
officials.'" There are various vantages from which the
statement could be attacked as false (e.g., that no such view
was expressed by the unnamed executive), but the bite here is in
the claim that "closeness" was "faked" and Gray's position is
that he could show at trial that he was quite close to President
Reagan and other senior officials and was not "faking" these
relationships.
Whether calling something a "fake" is or is not
protected opinion depends very much on what is meant and
therefore on context. To say that a dollar bill is a fake
would, in most situations (but perhaps not all), be taken to
mean that it was a counterfeit; and to say that the defendant
was knowingly passing a fake dollar bill would surely be
actionable, if false. At the other extreme, where there were
two productions of Phantom of the Opera, and the defendant
called one of them "fake" and "phony," this court held that the
adjectives were subjective aesthetic judgments protected as
opinion. Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publications, 953
F.2d 724, 728 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 974 (1992).
-7-
In this case, Gray might have a claim if defendants had
said that Gray claimed to know President Reagan or other high
officials but did not in fact know them; whether or not he knew
them is an objective fact. However, the book made quite clear
that Gray did have contacts at the highest levels; the word
"fake" was used to imply that Gray was exaggerating his
"closeness." This is just the kind of subjective judgment that
is only minimally about "what happened" but expresses instead a
vague and subjective characterization of what happened. As we
read the case law, the statement is protected opinion.
Statement (f) is in essence several different
statements: in it Trento asserted that a number of Washington
lobbyists said that Gray and Company "ultimately failed because
it offered very little real substance." Gray’s quarrel is not
with the claim that lobbyists (quite possibly competitors) had
expressed such views but with the assertions that the company
had "failed" and offered "little real substance." The latter
judgment, where the product is an intangible service like
lobbying and criteria for success are debatable, is surely one
of opinion so we direct our attention to the charge that Gray
and Company "failed."
If the book had said or even implied that Gray and
Company went bankrupt or did not make a profit, these would be
-8-
statements of fact that could be proved true or false. Instead,
the book made clear that in 1986 Gray sold his company to JWT
Group, Inc., which made the company part of its subsidiary, Hill
and Knowlton, for about $16 million, of which Gray himself got
at least $9 million (the purchase price had been $21 million but
the buyer withheld about $4.6 million to cover possible
liabilities). Gray does not dispute that the figures are given
in the book and those figures make clear that Gray’s company did
not fail in any absolute sense.
Indeed, in explaining that Gray and Company "failed,"
Trento said that the sale was "profitable" but it "shattered"
Gray’s dream of owning the world’s largest public communications
firm. Gray does not challenge the latter statement; recall that
he left Hill and Knowlton to found Gray and Company as an
independent enterprise to compete with Hill and Knowlton. Some
might think it a success, rather than a failure, that his former
employer found him competitive and competent enough to buy him
out for millions and place him on its board of directors; but
what is "success" in a situation like this one is very much a
matter of opinion.
The next statement, designated (h), reads as follows:
Robert Crowley believed that "Casey may have
asked Gray to take on these controversial
clients--for the very purpose of spying on
them." If that were so it would explain why
-9-
Gray considered countries like Libya, and
took clients like Angola.
Robert Crowley was a former senior CIA official and William
Casey was the CIA director in the early to mid-1980s. Once
again, Gray does not dispute that Crowley may have so believed
but he does challenge the balance of the statements.
Interestingly, the first disputed proposition--that
Casey may have asked Gray to spy--is not necessarily protected
as to defendants even if they were merely describing Crowley’s
view. The reason, which is one of policy rather than strict
logic, is that it would otherwise be too easy for a writer or
publisher to defame freely by repeating the defamation of others
and defending it as simply an accurate report of what someone
else had said. Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 60-
61 (2d Cir. 1980) (Friendly, J.); Cepeda v. Cowles Magazines &
Broad., Inc., 328 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 844 (1964); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 578. Thus, the
first issue is whether Crowley’s speculation is actionable once
it is attributed to the defendants.
Statement (h), by its terms, links the possible purpose
to spy to Casey, not Gray; but the second sentence, seemingly a
separate speculation by defendants, suggests that Gray may have
acted on this request. Defendants say that to spy for one’s
country is laudable, not defamatory. Whether a statement is
-10-
capable of a defamatory meaning is an issue of law for the
court, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614(1); Harkaway v.
Boston Herald Traveler Corp., 418 F.2d 56, 58 (1st Cir. 1969),
and thus one we would review de novo; but the factfinder must
ultimately decide whether a statement like the one here,
reasonably capable of both a defamatory and non-defamatory
meaning, was in fact understood as defamatory by its recipients.2
We think that the statement's implication of spying on
clients is capable of bearing a defamatory meaning--it could
easily harm Gray in dealing with clients--and that a reasonable
jury could have found the statement in question defamatory. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 ("A communication is
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as
to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter
third persons from associating or dealing with him."); Thomson,
119 N.H. at 373 (to be defamatory, a statement "must tend to
lower the plaintiff in the esteem of any substantial and
respectable group, even though it may be quite a small
2
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614(2) & cmt. d ("The jury
determines whether a communication, capable of a defamatory
meaning, was so understood by its recipient."); Perk v. Vector
Resources Group, Ltd., 253 Va. 310, 316 (1997) (statement must
be sufficiently defamatory on its face before it is sent to the
jury); Thomson v. Cash, 119 N.H. 371, 374 (1979) ("Because the
words are susceptible of more than one meaning, whether they
were used in the defamatory sense is a question of fact for the
jury.").
-11-
minority") (internal quotation marks omitted); Carwile v.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 196 Va. 1, 8 (1954) (a statement
"which imputes to a business or professional man conduct which
tends to injure him in his business or profession" is actionable
as libel per se).
To determine if the Crowley statement is shielded
because it is conditional ("may have") is a more difficult
question. Here, the statement may be protected "opinion" not
because it is vague or judgmental but because it is speculative.
The test, admittedly a very crude one, is whether the statement
is properly understood as purely speculation or, alternatively,
implies that the speaker or writer has concrete facts that
confirm or underpin the truth of the speculation. Levin v.
McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1997); Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 566, comment (c) at 173. The former is protected as
opinion; the latter is taken as an indirect assertion of truth.
Like the district judge, we see nothing that suggests
that Crowley or the defendants were relying upon undisclosed
facts. Crowley’s own view is couched as a belief as to what
"may have" happened. The defendants add a further supporting
fact that Gray "considered countries like Libya, and took
clients like Angola"; but Gray does not dispute that this is so,
and where the underlying facts are disclosed, it becomes even
-12-
more clear that the writer or publisher is merely speculating
("if so") about the inference. Restatement (Second) of Torts §
566, at 174 ill. 5 ("A says to B about C, a city official: 'He
and his wife took a trip on city business a month ago and he
added her expenses in as a part of his own.' B responds: 'If
he did that he is really a thief.' B's expression of opinion
does not assert by implication any defamatory facts, and he is
not liable to C for defamation.").
The last statement of the four statements disposed of
before trial--statement (c)--quotes a former "Gray and Company
senior vice president" as saying that "there’s a degree of
venality on the part of [Gray] and lack of integrity which
always took me aback" and "very little real basic principle and
an awful lot, to me, of over charging." During discovery, the
defendants produced a transcript of Trento's interview with
Barry Zorthian, a former Senior Vice President at Gray and
Company, as the source of this statement. The district court
granted summary judgment as to this statement because it found
that Gray was a limited-purpose public figure with respect to
lobbying and that no reasonable jury could find that the charge
was made by the defendants with actual malice.
On appeal, Gray first disputes the limited-purpose
public figure label. This is treated as an issue of law to be
-13-
resolved by the district judge and reviewed de novo by us.
Pendleton v. City of Haverhill, 156 F.3d 57, 68 (1st Cir. 1998).
We agree with the district court that, prior to and continuing
up to the book’s publication--which (to avoid bootstrapping) is
the pertinent time frame, Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe
Newspaper, Inc., 633 F.2d 583, 591 (1st Cir. 1980)--a public
controversy existed as to the methods and influence of lobbyists
in Washington. This was amply evidenced by materials submitted
to the district court showing that from the early 1980s onward
there has been a tide of concern and criticism about Washington
lobbying.
The record also shows that Gray was a central figure
in this controversy, being identified as one of the best-known
of the high-level Washington public relations experts, an
emblematic figure, and a self-professed defender against attacks
on lobbying. Indeed, Gray’s lobbying and in particular billing
practices were themselves the subject of comment and criticism
in mainstream publications like Time, Newsweek, the Washington
Post and the New Republic. This does not show that he behaved
improperly as a lobbyist or overbilled his clients. It does
mean that, in the complex equation for liability laid down by
the Supreme Court, Gray needed to show actual malice by clear
-14-
and convincing evidence. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52; Pendleton,
156 F.3d at 67 & n.7.3
In most cases, as in this one, the plaintiff does not
have any evidence of actual malice in the literal sense but, as
already noted, recklessness suffices. New York Times, 376 U.S.
at 279-80; Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496,
510 (1991). Recklessness is a jury issue so long as the
plaintiff at the summary judgment stage produces evidence that
would allow a reasonable jury to find the defendants reckless by
clear and convincing evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986). Recklessness, in this context, can be
shown by proving "that the defendant actually had a 'high degree
of awareness of . . . probably falsity,'" Harte-Hanks Communs.,
Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) (quoting Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964)), but mere negligence in
conducting an investigation or weighing the evidence is not
enough. Harte-Hanks Communs., 491 U.S. at 688; Masson, 501 U.S.
at 510.
3Gray also argues that the statements were not "germane" to
any controversy over lobbyists and that he was not a limited-
purpose public figure by 1992 when the book was published. We
think that the statements are germane to the controversy over
lobbying, and the record shows numerous articles concerning
Gray, his company, and Hill and Knowlton published between 1986
and 1992.
-15-
The defendants assert, and the plaintiff does not
dispute, that actual malice in this case must be shown
separately as to each defendant. But cf. Cantrell v. Forest
City Publ'g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 253 (1974) (referring to
vicarious liability). With respect to Trento, she relied not
only on Zorthian but also on several other sources. They, too,
had connections with Gray and Company and their statements
tended to back up Zorthian’s position. Against Trento's
multiple sources, Gray counters that Zorthian had an axe to
grind (he had parted ways with Gray and later sued him); that
few of Trento’s sources had much knowledge of the billing side
of Gray’s business; and that Trento failed to publish one other
source's statement that he had "never heard" about charges of
overbilling or to interview others who would have denied such
overcharging.
There is no point in our going through this evidence
piece by piece since we agree with the district court's
assessment. Prejudice or limited knowledge on the part of a
source may suggest caution but does not preclude reliance; the
fact that one witness had "never heard" about the charges counts
for little; and while refusing to seek out decisive witnesses
may be a mark of recklessness in some circumstances, Trento
already had multiple sources and was under no obligation to
-16-
exhaust every possible witness before winding up her
investigation. Even assuming she was careless and reached a
mistaken conclusion, that is not enough for actual malice.
Less need be said about St. Martin’s. It apparently
had some doubts about the rigor of Trento’s book proposal. But
the proposal was followed by more than two years of research and
there is no evidence that St. Martin's employees doubted the
accuracy of Trento’s final product. It is true that Gray
protested to St. Martin’s prior to publication that some of the
statements were untrue. However, apart from the fact that in
this original protest statement (c) was not specifically
identified as false, simple denials by the subject are
commonplace and, absent more, are normally not enough to premise
a finding of actual malice. Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y,
Inc., 556 F.2d 113, 120-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1002 (1977).
Gray's next claim of error on appeal is that the
district court erred in upholding a claim of press privilege
during the discovery process. Specifically, Trento declined to
reveal the name of her confidential source for statement (g),
which reads: "One Gray and Company executive in a position to
know said that Gray and Company was making payments to [Duke]
Zeller." According to the book, Duke Zeller had previously
-17-
worked for Gray and at the time in question was the Director of
Communications for the Teamsters Union, a lucrative client of
Gray's company. The apparent implication is that Gray made
secret payments to Zeller in order to retain the Teamsters
account.
The magistrate judge, later sustained by the district
judge, upheld Trento's objection on the grounds that New
Hampshire recognized a qualified confidential source privilege
for reporters, State v. Siel, 122 N.H. 254, 259-60 (1982);
Downing v. Monitor Publ'g Co., Inc., 120 N.H. 383, 386-87
(1980), that one requirement to overcome the privilege was to
show that the applicant had made all reasonable efforts to
obtain the identity of the confidential source by other
reasonable means, and that this requirement had not been
satisfied by Gray. On appeal, Gray argues that the district
court misread New Hampshire privilege law, which both sides now
assume to govern the question, and that in any event it was
error to find that Gray had not satisfied the requirement.
New Hampshire law on the privilege in question, an
issue for de novo review, is not a model of clarity; and, while
the "failure to satisfy" finding would be reversed only for
clear error or abuse of discretion, we have some initial
sympathy for Gray's claim that he did all he could to satisfy
-18-
the requirement of exhausting other means. And if Gray were
found to have exhausted all reasonable means of identifying the
source and Trento still refused to reveal her source, Gray would
have been entitled to a presumption that no source existed.
Downing, 120 N.H. at 387. This could have helped Gray persuade
the jury that Trento acted with actual malice in making the
payoff charge.
The problem for Gray is that however the matter stood
at the time of the privilege ruling, the jury returned a verdict
as to statement (g) that rested on two alternative grounds: one
was lack of actual malice but the other was Gray's failure (in
the jury's view) to prove that the statement was false and
defamatory. Defendants say that the verdict thus rested safely
on a ground independent of the no-malice finding. Gray, who has
not independently attacked the jury's alternative ground, has
not provided any very cogent answer to this claim, beyond saying
rather tersely that if the privilege had been overridden, Trento
had still baulked, and the jury been told that therefore it
could presume that the source did not exist, then the jury might
have thought the statement false.
It is hard to see why this is so. Obviously, there was
far better direct evidence available--such as Gray's own
testimony--as to whether the payoff occurred; indeed, on this
-19-
issue the source's statement was inadmissible hearsay as to the
truth of the charge. Nor is there all that much basis to doubt
that some source did exist, whether reliable or otherwise;
Trento produced redacted notes of her conversation with the
source and Gray himself got some mileage out of an argument that
this portion of Trento's interview was not taped like the rest
of the interview with the confidential source.
Gray also says that while Trento preserved the claim
of privilege, St. Martin's never asserted the privilege so the
district court had to have erred in upholding the claim as it
did. St. Martin's agrees that it did not assert the privilege
but argues, as it did in the district court, that it did not
know the name of the source and therefore needed no privilege in
order to withhold it. Gray responds that in previous court
papers St. Martin's never affirmatively stated that it had not
been told the name of the confidential source. But Gray himself
does not allege that St. Martin's does actually know the
identity of the source, and without evidence to contradict St.
Martin's assertion in its brief that it does not know the
identity of the source, Gray's argument does not undermine St.
Martin's commonsense position.
Gray's final argument on appeal, properly placed last,
is that the district court erred in refusing to grant Gray leave
-20-
to amend his complaint to add 20 additional statements from the
book now alleged to be defamatory. As earlier noted, the
complaint was filed in June 1995; and the motion to amend was
made three years later, after extensive proceedings including
discovery. The district court found the motion untimely and
unduly prejudicial.
We find no abuse of discretion. Grant v. News Group
Boston, Inc., 55 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995). It is enough to say
that although leave to amend is to be "freely given," Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a), Gray had the book for six years before he moved
to amend and at the outset of the litigation could have easily
decided which charges he believed to be false. The district
court amply explained its reasons for finding that under the
circumstances there was undue delay and prejudice.
The judgment is affirmed. The conditional cross-appeal
filed by St. Martin's Press and Susan Trento is dismissed as
moot.
-21-
ADDENDUM
a. "As others were cleaning out their
desks, looking for jobs, briefing
their successors, and preparing to
leave the White House, Gray was busy
dictating his memoirs to his White
House secretary." The Power House,
p. 53.
b. "A senior Gray and Company executive
insisted that Gray's closeness to the
President and others was often faked.
'He completely faked his closeness
with a number of senior
administration officials.'" The
Power House, p. 156.
c. "'I think there's a degree of
venality on the part of Bob and lack
of integrity which always took me
aback. A lot of it he would justify
as being a businessman, but there was
very little real basic principle and
an awful lot, to me, of over
charging.'" The Power House, p. 165.
d. "'. . . at Gray and Company he [Mr.
Gray] stage-managed impressive-
sounding calls. A reporter would
walk in and he would instruct his
executive assistant to come in and
announce that there was a call from
the White House. Totally fabricated.
Absolutely. They would come in and
they would say, 'Mr. Gray, Mr. Meese
is on the phone,' and he would pick
up a dead line or a line that was set
up by the executive assistant, carry
on a conversation of four or five
short rapid sentences as though he
was in constant communication and
hang up. And then, of course, the
reporters, dazzled, would then report
-22-
that a White House phone call came
in,' explained one Gray and Company
executive." The Power House, p. 167-
8.
e. "And the Gray and Company employees
in Spain were to be convinced that
the office was used as a money
laundering operation for the Reagan
administration's private intelligence
network." The Power House, p. 273.
f. "In the end, several Washington
lobbyists feel that Gray and Company
ultimately failed because it offered
very little real substance." The
Power House, p. 323.
g. "One Gray and Company executive in a
position to know said that Gray and
Company was making payments to
Zeller." The Power House, p. 202.
h. "Robert Crowley believed that 'Casey
may have asked Gray to take on these
controversial clients--for the very
purpose of spying on them.' If that
were so it would explain why Gray
considered countries like Libya, and
took clients like Angola." The Power
House, p. 260.
-23-
Gray v. St. Martin's Press, Inc.
Court: Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
Date filed: 2000-08-02
Citations: 221 F.3d 243
Copy Citations