FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 26, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
JACK J. GRYNBERG; GRYNBERG
PRODUCTION CORPORATION, and
its successors; GRYNBERG
PETROLEUM COMPANY, and its
successors,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 06-1328
TOTAL S.A.,
Defendant - Appellee.
_____________________________
JACK J. GRYNBERG; GRYNBERG
PRODUCTION CORPORATION and
its successors; GRYNBERG
PETROLEUM COMPANY, and its
successors,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v. No. 06-1355
SHELL EXPLORATION B.V. and
SHELL INTERNATIONAL
EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
B.V. f/k/a SHELL INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM MAATSCHAPPIJ
B.V.,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. NOS. 03-CV-1280-WYD-BNB and 03-CV-01212-LTB-PAC)
Michael S. Porter, Wheat Ridge, Colorado, (Roger A. Jatko, Grynberg Petroleum
Company, Greenwood Village, Colorado, with him on the briefs) for Plaintiffs -
Appellants Jack J. Grynberg; Grynberg Production Corporation, and its
successors; Grynberg Petroleum Company, and its successors.
John P. Bowman (William J. Boyce, Jennifer Lee Price, and Christopher R. Hart,
with him on the briefs) of Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Houston, Texas, for
Defendant - Appellee, TOTAL S.A.
Roger A. Jatko, Grynberg Petroleum Company, Greenwood Village, Colorado,
for Plaintiff - Appellant Jack J. Grynberg; Grynberg Production Corporation and
its successors; Grynberg Petroleum Company, and its successors.
Graham Kerin Blair, Baker & McKenzie LLP, Houston, Texas (Marcy G. Glenn
and John F. Shepherd, Holland & Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado, and David A.
Brakebill and J. Chad Newton, Baker & McKenzie LLP, with him on the briefs),
for Defendants - Appellees, Shell Exploration B.V. and Shell International
Exploration and Production B.V. f/k/a Shell International Petroleum Maatschappij
B.V.
Before HARTZ, McKAY, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Jack Grynberg (Mr. Grynberg), Grynberg Production Corporation, and
Grynberg Petroleum Company (collectively, Grynberg) appeal from summary
judgments in two separate lawsuits, one against Total S.A. and one against Shell
Exploration B.V. and Shell International Exploration and Production B.V.
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(collectively Shell). Both lawsuits, which were filed in 2003 in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado as diversity actions, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332, raised essentially identical claims based on essentially the same factual
allegations. Grynberg alleged that through its special relationship with authorities
in the Soviet Union and Kazakhstan, it obtained valuable information regarding
potential oil and gas reserves in Kazakhstan. After obtaining authority from
Kazakhstan to form a consortium of companies to join with Kazakhstan in
exploring for and developing these reserves, Grynberg approached Shell and Total
in 1990 with its information and reached agreements on joining a consortium.
Shell and Total, however, joined a different consortium and obtained rights to oil
and gas in the very area that was to be the subject of the Grynberg consortium.
Grynberg’s suits against Shell and Total raise against each a tort claim for breach
of fiduciary duty and an equitable claim for unjust enrichment. Shell and Total
moved for summary judgment on the ground that Grynberg’s claims were
untimely, barred by the applicable statute of limitations and laches. The district
judges granted the motions.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, consolidate the two appeals,
and affirm. The limitations period for Grynberg’s tort claims was three years, and
well more than three years before Grynberg filed suit it should have known—from
news reports and from information disclosed in a settlement with a consortium
partner of Shell and Total—that it could have sued Shell and Total for acquiring
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oil and gas interests in the area that Grynberg’s consortium was to explore and
develop. As for Grynberg’s unjust-enrichment claims, they were barred by laches
because Grynberg has failed to point to any extraordinary circumstance that
would justify extending the laches period beyond the limitations period for the
closely allied tort claims.
II. THE COMPLAINTS
The allegations at issue on appeal are those in Grynberg’s Second Amended
Complaint against Shell (the Shell Complaint) and its First Amended Complaint
against Total (the Total Complaint), which overlap substantially. They allege the
following:
Mr. Grynberg is fluent in Russian and has “extensive knowledge, training
and experience in the field of oil and natural gas discovery and development.”
Shell Compl. at 16; Total Compl. at 13. After a mining convention in September
1989, he helped obtain plane tickets to Washington, D.C., for a Soviet official and
his aide who had been bumped from a flight. The official expressed his gratitude
and, at Mr. Grynberg’s request, invited him to Moscow in early November to
review secret seismic data pertaining to the Caspian Sea and Northwestern
Kazakhstan. Mr. Grynberg reviewed the data and decided to focus his attention
on one particular region (which he calls the Area of Mutual Interest (AMI))
“because of its enormous potential, and because of its inaccessibility to others at
that time.” Shell Compl. at 12; Total Compl. at 9. The AMI includes “the largest
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oil, natural gas, and sulphur discovery in the world in over 40 years.” Shell
Compl. at 3; Total Compl. at 2.
Also in November 1989, the United States State Department asked
Mr. Grynberg to host a delegation from Kazakhstan that had expressed interest in
his cattle-feeding operation. The delegation included First Secretary Nursultan A.
Nazarbaev. Mr. Grynberg held a dinner for Nazarbaev, who asked him to
assemble teams of experts in the petroleum and mining industries and travel to
Kazakhstan to determine whether the region could support those industries. His
trip to Kazakhstan in February 1990 confirmed his belief that the AMI had
significant potential for oil and natural-gas production. Before returning to the
United States, Mr. Grynberg contacted British Gas, British Petroleum, and BP
Exploration Operating Company Limited (collectively BP) to discuss the
possibility of oil exploration in Kazakhstan.
In April 1990 Mr. Grynberg convinced the President of Venezuela to invite
Nazarbaev, who was by then the President of Kazakhstan, to Caracas, where he
spent a week with Mr. Grynberg observing western-led oilfield development.
During this trip Nazarbaev “reaffirmed his commitment to Grynberg to assist
Grynberg in forming an international oil and natural gas consortium to explore,
develop and produce oil and natural gas in the AMI of Kazakhstan.” Shell
Compl. at 13; Total Compl. at 10.
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Mr. Grynberg returned to Kazakhstan the next month with a BP executive
and a BP team of experts. Nazarbaev permitted Mr. Grynberg to call him by his
first name, “indicat[ing] a close relationship, and friendship.” Shell Compl. at 14;
Total Compl. at 11. At the end of the trip Mr. Grynberg was authorized by a
Kazakh government protocol to form an international consortium for oil and gas
exploration in the AMI. To allay Nazarbaev’s fears that oil exploration could
lead to a natural disaster that would harm the Caspian Sea’s sizable premium
caviar industry, Mr. Grynberg invited a Kazakh delegation to observe Arctic
drilling in Alaska. In June he hosted the delegation as it toured the United States,
ending in Alaska with a visit to Prudhoe Bay and the Endicott Oil Fields in the
Beaufort Sea, which he used as an example of a large offshore operation
conducted without polluting the sea.
The visit led to the signing of additional protocols covering development in
the AMI. Mr. Grynberg credited his fluency in Russian, close relationship with
Nazarbaev and other important players, and his expertise in the oil-and-gas
industry (particularly with regard to advances in undersea production) for his
success in negotiating with Kazakh and Soviet officials and obtaining the
protocols.
In July 1990 Mr. Grynberg proposed to Shell and Total that they join a
consortium led by him in partnership with the Republic of Kazakhstan for the
purpose of developing “a profitable and potentially gigantic oil and natural gas
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industry in the AMI in Kazakhstan.” Shell Compl. at 4–5; see also Total Compl.
at 3–4. Under this proposed consortium agreement, Grynberg was to obtain a
20% working interest in the AMI. The agreement also provided that Grynberg’s
share of the costs associated with acquiring and developing properties in the AMI
would be carried by Shell and Total, who would be reimbursed out of Grynberg’s
share of future revenue. To convince Shell and Total that oil exploration in the
AMI was a viable prospect, Grynberg gave them “access to geologic maps and
seismographic data, together with a detailed economic, technical, and scientific
analysis,” and told them that he believed that “billions of barrels of oil and
trillions of cubic feet of natural gas” could be recovered from the AMI. Shell
Compl. at 6; Total Compl. at 5.
Shell accepted Grynberg’s proposal. Total responded to the proposal in a
letter dated July 20, 1990, which stated, “[W]e basically agree on the proposed
principles as set out in your draft.” Total Compl. at 4. But nothing came of
Grynberg’s arrangements with Shell and Total, and the complaints skip seven
years to 1997, when Shell, Total, BP, and other oil companies signed an
agreement with the government of Kazakhstan giving them oil production rights
in the AMI. Although Shell and Total thereby profited greatly from Grynberg’s
efforts, Grynberg was not included in the deal. In 2002 the Kashagan Field in the
AMI was declared commercial. The estimated value of each defendant’s interest
in the entire AMI is $10 billion.
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The Shell Complaint summarizes the alleged misconduct as follows:
[S]everal huge oil companies, including Shell, by their
exploration efforts based upon Grynberg’s confidential
information, were able to determine the value and extent
of some of the Kazakhstan oil and natural gas deposits
in the AMI. This, they were only able to do as a result
of acquiring Grynberg’s research, contacts, analysis of
confidential scientific data, and organizational skills.
Nonetheless, Shell, along with others, later went around
Grynberg to Kazakhstan directly, cutting Grynberg out
of the entire deal, and profiting by billions of dollars.
Shell, and others, then denied Grynberg any
compensation whatsoever for his valuable contribution
to their assets and profits.
Id. at 6. It further states:
Shell violated its agreement with Grynberg related to
this confidential information. The confidential
information supplied to Shell by Grynberg, and to other
parties to the organization of western oil companies
initiated by Grynberg at the behest of the government of
Kazakhstan, was specifically provided on condition that
Grynberg retained a fair share of the entire deal. Shell
breached its agreement with Grynberg, and then waited
to enter into its own agreement with others and
Kazakhstan to acquire its own interest in the AMI. Shell
waited, while ongoing exploration in the AMI confirmed
exactly what Grynberg had revealed to Shell in July of
1990, i.e. that the AMI location described contained
enormous deposits of oil and natural gas. Then on
November 18 of 1997, Shell and others struck a deal
with the Republic of Kazakhstan . . . to actually take oil
and natural gas production from the Area of Mutual
Interest, and to therefore profit immensely from
Grynberg’s efforts on their behalf.
Id. at 7. The Total Complaint contains virtually identical allegations against
Total.
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The Shell and Total Complaints also state virtually identical causes of
action. Neither asserts a claim for breach of contract. Rather, they each present
two other claims. The first is an equitable claim that Shell and Total were
unjustly enriched when they “a) used a benefit provided by Grynberg in an
unauthorized and unfair manner; and b) retained that benefit conferred on it by
Grynberg without paying fair compensation for it.” Shell Compl. at 24; Total
Compl. at 19. Shell and Total did this by “using Grynberg’s contacts,
confidential information, and interpretation thereof as aforesaid without paying a
penny to Grynberg out of [their] enormous profits.” Shell Compl. at 24; Total
Compl. at 19. The second cause of action is a tort claim for breach of fiduciary
duty. The Shell Complaint alleges that Shell breached “its fiduciary duties to
Grynberg in wrongfully using the confidential information imparted to Shell by
Grynberg for its own use and profit to the exclusion of Grynberg.” Shell Compl.
at 24. The Total Complaint alleges that
a) Total obtained confidential information from Grynberg . . . ; b)
Total acted as a fiduciary of Grynberg in regard to the confidential
information supplied by Grynberg; c) Total breached its fiduciary
duty to Grynberg by wrongfully appropriating the confidential
information for its own use and profit to the exclusion of Grynberg;
and d) Grynberg incurred damages as a result of Total’s breach of its
fiduciary duties.
Total Compl. at 20. For relief, both complaints sought, in the alternative, (1) 20%
of the fair market value of the defendants’ interests, less expenses, in the AMI;
(2) a constructive trust on Grynberg’s fair share of the defendants’ interests in the
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entire AMI; or (3) disgorgement to Grynberg of the defendants’ profits from the
AMI.
III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
Grynberg filed the lawsuits in July 2003. Both Shell and Total raised in
their answers the affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations and laches, and
the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The parties agreed, at
least at that stage of the proceedings, that the applicable limitations period was
three years. Although the evidence in the two cases overlaps, we will discuss
them separately because the parties presented different evidence and raised
different arguments.
A. Shell
Both Shell and Grynberg submitted numerous exhibits to support their
positions. These exhibits established the following series of events: In June 1990
the government of Kazakhstan executed several protocols with Grynberg, BP, and
other oil companies (but not Shell or Total), purporting to give (1) Grynberg
authority to form a consortium and (2) BP rights to study exploration and
production “in the Pricaspian Basin of Northwest Kazakhstan.” Shell App.
Vol. II at 364 (June 1990 Protocol at 1). On May 31, 1991, Grynberg and BP
Exploration executed an agreement (the BP Agreement) stating that if either
Grynberg or BP Exploration obtained an opportunity to “participate in any
petroleum exploration, development, production, processing and transportation
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opportunities” within the AMI, it was to share the offer with the other party, and
the parties could either jointly accept the offer, or one could decline and the other
could accept the offer. Id. Vol. III at 764 (BP Agreement at 2). Notwithstanding
the 1990 protocols, the government of Kazakhstan executed in 1993 two
consortium agreements with oil companies, including subsidiaries of BP, Shell,
and Total. The first agreement, called the “Preliminary Consortium Agreement”
(PCA), was executed on June 9, 1993. Id. Vol. I at 111 (1997 Agreement). The
second agreement, called the “Consortium Agreement” (CA), was executed on
December 3. Id. at 112. The primary purpose of the CA was to implement an
“exploration research study” to obtain and interpret seismic and other geologic
data and to assess the environmental impact of oil production. Id. at 270. In
return for their payments and exploration efforts, the foreign companies were to
receive “the exclusive right to select a number of E&P [Exploration and
Production] Blocks . . . and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration and production of such E&P Blocks.” Id. at 112.
Grynberg was not a party to either agreement. But the involvement of
Shell, Total, and other oil companies was not secret. Several prominent
newspapers carried articles describing the PCA, and identifying BP, Shell, and
Total as participants. On June 8, 1993, the day before the PCA was signed, the
Wall Street Journal reported that several oil companies were preparing to enter an
agreement to perform exploratory work toward developing oil fields in the
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Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan. On June 10 the paper published a follow-up article
stating that the agreement had been signed, that it addressed only exploration, and
that production was not projected to begin until 2000. The New York Times
reported on June 9 that the purpose of the agreement was to begin “a seismic
exploration program” and that the agreement was “preliminary” and would be
followed by a “final agreement” in the fall. Id. Vol. II at 526. Also on June 9,
the Financial Times stated that the purpose of the agreement was seismic
exploration, that a final agreement was to be formed as early as the fall, and that
the participating oil companies, in return for financing the surveys and paying a
fee to the Kazakh government, would have a right of first refusal to exploit any
oil that was discovered. The Los Angeles Times reported on June 10 that a
consortium had been formed to explore the Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan.
According to the article, after Kazakhstan’s entire shelf in the Caspian Sea was
surveyed, each participant would be allowed to select blocks in which it would
have exclusive rights to the oil.
Later in 1993 the CA also received widespread publicity. On December 6
the New York Times reported that “Kazakhstan signed a final agreement . . . with
seven Western companies to explore for oil in the northern part of the Caspian
Sea shelf.” Id. Vol. II at 531. It identified BP, Shell, and Total as among the
signatories. Lloyd’s List International stated on December 4 that a final
agreement had been reached that included BP, Shell, and Total, and that
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development and production would not occur until after 2000. None of this 1993
news coverage, however, used either the name Kashagan Field or Tazhigali
Offshore (the term originally used by Mr. Grynberg for the Kashagan Field).
Although Mr. Grynberg initially testified in his deposition that television is
his primary source of news and business information, that he did not read regular
periodicals from 1993 to 2003, and that he never saw reports of the 1993 CA, he
then admitted that he had written a letter referring to the June 10, 1993, Wall
Street Journal article. The letter, addressed to a BP executive, said:
Congratulations on the Caspian Sea agreement. After all
this hard work I am delighted it has finally come
through for all of us. Based on the article in today’s
Wall Street Journal let’s hope this effort will result in
the discovery of the world’s greatest oil accumulation.
Id. Vol. III at 1031.
Two months earlier Grynberg had sued British Gas in Texas state court for
breaching its August 1990 agreement with Grynberg relating to oil and gas rights
in the AMI, and for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of confidentiality.
The suit also sought a declaratory judgment against BP Exploration and others to
establish that any rights they had in the AMI were rights against British Gas (not
Grynberg). After receiving Mr. Grynberg’s congratulatory letter, BP Exploration
sued Grynberg in the Southern District of New York, alleging that the 1991 BP
Agreement superseded an earlier agreement and was itself unenforceable because
it had been terminated by its own terms, the purpose had been frustrated, and
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performance had been rendered impossible. In the alternative, BP Exploration
alleged that Grynberg had breached its obligations (1) under its August 1990
agreement with British Gas, under which BP Exploration was an intended
beneficiary; and (2) under the 1991 BP Agreement. We will refer to this pair of
lawsuits as the BP Litigation. (Although the BP Litigation eventually settled, the
settlement agreement is not part of the record in the Shell Case.)
On November 18, 1997, four years after the CA was signed, Kazakhstan
signed a “Production Sharing Agreement” (PSA) covering “The North Caspian
Sea (Kashagan)” with several oil companies, including BP, Shell, and Total. Id.
Vol. I at 100 (1997 PSA). The agreement was signed in Washington, D.C., in the
presence of Nazarbaev and Vice President Gore. In an affidavit Mr. Grynberg
stated that he obtained a copy of the PSA only in January 2002. But, again, there
was extensive contemporaneous news coverage. About seven weeks before the
PSA was signed, the Wall Street Journal carried an article stating that six oil
companies (including BP, Shell, and Total), having spent $300 million on a
seismic survey, were planning to enter a production-sharing agreement with
Kazakhstan for the Kazakh sector of the Caspian Sea. The day the agreement was
signed, articles in the New York Times and the Financial Times stated that BP,
Shell, and Total were going to sign a production-sharing agreement with
Kazakhstan. The New York Times article identified the Kashagan Field by name.
The Financial Times article referred to the area involved as the Kazakhstan sector
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of the North Caspian Sea. In the days that followed, at least four other periodical
articles reported on the subject and named BP, Shell, and Total. One of these
articles, in Europe Energy, said that the project’s development costs were likely
to exceed $20 billion, and referred specifically to Kashagan; the other three
referred only to the North Caspian Sea.
Grynberg argued that the evidence presented on the motions for summary
judgment did not establish that the Shell Complaint was untimely. It contended
that the three-year limitations period could not begin until it incurred damages;
that it could not incur damages until a field had been declared commercial; and
that the Kashagan Field was not declared commercial until June 28, 2002, barely
a year before Grynberg filed suit. Moreover, argued Grynberg, even if its causes
of action could have been brought on July 24, 2000, when the first oil discovery
in the Kashagan Field was publicly announced, the lawsuit was still filed within
three years of that date. With regard to laches, Grynberg contended that because
the lawsuit was brought within the time period established by the analogous
statute of limitations, it would be barred by laches only if Shell could prove
extraordinary circumstances, which it had not done.
Shell contended that Grynberg’s claims accrued as soon as it knew (or
should have known) the facts underlying its claims, and that this had occurred by
1993, or at the latest by 1997. According to Shell, Grynberg had acquired the
necessary knowledge from the BP Litigation and from Mr. Grynberg’s admitted
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reading of the 1993 Wall Street Journal article reporting that Shell, BP, Total, and
others, had signed an agreement “to begin exploration of a potentially huge oil
field in the Caspian Sea north of Iran.” Shell Cross-Mot. Summ. J. at 8, March 6,
2006 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, Shell continued, Grynberg should
have known the necessary facts from the news accounts on the matter, its access
to Kazakh officials, and its ability to contact Shell itself.
Responding to Grynberg’s argument on laches, Shell said that it did not
need to prove extraordinary circumstances because the suit was not filed within
the analogous limitations period. Alternatively, it contended that extraordinary
circumstances existed because (1) Grynberg had not filed suit until 13 years after
Mr. Grynberg’s only meeting with Shell, (2) Grynberg had admittedly lost
“numerous boxes of important documents” pertaining to the lawsuit, and (3) the
Shell representatives who had met with Mr. Grynberg and almost all those with
personal knowledge of the material events were no longer Shell employees. Shell
App. Vol. II at 474 (Shell Mem. of Law in Opp’n to Pls.’ Mot. Summ. J. at 20,
March 6, 2006).
Grynberg in turn replied that Shell had failed to show prejudice from delay,
contending that Shell could still obtain the testimony of its former employees, but
not addressing Shell’s claims of prejudice from Grynberg’s loss of important
records.
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The district court granted Shell summary judgment. It ruled that Grynberg
was injured when Shell entered a consortium in 1993 in reliance on the
information provided by Grynberg, or, at the latest, in 1997 when Shell and others
planned commercial development of the Kashagan Field. The court also ruled
that Grynberg should have discovered the requisite injury in November 1997,
when newspapers reported that a consortium including Shell “had agreed to
develop the Kashagan Field for commercial purposes.” Mem. Op. & Order (on
Summ. J.) at 7, 9, June 6, 2006. The court concluded that Grynberg’s breach-of-
fiduciary-duty and unjust-enrichment claims were both barred under the three-
year limitations period which applied “under the statute [of limitations] and the
correlating laches doctrine.” Id. at 1–2.
On June 16, 2006, Grynberg filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. It argued that the unjust-
enrichment claim, which was governed by laches, was not untimely because the
limitations period under the analogous statute of limitations was six years. The
district court denied the motion on the ground that a party may not use a Rule
59(e) motion to raise new issues that could and should have been presented before
entry of judgment.
B. Total
The exhibits submitted by Total in support of its motion for summary
judgment were more extensive than those submitted by Shell. In addition to the
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Shell materials, Total submitted copies of the 1993 CA, the 1997 PSA, and the
1999 settlement agreement between Grynberg and BP (the BP Settlement
Agreement) to resolve the BP Litigation. The 1999 BP Settlement Agreement
states that BP, Shell, and Total, among others, were parties to a “Production
Sharing Agreement in Respect of the North Caspian Sea, dated as of November
18, 1997, to Engage in Exploration and Production.” Total App. Vol. VI at 1969.
The Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in Total’s motion asserts that the
AMI set forth in Grynberg’s 1990 letter to Total “matched, by latitude and
longitude, the boundaries of the North Caspian Sea then claimed by and now
defined to be within Kazakhstan,” and attached a sworn statement and map
prepared by a cartographer. Id. Vol. V at 1462. This assertion was uncontested,
as Grynberg’s response (which would have been more appropriate in an answer to
a complaint) states only that it “is without knowledge to admit or deny the
boundaries of the North Caspian Sea then claimed by and now defined to be
within Kazakhstan.” Id. Vol. IV at 1040. A fact is “disputed” in a summary-
judgment proceeding only if there is contrary evidence or other sufficient reason
to disbelieve it; a simple denial, much less an assertion of ignorance, does not
suffice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Trevizo v. Adams, 455 F.3d 1155, 1159–60
(10th Cir. 2006).
As in the Shell Case, Grynberg argued that its claims had not arisen until
the Kashagan Field was declared commercial in 2002, because it had not been
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injured until then: if the exploratory wells had been dry, Grynberg reasoned, it
“would have had nothing on which to claim an interest.” Pls.’ Cross-Mot. Summ.
J. at 6, Dec. 16, 2005. At the earliest, argued Grynberg, the clock started on July
24, 2000, when the first oil discovery was publicly announced, still less than three
years before it filed suit. In the alternative, Grynberg contended that even if it
could have sued Total for entering the PSA in 1997, the limitations period did not
begin to run on that claim until 2002, when it first obtained a copy of the PSA,
because it had not known before then that Total itself was exploiting areas within
the AMI. Grynberg asserted that the BP Settlement Agreement had not revealed
which blocks of the Caspian Sea were being exploited by Total or whether Total
had used confidential information from Grynberg. Grynberg also contended that
both the breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim and the unjust-enrichment claim were
equitable claims governed by laches, and that Total had not established laches
because suit had been brought within the analogous limitations period and Total
had failed to prove prejudice from delay.
Total’s legal theory was that Grynberg’s causes of action accrued as soon
as Grynberg knew or should have known that Total (1) had exploration and
production rights, (2) within the AMI, (3) to the exclusion of Grynberg.
According to Total, all three elements were satisfied by the time that Grynberg
executed the BP Settlement Agreement on January 19, 1999, more than three
years before Grynberg sued Total. In particular, the agreement stated that Total
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had production rights in the Kazakh sector of the North Caspian Sea, all of which,
asserted Total, is within the AMI. Total further argued that Grynberg’s claims
had accrued even earlier, when Total’s commercial interest in the AMI had been
widely publicized in 1997. Total contended that although Grynberg’s claim for
unjust enrichment was governed by laches, Grynberg could overcome a laches bar
only by showing extraordinary circumstances because it had filed suit outside of
the analogous three-year limitations period. In a later pleading Total argued that
claims for unjust enrichment are governed directly by the statute of limitations,
but Total also contended that it was prejudiced by Grynberg’s delay because it no
longer employed certain key people, memories had faded, and it had lost track of
relevant documents.
Grynberg replied that Total had not established prejudice, pointing out that
(1) Total still employed most of the people involved in developing the Kashagan
Field, (2) it could not explain how it was prejudiced by the loss of documents
because it could not describe their contents, and (3) it did not know whether an
unlocated former employee would testify in its favor.
The district court granted summary judgment for Total, ruling that
Grynberg’s causes of actions accrued by 1999, when Grynberg should have
known that Total had obtained production rights in the AMI to the exclusion of
Grynberg. The court rejected Grynberg’s argument that it could not have brought
a claim before the Kashagan Field was declared commercial.
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On June 16, 2006, Grynberg filed a motion to alter or amend judgment
under Rule 59(e). It argued that its unjust-enrichment claim was governed by
laches and that the limitations period under the analogous statute of limitations
was six years, not three. The district court denied the motion because Grynberg
was making a new argument that it could have previously raised. It also rejected
the argument on the merits.
IV. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo,
viewing all facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary
judgment. See Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 425 (10th Cir. 2004). We
will affirm a grant of summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of material
fact and the prevailing party is entitled to judgment under the law. See id. at 426;
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because the parties’ arguments assume that Colorado law
applies, we will proceed under the same assumption. See St. Anthony Hosp. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 309 F.3d 680, 703 (10th Cir. 2002)
(assuming that Oklahoma law applies because parties assumed that it did). We
will first address Grynberg’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and then the
unjust-enrichment claims. We hold that there is no genuine dispute regarding
facts that establish that Grynberg’s claims are time-barred.
A. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
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The parties do not dispute that the limitations period for a claim of breach
of fiduciary duty is three years from when the claim accrues. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 13-80-101(1)(f). To establish a claim under Colorado law for breach of
fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must prove (1) that it was justified in reposing trust or
confidence in the other party, or that the other party invited, accepted, or
acquiesced in that trust; (2) that the other party assumed a primary duty to
represent the plaintiff’s interest in a transaction; (3) that the nature and scope of
the duty extended to the subject matter of the claim; and (4) that it was damaged
by the trustee’s breach of that duty. See Equitex, Inc. v. Ungar, 60 P.3d 746, 752
(Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
Although the fourth element refers to “damage,” it does not require that the
plaintiff actually be worse off; it also encompasses any benefit that the defendant
wrongfully obtained. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874 cmt. b (1979)
states that the remedies for breach of fiduciary duty include “restitutionary
recovery,” and cites, among other things, the Restatement (First) of Restitution
§§ 138 and 190 (1937). Section 138(1) states that “[a] fiduciary who has acquired
a benefit by a breach of duty as fiduciary is under a duty of restitution to the
beneficiary.” And § 190 states that “[w]here a person in a fiduciary relation to
another acquires property, and the acquisition or retention of the property is in
violation of his duty as fiduciary, he holds it upon a constructive trust for the
other.” In accord with the Restatements, the Colorado Uniform Jury Instruction
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for damages with respect to a claim for breach of fiduciary duty includes as a
possible component of damages: “[a]nything of value or any profit the defendant .
. . received as a result of the breach of fiduciary duty.” Colo. Jury Instrs., Civil
ch. 26:5(2)(a), (c) (4th ed. 2007); see TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., 498 F.3d
1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that Colorado jury instructions are
promulgated by state supreme court).
The Shell Complaint alleges that Shell “wrongfully us[ed] the confidential
information imparted to Shell by Grynberg for its own use and profit to the
exclusion of Grynberg.” Shell Compl. at 24. The Total Complaint is essentially
the same, alleging that “Total breached its fiduciary duty to Grynberg by
wrongfully appropriating the confidential information [obtained from Grynberg]
for its own use and profit to the exclusion of Grynberg.” Total Compl. at 20.
The only issue before us on appeal is when Grynberg knew or should have known
that it could bring claims against the defendants for benefitting from the
appropriation of the confidential information it had provided.
Grynberg’s position on appeal appears to be that it had no cause of action
until it knew that a defendant had a production interest in the specific area within
the AMI that Mr. Grynberg had pinpointed to the defendants—namely, the
Kashagan Field. This might follow if its claim had been solely that the defendant
would breach a duty to Grynberg if it used confidential information from
Grynberg to obtain an interest in the Kashagan Field (as opposed to the entire
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AMI). But that was not Grynberg’s theory below. Both complaints alleged that
the involvement of Shell or Total anywhere in the AMI was a breach of fiduciary
duty owed to Grynberg. Accordingly, whenever either defendant benefitted from
involvement in the AMI, Grynberg could have brought its claim against that
defendant for breach of fiduciary duty. It was on this basis that Grynberg sought
20% of the defendants’ interests in the entire AMI. Grynberg did not argue
during the summary-judgment proceedings that it had a claim against Shell or
Total only if that defendant had an interest in the Kashagan Field. Nor did it
argue below, as it does on appeal, that its claim is essentially one for
misappropriation of a trade secret (the information that Grynberg allegedly
conveyed regarding the Kashagan Field). We need not consider a legal theory
raised for the first time on appeal. See Carpenter v. Boeing, Co., 456 F.3d 1183,
1198 n.2 (10th Cir. 2006). Therefore, we examine only when Grynberg knew or
should have known that Shell or Total had obtained a benefit from an interest
somewhere in the AMI.
This examination is a two-part process. First we determine when the
defendants obtained a benefit. Then we determine when Grynberg should have
known of that benefit. Colorado has endorsed a broad view of benefit in the
context of restitutionary recovery.
“A person confers a benefit upon another if he gives to
the other possession of or some other interest in money,
land, chattels, or choses in action, performs services
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beneficial to or at the request of the other, satisfies a
debt or a duty of the other, or in any way adds to the
other’s security or advantage. He confers a benefit not
only where he adds to the property of another, but also
where he saves the other from expense or loss. The
word ‘benefit,’ therefore, denotes any form of
advantage.”
Cablevision of Breckenridge, Inc. v. Tannhauser Condo. Ass’n, 649 P.2d 1093,
1097 (Colo. 1982) (en banc) (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement (First) of
Restitution § 1 cmt. b (1937)). By this standard it would seem that Shell and
Total had received a benefit as soon as they entered their first consortium
agreements with Kazakhstan in 1993. Both Shell and Total understandably
thought that membership in the consortium was “advantageous” to them,
something worth the obvious expenditures that would be required. But we need
not resolve that matter. It is enough that participation in the 1997 PSA was a
benefit to each of them. Grynberg’s complaints allege the undeniable: “[O]n
November 18 of 1997, Shell [, Total,] and others struck a deal with the Republic
of Kazakhstan . . . to actually take oil and natural gas production from the Area of
Mutual Interest, and to therefore profit immensely . . . .” Shell Compl. at 7; Total
Compl. at 6. The 1997 deal was worth a fortune.
As for Grynberg’s knowledge, in the Shell Case the district court ruled that
newspaper articles established that Grynberg knew or should have known of the
breach of fiduciary duty in 1993, when Shell’s involvement in the exploratory
consortium became public (and Grynberg knew that it was not a party to that
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consortium), or at the latest in 1997, when newspapers reported that a consortium
including Shell was going to exploit the Kashagan Field commercially. In the
Total Case the court ruled that documents from the BP Litigation established that
Grynberg knew or should have known in 1999 that Total had a commercial
interest in the AMI. We address the Shell decision first, and then the Total
decision.
1. Shell
In our view, there can be no dispute that Grynberg knew or should have
known by the end of 1997 that Shell was a participant in the 1997 PSA.
Mr. Grynberg admits that in 1993 he read a Wall Street Journal article stating that
Shell and BP, among others, were involved in an exploratory consortium in
Kazakhstan. Based on that article, he wrote a letter to BP exclaiming that their
“hard work . . . ha[d] finally come through for all of us.” Shell App. Vol. III at
1031. Articles published in 1997 in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal,
the Financial Times, and Europe Energy, among others, identified Shell as a
member of a commercial consortium in Kazakhstan for oil exploration in an area
that probably, if not certainly, overlapped the AMI. Two (in the New York Times
and Europe Energy) mentioned the Kashagan Field by name, one (in the Financial
Times) referred to the Kazakh Sector of the North Caspian Sea, and the others
simply referred to the North Caspian Sea.
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Grynberg argues that the articles are irrelevant because they contained
“inconsistent and . . . insufficient detail” and he did not read them. Shell Aplt.
Br. at 22. We disagree. First, Mr. Grynberg does not explain in what ways the
articles were inconsistent or insufficient; he merely asserts that they were. Yet all
identify BP, Shell, and Total as parties to the commercial agreement, and all point
to the North Caspian Sea (or more specifically the Kashagan Field) as a subject of
the agreement. Second, it strains credulity that a person of Mr. Grynberg’s self-
described experience, expertise, and worldliness, with a financial interest worth
millions of dollars, or even tens or hundreds of millions, could not, with
reasonable diligence, learn of matters reported in the leading business newspapers
circulated in this country. How could any reasonable person with Grynberg’s
expertise, resources, and financial interest have remained ignorant of an
agreement relating to oil exploration in the Kazakh portion of the North Caspian
Sea that was signed in Washington, D.C., in the presence of Mr. Grynberg’s
“friend” Nazarbaev and Vice President Gore? To the extent that any particular
article did not provide complete information, it still would have caused a
reasonable person in Grynberg’s position to pursue the matter, eventually
obtaining the publicly available information that Shell was party to a production-
sharing agreement with respect to oil and gas reserves in the AMI. Grynberg
contends that a jury might have believed that it exercised reasonable diligence,
but we disagree that a rational jury could have reached that conclusion. See
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Carpenter, 456 F.3d at 1192 (issue is genuine only if a reasonable jury could find
in nonmovant’s favor).
Colorado case law supports the view that sophisticated business people can
be expected to check public information. In Skyland Metropolitan District v.
Mountain West Enterprise, LLC, 184 P.3d 106 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007), the court
held that claims by developers challenging the assessment of fees against their
property were time-barred. The relevant information on which the claims were
based had been “publicly available and obtainable in the exercise of reasonable
diligence,” particularly in light of the developer’s experience and sophistication.
Id. at 127. Also, more generally, several of our sister circuits have held that
“‘[w]here events receive . . . widespread publicity, plaintiffs may be charged with
knowledge of their occurrence.’” Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548
(6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United Klans of Am. v. McGovern, 621 F.2d 152, 154
(5th Cir. 1980)). Accord Patterson v. United States, 451 F.3d 268, 271 (1st Cir.
2006) (cause of action accrued when FBI’s involvement in plaintiffs’ father’s
death received widespread publicity); In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 223–24 (3d.
Cir. 2006) (plaintiffs had a “reasonable opportunity to discover the alleged
wrong” due to “extensive publicity” regarding dangerous diet drugs that injured
them (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fulcher v. United States, 696 F.2d
1073, 1077 (4th Cir. 1982) (“prudent landowner exercising reasonable diligence
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should . . . have discovered the government’s open and notorious occupation of
the land” because of “extensive publicity and discussion.”).
Grynberg cites cases in which general publicity was held inadequate to
establish that a plaintiff should have known of the cause of action, but the cases
are readily distinguishable because of the lack of expertise of the plaintiff or
imprecision of the public information. In Maughan v. SW Servicing, Inc., 758
F.2d 1381, 1383 (10th Cir. 1985), the plaintiffs sued a uranium mill for wrongful
death, alleging that the mill had caused leukemia that killed their children and
spouses. We held that “the mere fact that there were public statements
concerning the possible link between radiation and leukemia is not enough to
establish, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs should have known that emissions
from the uranium processing plant . . . were the likely cause of the leukemia.” Id.
at 1388. “Nor can it be said,” we added, “that [as a matter of law] the average
layman would understand, after reading that fall-out from atomic bombs causes
cancer, that the local uranium mill may have caused . . . leukemia.” Id. Further
supporting this court’s holding was that the doctors who had been consulted by
the plaintiffs’ decedents did not correlate the leukemia with the mill. See id. at
1389. No similar scientific uncertainty or lack of expertise hampered Grynberg.
See also Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206, 1216 n.4 (10th Cir. 2004)
(distinguishing Maughan on similar grounds).
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Even easier to distinguish is Cook v. Rockwell International Corp., 755 F.
Supp. 1468, 1476, 1483 (D. Colo. 1991), which held that publicity about pollution
at Rocky Flats was insufficient to notify plaintiffs that their property was polluted
and they had been exposed to hazardous substances; there was no evidence
regarding when the plaintiffs should have known that this pollution had extended
to their properties, some of which were six miles from Rocky Flats.
Grynberg also cites two other cases apparently to support its position on
this issue, but it provides no analysis or discussion. In the first, O'Connor v.
Boeing North American, Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2002), plaintiffs
alleged that they had been harmed by exposure to radioactive and nonradioactive
substances released from rocket-testing facilities. Boeing argued that plaintiffs’
claims were time-barred because there had been general publicity regarding
cancer and specific publicity regarding Boeing’s facilities. The court held that
this publicity was not sufficient to put plaintiffs on notice that Boeing caused
their cancer, because the extent of publicity was unclear, there were multiple
possible causes for their illnesses, and, as in Maughan, the plaintiffs were under
the care of doctors who did not make the connection between their cancers and
the defendant’s facilities. See id. at 1151–55. In the second case, Williams v.
Stewart, 112 P.3d 281, 283–84 (N.M. Ct. App. 2005), plaintiffs were family
members of decedents whose organs had been removed and tested by the Los
Alamos National Laboratory for plutonium content, without the informed consent
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of the decedents or their families. The Laboratory argued that plaintiffs’ claims
accrued when the plutonium-testing program received publicity, but the appellate
court ruled that whether plaintiffs were diligent was a question of fact. Id. at
286–87. The court noted questions concerning which publications would have
been widely circulated where the plaintiffs lived and that many of the articles
omitted the important information (such as the failure to obtain informed consent)
that would have alerted the plaintiffs to their claims. In contrast, the publicity
related to the PSA was sufficiently specific and widely circulated that a
reasonable person with Grynberg’s expertise and financial stake would have been
adequately informed.
Finally, Grynberg cites two readily distinguishable Colorado opinions that
do not concern the effect of widespread publicity. In Salazar v. American
Sterilizer Company, 5 P.3d 357, 362–64 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000), the court ruled
that Salazar’s cause of action did not accrue until a toxicological report diagnosed
her peripheral neuropathy as being caused by ethylene oxide, even though prior
doctors had told her that the chemical was a possible cause. Salazar is inapposite
because, like the cancer cases discussed above, it involved an unsophisticated
layperson. The second case, Financial Associates, Ltd. v. G.E. Johnson
Construction Co., Inc., 723 P.2d 135, 138–40 (Colo. 1986) (en banc), was a suit
alleging a design defect. Various expert reports stated that the damage to the
plaintiff’s building had several possible causes, but a design defect was not
-31-
mentioned. The court held that the cause of action did not necessarily accrue
before the plaintiff received a report attributing the damage to the design defect.
We fail to see any help for Grynberg in this decision.
2. Total
In the Total Case the district court ruled that there was no genuine issue of
disputed fact that Grynberg’s cause of action accrued by the time of the BP
Settlement Agreement in 1999 because the text of the agreement revealed that
Total, among others, had entered a production sharing agreement with respect to
the North Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan. The court stated that “the AMI . . . covers
the entire Kazakh sector of the North Caspian Sea and, therefore, the area
referenced in the PSA as the ‘North Caspian Sea’ necessarily falls within the
areas covered in the AMI.” Order on Mots. for Summ. J. at 13, May 31, 2006.
We agree. Moreover, we have already held that the 1997 news articles showed
that Grynberg should have known of its cause of action against Shell, and these
articles were also produced by Total and mention Total’s involvement as much as
Shell’s.
Grynberg argues that it did not realize in 1999 that Total had an interest
specifically in the Kashagan Field. But, as we have already explained, such
knowledge was not necessary for Grynberg’s cause of action. The precise
location of Total’s interest within the AMI was irrelevant.
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Grynberg further contends that a reasonable jury could conclude that it was
diligent in its efforts to learn of Total’s involvement in the region. It argues that
it had no duty to ask Total whether it was involved in the AMI because it was
entitled to trust Total based on their fiduciary relationship, even though it had not
communicated with Total since 1990. But diligence is not at issue because by the
time of the 1999 BP Settlement Agreement, Grynberg had all the information it
needed to bring its cause of action; further investigation was unnecessary.
Grynberg also argues that Total engaged in fraudulent concealment to
prevent him from learning of Total’s breach of fiduciary duty. Fraudulent
concealment tolls the statute of limitations. See First Interstate Bank v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 744 P.2d 1197, 1200 (Colo. 1989) (en banc). But in district court
Grynberg merely asserted such fraud, providing no evidence, or even argument,
on the point. “[W]here an issue is raised but not pursued in the trial court, it
cannot be the basis for the appeal.” Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d
716, 722 (10th Cir. 1993).
B. Unjust Enrichment
Grynberg’s unjust-enrichment claims against Shell and Total were
dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches.
Unjust enrichment occurs when “(1) at plaintiff’s expense (2) defendant received
a benefit (3) under circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to
retain the benefit . . . .” Salzman v. Bachrach, 996 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Colo. 2000)
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(en banc). As we understand Grynberg’s complaints, the unjust-enrichment
claims are predicated on the same alleged misconduct—a breach of fiduciary
duty, primarily arising from the use of confidential information—as the breach-
of-fiduciary-duty claims. This is a well-established type of unjust-enrichment
claim. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution § 43 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2005)
(discussing unjust-enrichment claims based on breach of fiduciary duty). Indeed,
it appears to us that Grynberg’s unjust-enrichment claims are identical to its
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims. There is no practical difference between (1) a
tort claim for breach of a fiduciary duty in which the plaintiff seeks disgorgement
of (or a constructive trust on) profits or property and (2) an unjust-enrichment
claim in which the enrichment is claimed to be unjust because it was
accomplished through a breach of fiduciary duty. See Andrew Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1191, 1222–26 (1995) (Although recognizing that
there is no practical difference, the author emphasizes that in this context unjust-
enrichment doctrine provides a conceptual basis for a substantive claim of
wrongful retention of a benefit and does not merely provide an additional means
of recovery for the tort.); cf. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998,
1006–08 (Colo. 2008) (en banc) (governmental immunity from actions in tort
encompasses unjust-enrichment claim arising out of tortious conduct). As do the
parties, however, we will treat the claims separately.
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The parties dispute when the defendants received the benefit that would
establish Grynberg’s claim of unjust enrichment. The defendants contend that the
requisite benefit would be a valuable interest in the AMI. Grynberg contends that
(1) the defendants’ interest would have to be a production interest located
specifically in the Kashagan Field and (2) that interest would not be unjustly
retained by a defendant until the defendant began receiving profits that would
have to be shared with Grynberg under their 1990 agreements. We agree with
Shell and Total.
First, as previously discussed in relation to Grynberg’s breach-of-fiduciary-
duty claims, Grynberg’s complaints can only be read as claiming an entitlement to
a share of the defendants’ benefits throughout the entire AMI, not just the
Kashagan Field. The theory of the complaints is that any involvement of the
defendants in the AMI is an exploitation of their breach of a fiduciary duty—the
use of confidential and valuable information provided by Grynberg. Thus, the
unjustly retained interest need only be somewhere within the AMI; it is not
restricted to the Kashagan Field.
Second, any benefit retained by Shell or Total in the AMI would constitute
unjust enrichment. Under Colorado law, in this context a benefit is “‘any form of
advantage.’” Cablevision, 649 P.2d at 1097 (quoting Restatement (First) of
Restitution § 1 cmt. b). Grynberg argues that the defendants would not have done
anything improper—and therefore would not be unjustly enriched—until they
-35-
refused to pay Grynberg as required by their 1990 agreements, namely, when they
started receiving profits from production of oil and gas in the AMI. But that
analysis would be proper only if Grynberg were suing for breach of contract. If it
were, one could say that a breach has not occurred until a defendant has not
performed under the contract, and neither Shell nor Total owed any duty of
performance until it started earning profits from production. Grynberg’s
complaints, however, do not allege breach of contract. They allege unjust
enrichment, and the benefit to a defendant is what matters, not the breach of a
promise to pay that is not the basis of the claim. The defendants were unjustly
enriched, according to the theory of the complaints, when they obtained a benefit
by appropriating Grynberg’s confidential information and efforts. Accordingly,
Grynberg had an unjust-enrichment claim when Shell or Total obtained a
benefit—a valuable interest—in the AMI. And, as we explained in discussing the
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, Shell and Total certainly had such an interest
when they executed the PSA in 1997.
The traditional rule for equitable claims, such as a claim for unjust
enrichment, is that timeliness is determined under the doctrine of laches. See
Interbank Invs., LLC v. Vail Valley Consol. Water Dist., 12 P.3d 1224, 1229–30
(Colo. Ct. App. 2000). The elements of laches in Colorado are: “(1) full
knowledge of the facts; (2) unreasonable delay in the assertion of available
remedy; and (3) intervening reliance by and prejudice to another.” Manor Vail
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Condo. Ass’n v. Vail, 604 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted). But the traditional rule must yield to legislative
authority and may yield, at least in part, to legislative policy. As we proceed to
explain, the Colorado statute of limitations may well be itself controlling in this
case, either on its own or in conjunction with established doctrine. And even if
the statute is not controlling, the Colorado rule that would then apply requires
dismissal of Grynberg’s claims.
First, Colorado’s three-year statute of limitations on its face applies to
Grynberg’s restitutionary claim. It states:
The following civil actions, regardless of the theory
upon which suit is brought, or against whom suit is
brought, should be commenced within three years after
the cause of action accrues, and not thereafter:
...
(f) All actions for breach of trust or
breach of fiduciary duty
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101(1) (emphasis added). See Hersh Companies Inc. v.
Highline Village Assocs., 30 P.3d 221, 223–24 (Colo. 2001) (en banc) (whether
claim falls within statute-of-limitations provision depends on nature of the
claimed right, not the form of action or relief sought). Because Grynberg’s
unjust-enrichment claims are founded on allegations of breach of fiduciary duty,
the claims are encompassed by the statute. Although one might try to argue that
the statutory provision governs only actions at law, not suits in equity, the
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language “regardless of the theory upon which suit is brought” undermines the
argument.
Second, even if the statute explicitly applied only to actions at law,
compelling authority would require application of the statute here because the
only difference between Grynberg’s legal and equitable claims is the relief
sought. In Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463–64 (1947), the Supreme Court
wrote:
Even though these suits are in equity, the states’ statutes of
limitations apply. For it is only the scope of the relief sought and the
multitude of parties sued which gives equity concurrent jurisdiction
to enforce the legal obligation here asserted. And equity will
withhold its relief in such a case where the applicable statute of
limitations would bar the concurrent legal remedy.
See Douglas Laycock, Modern American Remedies 1003 (3d. ed. 2002)
(describing this “concurrency” doctrine and providing the example of a suit for
breach of contract and a suit for specific performance, which seek two remedies
for the same substantive wrong, a breach of contract). If the legislature has
determined that three years is sufficient time to sue for a breach of fiduciary duty,
that determination could be undermined by permitting less timely claims for such
breach when only equitable remedies are sought.
Third, even if the statute is not controlling, the Colorado law that would
then apply still gives great weight to the statutory period. A recent decision of
the Colorado Court of Appeals stated the following rule: “Absent extraordinary
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circumstances, . . . a court ‘“will usually grant or withhold relief in analogy to the
statute of limitations relating to actions at law of like character.”’” Interbank, 12
P.3d at 1230 (quoting Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, 911 F.Supp. 470, 477 (D. Colo.
1996) (quoting Shell v. Strong, 151 F.2d 909, 911 (10th Cir. 1945)). To be sure,
as Grynberg argues, we are not bound by decisions of state intermediate appellate
courts when we apply state law in a diversity case; rather, we are to follow
decisions of the state’s highest court, or, when none is in point, predict how it
would rule on the issue. See Pompa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 520 F.3d 1139,
1142 (10th Cir. 2008). But Interbank is not contrary to any Colorado Supreme
Court decision, and we see no reason to believe that the state supreme court
would adopt a rule more favorable to Grynberg than the Interbank rule. See
Stickley v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 2007)
(we will not disregard an intermediate state court’s decision unless we are
“convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would
decide otherwise.”). The Interbank rule is in accord with a “modern view” that in
litigious times, certainty is a virtue. Rather than making an individualized
assessment of the laches factors in each case, a court can rely on a precise statute
of limitations for analogous claims, although—after all, we are dealing with
equitable relief—extraordinary circumstances may provide an avenue of escape.
See generally, Gail L. Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of
Limitation and the Doctrine of Laches, 1992 BYU L. Rev. 917, 952–54 (1992).
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Thus, if Grynberg cannot survive application of the Interbank rule, his claims
would surely be doomed under Colorado Law.
The first step under Interbank is to determine whether the claim would be
untimely under the statute of limitations for analogous claims—here, the three-
year period under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101(1)(f). We have already made that
determination. As we concluded in our discussion on the breach-of-fiduciary-
duty claims, that limitations period ran before Grynberg filed suit. Under
Interbank, our next step would ordinarily be to consider whether Grynberg has
proved that extraordinary circumstances justify the tardy filing of his lawsuits.
But Grynberg has failed to allege extraordinary circumstances. We therefore rule
that his unjust-enrichment claims are barred as untimely.
We reject Grynberg’s argument that we must apply the six-year statute-of-
limitations period set forth in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103.5(1)(a). The argument
was raised for the first time in postjudgment Rule 59(e) motions, and we have
held that such motions cannot be used to “advance arguments that could have
been raised in prior briefing.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005,
1012 (10th Cir. 2000).
We also reject Grynberg’s argument that the district court in the Shell Case
did not apply the proper accrual provision, and his argument in both cases that his
cause of action for unjust enrichment may not yet have accrued; both these
arguments were raised for the first time on appeal. See Carpenter, 456 F.3d at
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1198 n.2 (we will generally not consider arguments raised for the first time on
appeal). Also, we need not address Grynberg’s contentions that both district
judges did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to it, that the district
court made an impermissible credibility determination in the Total Case, and that
both district judges incorrectly analyzed the elements of laches. Our review has
been de novo and does not repeat the district judges’ alleged errors.
V. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM both grants of summary judgment. We DENY Appellants’
Motions for Certification of Questions of Law Pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 27.1.
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Grynberg v. Total S.A.
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date filed: 2008-08-26
Citations: 538 F.3d 1336
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