Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Christopher

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

No. 95-4043.

HAITIAN REFUGEE CENTER, INC., Andre Joseph, Lorilus Achat,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

Warren CHRISTOPHER, Secretary of State, William J. Perry,
Secretary of Defense, Doris Meissner, Commissioner, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, Janet Reno, Attorney General, Immigration
and Naturalization Service, Michael Williams, Brigadier General,
Commander, Joint Task Force, Defendants-Appellees.

Jan. 18, 1995.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. (No. 95-22-CV-KMM), K, Michael Moore, Judge.

Before KRAVITCH, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

BIRCH, Circuit Judge:

In this case we determine whether Haitian migrants in safe

haven outside the physical borders of the United States should have

been granted injunctive relief to prevent their repatriation to

Haiti. The district court denied their motions for a temporary

restraining order or a preliminary injunction, and they appeal. We

AFFIRM.

I. BACKGROUND

The factual background of the Haitian migrants' arrival in

safe haven at Guantanamo Bay is documented in our opinion issued

today, Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, Nos. 94-5138, 94-5231,

& 94-5234, slip op., --- F.3d ---- (11th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995)

[hereinafter CABA ], and thus, here we address only those facts

which give rise to this appeal. On December 29, 1994, the

government announced its offer of approximately $80.00 American
dollars to each Haitian migrant who volunteered to return to Haiti

by January 5, 1995. The migrants were informed that if they failed

to volunteer to return to Haiti, they would not receive any

compensation and likely would be involuntarily repatriated

beginning on January 5, 1995. The government began the involuntary

repatriation process as anticipated.

On January 5, 1995, the plaintiffs-appellants, Haitian Refugee

Center ("HRC") and two individual Haitian migrants at Guantanamo

Bay, initiated suit in the Southern District of Florida requesting

a temporary restraining order to prevent the involuntary

repatriation of Haitian migrants scheduled to begin that evening.

Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Christopher, No. 95-0022-CIV-MOORE

(S.D.Fla.1995). During the evening of January 5, the district

court heard oral arguments regarding HRC's and the individual

Haitian migrants' claims that the defendants-appellees ("the

government") were violating the Haitian migrants' putative equal

protection and due process rights by repatriating them without

their consent. After a two hour hearing, the district court orally

converted HRC's and the individual Haitian migrants' request for a

temporary restraining order into a request for preliminary

injunctive relief so that appeal could be taken. The district

court then orally denied injunctive relief to HRC and the

individual Haitian migrants. On January 9, 1995, HRC and the two

individual Haitian migrants moved in this court for summary

reversal of the district court's denial of injunctive relief or in

the alternative, an expedited briefing schedule for appeal on the

merits. We held their request pending release of our opinion in
CABA.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

The district court with consent of the parties, converted

HRC's request for a temporary restraining order into a request for

preliminary injunctive relief so that, in light of the similarity

of issues presented in this case and those pending before us in

CABA, the losing party could appeal directly to this court. We

have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory orders of the

district court denying injunctive relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

B. Standard of Review

Because of the extraordinary and " "drastic' " nature of

preliminary injunctive relief, "we will disturb the denial of a

preliminary injunction only if the district court abused its

discretion." Crochet v. Housing Auth. of Tampa, 37 F.3d 607, 610

(11th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (quoting Cafe 207, Inc. v. St. Johns

County, 989 F.2d 1136, 1137 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam)). Only

where the district court misapplies the law will we refuse to defer

to its conclusions supporting its denial of relief. See Speer v.

Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir.1994).

C. The Merits

A party requesting preliminary injunctive relief must show:

"(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a

substantial threat of irreparable injury; (3) its own injury

outweighs the injury to the nonmovant; and (4) the injunction

would not disserve the public interest." Haitian Refugee Ctr.,

Inc. v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109, 1110 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam).
The requesting party's failure to demonstrate a "substantial

likelihood of success on the merits" may defeat the party's claim,

regardless of its ability to establish any of the other elements.

See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1342 (11th

Cir.1994).

HRC and the individual Haitian migrants in this case contend

that the United States is violating Haitian migrants' statutory and

constitutional rights by involuntarily repatriating them to Haiti.

They contend that the government has created a protectable liberty

and property interest in remaining in safe haven. Thus, they

argue, the migrants should not be removed from safe haven without

due process.

The district court concluded that HRC and the individual

Haitian plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of

their claim that the government violated migrants' due process and

equal protection rights. The court reasoned that "the law with

respect to the rights of such individual[ ] [migrants] that has

been decided," indicates no cognizable claim. Additionally, it

found no support as a matter of law that provision of safe haven

created a protectable liberty interest, deprivation of which would

require that the government's actions comport with due process.

Hr'g Tr. at 72. We agree. See CABA, slip. op. at ----, --- F.3d

at ----, ("[P]roviding safe haven residency is a gratuitous

humanitarian act which does not in any way create a liberty

interest.").

HRC's attempt to liken the conduct by the government in

repatriating the individual Haitian migrants with conduct
proscribed by the Supreme Court in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846,

105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985), aff'g, 727 F.2d 957 (11th

Cir.1984), also fails. In Jean, the Court was addressing

individualized parole decisions by lower-level immigration

officials who were constrained by statutory and regulatory

provisions which did not allow those decisions to be based on

national origin. Jean did not address the Executive Branch's

plenary authority over the immigration and foreign policy decision

to repatriate from safe haven Haitian migrants. Under the binding

law of this circuit, there is no statutory provision which prevents

the President or the Attorney General from repatriating the Haitian

migrants. See CABA, slip op. at ----, --- F.3d at ----; Haitian

Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir.) (per

curiam), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1245, 117 L.Ed.2d

477 (1992). Moreover, HRC and the individual Haitian migrants have

not identified, nor have we found, any applicable regulations

constraining lower-level immigration officials that would possibly

change the result in this case. Hence, the district court

correctly interpreted the precedents of this circuit, and thus, did

not abuse its discretion in denying HRC's and the two individual

Haitian migrants' meritless request for injunctive relief from

alleged equal protection and due process violations.

III. CONCLUSION

HRC and two individual Haitian migrants sought to enjoin the

government's repatriation of Haitian migrants from safe haven

outside the physical borders of the United States. The district

court, correctly interpreting the law of this circuit, denied them
relief. The court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we

AFFIRM.