United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 93-9183.
Brandon Joshua HANEY, by next friend, Guardian of his Property,
Margean Haney; Dana Shaun the Estate of Dana Shaun Haney, by
Margean Haney, Administratrix, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-
Appellants,
v.
CITY OF CUMMING; and Wayne Lindsey, in his capacity as Chief of
Police for the City of Cumming, Defendants-Cross-Appellees,
Cumming Police Department; Sheriff's Department of Forsyth
County; Roslyn Haygood; D.O. Dampier; Jeff Lowe, Defendants,
Forsyth County; Wesley Walraven, in his individual capacity and
in his capacity as Sheriff of Forsyth County; Russell Matthews;
Rusty Griffin, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
Nov. 27, 1995.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia. (No. 1:90-01438-CV-JTC), Jack T. Camp, Judge.
Before KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge, and GODBOLD and MORGAN, Senior
Circuit Judges.
MORGAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
The parties before us appeal the district court's ruling on
summary judgment in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arising from a
prisoner suicide. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the
district court's denial of summary judgment with respect to the
qualified immunity claims and dismiss the remaining issues for lack
of appellate jurisdiction.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 20, 1989, police officers for the City of Cumming,
Georgia, travelled to the local Days Inn hotel in response to a
telephone call from the hotel manager, advising them that a room
was being occupied by persons who had failed to pay for it. At the
hotel, the police arrested Dana Shaun Haney and Jacqueline Hunt for
theft of services. Both women were taken to the city jail where
they were booked, during which time Hunt retrieved fifteen Xanax
pills from her purse and swallowed them.1 Later in the afternoon,
Police Chief Wayne Lindsey of the city police transferred Haney and
Hunt to the Forsyth County jail. While there, Hunt passed out and
was taken to a local hospital. The county deputies placed Haney in
a detoxification cell.
The next morning, Russell Matthews, Chief Criminal
Investigator for the Forsyth County Sheriff's Department, arrived
at the county jail to speak with Haney. Matthews was conducting an
investigation into local physicians who reportedly have written
excessive amounts of prescription drugs and thought Haney might
have some useful information. The two spoke for approximately
thirty to forty-five minutes, during which time Haney expressed
deep concern over Hunt's condition. After making inquiries of the
jailers, Matthews informed Haney that Hunt was in intensive care at
the hospital and could not receive any visitors.
Upon the conclusion of her interview with Matthews, Haney was
returned to the detoxification cell. Shortly thereafter, officer
Rusty Griffin, who was on duty at the jail that morning, found
Haney standing on the toilet in her cell and noticed that she had
torn up her mattress and pillow. When Griffin questioned her about
her conduct, Haney replied that she "might as well kill" herself.
1
At the time of their arrests, both Haney and Hunt were high
on intoxicants. Hunt later admitted that she was not attempting
suicide when she swallowed the Xanax pills. Rather, she was
merely trying to keep her "high" going because she knew it would
be a long time before she would be able to take any other drugs.
Griffin then immediately located Matthews and brought him back to
the cell to observe Haney, who was found crying in the corner.2
After Matthews and Haney spoke for a while, she assured him that
she would behave, but told him she wanted to be taken back to the
city jail. Matthews and the county deputies made the necessary
arrangements, and Haney was transferred to the city jail shortly
after noon.3 Unfortunately, no one from the county informed the
officers at the city jail that Haney had mentioned suicide, and
Haney was placed in an unsupervised cell. Within an hour, a
dispatcher at the city jail found Haney hanging from a horizontal
bar in her cell with a sheet around her neck. She was not
breathing. Attempts were made to revive her, but they proved
unsuccessful. Prior to Haney's death, there had never been a
suicide at either the Forsyth County or Cumming city jail.
As a result of the suicide, Margean Haney, as next friend of
Haney's minor son, Brandon Joshua Haney, and as administratrix of
Haney's estate (collectively hereinafter "Plaintiffs"), brought
suit under federal and Georgia law against the City of Cumming,
Cumming Police Chief Wayne Lindsey, Forsyth County, Forsyth County
Sheriff Wesley Walraven, Inspector Russell Matthews, and Officer
Rusty Griffin (collectively hereinafter "Defendants"). On March
18, 1991, the district court compelled the Plaintiffs to respond to
the discovery requests filed by the various Defendants. When the
2
Griffin claims he informed Matthews that Haney had
mentioned killing herself, but Matthews denies that anyone ever
told him that she was contemplating suicide.
3
During the transfer from the county jail, Haney appeared to
be in good spirits as she was laughing, talking, smoking, and
drinking coffee.
Plaintiffs failed to comply, the district court dismissed their
complaint. The district court set aside its dismissal on October
23, 1991, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b), on the Plaintiffs'
counsel's testimony that he had failed to inform his clients of the
court's discovery order.
After the completion of discovery, the Defendants filed
motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the City of Cumming and Chief Lindsey, finding
they had no special reason for concern about Haney's condition when
she was transferred to the city jail. The district court denied
summary judgment on qualified immunity in favor of Matthews and
Griffin, finding that Haney's constitutional rights at issue were
clear at the time of her incarceration and that genuine factual
questions remained regarding the propriety of their conduct.
Summary judgment was granted in favor of Forsyth County and Sheriff
Walraven after the district court concluded that Griffin's training
and the county's inmate transfer policy were not facially
unconstitutional. Nevertheless, the district court denied summary
judgment for Forsyth County and Walraven as to Matthews' training
and discretion. Finally, summary judgment was granted in favor of
all the Defendants on the state law claims after the district court
found that the Plaintiffs had failed to adequately support such
claims.
This appeal and cross appeal stem from the district court's
rulings on summary judgment and its decision to reinstate the
Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 60(b). We address
the necessary issues in the following discussion.
DISCUSSION
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
At the outset, we must determine our jurisdiction over these
appeals since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.
Winfrey v. School Board of Dade County, 59 F.3d 155, 157 (11th
Cir.1995). The primary issue presented to us for consideration is
whether the district court erred in denying summary judgment for
Matthews and Griffin with respect to their qualified immunity
defense. A trial court's denial of qualified immunity at the
summary judgment stage is immediately appealable. Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817-18, 86 L.Ed.2d 411
(1985); McCoy v. Webster, 47 F.3d 404, 406 (11th Cir.1995). Thus,
we have jurisdiction over Matthews' and Griffin's appeal, but only
insofar as the district court's order turns on purely legal issues.
Johnson v. Jones, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 132
L.Ed.2d 238 (1995); Babb v. Lake City Community College, 66 F.3d
270 (11th Cir.1995).
Our jurisdiction over the remaining claims presented to us on
appeal is a more problematic question.4 This case is one that
involves multiple claims and multiple parties, and the district
court's order on summary judgment disposed of some but not all of
the claims and parties.
4
The Plaintiffs and the Forsyth County Defendants argue that
it is proper for us to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the
remaining issues. The City of Cumming Defendants simply state
that they do not oppose such jurisdiction. Thus, no party
objects to our hearing these matters. Nevertheless, jurisdiction
cannot be conferred upon us by consent of all parties involved.
We must decide the validity of our own authority to consider a
matter even in the absence of objection from an interested party.
[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated,
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and
liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate
the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and
the rights and liabilities of all the parties.
FED.R.CIV.P. 54(b); see generally 10 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER
& MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2653-2661 (1983 &
Supp.1995). An order that disposes of some but not all claims may
be appealable if it is so certified by the district court pursuant
to Rule 54(b). Absent such a certification, as is the case here,
the district court's ruling is merely interlocutory and not an
appealable final decision over which we have jurisdiction. 28
U.S.C. § 1291; see Mesa v. United States, 61 F.3d 20 (11th
Cir.1995); Penton v. Pompano Constr. Co., 963 F.2d 321 (11th
Cir.1992); C HARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 102, at 756 (5th
ed. 1994).5
The Plaintiffs and the Forsyth County Defendants argue that
we have the authority to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the
remaining claims since they are pendent to the qualified immunity
appeal. It is true that in the past we have used our discretion to
exercise pendent jurisdiction over additional issues when an appeal
appeared before us on the qualified immunity question. See, e.g.,
Kelly v. Curtis, 21 F.3d 1544 (11th Cir.1994). Earlier this year,
however, the Supreme Court rejected our practice of exercising such
5
We note that three exceptions to the final judgment rule
exist: (1) the collateral order doctrine, (2) the doctrine of
practical finality, and (3) the exception for intermediate
resolution of issues fundamental to the merits of the case.
Lockwood v. Snookies, Inc. (In re F.D.R. Hickory House, Inc.), 60
F.3d 724, 725 (11th Cir.1995). None of these exceptions apply to
the issues remaining on this appeal.
discretionary jurisdiction in Swint v. Chambers County Commission,
--- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995), finding our
purported pendent party appellate jurisdiction to be nonexistent
under these circumstances.6 In view of Swint, we must conclude
that our immediate authority to review the district court's denial
of Matthews' and Griffin's qualified immunity defense does not
include the authority to review at once the questions regarding the
denial or granting of summary judgment to the other Defendants. 7
See, e.g., L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 683 n. 8 (11th
Cir.1995). Thus, the only issue we now consider on appeal pertains
to Matthews' and Griffin's qualified immunity.
B. Qualified Immunity
The Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that Matthews' and
Griffin's failure to prevent Haney's suicide violated her civil
rights as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Both
Matthews and Griffin claimed the protection of qualified immunity,
but the district court denied that argument at summary judgment.
Since issues of qualified immunity present questions of law, we
review the district court's decision de novo. Jordan v. Doe, 38
F.3d 1559, 1563 (11th Cir.1994).
6
In Swint, the Supreme Court suggested that appellate review
might exist where an otherwise nonappealable question is
"inextricably interwoven" with an issue properly before us. Id.
at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1212. On the facts of this case, however,
we find that no such jurisdiction exists since the issues
remaining on appeal are not inextricably interwoven with the
qualified immunity defense asserted by Matthews and Griffin.
7
Likewise, we lack appellate jurisdiction to consider now
the Defendants' argument that the district court erred by
reinstating the Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P.
60(b). Such an order is interlocutory in nature and unreviewable
absent a final judgment.
To prevail in a prisoner suicide case, a plaintiff must prove
that a defendant displayed deliberate indifference to a prisoner's
mental condition and the likely consequences of that condition.
Tittle v. Jefferson County Commission, 10 F.3d 1535, 1539-40 (11th
Cir.1994) (discussing governmental liability and not individual
liability). The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective
one, requiring that a defendant know of and disregard an excessive
risk to an inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S.
----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994); Hardin
v. Hayes, 52 F.3d 934, 939 (11th Cir.1995). Nevertheless,
qualified immunity will shield from civil damages individual
government officials who perform discretionary functions "insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,
2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); see also Belcher v. City of Foley, 30
F.3d 1390, 1395 (11th Cir.1994); see generally Kit Kinports,
Qualified Immunity in Section 1983 Cases: The Unanswered
Questions, 23 GA.L.REV. 597, 600-07 (1989). Should the plaintiff
fail to show that the law was clearly established at the time in
question, the individual defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. Belcher, 30 F.3d at 1400.
In denying Matthews' and Griffin's claim of qualified
immunity at summary judgment, the district court relied heavily on
our decision in Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030 (11th Cir.1989), as
evidence that the law in 1989 was established that officers who
fail to notify competent authorities and take appropriate action
regarding an inmate's psychological needs can be liable under
section 1983. Waldrop was an action against doctors at a state
correctional facility stemming from a prisoner suicide. Last year
in Belcher, however, we held that Waldrop did not clearly establish
officer liability because it pertained only to the issue of
physician liability.8 Belcher, 30 F.3d at 1399-1400. Like the
case currently before us, Belcher involved a suit against police
officers in the wake of a prisoner suicide. Specifically, we
stated in Belcher as follows:
Waldrop could not have clearly established the law governing
the conduct of police officers in positions materially similar
to Officer Roberson's or any of the other defendant police
officers in this case, because Waldrop addressed the liability
of a physician.... The defendants in this case are not
physicians and are not responsible for meeting the medical and
psychiatric needs of inmates in a mental health evaluation
facility. They are police officers whose primary
responsibility is to enforce laws and to arrest persons
suspected of violating laws in their community. Because the
circumstances in Waldrop are not materially similar to the
circumstances in this case, Waldrop did not clearly establish
the law applicable to this case.
Id. (emphasis added). We further concluded in Belcher that case
law other than Waldrop failed to establish the law governing the
conduct of officers under the circumstances in question. Id. at
1401.
Both Matthews and Griffin are in a situation materially
similar to the defendants in Belcher. They are not physicians and
thus were not responsible for meeting the psychiatric and medical
needs of Haney at the time she was in the jail. Having found in
Belcher that case law as of 1991 did not clearly establish
8
We note that the district court did not have the benefit of
our Belcher decision at the time it ruled on the qualified
immunity defense.
constitutional or statutory rights in such a situation, it is clear
that there also were no such rights at the time of Haney's 1989
suicide. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, neither
Waldrop nor other case law clearly establish the law that is
applicable to this case. Accordingly, the district court erred
when it denied qualified immunity for Matthews and Griffin.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the district court's denial of
qualified immunity to Matthews and Griffin is REVERSED. All other
issues brought before us are hereby DISMISSED for lack of appellate
jurisdiction.
REVERSED in part and DISMISSED in part.