No. 12271
I N THE SUPREME COURT O THE STATE O MONTANA
F F
1973
MAYME 0 ' CONNELL HANNIF I N ,
P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,
RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION and VERN RHINEHART,
Defendants and A p p e l l a n t s .
Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,
Honorable John B . McClernan, Judge p r e s i d i n g .
Counsel of Record :
For Appellant :
Thomas Joyce, B u t t e , Montana.
Benjamin H i l l e y argued, Great F a l l s , Montana.
P a t r i c k Paul, Great F a l l s , Montana.
For Respondent:
Henningsen and P u r c e l l , B u t t e , Montana.
James P u r c e l l argued, B u t t e , Montana.
.
Donald C Robinson argued, B u t t e , Montana.
Submitted: March 29, 1973
Decided : lJlm4 ~$EI
Filed :MRY 4 \973
... .'? . i
. .J)
,j,j
/ lp 1
,..:'.G-7 ) * - I f 0 , :
4 ,A --"
" ..., .
i
'2 / ' Clerk
M r . J u s t i c e Wesley C a s t l e s d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.
T h i s i s an a p p e a l from a j u r y v e r d i c t rendered i n t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t of S i l v e r Bow County a g a i n s t defendant R e t a i l Clerks I n t e r n a -
t i o n a l Association, The a c t i o n was brought by Mayme ~ ' ~ o n n e l l
Hannifin a l l e g i n g among o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e R e t a i l Clerks I n -
t e r n a t i o n a l Associati.on had induced R e t a i l C l e r k s Union Local No, 4
t o breach i t s employment c o n t r a c t w i t h h e r ,
Before reaching t h e major i s s u e we d i s p o s e of two p r e l i m i n a r y
matters. F i r s t i s defendant's (appellant herein) challenge t o t h i s
C o u r t ' s and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . This c h a l l e n g e i s based
on d e f e n d a n t ' s view t h a t t h i s i s a "labor law1' c a s e and a s such i s
governed by f e d e r a l law. I n a r e c e n t d e c i s i o n , Motor Coach Employees
v . Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 91 S.Ct, 1909, 29 L ed 2d 473, t h e United
S t a t e s Supreme Court r e a f f i r m e d t h e preemption by t h e United S t a t e s
of t h e complete law of l a b o r r e l a t i o n s . While t h i s i s t r u e , under
our view o f t h e f a c t s and law i n t h i s c a s e no l a b o r law i s s u e i s
p r e s e n t e d which need be r e s o l v e d by f e d e r a l l a b o r law. The f a c t s i n
Motor Coach Employees show i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h a c o l l e c t i v e b a r g a i n i n g
agreement, Nothing even s i m i l a r i s found i n t h i s c a s e , a s w i l l
h e r e i n a f t e r appear,
Second i s p l a i n t i f f ' s (respondent h e r e i n ) motion t o d i s m i s s
t h e appeal. This motion was based on d e f e n d a n t ' s a l l e g e d f a i l u r e t o
f i l e t h e r e c o r d w i t h i n t h e time l i m i t s e t o u t i n Montana A p p e l l a t e
Rules of C i v i l Procedure, The n o t i c e of a p p e a l was f i l e d on December
20, 1971. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r defendant ordered a t r a n s c r i p t of t h e
proceedings from t h e o f f i c i a l c o u r t r e p o r t e r . When i t became a p p a r e n t
t h a t t h e t r a n s c r i p t would n o t be ready w i t h i n t h e f o r t y days provided
i n Rule I O ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P,, defendant moved t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t under
Rule l o @ ) f o r a n i n e t y day e x t e n s i o n of time f o r t h e f i l i n g of t h e
record, E i t h e r through e r r o r by t h e defendant o r t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t ,
t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g t h e motion gave defendant u n t i l A p r i l 28, 1972,
t o f i l e t h e record. Under t h e r u l e an e x t e n s i o n should be g r a n t e d
from t h e d a t e of t h e f i l i n g o f t h e n o t i c e of a p p e a l , In t h i s case
t h e e x t e n s i o n should have been granted u n t i l March 19, 1-972. On
A p r i l 28, 1972, defendant f i l e d an o r d e r w i t h t h i s Court a s k i n g
f o r a t h i r t y day e x t e n s i o n , which was granted. On t h a t same day,
unknown t o defendant, t h e r e c o r d was f i l e d , It i s on t h e b a s i s
of t h i s l a t e f i l i n g t h a t p l a i n t i f f c l a i m s t h e appeal should be d i s -
missed,
I t appears from d e f e n d a n t ' s b r i e f on a p p e a l t h a t t h e d i f f i c u l t y
was a l a c k o f communication between counsel f o r defendant and t h e
c o u r t r e p o r t e r , which r e s u l t e d i n t h e - d e l a y . Under Rule 1 0 ( c ) , M,R.
App,Civ.P., t h i s Court h a s wide d i s c r e t i o n i n p e r m i t t i n g t h e f i l i n g
of a r e c o r d . The p e r t i n e n t p o r t i o n of t h a t r u l e r e a d s :
"If t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s without a u t h o r i t y t o
g r a n t t h e r e l i e f sought o r h a s denied a r e q u e s t
t h e r e f o r , t h e supreme c o u r t may on motion extend
t h e time f o r t r a n s m i t t i n g t h e r e c o r d o r may permit
t h e record t o be t r z n s m i t t e d and f i l e d a f t e r t h e
e x p i r a t i o n of t h e time allowed o r f i x e d . "
Montana's r u l e i s i d e n t i c a l t o t h e f e d e r a l r u l e and f o r t h a t
reason t h e following f e d e r a l a u t h o r i t y i s p e r s u a s i v e , I n King v.
Laborers I n t e r n a t . U , of No. America, U,L. No. 818, 443 F.2d 273,
276 (6th C i r . 1971), t h e c o u r t h e l d where t h e r e c o r d had been f i l e d
w i t h i n t h e f o r t y days allowed and t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f had n o t been
timely f i l e d :
"The r u l e s c i t e d by Appellee a r e s t a t e d i n per-
m i s s i v e , r a t h e r than mandatory language, W a r e e
n o t r e q u i r e d t o d i s m i s s every a p p e a l which does
n o t meet each of t h e time l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h e above-
stated rules. t1
A s s t a t e d h e r e t o f o r e , t h i s Court h a s d i s c r e t i o n i n t h i s type
of c a s e , and where, a s h e r e , s e r i o u s i s s u e s a r e presented f o r review
we wj.11 n o t d i s m i s s t h e appeal.
The a c t i o n was brought o r i g i n a l l y a g a i n s t t h e l o c a l union f o r
breach of c o n t r a c t . A f t e r d i s c o v e r y proceedings, t h e complajmt was
amended t o i n c l u d e t h e r e t a i l Clerks I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n , a l -
l e g i n g t h a t t h a t A s s o c i a t i o n had unlawfully induced t h e breach of
p l a i n t i f f ' s employment c o n t r a c t , A t t h e c l o s e of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e ,
t h e Local Union, one of defendants, moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t
on a l l f o u r counts of t h e complaint; count one being concerned
w i t h whether t h e c o n t r a c t of employment had been breached, The
L o c a l ' s motion, a s t o count one, was made on t h e ground t h e e v i -
dence d i d n o t show t h a t p l a i n t i f f had been discharged, I n response
t o t h e motion, counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f s a i d :
"IJith r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s , l e t t h e r e c o r d show t h a t
t h e P l z i n t i f f w i l l submit, a s t o t h e R e t a i l Clerks
Union Number 4 , t h a t t h e y w i l l submit t h e i r motion
i s w e l l taken a s t o counts one, two, t h r e e and f o u r
of t h e complaint and I would a s k on b e h a l f of m y
c l i e n t t h a t t h e compl-aint b e dismissed a s t o t h e
Local Union. 11
The complaint w a s disrnj-ssed a s t o t h e Local Union.
P l a i n t i f f , Mayme Hannifin, served a s b u s i n e s s agent-
s e c r e t a r y - t r e a s u r e r o f Local Eb,4 &cm J u l y 1954 when s h e was ap-
pointed t o f i l l an unexpired term, u n t i l h e r a l l e g e d d i s c h a r g e
i n 1969. Her term of o f f i c e would have e x p i r e d i n December 1970,
The i n c i d e n t s l e a d i n g t o t h e c o n t r o v e r s y took. p l a c e i n September
and e a r l y October, 1969. On September 22, 1969, Vern Rhinehart
went t o B u t t e i n h i s c a p a c i t y a s a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l Association. A e x e c u t i v e board meeting was c a l l e d f o r
n
t h e n i g h t of September 22, There i s d i s p u t e i n t h e testimony a s
t o whether i t w a s a t ~ h i n e h a r t ' s u r g i n g t h a t t h i s meeting was
called. P r e s e n t a t t h e meeting were Bernard McGarry, p r e s i d e n t
of t h e Local; J e r r y Kal-archik, v i c e - p r e s i d e n t ; William C. Smyers,
r e c o r d i n g s e c r e t a r y ; P a t s y Thomas, o f f i c e s e c r e t a r y and c l e r k f o r
t h e Local; and Mr-Rhinehart. Mrs. Hannifin d i d n o t a t t e n d t h e
meeting and t h e r e i s c o n t r o v e r s y i n t h e testimony a s t o whether
she was n o t i f i e d of t h e meeting. Mr. Smyers, t e s t i f y i n g as an
adverse w i t n e s s f o r p l a i n t i f f , s t a t e d :
If* Jc * t h a t t h e r e a s o n t h e meeting was c a l l e d was
t h a t Vern m n e h a r t j was i n town t o f i n d out i f he
could s t r a i g h t e n o u t t h e c o n t r a c t t h a t was due i n
D i l l o n Jc * *."
The d i s c u s s i o n then turned t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s t h e Local
was having w i t h M r s . Hannifin. Again M r . Smyers t e s t i f i e d :
"9: ** and a l s o he mentioned about Mayme missing t h e
meeting i n Great F a l l s and then we s t a r t e d d i s c u s s i n g
h e r frequent absences from work. '"
This d i s c u s s i o n apparently r e s u l t e d i n t h e o f f i c e r s asking f o r M r .
~ h i n e h a r t ' sadvice, He gave t h e Local t h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e s : (1)
they could ask t h e I n t e r n a t i o n t o put t h e Local under a t r u s t e e -
s h i p , (2) charges could be brought a g a i n s t Mrs, Hannifin and a f t e r
t r i a l she could be remaved from o f f i c e , o r ( 3 ) t h e Local could do
nothing. The board members then asked M r . Rhinehart t o leave t h e
meeting so they could d i s c u s s the matter,
The board, with t h e exception of McGarry, voted t o ask
the International for a trusteeship. This would have meant, i f
approved by I n t e r n a t i o n a l , a l l t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e Local would have
been removed and someone appointed by I n t e r n a t i o n a l would t a k e
charge of t h e management of t h e Local. The t r u s t e e s h i p was n o t
approved by I n t e r n a t i o n a l . A l l members of t h e board voted f o r t h e
t r u s t e e s h i p , except M r , McGarry, and they signed a l e t t e r t o t h a t
e f f e c t addressed t o l n t e r n a t i . o n a l t s p r e s i d e n t . On t h e following
day another member of t h e board, not present t h a t n i g h t , signed t h e
l e t t e r and i t was mailed,
On September 24, Mrs, ~ a n n i f i n ' ss i s t e r , M r s , Jewel1 McLeod,
took some dues s l i p s t o t h e union o f f i c e f o r Mrs. Hannifin. Mrs.
~ c ~ e a d testimony was t h a t Patsy Thomas t o l d h e r a t t h a t time t h a t
's
visit
Mrs. Hannifin's job ' b a s gone". During t h i s /patsy Thomas gave M r s .
McLeod t h e union check book so t h a t h e r s i s t e r could sign some checks.
had
Mrs. Hannif i n t e s t i f i e d t h a t she / t h i s telephone conversation with
Patsy Thomas t h a t same day:
"I c a l l e d Patsy on t h e morning; t h e morning of t h e
24th and I s a i d , ' p a t s y a r e you mad a t me? , She s a i d ,
no, b u t I b e l i e v e everybody e l s e i s , I s a i d , ' I w i l l
be up i n a l i t t l e while. I She s a i d , 'you don't have
t o come up. Your job i s a l l through, Vem Rhinehart
was here Monday n i g h t and w e had a meeting of t h e exeeu-
t i v e board and you a r e a l l f i n i s h e d . I pleaded with them
and everythi.ng. H s a i d t h e r e was nothing you could do,
e
He was t u r n i n g t h e Union i n t o a t r u s t e e s h i p . There was
nothing t h a t could be done about i t a t a l l , "'
A f t e r t h i s conversation Mrs. Hannifin made no attempt t o
c o n t a c t any of t h e o f f i c e r s of t h e Local t o e i t h e r s u b s t a n t i a t e
o r confirm what she had been t o l d by P a t s y Thomas. A s a m a t t e r of
f a c t , M r s . Hannifin f i l e d f o r unemployment i n s u r a n c e b e n e f i t s on
September 29, t h e same day she v i s i t e d t h e union o f f i c e t o r e q u e s t
h e r l a s t week's paycheck and v a c a t i o n pay due h e r . She t e s t i f i e d
t h a t M r . Thomas Evankovich was p r e s e n t i n t h e o f f i c e t h a t morning
and s h e thought he had been s e n t i n by I n t e r n a t i o n a l t o run t h e
Loca 1.
The t r i a l c e n t e r e d around t h e i s s u e o f whether, by t h e a c t i o n s
of Rhinehart, t h e Local was induced t o breach i t s c o n t r a c t w i t h
Mrs. Hannifin, P l a i n t i f f ' s t h e o r y was t h a t by t h e a c t i o n of Rhine-
h a r t t h e Local r e q u e s t e d t h e t r u s t e e s h i p and Mrs, Hannifin was
r e m ~ v e dfrom o f f i c e . The c o n t r o l l i n g i s s u e i s whether t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t
a t t h e end of p l a i n t i f f ' s c a s e i n c h i e f ,
Motions f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t s a r e provided f o r by Rule 50,
M.R,Civ.P. I n Mueller v. Svejkovsky, 153 Mont, 416, 420, 458 P.2d
265, t h i s Court e s t a b l i s h e d t h r e e r u l e s which apply on an a p p e a l
from a motion denying a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t :
"On an a p p e a l from a motion denying a d i r e c t e d
v e r d i c t t h e r e a r e t h r e e r u l e s which apply. (1)
The evidence introduced by t h e p l a f n t i f f w i l l b e
considered i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o him,
(2) The conclusion sought t o be drawn from t h e
f a c t s must follow a s a m a t t e r o f law, (3) Only
t h e evidence of t h e p l a i n t i f f w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d ,
P i c k e t t v , Kyger, 151 Mont, 87, 439 P,2d 57,"
I n l i g h t of t h e s e r u l e s , t h i s Court cannot r e a c h t h e conclu-
s i o n t h e evidence produced would permit a j u r y t o f i n d t h a t I n t e r -
n a t i o n a l had induced t h e Local t o d i s c h a r g e Mrs, Hannifin. It i s
impossible t o f i n d a n y t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d which would l e a d t o t h e
conclusion M r s . Hannifin was discharged a t a l l . A s h a s been
p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d , t h e r e q u e s t f o r t r u s t e e s h i p was denied by I n t e r -
national. The only testimony concerning Mrs. H a n n i f i n ' s d i s c h a r g e
came from p l a i n t i f f h e r s e l f , By h e r o m testimony s h e i n d i c a t e s
h e r " b e l i e f " t h a t t h e a l l e g e d d i s c h a r g e occurred a t t h e e x e c u t i v e
board meeting on September 22. Her testimony was:
"Q. Ffia f i r e d you, Mayme? A, Well, I would say
t h a t Vern Rhinehart through t h e e x e c u t i v e board,
"Q. Well, why do you s a y t h a t ? A . Because when I
t a l k e d t o Patsy t h a t morning she t o l d m Vern Rhinehart
e
had advised t h e e x e c u t i v e board t h a t t h e y were going
i n t o a t r u s t e e s h i p and I was a l l through, There was
a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g I could do about i t .
"Q, Did Rhinehart himself t e l l you you were f i r e d ?
A. No.
"Q. Did any member of t h e e x e c u t i v e board t e l l you
you were f i r e d ? A. No, h u t Patsy Thomas d i d .
"Q. I s she on t h e e x e c u t i v e board? A, No, she i s n o t .
"Q. What i s h e r s t a t u s with t h e Union? A. 1 ' d say
s h e i s a c l e r k of t h e Union.
"Q, Did you h i r e h e r o r d i d they--A. I hired her,
"Q. Did she hold o f f i c e a t your p l e a s u r e w h i l e you
were t h e r e . A. Yes, she d i d ,
"Q, You could have f i r e d h e r i f you didn ' t think.
s h e was doing a good j o b , r i g h t ? A. Yes,
"Q. She had no a u t h o r i t y t o f i r e you? A. No, she
d i d n ' t , b u t t h e e x e c u t i v e board a s such could have,
"Qq, How i s t h a t ? How could t h e e x e c u t i v e board f i r e you?
A. Because s h e t o l d m they had taken a procedure, t h e y
e
had gone i n t o a t r u s t e e s h i p s o i f you go i n t o a t r u s t e e -
s h i p you a r e f i r e d ,
"Q. Did she a c t u a l l y go i n on---A. I d i d n ' t know t h i s .
Q . Did you i n q u i r e ? A, No, I d i d n ' t because s h e s a i d
i t s j u s t a l l s e a l e d , signed and d e l i v e r e d . She s a i d you
are fired t h a t ' s it. There i s j u s t n o t h i n g t h a t can be
done,
"Q, What a u t h o r i t y d i d she have to---A. As a f r i e n d of
mine I t h i n k she t o l d m t h a t .
e
"Q, So you r e a l l y d o n ' t know whether i t d i d go i n t o a
t r u s t e e s h i p o r n o t ? A. No, I d i d n ' t know,
11
Q. W o i s t h e c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r of t h e Local Union?
h
A, I was t h e c h i e f e x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r of t h e Local Union.
"Q. You were t h e b o s s ? A. And I was t h e b o s s ,
"Q. And you were f a m i l i a r w i t h c o n s t i t u t i o n g e n e r a l l y I
suppose? A, Yes, I was, I I
The Colorado Court of Appeals i n Colorado C i v i l Rights Com'n
v , S t a t e School D i s t , No, 1, (Col,kpp.l971), 488 P.2d 83, 8 6 , e s -
t a b l i s h e d a t e s t t o determine whether a person has been discharged:
he f a c t of d i s c h a r g e does n o t depend upon t h e
use of formal words of f i r i n g . The t e s t i s whether
s u f f i c i e n t words o r a c t i o n s by t h e employer 'would
l o g i c a l l y l e a d a prudent person t o b e l i e v e h i s
t e n u r e had been t e r m i n a t e d , I'
W b e l i e v e t h i s t o be a proper t e s t and we adopt i t f o r use i n
e
t h i s case, It must b e p a i n t e d o u t t h a t Mrs.Hannifin was n o t an
employee who could b e discharged a t t h e w i l l of h e r employer.
She was an e l e c t e d o f f i c i a l of t h e union, chosen f o r h e r p o s i t i o n
by t h e e n t i r e membership of t h e Local, The Local had e s t a b l i s h e d
procedures f o r t h e removal of j.ts e l e c t i v e o f f i c e r s . A r t i c l e V,
S e c t i o n 11, o f i t s c o n s t i t u t i o n r e a d s :
" A l l t h e o f f i c e r s s h a l l s e r v e f o r t h e p e r i o d of
t h e i r e l e c t i o n u n l e s s removed f o r incompetency,
n e g l e c t of d u t y , o r d i s h o n e s t y , i n accordance
w i t h t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Asso-
ciation. II
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n provides procedure f o r t h e
removal of l o c a l union o f f i c e r s , The evidence p r e s e n t e d by p l a i n -
t i f f can b e s t b e summed up i n t h e statement made by Mrs, Hannifin
on cross-examination. She responded t o t h e q u e s t i o n :
II
J u s t what information do you have t h a t t h e Znter-
n a t i o n a l f i r e d you?" w i t h
" J u s t what Patsy gave me and what I heard around
t o m and a l l k i n d s of t h i n g s t h a t were s a i d . "
This i s h a r d l y t h e t y p e of information which would l e a d
a prudent person t o b e l i e v e t h a t she had been discharged. There
i s n o t h i n g i n t h e r e c o r d t o show t h a t Mrs. Hannifin e v e r t a l k e d
t o anybody i n a u t h o r i t y i n t h e Local t o confirm h e r d i s c h a r g e ,
Her only source of information was t h e o f f i c e s e c r e t a r y , It h a s
long been h e l d t h a t an agent of an employer cannot d i s c h a r g e
a n o t h e r employee, u n l e s s he h a s t h e a u t h o r i t y t o da so. Amann v ,
Pantages, 90 Wash, 271, 155 P. 1070, N testimony was presented
o
which would i n d i c a t e Patsy Thomas was empowered t o speak f o r t h e
Local. To t h e c o n t r a r y , M r s . Hannifin was h e r s u p e r v i s o r ,
E a r l i e r i n t h i s opinion we p a i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e complaint
was dismissed a s t o t h e Local Union on t h e s p e c i f i c count t h a t
r e f e r r e d t o t h e a l l e g e d d i s c h a r g e o r breach of c o n t r a c t ; and t h a t
c o u n s e l f o r p l a i n t i f f agreed t h e motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t was
w e l l taken. C l e a r l y t h a t was c o r r e c t ; and, j u s t a s c l e a r l y , i f
t h e r e was no breach of c o n t r a c t by t h e Local Union, t h e I n t e r n a -
t i o n a l Union could n o t have induced a breach t h a t d i d n o t occur.
T h e r e f o r e , we hold a s a m a t t e r of law t h a t t h e r e was no
f a c t u a l d i s p u t e over which r e a s o n a b l e men could d i s p u t e and t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d
verdict. Other i s s u e s r a i s e d on t h i s a p p e a l need n o t b e d i s c u s s e d
i n view of t h e r e s u l t reached,
The judgment o f t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s r e v e r s e d and t h e
a c t i o n dismissed.
W Concur:
e
A n . Jack Shanstrorn, D i s t r i c t
' Judge, s i t t i n g for M K ~Chief
J u s t i c e James T. Harrison.
M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d i s s e n t i n g :
I r e s p e c t f u l l y d i s s e n t t o t h e view o f t h e m a j o r i t y .
The m a j o r i t y opinion c o n t r a d i c t s one of our l o n g e s t s t a n d i n g
and most f r e q u e n t l y r e p e a t e d p r i n c i p l e s of a p p e l l a t e j u r i s p r u -
dence, I n t h e r e c e n t c a s e of Resner v. Northern P a c i f i c Railway,
Mont . 505 P.2d 86, 89, 30 %.Rep. 55,60, t h i s Court
quoted from Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L Ed
11 1
Whenever f a c t s a r e i n d i s p u t e o r t h e evidence i s
such t h a t fair-minded men may draw d i f f e r e n t i n f e r -
e n c e s , a measure of s p e c u l a t i o n o r c o n j e c t u r e i s
r e q u i r e d on t h e p a r t of t h o s e whose duty i t i s t o
s e t t l e t h e d i s p u t e by choosing what seems t o them
t o be t h e most r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e . Only when
t h e r e i s a complete absence of p r o b a t i v e f a c t s t o
support t h e conclusion reached does a r e v e r s i b l e
e r r o r appear, But where * f: * t h e r e i s a n e v i -
dentiary basis f o r the jury's v e r d i c t , the jury i s
f r e e t o d i s c a r d o r d i s b e l i e v e whatever f a c t s a r e
i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h i t s c o n c l u s i o n , And t h e a p p e l l a t e
c o u r t ' s f u n c t i o n i s exhausted when t h a t e v i d e n t i a r y
b a s i s becomes a p p a r e n t , i t b e i n g immaterial t h a t
t h e c o u r t might draw a c o n t r a r y i n f e r e n c e o r f e e l
t h a t a n o t h e r conclusion i s more r e a s o n a b l e . ' "
See a l s o : Kirby v. K e l l y , Mon t . 504 P. 2d 683, 29
St.Rep. 1090; Davis v. Davis, 159 Mont. 355, 497 P.2d 315, 29
St,Rep, 65; Wallace v . Wallace, 85 Mont. 492, 279 P. 374; 66
This p r i n c i p l e of law c i r c u m s c r i b i n g our r i g h t t o review
t h e evidence i s based on t h e sound premise t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t
and j u r y have an obvious advantage over t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i n
making d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of f a c t . They h e a r and observe t h e a t t i t u d e
and demeanor of t h e w i t n e s s e s f i r s t h a n d , whereas t h i s Court h a s
o n l y th.e w r i t t e n r e c o r d ,
An exami.nation of t h a t w r i t t e n r e c o r d r e v e a l s defendant h a s
r e l i e d e x c l u s i v e l y on t h e f a c t s (1) t h e person informing Mrs.
Hannifin t h a t h e r job was l o s t was s u b o r d i n a t e t o h e r i n r a n k ,
and (2) M r s . Hannifin chose t o pursue h e r remedy i n t h e d i s t r i c t
c o u r t r a t h e r than through i n t e r n a l union v e r i f i c a t i o n and a p p e a l
channels.
Defendant made l i t t l e o r no a t t e m p t t o e s t a b l i s h s e v e r a l
o t h e r a s p e c t s of i t s c a s e a s f a c t , i n c l u d i n g (1) t h a t Patsy
Thomas had spoken mistakenly, imdependently o r i n excess of
h e r c o n f e r r e d a u t h o r i t y , (2) t h a t M r s . Hannifin had o r should
have had reason t o d i s b e l i e v e o r doubt t h e word of Patsy Thomas,
( 3 ) t h a t M r s . Hannifin d i d n o t , i n f a c t , b e l i e v e t h a t P a t s y
Thomas was r e l a y i n g t r u e information from t h o s e i n a u t h o r i t y
t o e f f e c t h e r dismj-ssal, (4) t h a t Mrs, Hannifin d i d v o l u n t a r i l y
and w i t h f u l l knowledge of h e r a c t i o n s , r e s i g n h e r employment,
(5) t h a t Mrs. Hannifin e x p r e s s l y o r i m p l i e d l y waived t h e pro-
t e c t i o n s she was accorded under h e r employment c o n t r a c t and
t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n s of B u t t e Local No. 4 and t h e R e t a i l C l e r k s
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n , o r (6) t h a t defendant o r anyone
connected w i t h i t , made any attempt t o c o r r e c t t h e claimed
they
~ -
misapprehension 1- e a t e d n t h e mind of Mrs. Hannifin t h a t h e r
i
job had been terminated. The j u r y s u p p l i e d t h e answers t o
t h e s e q u e s t i o n s o f f a c t based on t h e evidence p r e s e n t e d a t t r i a l ,
It i s n o t t h e p r e r o g a t i v e of t h i s Court t o supply i t s own
answers.
There was some testimony i n d i c a t i n g t h a t Mrs. ~ a n n i f i n ' s
job performance was poor and c r e a t e d adequate grounds f o r
dismissal. Perhaps t h e n , i t could b e r a t i o n a l i z e d t h a t i n t h i s
c a s e t h e end r e s u l t w a s j u s t and e q u i t a b l e , Even i f t h i s were
t r u e , I do n o t b e l i e v e t h e end j u s t i f i e s t h e means. And indeed,
t h e means employed t o circumvent Mrs. ~ a n n i f i n ' s r i g h t s under
h e r employment c o n t r a c t and t h e union c o n s t i t u t i o n s a r e within
t h e purview of c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a u d , i f i n t e n t i o n a l , o r a c t i o n a b l e
negligence, i f inadvertent,
The f i n d i n g of f a c t , a s made by t h e j u r y , was based on sub-
s t a n t i a l , c r e d i b l e and i n some a s p e c t s u n c o n t r a d i c t e d evidence.
There appears no i n d i c a t i o n of p a s s i o n o r p r e j u d i c e on t h e p a r t
of t h e t r i a l c o u r t o r j u r y , The v e r d i c t and judgment d i d no mare
than compensate Mrs. Hannifin f o r t h e wages t h e Local Union
was c o n t r a c t u a l l y o b l i g a t e d t o pay h e r over t h e remainder of
h e r e l e c t e d term of employment.
I would a f f i r m t h e judgment