United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
No. 94-8454.
Johnny HEGGS, Husband of Delois Heggs, deceased; James Reynolds,
Administrator of the Estate of Delois Heggs, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
Hershal GRANT; Wayne Fuqua, in his individual and official
capacity; The City of Dublin, Georgia, Defendants-Appellants.
Jan. 22, 1996.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Georgia. (No. 3:92-00032-CV), Dudley H. Bowen, Jr.,
Judge.
Before BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Georgia denying the appellants'
motion for summary judgment in an action filed pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.1 As we more fully explain below, our jurisdiction
is limited to deciding whether the appellants, Hershall Grant and
Wayne Fuqua, are entitled to qualified immunity from the assessment
of § 1983 damages. We conclude that they are and therefore reverse
the district court's implicit ruling to the contrary.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts giving rise to this lawsuit are not in dispute. On
February 1, 1992, Delois Heggs was arrested for public drunkenness
and disorderly conduct by T.J. Cobb, Jr., a police officer of the
1
Section 1983 prohibits the deprivation under color of state
law of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States.
City of Dublin, Georgia ("City"). Cobb transported Heggs to the
City jail for booking. According to the incident report prepared
by Cobb and made a part of the record, Heggs was not unconscious,
she displayed no signs of trauma, illness, drug or alcohol
withdrawal and she denied being under the influence of any drug
other than alcohol. Although Heggs was uncooperative in answering
questions, Cobb was able to elicit her medical and drug use
history. She denied having suicidal tendencies stating that she
"loved" life and had never planned to kill herself in the past, nor
would she in the future. However, when Cobb advised her he was
going to place her in a cell, she threatened to take her life if he
took such action. In accordance with standard operating procedures
in place at the jail, Cobb reported Heggs' threat to Cassandra
Hall, the jailer on duty, who in turn called the shift supervisor,
Lieutenant Hershall Grant, to evaluate the situation. While
waiting for Grant, Heggs informed Cobb that she was only joking
about killing herself and stated that she was just "making it hard
on him (Cobb)."
Grant had known Heggs for approximately fifteen years and had
arrested her for public drunkenness on a number of occasions. She
had never threatened or attempted suicide during any of her past
incarcerations. When Grant arrived he asked Heggs whether her
suicide threat was serious and suggested that he transport her to
the hospital. She assured him there was no need for that and
repeated that she had only been trying to make things difficult for
Cobb. At that point Heggs telephoned her attorney, who apparently
refused to render her immediate assistance, but agreed to come to
the jail later in the morning.2 After receiving further assurances
from Heggs that she was going to be all right and determining that
her suicide threat was not a reality, Grant approved her placement
in a cell.
In keeping with procedures affecting intoxicated inmates, the
3
mattress, blanket and sheets were removed from Heggs' cell, but
she continued to wear her street clothing. It was also jail policy
to conduct a check of all prisoners every fifteen minutes. The
first check of Heggs occurred at 1:45 a.m. and was made by an
officer who remained in the cell area until 2:08 a.m. Subsequent
observations were conducted at 2:20 a.m., 2:34 a.m. and 2:42 a.m.
Heggs spoke with the jailer during two of these visits and
requested a blanket and mattress. At 2:57 a.m. Grant passed
through the inmate area and discovered Heggs hanging from the cell
bars by her socks. Attempts to revive her were unsuccessful.
Heggs' husband and the administrator of her estate
subsequently instituted the present action seeking § 1983 damages
against Grant in his individual capacity, the Chief of Police,
Wayne Fuqua, in his individual and official capacities, and the
City. The complaint alleged that Grant was deliberately
indifferent to Heggs' medical needs, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, by failing to move her to a proper facility for
psychiatric intervention after she threatened to commit suicide and
2
The time of Heggs' arrest was 12:37 a.m.
3
Grant explained in deposition testimony that intoxicated
inmates sometimes try to hurt themselves or set fire to their
cells and that the removal of these items was a preventative
measure.
by leaving her unattended in a jail cell with the means to carry
out the threat. It further alleged that Fuqua and the City were
also liable under § 1983 because they were aware of the need for
better staffing and training at the jail in the area of suicide
prevention and failed to take adequate corrective measures.4 The
complaint also asserted pendent state law claims.
Thereafter, the defendants filed a joint motion for summary
judgment supported by affidavits and deposition testimony, which
outlined the facts as stated above. They argued they were entitled
to judgment on the merits and that Grant and Fuqua were entitled to
qualified immunity from the payment of damages in their individual
capacities. 5 In response, the plaintiffs did not take issue with
the defendants' statement of the facts, but submitted the affidavit
of David E. Slemons, identified as a Criminal Justice Management
Consultant, who opined that the circumstances demonstrated
deliberate indifference to Heggs' medical needs and safety. The
district court thereafter denied the motion for summary judgment
stating simply that the plaintiffs had "met their burden ... of
demonstrating genuine issues of material fact." (R1-38). The
4
The record shows that in the year preceding Heggs' death,
there were three successful suicides at the jail and two
attempts.
5
The qualified immunity defense does not extend to
municipalities or to claims against state actors in their
official capacities. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, ----, 113 S.Ct.
1160, 1162, 122 L.Ed.2d 517, 523 (1993); Lassiter v. Alabama A &
M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 n. 2 (11th
Cir.1994). The motion for summary judgment did not specifically
address the plaintiffs' state causes of action. We note in
passing, however, that the defense does not apply to suits
governed by state law. D'Aguanno v. Gallagher, 50 F.3d 877, 879
(11th Cir.1995).
court did not identify the issues of fact for trial, nor did it
address the subject of qualified immunity. The defendants later
filed this appeal in which they challenge the district court's
implicit denial of qualified immunity and its explicit denial of
summary judgment on the merits.
II. DISCUSSION
Because a final order has not been entered in this case, we
are limited in the scope of our review. On the appeal of a
nonfinal order denying qualified immunity, we have jurisdiction
under the collateral order doctrine to decide whether the conduct
complained of violated "clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727,
2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 410 (1982); see Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 427 (1985);
Haygood v. Johnson, 70 F.3d 92, 94-95 (11th Cir.1995). This is
purely a question of law, which we review de novo. Elder v.
Holloway, 510 U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d
344, 351 (1994). We do not have jurisdiction to decide sufficiency
of the evidence issues going to the merits of the case. Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U.S. 2151, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 132 L.Ed.2d 238,
246-47 (1995). Thus, at this interlocutory stage, we may not
review a district court's finding "that there exists a genuine
issue of material fact regarding the conduct claimed to violate
clearly established law." Babb v. Lake City Community College, 66
F.3d 270, 272 (11th Cir.1995).
Despite the district court's finding in the present case that
summary judgment was precluded due to the presence of genuine
issues of fact, the parties are in full agreement that the events
described herein accurately portray what happened at the jail after
Heggs' arrest.6 We may review, therefore, whether clearly
established law was violated under this "given set of facts."
Johnson, 515 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2159, 132 L.Ed.2d at 250.
To recap, the undisputed facts are as follows: Heggs, in an
intoxicated state, threatened to kill herself. She then retracted
the threat and assured both Cobb and Grant that she was only joking
and did not contemplate self-inflicted injury. She also declined
Grant's offer to take her to the hospital. Grant, who had known
Heggs for fifteen years and knew that she had never been suicidal
on any other occasion, accepted her assurances, decided that the
threat was not genuine and yielded to her refusal of
hospitalization. He then placed her in a cell from which the
sheets, blanket and mattress had been removed, knowing that she
would be checked every fifteen minutes.
The law is clearly established that jail officials may not act
with deliberate indifference to the risk of inmate suicide.
Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (11th Cir.1989). There
can be no deliberate indifference to an inmate's safety, however,
6
The district court did not find that a question of material
fact precluded qualified immunity. We construe its order as
addressing the merits of the case only, an issue which is
"conceptually distinct" from the question of qualified immunity.
See Johnson, 515 U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 2157, 132 L.Ed.2d at
247-48. Assuming that we have the discretion to exercise pendent
appellate jurisdiction over the district court's denial of
summary judgment on the merits, see Swint v. Chambers County
Comm'n, 514 U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 1212, 131 L.Ed.2d
60, 74-75 (1995), we decline to exercise it. See Ratliff v.
DeKalb County, Ga., 62 F.3d 338, 340 n. 4 (11th Cir.1995).
unless there was a "strong likelihood, rather than a mere
possibility, that suicide would result from a defendant's actions
or inaction." Tittle v. Jefferson County Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535,
1540 (11th Cir.1994) (en banc) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Consequently, Grant is entitled to qualified
immunity unless a reasonable officer in his position should have
known under the circumstances then existing that Heggs would most
likely harm herself if he did not take additional precautions to
protect her. That is, "the law must have earlier been developed in
such a concrete and factually defined context to make it obvious to
all reasonable government actors, in [Grant's] place, that "what he
[did or did not do]' violate[d] federal law." Lassiter v. Alabama
A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir.1994)
(quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034,
3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523, 531 (1987)).
We find that at the time of Heggs' suicide, the law did not
(nor does it now) require Grant to do anything differently than
what he did on this occasion. In fact, in a case decided just
after Heggs' suicide, this court found no § 1983 liability under
somewhat similar circumstances. In Schmelz v. Monroe County, 954
F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.1992), James Michael Schmelz was arrested by
the Monroe County Sheriff's Department. He was well-known to the
Department's members because of numerous prior arrests. Although
Schmelz was normally combative, on this particular occasion he was
quiet and subdued. He had never attempted suicide in the past and
denied the wish to harm himself when questioned by the ranking
officer on duty. The officer nevertheless thought it prudent to
put him on a "suicide watch." According to Department policy, this
required that a guard be present in the jail area on a continuous
basis and that Schmelz be visually observed every fifteen minutes.
In between observations and during a brief absence of the officer
assigned to the cell area, Schmelz attempted to hang himself with
a blanket. He consequently sustained injuries which left him in an
irreversible coma. Id. at 1541-42, 1545.
The court in that case stated that § 1983 liability cannot be
founded upon the suicide of an inmate " "who never had threatened
or attempted suicide and who had never been considered a suicide
risk.' " Id. at 1545 (quoting Edwards, 867 F.2d at 1277). The
court held that the ranking officer went beyond her duty by placing
Schmelz on a suicide watch under the circumstances, and that
leaving him alone and with a blanket was at most, negligence. Id.
In the instant case, although Heggs threatened to kill
herself, she quickly and emphatically recanted the threat. She had
spent the night in the jail while intoxicated many times in the
past without incident. Grant knew her well and believed her
assurances that she would be all right. Serving as additional
insurance was the knowledge that her condition would be checked at
fifteen-minute intervals. There is nothing in the record to
demonstrate that Grant's evaluation of the situation was
unreasonable. No clearly established law required him to take
further measures to protect her. Likewise, no clearly established
law required Fuqua to staff the jail or train his officers more
thoroughly to prevent suicide under these circumstances. Through
this lawsuit the plaintiffs, in effect, seek to establish a new
rule of law which would require jail officials to treat more
seriously than is now required every suicide threat made by a
prisoner, even those made in an offhand or joking manner. We
simply observe that there was no such legal duty imposed at the
time of Heggs' suicide requiring the custodial authorities to do
more than what was done on this occasion. We therefore conclude
that Grant and Fuqua are entitled to the qualified immunity defense
from liability.
III. CONCLUSION
Because clearly established law did not proscribe the actions
or inaction of Grant and Fuqua, they are immune from an award of §
1983 damages in their individual capacities. We therefore REVERSE
the district court's implicit finding to the contrary and REMAND
the case for further proceedings on the plaintiffs' remaining
claims.